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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The main motivation for this thesis comes from the lack of comprehensive studies on 
issues related to increases in central bank debt certificates − monetary stabilisation (or 
sterilisation) bonds (MSBs).  The MSBs have been, in particular, issued in emerging 
economies (e.g. Korea, China, Indonesia, Taiwan, Chile, etc.) to offset the impacts of 
sterilised FX market interventions on domestic money and thereby to reduce imminent 
inflationary pressure. The objectives of this thesis are to examine the impacts of and 
motivation for sterilised FX interventions comprehensively and to explore methodologies to 
assess the sustainability of MSB-dependent sterilisation policy.  
Following Chapter 2 where we overview the main theoretical issues and statistical 
facts related to sterilisations, Chapter 3 and 4 investigate the impacts, profits and motives of 
sterilised FX interventions in selected countries (e.g., Korea, Australia, Japan, etc.). We 
examine the impacts of interventions on the level and volatility of the exchange rate and the 
determinants of central banks’ sterilised interventions. In particular, these chapters provide 
investigations on whether central banks exhibit asymmetric intervention preference for 
inducing or resisting domestic-currency depreciation. We apply a variety of recent 
econometric techniques with daily intervention and monthly foreign reserve data for cross-
country analyses. The methodologies include Asymmetric Component Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ACT GARCH), bounds test and friction 
model.  
Chapter 5 compares the degree of sterilisation and de facto capital mobility – 
particularly focusing on emerging countries under inflation targeting – by estimating 
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sterilisation and offset coefficient with panel data for 30 countries. We also use a simple 
model explaining interest rate determination to investigate whether sterilisations have 
significant effects on local interest rates. Both panel and time series instrument variable 
analyses are applied. 
Chapter 6 proposes several methodologies for assessing the sustainability of MSB-
dependent sterilisation policy.  Owing to the lack of concrete theories on the central bank debt 
policy, we modify theories of fiscal sustainability and then derive central bank's intertemporal 
budget constraint, which is separated from the central governments. Several sustainability 
conditions are obtained, based on cointegration relation between total revenues and 
expenditures or on central bank’s monetary reaction function. Then, the sustainability tests are 
applied to empirical studies on the Bank of Korea’s sterilisation policy. The assessment of 
central bank’s MSB-dependent sterilisation in this chapter is a novel area and the main 
contribution of this thesis.   
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, most countries have used 
foreign exchange market intervention (hereafter FXI) to both slow rapid FX rate movements 
and signal their views that their exchange rates do not reflect fundamental economic 
conditions (Edison 1993).  Despite their sustained and frequent FXIs, authorities seem to have 
been able to retain their monetary policy independence to some extent by sterilisation 
operations (IMF 2011). Sterilisation of FXIs means that any change in the monetary base is 
neutralised by open market operations (hereafter OMOs), using domestic bonds in the 
opposite direction so that the monetary base remains unchanged.1In other words, sterilisation 
enables CBs to determine the money supply and thereby to set and control their policy interest 
rates without interference from external shocks. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, when capital mobility was limited, sterilised FXIs 
provided the monetary authorities with an additional policy tool to pursue exchange rate 
objectives independently of their monetary policies. However, as capital mobility has 
accelerated since the early 1990s, many advanced countries have reduced (or abandoned) their 
FXIs and allowed more flexible movement of FX rates.  This trend has been due mainly to the 
consensus based on the trilemma hypothesis (Mundell 1963; Summers 1999; Fischer 2001) 
that, given perfect capital mobility, a central bank (hereafter CB) cannot accomplish the 
simultaneous control of interest rates and exchange rates. In other words, a perfectly 
independent monetary policy could be guaranteed with the CB allowing exchange rates to 
1The sterilisations include FXIs and subsequent OMOs to offset any changes in the monetary base caused by the 
FXIs, and thus aim to simultaneously control both FX rates and targeted interest rates (or monetary base). 
Sterilisation broadly indicates any form of activity like changes in reserve requirements or mandatory deposits in 
the CB’s account in an attempt to leave the domestic money supply unchanged in the face of external shocks. In 
this paper, FXIs indicate sterilised interventions to influence FX rates, and sterilisations denote OMOs for the 
purpose of leaving the monetary base (or local interest rate) unchanged. 
2 
change without limit.2 This leads to the natural reasoning that given perfect (or high) capital 
mobility, a de facto free float may be consistent with an independent monetary policy regime 
like inflation targeting (hereafter IT).Since the mid-1990s, confronted with substantial and 
persistent capital inflows, Korea and many small open emerging economies have faced a 
trilemma similar to that the advanced countries did a decade ago. With capital account 
liberalisations, these countries have been concerned about how to maintain monetary 
independence while stabilising FX rate fluctuations at the same time.  Overall, there seems to 
have been a greater tendency to abandon intermediate FX rate regimes and to adopt inflation 
targeting (Eichengreen 2008).   
According to theory, it is expected that FXI should decrease under an IT regime, 
other things being equal, because sustained interventions may not be compatible with IT, 
which is inherently a rule-based regime, emphasizes policy transparency and theoretically 
assumes a free float regime (Svensson 1999, 2010).Sterilisations (for maintaining monetary 
independence) will become less effective or less feasible as domestic markets are more 
integrated with international markets (Mundell 1963).  However, most emerging IT countries 
appear to still actively conduct sterilised FXIs after introducing IT with more flexible FX 
regimes.  For emerging countries facing massive capital inflows, sterilisations have been used 
as a main tool to lessen the undesirable effects of these flows.  East Asian countries are 
frequently cited as an example of successful sterilisation in the sense that they have retained 
monetary independence without abandoning the control of FX rates (see Reisen 1993).  In this 
context, sterilisation may be regarded as an imperfect substitute for capital controls under 
which the CBs can control both FX and interest rates.  
2  The trilemma tells that it is impossible for a country to achieve three contradicting but desirable goals 
simultaneously: (i) freeing capital completely, (ii) fixing FX rates, and (iii) setting domestic interest rates 
indifferently of foreign shocks – but that it can only attain a combination of two of these objectives. Thus, in 
order to stabilise both interest rates and FX rates, the authorities must control capital flows.  
3 
Sterilisations in emerging countries are mostly characterized by fast-growing 
accumulations of foreign reserves and considerable issuance of monetary sterilisation bonds 
(hereafter MSBs). MSBs indicate bonds or bills issued by CBs in order to drain surplus 
liquidity (i.e., excess money supply), which may lead to inflation. MSBs have an effect on 
putting off imminent inflation caused by increases in money, but must be paid back in the 
future. According to the BIS, about 31 economies have MSBs as of end of 2002 (Hawkins 
2003). MSBs are mainly denominated in the local currency and pay nominal interest rates to 
their holders. Sterilisation accordingly involves an exchange of foreign reserves and MSBs.   
The build-up of foreign reserves has been most prominent in emerging countries, 
mainly because these countries tend to fear the appreciation of the domestic currency more 
than its depreciation (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2007) and because policy makers believe 
that large foreign reserve holdings will be helpful in preventing or addressing possible sudden 
stops and capital flow reversals in the future.  MSBs have been used particularly in emerging 
countries whose Treasury bond markets are relatively less developed.  When issued by 
competitive tender, MSBs are regarded as more market-friendly instruments than reserve 
requirements.  
Despite all of these aforementioned benefits, however, sterilisation has limitations in 
being continuously used as a policy tool to address capital inflows. First, complete 
sterilisation (in the context of completely offsetting the effect of capital inflows) may be 
impossible with high capital mobility.  For example, given a situation in which domestic 
interest rates are higher than foreign ones, the sterilisation of capital inflows is an actual 
monetary tightening. Successful sterilisations may hence leave the existing domestic-foreign 
interest rate differential unchanged, and thus attract further capital inflows. The effect of 
initial sterilisation is offset by consequential international capital flows, so that domestic 
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interest rates significantly different from the internationally prevailing level cannot persist in 
the long-run (Herring and Marston 1977).  
Second, there are considerable quasi-fiscal costs associated with sterilisation 
particularly in emerging countries, because most CBs exchange high-yielding domestic assets 
for low-yielding foreign reserves. Persistent sterilisations and resultant large issuances of 
MSBs cause CBs to suffer financial losses. When the CB cannot afford to continue 
sterilisation due to its accumulated financial losses, the public will come to doubt the CB’s 
will to control inflation, because unsterilised capital inflows may lead to inflation and because 
financially-unsound CBs are likely to make up for their losses by taxation or monetisation in 
the long run.  Recapitalizing the CB (by taxation) may weaken its monetary policy 
independence from the central government or politicians.  
Third, there is a sterilisation peril, in that sterilisation itself could lead the CB’s 
monetary policy into credibility problems (Calvo 1991). For example, if the CB issues 
nominal MSBs to sterilise capital inflows induced by an increase in domestic money demand, 
the sterilisation could push nominal interest rates unnecessarily high and thereby perpetuate 
the domestic-foreign interest rate differential, which will exacerbate the CB’s balance sheet 
problem. This may be particularly true for emerging countries (confronted with capital 
inflows) where the CBs are in severe “debtor” positions. Given domestic interest rates higher 
than foreign rates, debtor CBs are frequently forced to issue either MSBs with higher interest 
rates than market rates, in order to encourage market participants to purchase them, or long-
term MSBs in order to reduce their rollover risk.3 
Fourth, if FXIs are asymmetric in the sense that dominant interventions are to resist 
appreciation, the sterilisation costs will be much higher.  From the practical perspective, 
3Generally, long-term interest rates are higher than short-term ones. Most CBs issue short-term bonds with 
maturities of less than one year (e.g. Japan and Switzerland). But some CBs issue bonds with maturities of up to 
three years (in Korea, China and Taiwan) or even 20 years (in Chile).   
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sterilised interventions to resist domestic-currency appreciation are more feasible than those 
for fighting against depreciation, because the CB can easily print money.  Particularly, CBs in 
emerging countries have more incentives to prefer asymmetric intervention, because the 
foreign reserves are regularly revalued in terms of the domestic currency. However, the 
sterilisations may not be sustainable in the long run given the possible inflation costs incurred 
by printing money and the sterilisation cost from domestic-foreign interest rate differential. 
Despite considerable discussion, studies on the effects and sustainability of 
sterilisation policies of the 2000s have been rare. Particularly, there has been little 
investigation of the sustainability of MSB-dependent sterilisation, which has already become 
a critical issue in several emerging economies like Korea, Taiwan, Chile and China.  In this 
regard, Korea and several countries provide good examples, because they are still engaging in 
active sterilised interventions and have issued massive amounts of MSBs and because several 
of their CBs have experienced considerable financial losses from sterilisation activities. This 
thesis investigates the sterilisation policies in selected countries from the specific viewpoint of 
CB financial soundness and sterilisation costs. 
The ECB (2006) briefly points out the possible side effects of sterilisation and 
sustained reserve accumulation, which are discussed in this thesis: 
“Continued reserve accumulation may over time entail some risks and costs, such as 
inflationary pressure, over-investment, asset bubbles, complications in the management of 
monetary policy, potentially sizeable capital losses on monetary authorities’ balance sheets, 
sterilisation costs, segmentation of the public debt market and misallocation of domestic 
banks’ lending” 
 
With regard to the issues of sterilisation risks and costs, the effects and motives of 
sterilised FX interventions, interlinks between sterilised interventions and monetary 
operations, sterilisation costs are the main interests of this thesis.   
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CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL/STATISTICAL 
BACKGROUNDS AND THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
2.1 Theoretical background 
In this section, we review the main theoretical issues concerning sterilisations. At 
first, based on Frankel(1997)’s simple IS-LM analysis with an open economy, we explain 
how sterilisation operations affect the financial variables – especially interest rates – in 
different situations in terms of exchange rate regime and capital mobility. Our interest is 
sterilisation undertaken to offset the effects of capital inflows on the monetary base. The point 
here is to understand that, given a certain degree of capital mobility, the appropriate policy 
responses to capital inflows depend upon the causes of these flows and the exchange regime; 
and that there exists a sterilisation peril that persistent sterilisation may threaten price stability. 
Afterwards, we briefly explain the channels through which FXIs influence the level and the 
volatility of exchange rates. More detailed explanations are presented in each relevant chapter.  
 
2.1.1 Sterilisation and trilemma  
2.1.1.1 Sterilisation under perfect capital mobility 
In this section, sterilisation is narrowly defined as OMOs by which the CB ensures 
that the money supply returns to its level prior to the FXIs.  If sterilisation is impossible, the 
CB can neither determine the money supply nor set domestic interest rates independently of 
foreign disturbances like capital flows. Accordingly, the CB’s inability to sterilise implies the 
loss of its monetary policy independence (Frankel 1997, p 268).  
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According to Mundell (1963) and Obstfeld (1982), given completely perfect capital 
mobility the feasibility of sterilisation depends upon the exchange rate regime. Under a fixed 
exchange regime, sterilisation operation is impossible because of offsetting capital flows. For 
example, open market sales of domestic bonds cause an incipient appreciation of the domestic 
currency. To maintain the official parity the CB must intervene by selling the monetary base 
for foreign reserves. As a result, the initial open market sales are offset by an increase in the 
foreign component of the monetary base. In this case, the CB cannot sterilise the foreign 
reserves through offsetting the domestic monetary base, even temporarily, and the monetary 
base is thus determined independently of the CB intentions (Obstfeld 1982, p45).  
Any open market purchase (to offset the effect of foreign-currency selling 
interventions) may bring about infinite capital outflows and deplete the foreign reserves until 
they are all exhausted and the fixed regime collapses (Mundell 1963, pp.484-485). 
Accordingly, sterilisations just change the foreign reserve level without affecting the levels of 
output and employment. Open market sales (purchases) of domestic bonds result in an equal 
increase (decrease) in the foreign reserves.  Theoretically, complete sterilisation may be 
unsustainable within perfect capital mobility, because the size of the OMOs in domestic 
bonds becomes indefinitely large (Boyer 1979).  
In contrast, under a completely flexible exchange regime (where FXIs are not carried 
out), unsterilised capital flows do not affect inflation and sterilisation is thus not necessary. In 
this case, the appreciation of the domestic currency leads to a fall in relative prices of 
imported goods and consumption shifts from the nontradable to the tradable goods sector, 
which contributes to a lessening of the inflation pressure (Frankel 1997). Consequently, a 
flexible FX regime automatically adjusts the possible inflation pressures. 
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To sum up, given perfect capital mobility the CB is totally subject to the “trilemma,” 
so that it is impossible to maintain exchange rate parity and control the domestic money 
supply simultaneously, through sterilised intervention. Sterilisation may be regarded as a 
more feasible and necessary option under imperfect capital mobility, because perfect capital 
mobility makes sterilisation activities impossible (in the case of a fixed regime) or 
unnecessary (under a flexible regime).  
 
2.1.1.2 Sterilisation under imperfect capital mobility 
 
When capital mobility is limited, sterilised interventions, irrespective of the 
exchange-rate regime, may be viewed as an attempt to simultaneously target both exchange 
and interest rates in the short-run (Obstfeld 1982).  Under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
sterilisation is possible in the short-run and even encouraged in order to reduce the inflation 
pressures caused by capital inflows (Frankel 1997, p 265).  Sterilisations are less needed 
under a flexible than a fixed exchange regime, because the appreciation of the domestic 
currency reduces the inflation pressures. The more flexible the exchange rate, the less likely it 
is that capital inflows will lead to inflation and sterilisation be necessary (Haque et al. 1997). 
However, limited capital mobility does not always guarantee the feasibility of 
sterilisation and resultant monetary autonomy. In a world in which Ricardian equivalence 
holds, any sterilisation is powerless.  In this case, the public rationally expects the future 
inflation and the future tax liabilities implied by the MSBs and the foreign reserves and thus 
internalise the budget constraint of the CB. Hence, sterilisations financed by increasing MSBs 
will not alter the ‘outside asset’ supply. In this case, the sterilisations will not affect the 
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domestic interest rate or monetary base even with imperfect substitutability between foreign 
and domestic assets (Obstfeld 1982, pp. 45-46). 
2.1.2 Causes of capital inflows and sterilisation  
As will be seen in the section 2.2, despite flowing temporarily out during crisis 
periods, international capital has flowed steadily into emerging countries over the last two 
decades. Most CBs in emerging countries appear to sell the monetary base for foreign 
reserves due to fears of appreciation and then sterilise the increases in money by selling 
domestic bonds. With regard to the feasibility of sterilisation, there exist two opposite 
arguments. Calvo (1991) shows that, even in conditions of limited capital mobility, 
sterilisation of capital inflows is more difficult than the conventional trilemma indicates, 
because the sterilisation itself tends to perpetuate the domestic-foreign interest rate differential, 
attracting capital inflows and causing excessively large fiscal costs. Sterilisation could thus 
run into serious credibility problems and thereby not be sustained in the long run, as shown in 
Latin America (see Calvo et al. 1993).  
Reisen (1993) argues on the contrary that sterilisation is easier than the conventional 
trilemma proposes, as exemplified by East Asian countries. They have retained some degrees 
of monetary autonomy while stabilising their exchange rates through sterilisation. Some 
studies have attempted to bridge the gap between these two views by pointing out that the 
feasibility of sterilisation differs depending upon the causes of the capital inflows (see Frankel 
1997, Haque et al. 1997). Sterilisation is more feasible when the capital inflows stem from a 
fall in foreign interest rates while being more difficult when they are caused by an increase in 
domestic money demand.  
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We illustrate the effects of sterilizing capital inflows coming from different driving 
forces by using a simple IS-LM analysis (Frankel 1997). The factors driving capital inflows 
are (i) an increase in domestic money demand, (ii) a fall in foreign interest rates, and (iii) an 
increase in the current account surplus. At first, we consider the simplified balance of 
payments (BP) consisting of the current account (CA) and the capital account (KA): 
(2.1) KACABP   
(2.2) )}(,{)}(,{)}(,,{ SEYIMSEYEXSEYYCACA dffd   
(2.3) }),(,{  SEiiKAKA fd  
where id=domestic interest rate, if=foreign interest rate (assumed to be exogenous), 
Yd=domestic disposable real income, Yf=foreign disposable real income, EX = export, IM = 
import, E=expectation, )/( * PPFXS   where S is the real exchange rate measured by the 
spot FX rate(domestic per foreign) times the relative price ratio(= foreign price/domestic price) 
and =other factors influencing the capital account such as exchange rate risk and default 
risk. It is assumed that prices are fixed in the short run, and changes in real exchange rates 
thus depend only upon nominal exchange rates: )()( FXESE  .  
The infinite responses of KA to )( fd ii   indicate perfect capital mobility. Since if is 
assumed to be exogenous, KA infinitely and instantly responds to changes in domestic 
monetary operations.  Under a fixed regime ( 0)( SE ), the BP curve does not shift. Under 
a flexible regime, the slope of the BP curve depends upon the degree of capital mobility.  
Under perfect capital mobility, BP does not shift because ∆KA overwhelms ∆CA. Under 
imperfect capital mobility, BP is upward-sloping. Imperfect capital mobility indicates the case 
where the BP curve is flatter than LM: capital is very but not perfectly mobile (Frankel 1997). 
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Aggregate demand (Yd) for domestic output depends upon the domestic demand 
( GICA  ) and net foreign demand for domestic goods (CA): 
(2.4) )}(,,{),,,()}(,,{)(),( SEYYCAWGiYASEYYCAGiIWYCY fdddfdddd  : IS curve 
where C=consumption, I=investment and W=wealth. The standard form of real money 
demand is assumed:  
(2.5) ),,(/  ddd YiLPM : LM curve 
where   indicates other variables affecting money demand (e.g. stock of bonds, expected 
exchange rate, inflation, etc.). If sM  denotes the money supply, then the condition for money 
market equilibrium is PYiLM dds ),,(  .  Here, unless the CB can influence interest rates, it 
cannot control the money supply. In this case, sterilisation is impossible, and the money stock 
is endogenously determined by money demand (Frankel 1997, pp. 267-268).  Note that, under 
imperfect capital mobility, S  affects CA and thus shifts both IS and BP in the same 
direction - see equations (2.2) and (2.4). On the graph, if the internal equilibrium (i.e., the 
intersection of the IS and the LM curves) is above the BP curve, higher domestic interest rates 
induce capital inflows. 
 
2.1.2.1 Increase in domestic money demand 
Figure 2.1 describes the case where initial capital inflows are caused by an increase in 
domestic money demand. This situation may occur when the expectation of high domestic 
inflation is dampened. Under perfect capital mobility, as the LM curve shifts leftward 
(LM1→LM2), the economy moves temporarily from M (initial equilibrium) to H (the 
hypothetical point where high domestic interest rates induce infinite capital inflows), and the 
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domestic interest rate thus rises from 1di to 2di . Since fd ii 2  at H, foreign capitals flow 
infinitely in, and the domestic currency appreciates irrespective of the exchange rate regime.   
 
① Under a credible fixed FX regime, the CB should immediately intervene in the FX 
market (by purchasing foreign reserves with base money) in order to maintain the official 
parity. In this case, foreign and domestic assets are perfect substitutes because 0)( SE . KA 
reacts infinitely to interest rate changes and arbitrage transactions insure that fd ii  , so that 
the point H (where fd ii  ) cannot be sustained – i.e., any sterilisation is impossible in this 
case.  As a result, the increase in base money created by FXIs causes the LM curve return 
instantly to where it was (LM2→LM1). Accordingly, the economy returns to its initial 
equilibrium M where fd ii  .There is no change in Y, id or inflation. ②Under a completely 
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id2 
if=id1 
BP1=0 
② 
② ① ① 
Y2 
IS2 
Y3 Y1 Y2 Y1 
IS2 
id 
A M 
H 
LM2 
LM1 IS1 
BP=0 
Y 
id 
if=id1 
 
A 
M 
S 
LM2 
LM1 
IS1 
Y 
Figure 2.1 Increase in domestic money demand (LM1→LM2) 
(LM1→LM2) 
(b) Imperfect capital mobility 
BP2=0 id3 
Notes: 1. Yd = domestic income; id= domestic interest rate; if= foreign interest rate 
            2. M: initial equilibrium; H: hypothetical point to which economy instantly moves (Under perfect 
capital mobility, the economy cannot remain here even in the short-term, because the high id  
induces infinite capital inflows); S: point which could be maintained in the short-run by 
sterilisation; A: appreciation  
            3. The BP curve is horizontal under perfect capital mobility and upward-sloping under imperfect 
   capital mobility. 
            4. A rightward movement on the horizontal axis indicates an increase in inflationary pressure. 
5.  For simplicity, it is assumed that id = if at initial equilibrium and if is exogenous. 
Source: Author’s modification of Frankel (1997) 
(a) Perfect capital mobility 
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flexible regime, the appreciation of the domestic currency leads to a reduction in exports 
(IS1→IS2) and the economy thereby moves to A, where inflationary pressure is weakened 
(auto-stabilisation of flexible regime). As a result, the sterilisation for controlling inflation is 
not necessary. 
Under imperfect capital mobility, ①if CB sterilises the capital inflows by issuing 
MSBs at point S, the sterilisation generally entails needlessly high interest rate(id3) and 
contracts economy(Y1→Y2).  In this case, there is a possibility that sterilisation may rather 
cause to destabilise economy due to the increasing sterilisation cost that comes from 
domestic-foreign interest rate differential (Calvo1991).  If CB expands money supply 
(LM2→LM1) to meet the increased money demand rather than sterilise it, the economy 
gradually return to M. ② If CB allows the appreciation of domestic currency, both IS and BP 
curve shift to the left and then economy goes to A. Note that if CB allows more flexible 
exchange rate, domestic-foreign interest rate differential decreases from )( 3 fd ii   to )( 4 fd ii   
and the necessity of further sterilisation decreases. 
 
2.1.2.2 Exogenous fall in foreign interest rates 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the case where capital inflows increase due to an exogenous fall 
in foreign interest rates )( 21 ff ii   which results in a downward shift of the BP curve 
(BP1→BP2). Under perfect capital mobility, the CB has no choice but to accept the fall in id
)( 21 dd ii  so that the economy temporarily moves to R. ①Under a fixed regime, capital 
inflows lead to increasing appreciation pressures that force the CB to conduct domestic-
currency selling interventions (LM1→LM2), and the economy attains its equilibrium at M. In 
addition, the investment stimulated by the fall in id lets the economy move to M.  ②If instead 
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the authorities give up fixed parity, the domestic currency appreciates, the CA worsens 
(IS1→IS2), and the economy is in equilibrium at A.  
 
Under imperfect capital mobility, the CB sterilises capital inflows by selling 
domestic bonds at point S. During this sterilisation process, id1 is kept higher than if2 in the 
short-run. ①When the CB eventually lets the money supply increase (LM1→ LM2), the 
domestic interest rate goes down to id2 and the economy moves to M. That is, domestic 
interest rates may converge with foreign interest rates in the medium or long run. ② If the 
CB allows appreciation of the domestic currency (IS1→IS2), the economy moves to point A.  
 
2.1.2.3 Improvement in current account 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the case where the current account improves due to an 
exogenous export increase. In abbreviation notation, this would be CA↑ → IS right: IS1 to 
①② 
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if2=id2 
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Figure 2.2 A Fall in foreign interest rates(BP1→BP2) 
(a)Perfect capital mobility (b) Imperfect capital mobility 
LM2 
IS2 
LM2 
Notes: 1. At initial equilibrium (H and S), it is assumed that id=if. 
            2. An exogenous fall in foreign interest rates leads the BP curve to move downward (BP1→BP2). 
            3. Other notations are the same as those in Figures 2.1 and 2.3. 
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IS2→ id ↑: id1 to id2  → KA↑ due to id2>if→ economy temporarily moves from A to H. 
①Under perfect capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate regime, capital automatically 
flows in through the BOP, allowing full accommodation of the increase in domestic 
output(LM1→LM2). The economy thus moves to M. ②If the CB gives up the fixed exchange 
rate and instead fix the monetary supply, the domestic currency appreciates and the CA 
deteriorates, which causes the IS curve to move leftward (IS2→IS1). The economy then 
returns to the initial points at A.  
Under imperfect capital mobility, an improvement in the CA causes both the IS and 
the BP curves to move rightward. The CB may keep id2 higher than if by sterilizing capital 
inflows at point S in the short-run. ① But the CB eventually gives up the sterilisation for 
fixing the interest rate, and the capital inflows move the economy to the equilibrium point M. 
②If the CB abandons the fixed exchange rate regime, the appreciation of the domestic 
currency leads the economy to move toward A.  
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Figure 2.3 Improvement in current account (IS1→IS2) 
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(a) Perfect capital mobility (b) Imperfect capital mobility 
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① 
Notes: 1. A is an initial equilibrium where id=if.. 
            2. Other notations are the same as those in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
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2.1.3 Feasibility of sterilisation, and sterilisation peril  
 
The CB’s ability to sterilise capital inflows depends upon the exchange rate regime, 
the degree of capital mobility, the cause of the capital inflows, the policy objectives of the 
country, its monetary policy stance, and the degree of development of its financial markets 
(Haque et al. 1997).  First of all, as seen in the previous section, sterilisation is feasible (in the 
short-run) and meaningful under limited capital mobility. As the trilemma suggests, given 
perfect capital mobility, the sterilisation of capital inflows is impossible under a perfectly 
fixed exchange regime and unnecessary under a completely flexible one. We can accordingly 
expect sterilised interventions to be frequent in cases of intermediate FX regimes and 
imperfect capital mobility. Second, sterilisations are less feasible and more costly when the 
domestic bond markets are thin. For example, CBs in less developed financial markets are 
sometimes forced to sell MSBs by providing interest rates higher than market rates.  
Third, under a managed float or a fixed regime, the necessity of sterilisation depends 
upon the causes of the capital inflows, because whether they lead to inflation or not is affected 
by the forces driving them (Haque et al. 1997). As seen in the previous section, when capital 
inflows are pulled in, for instance by a sustained increase in domestic money demand, 
domestic interest rates go up. In this case, the capital inflows are unlikely to be inflationary. 
Continuing sterilisations, therefore, which are by their nature monetary tightening, may lead 
to unnecessarily high domestic interest rates ( 43 dd ii   in Figure 2.1(b)) and perpetuation of 
the interest rate differential. In this case, monetary expansion may be a more desirable policy 
than sterilisation. If the capital inflows are pushed in by a decline in foreign interest rates, 
however, the level of domestic interest rates will not be any higher than it was before the 
capital flows in ( 12 dd ii   in Figure 2.2(b)). Since the fall in foreign interest rates induces 
17 
investors to prefer domestic assets vis-à-vis foreign ones, sterilisation will not in itself push 
domestic rates up. In this case, there might be a case for sterilizing the inflows by selling the 
MSBs.   
Comparing the three different causes of capital inflows, we can clarify the links 
between domestic interest rates and sterilisation (Frankel 1997, p 278).  First, sterilisation 
leads to a larger domestic-foreign interest rate differential, irrespective of the cause of capital 
inflows, than when there is no sterilisation. In all three cases, domestic interest rates are 
higher at point S (where the money supply is fixed by sterilisation) than at point M (where the 
money supply is allowed to increase) and at point A (where the domestic currency is allowed 
to appreciate).  
Second, when capital inflows are induced by a fall in foreign interest rates, the level 
of domestic interest rates is not higher after capital inflows than it is before capital inflows. In 
this case, the increase in domestic interest rates caused by sterilisation may not be a 
significant problem. In contrast, when capital inflows are, for example, encouraged by an 
increase in domestic money demand, domestic interest rates are higher with capital inflows 
than without them.  In this case recourse to sterilisation may be more costly, and monetary 
expansion instead may be proper.  
Calvo(1991) points out a possible risk of sterilizing capital inflows induced by an 
increase in domestic money demand which could be a response to an exchange-rate oriented 
stabilisation programme. When the CB issues nominal MSBs to purchase foreign reserves in 
order to sterilise capital inflows, there may be a peril of destabilising rather than stabilising 
the economy. In this case, as seen in the previous section, the CB should keep nominal 
domestic interest rates high in order to prevent the monetary base from increasing, and thus 
leave the domestic-foreign interest rate differential unnecessarily large. This situation induces 
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further capital inflows, which will require additional sterilisation, and thereby perpetuates the 
interest rate differential. This “vicious cycle of sterilisation” results in a persistent 
accumulation of MSBs and foreign reserves. A large stock of MSB outstanding may 
jeopardize the sustainability of the CB’s anti-inflation policies and eventually weaken central 
bank independence from the government. (See section 5.2.1.3 for details on sterilisation peril). 
 
2.1.4 Effects of sterilised interventions on exchange rate 
 
In the previous section, we focused mainly on the issue of whether monetary 
operations for sterilisation are able to offset the changes in the monetary base caused by FXIs. 
In this section, our concern is how sterilised FXIs affect exchange rates. Under hard pegs, 
FXIs are often rule-based in that the timings and amounts of interventions are predetermined 
in most cases, because their objective is to maintain fixed parity. Under flexible regimes, in 
contrast, FXIs are likely to be optional and discretionary (Duttagupta et al. 2005 p 8).  The 
intervention objectives under a flexible regime are not easily differentiated. In general, CBs 
are known to intervene in the FX markets to address misalignments, to calm disorderly 
markets, and to provide or accumulate foreign reserves.  
According to standard asset-pricing models of exchange rate determination, non-
sterilised FXIs may influence the FX rate by affecting the monetary base, just as other 
monetary operations do. However, the monetary base will not change in the case of sterilised 
interventions. As to the effect of OMOs, there seems to be a consensus that the CB can set 
and maintain short-term interest rates at a desirable level by controlling the supply of the 
monetary base in the short run. Theoretically, the effects of OMOs are explained by the 
“liquidity effect” (Friedman 1969, Thornton 2010) or the “announcement effect” (Guthrie and 
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Wright 2000).  However, as to the effects of FXIs on FX rates, there exist more ambiguous 
and rather doubtful views (see Edison 1993, Sarno and Taylor 2001, Menkhoff 2008).   
To explain the effects of sterilised intervention, previous literature presents mainly 
four channels: (i) the portfolio balance channel (Dominguez and Frankel 1993a), (ii) the 
signalling channel (Mussa 1981, Kaminsky and Lewis 1996), (iii) the microstructure or order 
flow channel (Hung 1997, Evans and Lyons 2002), and (iv) the coordination channel(Sarno 
and Taylor 2001). The portfolio channel suggests that FX intervention can affect FX rates by 
changing the net supply of foreign assets and eventually shifting the relative compositions of 
private investors’ portfolios. Sterilised interventions would hence be more effective when 
foreign and domestic assets are imperfect substitutes, and when the amount of intervention is 
considerably large relative to market turnover.   
In the signalling channel theory, FX intervention can affect FX rate by providing 
information about future monetary policy or economic fundamentals and thus changing 
market expectations. According to the signalling approach, sterilised intervention can still 
affect exchange rates even under perfect asset substitutability and with a small intervention 
amount. For example, foreign-currency purchasing interventions cause agents to expect future 
monetary expansion and thereby cause the domestic currency to depreciate. However, the 
signalling channel appears to contradict the widespread practice of secret interventions in 
most countries.  
The microstructure and coordination channels are proposed because empirical studies 
based on the portfolio and signalling channels have provided little evidence that 
macroeconomic variables have strong and consistent explanatory power except in 
extraordinary circumstances. The microstructure channel theory suggests that the CB’s 
transactions influence exchange rates by altering order flows and thereby changing the 
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expectations of noise traders. According to this theory, a single CB intervention transaction, 
regardless of the intervention amount or secrecy, can affect exchange rates by triggering a 
multitude of subsequent trades in the markets. The coordination channel theory meanwhile 
emphasizes that publicly-announced interventions can play a significant role in coordinating 
trades in the direction of equilibrium when exchange rates deviate far from economic 
fundamentals because of herd behaviour or self-fulfilling expectations.  
The effects of sterilised intervention through the aforementioned channels rely on 
certain assumptions: (i) (for all channels) that Ricardian equivalence should not hold4; (ii) (for 
the portfolio balance channel) that domestic and foreign assets should be imperfect 
substitutes; and (iii) (for the signalling channel) that there exists asymmetric information in 
the FX markets. The feasibility of each theory appears to have changed in line with the 
continuing development of financial markets. As financial markets become integrated, the 
portfolio channel appears to weaken. The signalling effect is instead then put consistently 
forward as the main channel. Particularly, the microstructure and coordination channels both 
of which focus on the role of information and the use of high frequency data (like daily and 
intra-daily trade amounts), appear likely to be more persuasive in explaining the impacts of 
FXIs in the future. However, the portfolio channel may still have valuable implications for 
developing countries whose capital markets are still not freely open to international investors, 
and the traditional signalling channel may have weak explanatory power in countries where 
monetary and FX intervention policy are conducted by separate entities.   
Previous empirical studies suggest that the effects of sterilised intervention on the 
exchange rate level appear short-lived or very slight (Edison 1993). As for the effects on FX 
4 When Ricardian equivalence holds, a sterilised intervention is simply a swap in the currency composition of 
“inside assets” (i.e., foreign reserves and MSBs), and thus does not create net wealth. Sterilised intervention 
should therefore have no effect on the foreign exchange market equilibrium (Dominguez 2009, p1036). 
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volatility, most studies seem to find a tendency for sterilised intervention to increase rather 
than reduce FX volatility (Sarno and Taylor 2001, Menkhoff 2008). 
 
2.1.5 Inflation targeting and sterilisation 
 
In typical IT models, exchange rates are assumed to change in line with uncovered 
interest rate parity (see Svensson 1997; 2010).A sterilised intervention is powerless unless it 
changes interest rates, because the interventions would be offset by capital flows in the 
opposite direction. In this situation, changes in interest rates rather than sterilisations should 
be more effective in influencing exchange rates.  Thus, CBs with IT regimes use short-term 
interest rates as their main policy targets. Any change in the monetary base caused by FXIs is 
almost contemporaneously sterilised in an automatic way.  Thus, under a typical IT regime 
most interventions are sterilised ones. 
However, as seen in the previous section, even when UIP holds and the portfolio 
balance effect is excluded, sterilised FXIs can affect FX rates by signalling the future 
direction of the interest rate path (Mussa 1981). For example, current foreign currency- 
buying interventions signal current overvaluation of the domestic currency, and that the policy 
interest rate should be lowered in the near future. This signal accordingly changes the market 
expectation of future monetary policy and thereby influences the current exchange rate. Most 
empirical work seems to agree that the transmission channel between FXIs and FX rates is 
likely to be highly uncertain and unstable (Edison 1993, Sarno and Taylor 2001, Menkhoff 
2008). As a result, under an IT regime it is more difficult to use FXI as an independent policy 
tool, and a short-term interest rate is considered most effective as a single policy tool. Given 
free capital movements, the CB under an IT regime is more likely subject to the trilemma 
constraint, because IT theory typically assumes a freely floating exchange rate(Eichengreen 
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2008).According to Eichengreen, the CB’s attempt to control FX rates under an IT regime 
may transform the FX rate into a nominal anchor in place of target inflation. In this case, there 
is a risk of losing monetary independence. It is accordingly expected that a positive 
relationship exists between an IT regime and FX volatility.5 According to the concept of strict 
IT, sustained sterilised interventions and intermediate exchange rate regimes are likely to be 
inconsistent with IT. 
In practice, however, IT regimes are always flexible in the sense that all CBs under 
IT not only aim at stabilising inflation but also put weight on other economic objectives. Thus, 
some of the literature argues that sterilisation to manage floating exchange rates could be 
consistent with an IT regime (Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser 2001, Truman 2003). These 
views argue that a CB under an IT regime is able to target both FX and interest rates to some 
extent. In these views, the justifications for FXIs are in general based on the order flow or 
coordination channels.  Hence, a sterilised intervention can be effective even if the 
intervention amount is small enough to be offset by international capital flows, because even 
one intervention transaction can create a “hot potato effect” triggering many subsequent 
trades (Holub 2004). As the international financial markets are rapidly integrated and many 
countries adopt IT, the implications of the portfolio balance channel seem to be diminishing.  
Sterilisation has a particular implication in an emerging country in which the 
authorities over the monetary and foreign exchange policies are divided among the CB and 
the government, respectively.  Most CBs set short-term interest rates as their operating targets, 
and then automatically offset the money changes (caused by government FX interventions), 
which destabilise the target interest rates.  If there is no prior policy coordination between the 
5 However, introducing a more rule-based and credible regime like IT may help to reduce FX volatility in 
emerging markets in the medium to longer run, because FX rate-oriented policies are likely to be more fragile 
and less credible in these countries. Eichengreen (2008) concludes that IT regimes enable emerging countries to 
adopt the policy regimes of advanced countries (e.g. independent monetary policies with capital account 
liberalisation) without exposing themselves to high levels of FX rate volatility.  
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two authorities, the CB has no choice but to take ex-post actions to offset the impacts of FXIs. 
In the absence of sterilisation, the treasury would control the monetary policy instruments by 
changing spending and taxation or intervening in FX markets. Note that, in a monetary model, 
non-sterilised FXIs would have the same effects on interest rates as OMOs.  As a result, 
sterilisations enable CBs to maintain independence from their governments.  
 
2.1.6 MSB-dependent sterilisation and domestic interest rates 
 
Sterilisations of capital inflows could cause domestic interest rates not to fall and 
thereby induce further capital inflows. This is the more plausible scenario for the case of 
MSB-dependent sterilisation, because MSBs are issued with long-term maturities relative to 
other sterilisation tools (such as reverse repo and term deposit). To examine this, let us 
consider the changes in demand for bank reserves before and after MSBs are issued.   
Figure 2.4 displays the shift in reserve demand induced by the issuance of the MSBs. 
If reserves (R) consist of only required reserve, the reserve demand curve will be vertical. 
However, considering banks’ need for excess reserves for interbank payments, a downward-
sloping demand curve appears appropriate, like dbeforeR )( . The supply of reserves (R
s) is 
assumed to be perfectly controlled by the CB to maintain its target interest rates (i*). Now, 
suppose that the CB issues MSBs to drain excess reserves: issuing MSBs can be depicted in 
the second coordination, since demand for MSBs is positively correlated with interest rate. 
Note that the increases in MSB issuance lead to the same amount of bank reserve 
decreases, and that the CB must provide purchasers with an interest rate at least above i* 
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because banks would not buy MSBs below i*.6  Thus, combining the two demand curves for 
the MSBs (in bond markets) and bank reserves (in reserve markets), the reserve demand curve 
after the issuance of MSBs can be drawn as the thicker line, Rd(after) . Because of the excessive 
issuance of the MSB, reserve market interest rates are likely to be frequently interrupted by 
long-term interest rates, which may not be controllable by the CB. This interruption, in turn, 
may hamper the efficacy of the OMO by causing the CB to lose controllability of the target 
interest rates. For example, the CB needs to withdraw more reserves (i.e., b-c rather than b-a 
in Figure 2.4) to raise the short-term interest rate (i* → i**in the figure) in this case.  
Figure 2.4 Reserves demand curve before and after the issuance of MSBs 
 
Source: Cha (2007) 
 
 
Furthermore, under a liquidity surplus, banks can decline to surrender excess 
reserves, by reducing their purchases of MSBs. To avoid this, the CB would have to offer a 
6 In Figure 2.4, imsb is higher than the interest rate prevailing in the reserve markets, which is close to the 
operational target rate (i*) since (i) the CB needs to provide higher interest rates than market rates to encourage 
banks to participate in the auction; (ii) the average maturity of the bonds is longer than that of money market 
instruments such as repos. For example, the average duration of outstanding MSBs is 11.2 months as of the end 
of 2006, while the maturities of typical market instruments are normally 3 months (e.g. commercial paper, 
certificate of deposit, and repo) in Korea. According to the liquidity preference hypothesis, longer-term bonds 
should provide higher interest rates than short-term bonds. 
i 
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higher yield on the MSBs, above the CB’s desired intervention rate. In this way, the stability 
of overnight interest rates may be obtained at the cost of destabilising other interest rates 
(Toporowski 2006). In this case, the rate of return of the MSB would be higher than that of 
treasury bonds with the same maturity, which might crowd out treasury bonds, and contribute 
to a long-term interest rate hike. Consequently, foreign currency buying interventions may 
have an intrinsic risk of impairing the efficacy of domestic monetary operations.   
However, there are several arguments that FXIs and OMOs may be harmoniously 
implemented with specific prerequisite conditions satisfied. Bofinger et al. (2001, pp. 389-390) 
argues that it is, in principle, possible for CBs to limit the appreciation of domestic currencies 
and to target the money market rate simultaneously. Such a dual policy is limited by the 
sterilisation potential, which is the amount of intervention resources (that should be supplied 
to the banking system for draining excess liquidity) and sterilisation costs. If MSBs can be 
issued continuously with affordable interest rates and be rolled over without enormous 
demand for redemption, unlimited sterilisation is possible. If, however, the public doubt the 
redemption of MSBs, due to the enormous interest payments, MSB-dependent sterilisations 
may be no longer sustainable.  
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2.2 Statistical backgrounds: Capital flows and sterilisations 
 
2.2.1 Volatility of exchange and interest rates, and inflation  
 
In this section, some statistical facts are presented to provide overviews on the 
evolution of sterilisation, exchange rates, interest rates and capital flows in selected main 
countries categorized into five country groups: IT-advanced, IT-(emerging) Asia, IT-
(emerging) Europe, IT-Latin and non-IT countries.7  The sample periods are divided mainly 
into the 1990s, when many advanced IT countries introduced IT regimes, and the 2000s, when 
many emerging IT countries introduced them (see Chapter 5 Table 5-1).  
The theories of IT and the trilemma expect that the introduction of IT in emerging 
countries generally leads to more volatile FX rates and more stable short-term interest rates 
around the target levels (Svensson 2010). This is because IT countries should adopt free floats 
to effectively implement IT regimes (Mishkin and Savastano 2001) and because short-term 
interest rates are more explicitly targeted under IT regimes. Other things being equal, it is 
expected that FX volatility would be higher, and interest rate volatility would be lower under 
IT regimes than under non-IT regimes such as monetary or exchange rate targeting regimes. 
Note also that if the authorities allow for more volatile FX or interest rates, the need for FXIs 
and subsequent sterilisations will decrease.  
7 Seven IT-advanced: countries: Australia, Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, UK 
  Four IT-Asian countries: Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Thailand 
  Six IT-European countries: Czech Rep., Hungary, Israel, Poland, Turkey, South Africa 
  Five IT-Latin countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
  Eight Non-IT countries: China, Euro area, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Argentina 
Note that Israel and South Africa are classified as IT-Emerging Europe in consideration of their economic 
connection to European countries. Most of the non-IT group consist of countries under fixed exchange rate 
regimes (China, Hong Kong), a country where the FX rate is nominally anchored (Singapore) or countries where 
sterilised FXIs are known to frequently occur under de jure flexible exchange rate regimes (Japan, India).  
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Table 2.1 shows some statistics about exchange rate and interest rate volatilities 
while Table 2.2 demonstrates the level of foreign reserves and balance of payment in 5 
country groups. Both tables suggest several implications about the development of 
sterilisation.  First, in most emerging IT groups, both exchange and interest rates became less 
volatile after IT was introduced, from around 2000.8  For example, FX volatility in the IT-
Asia decreased from 1.9% to 1.4% and interest rate volatility from 1.2% to 0.3% (both 
volatilities measured as standard deviations of daily changes within one quarter).  The less 
volatile FX rate during the post-IT period appears to contradict prior expectations. 
Second, in the last decade, FX rates were less volatile in the emerging-IT (except 
the IT-Europe) and Non-IT group than in the IT-advanced group, while interest rates were 
less volatile in the advanced-IT group than in the emerging-IT and Non-IT groups. For 
example, quarterly FX rate volatility in advanced-IT countries averaged 1.8% in the 2000s, 
while ranging from 0.8 to 1.5% in the emerging-IT (except IT-Europe) and Non-IT groups. 
Interest rate volatility in the advanced-IT was 0.2%, the least volatile among all country 
groups.  More stable short-term interest rates and more volatile FX rates in the advanced-IT 
country group may be ascribed to the longer history of their IT regimes, their deeper money 
markets and their less frequent FX interventions. The low FX rate volatility in emerging-IT 
groups (even after adoption of flexible regimes) may, on the other hand, be attributed to their 
frequent FXIs.  Both FX and interest rate volatility are in the meantime generally low in non-
8According to the classification of de facto and de jure FX regimes published by the IMF(2002, 2006), the 
number of countries adopting managed or independent floating regimes increased between the 1990s and the 
2000s. For example, among the countries included here, most IT-countries shifted their FX regimes from fixed to 
managed float or independent float regimes from the late 1990s. Examples of crisis-driven shift are Korea(1997), 
Thailand(1997), the Philippines(1997), Indonesia(1997), Colombia(1999), Brazil(1999), Mexico(1994) and 
Argentina(2001), while examples of voluntary changes are Chile(1999), Poland(2000), the Czech Republic 
(1997), Hungary(1994), India(1995), Peru(1999), the Philippines(2000), South Africa(1997) and Turkey(2001). 
See the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions(2002, 2006) for the IMF's 
de jure and de facto classifications of FX regimes. The IMF’s de jure classification stopped after it began 
compiling de facto regimes. 
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IT countries,9 because most countries in this sample group (e.g. China and Hong-Kong) adopt 
fixed exchange rate regimes, because their CBs (e.g. in China) rely on nonmarket instruments 
to control short-term interest rates, or because their interest rates have been maintained at 
close to zero per cent (e.g. in Japan) for considerable periods of time. 
 
Table 2.1 Volatilities of exchange and interest rates, and inflation rate  
                   
(Unit: %, 1990 Q1- 2010 Q4) 
  
Volatility (average standard deviation during the period) Change (average Q on Q growth rate) 
ΔFX rate1) ΔInterest rate1) ΔREER2) REER3) Inflation rate4) 
1990s  2000s 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 
 IT-advanced  1.4  1.8 0.3 0.2 2.6 3.8 -0.09 0.08 0.56 0.64 
   UK 1.5  1.4 0.2 0.2 3.0 2.9 0.19 -0.15 0.70 0.69 
   Australia 1.2  2.2 0.1 0.1 3.3 4.6 -0.18 0.37 0.53 0.70 
 IT-Asia 1.9  1.4 1.2 0.3 4.9 6.5 -0.16 0.06 1.81 1.18 
   Korea 1.5  1.6 0.9 0.1 3.5 7.5 -0.32 -0.07 1.20 0.79 
   Indonesia 3.1  1.9 2.0 0.6 - - - - 3.11 2.05 
 IT-Europe 5.5
5)  2.25) 2.1 0.9 5.0 4.6 0.25 0.24 5.47 1.40 
   Czech Rep. 1.6  2.0 1.2 0.1 5.5 2.6 0.37 0.44 0.79 0.55 
 IT-Latin 2.6  1.5 2.6
6) 0.5 6.3 5.0 -0.06 0.17 4.026) 1.11 
   Chile 1.0  1.9 6.3 0.4 3.2 4.1 0.18 0.03 2.03 0.78 
 Non-IT 1.1  0.8 0.5 0.3 4.0 2.4 0.15 -0.14 0.98 0.70 
   China 1.4  0.2 0.2 0.1 7.1 0.9 - - -0.07 0.09 
   India 1.3  0.9 2.0 1.1 4.4 2.9 - 0.02 2.05 1.58 
   Japan 2.0  1.5 0.1 0.0 5.7 3.9 0.23 -0.20 0.16 -0.05 
   Hong Kong 0.0  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.46 -0.40 1.18 0.16 
   Singapore 0.1  0.1 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.2 0.12 0.05 0.41 0.42 
Notes:  1) The volatilities of FX rates (interest rates) are measured as the standard deviations of the daily percentage 
changes in local currency units per USD (domestic money market rates) within a quarter.  
2) The volatilities of REERs are measured as the standard deviations of the monthly percentage changes in 
REERs (measured by the IMF) within the sample period (i.e., a decade). 
3) The changes in REER are calculated as the percentage changes (= log differences) of the quarterly REER 
during the sample periods (i.e. a decade). The REER is calculated based on unit labour costs. A decrease 
(-) in its value represents a real depreciation of the domestic currency. 
             4) Inflation rate is measured as (average) quarter-on-quarter percentage changes in the CPI. During the 
sample period, there were several episodes of hyper-inflation: in Peru (1990M7-1990M8; monthly 
inflation 48.4%), Brazil (1989M2-1990M3; 68.6%), Argentina (1989M5-1990M3; 66.0%), and Poland 
(1989M10-1990M1; 41.2%) (Siklos 2000b). 
5) The high FX rate volatility in IT-Europe is attributable partly to currency re-denominations in several 
countries (e.g. Poland in 1995, Israel in 2003, and Turkey in 2005). 
6) In calculating the volatility of interest rate and inflation in the IT-Latin group, we exclude Brazil whose 
interest rates were extremely high and volatile in the early 1990s. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on quarterly data on IMF IFS and daily data on DataStream 
 
9 The FX volatility in the non-IT group differs depending upon the FX regime. FX volatilities are very low in 
countries with fixed regimes or exchange rate targeting(e.g. China, Hong Kong and Singapore) and high in 
countries with flexible regimes (e.g. Japan). 
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Third, it seems that both FX and interest rates are more stable in countries holding 
larger amount of foreign reserves – see Table 2.1 and 2.2 together. It is thus likely that 
sterilisation with accumulation of foreign reserves has played a role as an imperfect substitute 
for capital controls (Steiner 2010).  For example, in the 2000s the accumulation of foreign 
reserves was particularly prominent in emerging IT-Asia where FX rate volatility was 
maintained at the lowest level among all IT-groups and interest rate volatility was as low as 
that of the IT-advanced group.  The reserves-to-GDP ratio in IT-Asia doubled over the last 
two decades – from 43.8% to 87.7% in Table 2.2 – the highest degree of increase among all 
IT groups: The ratio of Korea in the 2000s was 95.8%, remarkably high compared to those in 
the other IT-groups.  In Table 2.2, only a few countries in the non-IT group with fixed FX 
regimes showed higher reserves-to-GDP ratios than Korea's: e.g. China (126.2%), Singapore 
(359.9%) and Hong Kong (307.2%).  The reserves-to-GDP ratio in the IT-advanced was, on 
the other hand, only 31.9% during the last decade, the lowest among all groups. The non-IT 
group shows the highest reserves-to-GDP ratio, at 133.4%.  
Combining the statistics on FX volatility Table 2.1 and foreign reserves in Table 
2.2, more volatile FX rates in the IT-advanced in the 2000s may be partly explained by the 
relatively low increase in their foreign reserves, which may imply that the IT-advanced 
intervened less in the FX markets. The less volatile FX rates and higher FR/GDP ratio in the 
IT-Asia may in contrast suggest a high possibility of more active FXIs. Notwithstanding 
sterilisations, the volatility of REER appears to have not become stable in some countries 
over time. Rather, it seems to have grown more volatile in the IT-Asia and IT-advanced in the 
2000s.   
Fourth, inflation appears to decrease over time. Although inflation rates were 
higher in the IT-emerging groups than in the IT-advanced group over the past two decades, 
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they fell considerably in the 2000s. However, we cannot attribute the low inflation in the IT-
emerging groups to effective sterilisations, since inflation rates appeared to dampen globally 
in the 2000s. 
2.2.2 Foreign reserves, balance of payments and capital inflows  
Table 2.2 shows the foreign reserves, BOP and capital inflows. First of all, in the 
2000s, IT-Asia experienced ‘twin surpluses’ in both its current and its capital accounts, while 
IT-Europe and IT-Latin made up for their current account deficits by running capital account 
surpluses. Note that the REER in the IT-Asia group depreciated most during the 1990s and 
appreciated least during the 2000s as seen in Table 2.1.  In terms of nominal exchange rates, 
the currencies of IT-Asia appreciated most against the US dollar during the 2000s (see Table 
2.3 in the next section). Considering that FXIs occurred mostly on a daily basis and that the 
CBs know only the nominal FX rate, we expect that the pressures for domestic currency 
appreciation and the consequent necessity of sterilisation may be stronger in the IT-Asia 
group, all other things being equal. Despite the twin surpluses in IT-Asia in the 2000s, the low 
volatilities of both FX and interest rates (in Table 2.1) may indicate that the sterilisations were 
effective in managing capital inflows in these countries. 
Second, owing to their rapid build-ups of foreign reserves, most countries face 
liquidity surpluses in their domestic money markets. The degree of liquidity surplus is shown 
by the increase in net foreign assets (NFA) as a share of currency in circulation (CIC). Note 
that an NFA-to-CIC ratio above 1 indicates the existence of a liquidity surplus within a 
banking system where liquidity creation is driven predominantly by the accumulation of 
foreign reserves and there are no other substantial liquidity-absorbing operations (Loeffler et 
al. 2010).  In the case of a liquidity surplus, the CB is the debtor in the money markets, which 
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makes its sterilisations more complicated and costly than in the case of a liquidity shortage 
(Ganley 2000).10  The extent of liquidity surplus is most prominent in the IT-Asia owing to 
sterilisations of massive capital inflows stemming from twin surpluses. For example, the 
NFA-to-CIC ratio more than quadrupled in Korea, from 200% to 900%, which is the highest 
ratio among all IT countries and contrasts with the low ratios of the UK(-4~19%) and Japan 
(5~15%). 
Table 2.2 Foreign reserves and balance of payment1)  
 
                                                                                                                           (Unit: %, quarterly average, 1990 Q1- 2010 Q4) 
 
FR2)/GDP NFA/CIC CA/GDP  KA3)/GDP 
   
FDI/GDP PF/GDP OT/GDP 
1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 
IT-Advanced 28.0 31.9 244.1 291.8 -0.92 2.61 1.60 0.60 0.33 -1.72 -0.51 -0.75 1.57 3.26 
UK 12.8 8.0 19.3 -4.2 -1.54 -2.22 1.12 2.50 -1.79 -1.05 -0.68 4.29 3.40 -0.49 
Australia 15.0 17.9 125.4 149.4 -4.07 -4.48 4.28 4.69 0.85 0.95 2.73 3.55 0.40 0.14 
IT-Asia 43.8 87.7 203.3 466.3 -1.27 2.32 2.73 0.37 1.09 0.09 3.57 3.60 0.13 0.53 
Korea 27.8 95.8 200.3 899.5 0.40 1.88 1.36 0.79 -0.42 -6.04 9.82 9.60 -0.35 7.08 
Indonesia 37.3 52.2 - 219.5 -1.10 2.31 1.21 -0.55 1.74 1.32 0.75 3.87 0.29 -4.06 
IT-Europe 40.0 60.1 - 279.0 -1.97 -2.64 3.49 4.07 3.05 7.69 1.29 1.29 2.54 5.36 
Czech Rep. 67.6 89.2 - 236.0 -2.84 -3.46 7.42 5.84 7.94 8.49 2.58 1.54 2.76 1.46 
IT-Latin 32.7 44.5 - 344.4 -2.84 -0.51 2.79 1.70 2.32 4.12 1.19 -0.49 -0.49 -0.01 
Chile 79.9 64.6 - 422.2 -3.30 0.82 4.66 0.14 5.65 6.36 -0.98 -7.63 0.20 0.43 
Non-IT 101.9 133.4 305.8 415.3 3.20 5.49 -1.89 -2.88 1.21 0.57 -1.18 -3.37 -2.11 -0.69 
China 39.8 126.2 74.6 282.5 1.96 3.75 - - - - - - - - 
India 27.4 63.8 43.7 151.1 -1.14 -0.50 2.46 3.40 0.71 0.86 0.37 1.01 1.35 1.52 
Japan 3.5 16.1 15.2 4.6 0.59 0.83 -0.49 -0.48 -0.14 -0.24 -0.08 -0.34 -0.22 0.10 
Hong Kong 174.7 307.2 598.6 742.1 6.17 9.26 -0.61 -4.82 3.41 -0.18 19.83 -15.61 -28.50 7.82 
Singapore 303.3 359.9 938.7 1280.5 17.05 18.51 -11.47 -12.04 5.22 6.05 -11.60 -9.86 -4.89 -8.06 
Notes: 1) FR: Foreign Reserves, NFA: Net Foreign Assets, CA: Current Account Surplus), KA: Capital Account 
Surplus, FDI: Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows), PF: Portfolio Investments (net inflows), OT: Other 
Investment (net inflows) 
2) USD-denominated values of FR and BOP are converted into local-currency denominated values by using 
quarterly average exchange rates. 
    3) The capital account includes the financial account less foreign reserve assets.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on quarterly data on IMF IFS 
 
Third, capital inflows to IT-Asia in the 2000s came mostly from volatile portfolio 
investments. Relatively long-term and less volatile FDI accounted for only a very small 
portion of total capital inflows. This was in contrast to the cases of IT-Latin and IT-Europe, 
10 Under a liquidity shortage in the banking system, sterilisation costs are not a crucial problem because the CB 
is the creditor, meaning that it has the initiative in monetary operations. For example, the debtors in the banking 
system, i.e. commercial banks, have no choice but to participate in the CB’s operations; otherwise they are 
exposed to default risk due to lack of funds for payment and settlement. 
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where considerable capital inflows came via FDI.  If the capital inflows are in the form of hot 
money such as portfolio investment or short-term loans, as opposed to equity or FDI, it is 
more likely to be temporary, causing a greater need for intervention to prevent appreciation in 
the first place (Reisen 1994).  Thus, immediate sterilisations are expected to be more 
necessary in the IT-Asia group. Aforementioned, sterilisation peril indicates that given money 
demand, sustained sterilisation can lead to increased excess money demand. The CB hence 
needs to conduct sterilisation over a limited period, eventually choosing to either 
accommodate the capital inflows through money expansion or appreciation of the domestic 
currency (Kletzer and Spiegel 2004, p 912). 
Previous studies provide several reasons explaining the capital inflows into 
emerging markets: external or push factors (e.g. declines in foreign interest rates) and internal 
or pull factors (e.g. capital account liberalisation, increases in domestic money demand, etc.)  
Although it is extremely difficult to differentiate the causes of capital inflows, previous 
studies suggest that the declines in US interest rates have played a more significant role in 
driving capital into developing countries than pull factors (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel 
1996). It may thus be plausible that sterilisations have in general been the proper responses to 
capital inflows in most emerging countries over the last two decades. There may nevertheless 
be a sterilisation peril in emerging countries, since these capital inflows have been influenced 
by a combination of pull and push factors rather than by a single factor (IMF 2011), and 
because the rapid increases in foreign reserves in some countries may hint at the possibility of 
overly persistent sterilised interventions. One preliminary conclusion drawn from the 
aforementioned statistics is that, since the introduction of IT or more flexible FX regimes in 
the 2000s, many emerging countries appear to have succeeded in stabilising both interest rate 
and FX volatility by accumulating reserves.  
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2.2.3 Sterilisation costs 
Table 2.3 shows a simple estimation of sterilisation costs (SC). SC are mainly 
defined as the difference between the local-currency denominated yield on the NFAs and the 
yield that the authorities could earn by reducing the volume of their reverse-repo operations 
(or MSB issuance) by the same amount.  That is: tt
f
t
d
t NFASiiSC )]([  where i
d= the 
domestic money market rate; if= the US fed funds rate; ∆St= the percentage change in spot FX 
rates (domestic currency per USD); and NFA= net foreign assets. This equation is based on 
the strong ceteris paribas assumption that the interest and exchange rates are not influenced 
by intervention decisions (see Holub 2004, pp. 29-30).   Despite its oversimplification, the 
estimated SC provides a general view of the relationships between SC and the relevant 
variables over time.  Note that SC is estimated in terms of domestic-currency denominated 
values and that it will be larger when (i) f
t
d
t ii  ; (ii) ∆St↓(appreciation of domestic currency) 
or (iii) NFA is larger.11 
The estimated costs look consistent with prior expectations based on the statistics 
cited in the previous sections. First, sterilisation costs seem higher in emerging than in 
advanced countries. The SC-to-GDP ratio in the 2000s is lowest in the IT-advanced group at 
0.45%, and highest in the IT-Asia group at 0.80%. The SC-to-GDP ratios in the rest of the 
groups range from 0.54% to 0.66%. Sterilisation costs appear to increase over time in most 
countries, but with several exceptions. For example, in Japan, Canada and the UK, SC seems 
to be negligible in most periods. The SC-to-GDP ratios in these countries are far less than 
11 If we assume that UIP holds, i.e. that ,)( 1  tt
f
t
d
t SEii where  risk premium, then
ttttt FRSSESC   ]))([( 1  . This equation suggests two sources of sterilisation costs coming from the build-up 
of foreign reserves. First, unexpected appreciations/depreciations of the domestic currency lead to CB financial 
losses/profits. This unexpected risk will be averaged out over the long term and is thus unsystematic with 
rational expectations assumed. Second, there exists systematic risk originating rather from the risk premium on 
domestic assets, which is mainly reflected in the interest rate differential. 
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0.05%.  The small costs in Japan may be due to the much lower domestic interest rate 
compared to foreign rates (i.e, f
t
d
t ii  ) while those in the UK may be due to the infrequency 
of interventions (i.e. small NFAs). In the case of Canada, the domestic money market rates 
follow the US fed funds rates at similar levels.     
The SC-to-GDP ratios in China, India, Singapore and Czech Rep. are, in particular, 
high at from 1.26% to 1.69% in the 2000s.12  Although China and Japan have built up massive 
amounts of foreign reserves over the last decades, there seems to be a significant difference 
between two countries in their estimated SC. This difference may come from the differences 
between their exchange rate regimes (free float vs. peg), their main sterilisation tools (short-
term repos vs. MSBs) and the behaviours of their domestic interest rates (near zero rates vs. 
relatively high rate).  
Second, in most emerging IT groups sterilisations seem to have not been so costly 
in the 1990s (when most currencies depreciated against the USD), whereas their SCs 
increased significantly in the 2000s (when most currencies appreciated). For example, IT-Asia 
currencies appreciated by 22.8% over the last decade, while advanced-IT currencies 
appreciated by only 1.1%.  It is likely that the significant differences in SC between the IT-
Asia and IT-advanced groups owe primarily to their different extents of currency appreciation 
in the 2000s. 
Third, interest rate differentials (= local money market rate - US federal funds rate) 
have become narrower over time in most emerging countries, due mainly to the accelerating 
consolidation of the international financial markets and the globally low interest rates in the 
2000s.  Domestic interest rates have been higher than foreign rates except for in Japan, 
12The simply-estimated sterilisation costs here are similar to those of previous studies (see Kletzer and Spiegel 
2004). For example, sterilisation costs for Latin and Pacific Basin countries in those studies were estimated at 
0.25 to 0.5% of GDP, which is very close to our estimation (0.54%) in Table 2.3. In some countries facing huge 
capital inflows (e.g. Singapore and Taiwan), the costs rose above 1% of GDP. 
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Switzerland, Hong Kong and Singapore. The domestic-foreign interest rate differentials 
appear positively correlated with sterilisation costs, should we exclude the changes in FX 
rates.  For example, among the countries whose currencies changed by less than 5% during 
the last decade (e.g. most advanced IT countries, plus Hong Kong), those with small interest 
rate differentials (e.g. Canada, the UK, Hong Kong) had relatively negligible sterilisation 
costs compared to other countries. Note that SC increases significantly when the CB uses 
MSBs as its main sterilisation instrument rather than reverse-repos. In the case of Korea, the 
estimated SC-to-GDP ratio increases from 0.24% to 0.32% in the 1990s and from 0.31% to 
0.55% in the 2000s when one-year yields on MSBs are used instead of overnight call rates. 
 
Table 2.3 Simplified sterilisation costs, interest rate differentials and FX changes  
(Unit:  %) 
 
1981Q1- 1990Q4 1991Q1- 2000Q4 2001Q1- 2010Q4 
Cost 
/GDP1 
Rate 
gap2 
FX rate 
change3 
Cost 
/GDP1 
Rate 
gap2 
FX rate 
change2 
Cost 
/GDP1 
Rate 
gap2 
FX rate 
change3 
Australia 0.06 2.0 35.3 -0.14 1.4 36.3 0.43 2.8 -1.8 
Canada 0.00 17.2 -2.4 0.00 0.5 26.6 0.00 0.3 -1.1 
Norway 0.49 9.9 11.2 -0.49 2.2 41.8 0.81 1.8 -1.3 
New Zealand 0.53 2.4 39.6 -0.14 2.2 36.9 0.72 3.4 -1.8 
Switzerland -0.73 2.1 -38.4 -0.86 -1.4 26.6 0.95 -1.4 -1.6 
UK -0.09 3.1 13.6 -0.03 1.9 26.2 0.02 1.4 -0.3 
IT-Advanced 0.04  4.2 36.2 -0.28 1.6 35.9 0.45 2.1 -1.1 
Indonesia - 5.4 99.1 - 15.2 105.5 0.59 5.9 -11.4 
Korea 0.11(0.48) 2.9(5.2) 3.4 0.24(0.32) 6.7(9.3) 36.6 0.31(0.55) 1.5(2.9) -18.5 
IT-Asia -  4.4 56.9 -  8.4 60.0 0.80  3.0 -22.8 
Czech Rep. - -  -  - 6.0 29.7 1.69 0.5 -86.1 
Hungary - 15.9 60.1 - 17.1 155.7 0.97 6.0 -48.3 
IT-Europe - 38.3 246.8 - 21.9 171.7 0.59  8.5 -22.7 
Brazil -  - -  - -  -  0.95 13.1 -27.4 
Chile  - - 5.7 - 3.9 54.6 0.48 1.6 -24.1 
 IT-Latin - -  11.7 -  12.1 119.6 0.54 5.2 -14.9 
China - 0.4 113.5 -0.21 2.5 43.6 1.26 0.8 -21.9 
India - 0.6 82.4 -0.06 7.2 90.1 1.30 8.2 -5.6 
Japan - -3.2 -54.6 - -2.9 -23.2 0.00 -2.2 -31.9 
Hong Kong - 3.8 41.1 0.02 0.3 0.1 -0.27 -0.4 -0.5 
Singapore -2.07 -6.1 -20.7 -2.81 -3.2 0.2 1.54 -1.0 -30.2 
Non-IT -  -1.4 30.5 -0.68  1.6 27.2 0.66 2.0 -6.8 
Notes: 1. Quarterly averages 
            2. Interest rate gap = local money market rate-US fed funds rate (quarterly averages). 
            3. The FX rate changes indicate accumulated percentage changes during the sample period. (-) indicates 
appreciation of the domestic currency against the USD (.  
            4. The figures in (  ) for Korea indicate the results when yields on 1-year MSBs are used instead of money 
market rates. 
Sources: Author’s calculation based on IMF IFS 
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2.2.4 Main statistics on sterilisations in Korea 
 
As depicted in Figure 2.5, Korea has experienced a steady increase in capital 
inflows since the early 1990s when it began to push capital liberalisation. Since the late 1990s, 
Korea has run surpluses in both its current and capital accounts. The degree of capital inflows 
seems to have increased significantly right after the 1997-98 currency crises, when Korea 
completely opened its stock and bond markets. Despite short-term capital outflows owing to 
the two financial crises (1997-98 Asian currency crises, 2008 US mortgage crisis), capital 
inflows to Korea appear to have recovered at remarkably fast paces. These inflows have been 
characterized by a predominance of volatile and short-term portfolio and other investment. 
Equity investments occupy over 80% of total portfolio investments. Other investment is 
mostly short-term borrowings from non-residents. FDI shows net outflows since the mid-
2000s, when capital movements appear to have grown more volatile. Because of the nation's 
twin surpluses, the BOK has had to deal with increased supplies of the foreign component of 
the monetary base and resultant liquidity surpluses. 
 
Figure 2.5 Balance of payments in Korea 
 
 Data: IMF IFS 
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Figure 2.6 shows the quandary that the BOK confronts. During the 2000s, NDAs decreased 
continuously with negative values while NFAs increased with positive values. This implies 
that, as foreign reserves rushed in, domestic liquidity could have become too “loose” to 
stabilise inflation or too “tight” to resist the pressures for the domestic currency appreciation.  
Figure 2.6 Evolutions of NFA and NDA in Korea      
                                                                                                           (Nominal, KRW trill. 1987Q1- 2009Q4)  
 
Data: IMF IFS, BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
 
As shown in Figure 2.7, the increasing supply of foreign assets led to increases in 
MSBs except during the two crisis periods. During the crisis periods, NFAs and MSBs 
decreased because the BOK had to keep the local currency from depreciating rapidly and to 
inject ample liquidity into the money markets. However, the stock of MSBs shows a general 
trend of increase over time in line with foreign assets. The domestic-foreign interest rate gap 
is almost uniformly positive, although its level appears to be decreasing. Since its rapid 
depreciation in 1997, the nominal exchange rate has faced persistent appreciation pressures 
(except during the period of the 2008 US-subprime crisis). BOK frequently experienced 
financial losses from sterilisations during the 2000s owing to its huge volume of foreign 
reserve holdings and MSB outstanding, as domestic interest rates were higher than foreign 
rates and because the domestic currency appreciated against the US dollar.   
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Figure 2.7 NFA, MSBs, interest rates and exchange rate in Korea 
 
         Note: interest rate gap = O/N unsecured call rate – US federal funds rate 
Data: Author’s calculation based on IMF IFS, BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
 
Figure 2.8 shows that the BOK experienced serious fiscal losses in 2004-2007, which 
stemmed mostly from the interest paid on MSBs. Note that the interest payments on MSBs 
occupy around 70-90% of the BOK’s total costs in recent years. Accordingly, whether or not 
the current MSB-dependent sterilisation policy is sustainable in the future has been a 
controversial issue. However, there has been no comprehensive attempt to examine the issues 
involved. 
Figure 2.8 Profit and loss of the BOK 
 
       Data: BOK annual report, each year
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2.3 Thesis structure  
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters, including the Chapter 1 introduction and this 
Chapter 2. The sequence of the chapters follows that of the sterilisation procedures pursued in 
most countries over time, as illustrated in Figure 2.9. The rest of this chapter presents an 
overview of the main research questions, and brief reviews of the concurrent literature and the 
methodologies used. The main estimation results are also briefly provided. More detailed 
reviews of the literature and stylised facts are provided in each subsequent chapter. The main 
research questions are addressed in Chapters 3 through 6, before Chapter 7concludes. 
 
2.3.1 Impacts and profitability of sterilised FX interventions: Chapter 3  
 
Suppose a CB confronted with a surge in capital inflows. The CB generally 
intervenes in the FX markets by selling domestic currency for foreign currency. This 
intervention, if unsterilised, leads to increases in both foreign reserves(FR) and the monetary 
base(MB), which may increase inflation expectations, as shown in Figure 2.9.  Emerging 
countries are known to more prone to “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart 2002) or “fear of 
appreciation” of the domestic currency than advanced countries (Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger 2007). CBs thus attempt to offset the impact of capital inflows (i.e., increases in 
the MB) mainly by selling of domestic assets – mostly treasury bonds –or by issuing MSBs. 
At this stage of sterilisation, several significant issues are raised with regard to the 
intervention effects and motives, which will be addressed in Chapters3 and 4, respectively. 
Chapter 3 attempts to answer the following questions: (i) Through which channels 
do interventions influence FX rates? (ii) Do sterilised FXIs have effects on the exchange rate 
level and volatility? and (iii) Are FXIs profitable?  The previous literature appears to weakly 
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support the short-term effects of interventions on FX rate level (Edison 1993, Sarno and 
Taylor 2001). As for the impacts of FXIs on FX volatility in advanced economies, there has 
been little evidence that interventions systematically decrease FX volatility. Instead, many 
studies suggest that interventions are generally positively related with FX volatility or with no 
change in volatility, at least in the short-run (Rogers and Siklos 2003, Frenkel et al. 2005, 
Disyatat and Galati 2005, Dominguez 2006). On the other hand, some studies suggest that 
interventions may reduce FX volatility, particularly in emerging economies (Oura 2008, 
Domac and Mendoza 2002). 
The contradictory results come partly from the simultaneity problems that always 
exist in studies on intervention effects – causality does not always run from interventions to 
FX volatility because CBs tend to intervene when FX rates are volatile.  The secrecy of FXI 
conduct is known to contribute to the conflicting results as well. To deal with the simultaneity 
problem and to obtain more robust estimation results, we use dummies for persistent and 
large-scale interventions, making it possible to see whether the isolation of these unusual 
interventions can avoid the simultaneity bias (Kim and Sheen 2002, 2006, Newman et al. 
2011). Particularly, we apply an asymmetric threshold component (ACT) GARCH model 
with daily data on Korea, Japan and Australia to estimate the intervention effects on FX level 
and volatility. This model differentiates the intervention effects on long-term and short-term 
exchange rate volatility and enables us to catch the transient leverage effect on conditional 
volatility. Our estimation results suggest that interventions have limited effects on changing 
FX rate level into the desired direction and stabilising FX volatility, despite small differences 
in the effects, in the three countries.  Estimations of sterilisation profits show that only BOK 
experienced intervention losses due mainly to the interest rate differential and its asymmetric 
intervention preference. 
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2.3.2 Motives of sterilised FX interventions: Chapter 4  
 
Three main research questions are raised with regard to intervention motives: (i) 
What are the determinants of the intervention decision? (ii) Do CBs (in small open emerging 
economies) have an asymmetric preference for domestic-currency depreciation over 
appreciation? and (iii) Are there any differences in the degrees of asymmetric preference 
among countries?  Most studies suggest that deviation from the FX rate trend or volatility 
triggers the CB’s intervention – to reverse the current trend or to reduce volatility. Particularly, 
previous studies refer to “leaning against the wind” or “smoothing” as the main intervention 
motives (Sarno and Taylor 2001). Several studies have recently focused on asymmetric 
intervention motives, i.e. that interventions in emerging countries generally appear lenient 
with regard to depreciation of the domestic currency but strict concerning its appreciation 
(Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger 2007, Ramachandran and Srinivasan 2007).  
To deal with the aforementioned questions, we first use the monthly foreign 
reserves of 11 countries as proxies for interventions, to compare their degrees of asymmetric 
intervention motive as many as possible.  Based on the empirical specifications drawn from 
the buffer stock model for reserve demand (Frenkel and Jovanovic 1981, Ramachandran and 
Srinivasan 2007), we test cointegration between foreign reserves and exchange rate change by 
using Pesaran et al.’s bound test (2001). We have found a significant difference in CB 
preference for asymmetric interventions among sample countries.  
This result has limitations, however, because the foreign reserves include non-
intervention transactions and because monthly data does not reflect the fact that intervention 
decisions take place on a daily or even an intra-daily basis (Beine et al. 2009). Hence, we 
estimate both a probit model and a friction model (Rosett 1959; Neely 2005b), with daily data 
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in Korea, Japan and Australia, to investigate their intervention motives. Notably, friction 
models have recently begun to be used for examining the degrees of asymmetric intervention 
motives. The results of probit and friction estimations suggest common determinants of FX 
interventions in the three countries:  the degrees of current FX rate deviation from trend, the 
levels of FX rate volatility, etc. In particular, the friction estimation provides direct evidence 
of significant asymmetric intervention preference for inducing domestic-currency 
depreciation in Korea.  
 
2.3.3 Degree of sterilisation and capital mobility: Chapter 5 
 
Sterilisation has been used in most emerging countries as a main policy tool to avoid 
the trilemma constraints. The effects of sterilisation depend upon the degree of capital 
mobility, the institutional features of monetary and FX policy and the natures of the capital 
flows. Given the assumption of limited capital mobility, complete sterilisation may be 
possible in the short-run.  In this case, sterilisation probably raises domestic interest rates, 
preventing them from converging toward the international level, and thereby induces further 
capital inflows.  Sustained sterilisations are in conflict with purely free float regimes and are 
associated with fixed exchange rate regimes. In this regard, three questions arise: (i) How 
have the degrees of sterilisation and (de facto) capital mobility in major countries changed 
over time?  (ii) Are there any significant differences in the degrees of sterilisation and capital 
mobility across countries? and (iii) Do sterilisations cause local interest rates to fall or to rise?  
If they raise local rates significantly, then it is likely that the capital inflows may stem from 
pull factors such as increases in local money demand. Otherwise, capital may be assumed to 
be flowing in due to push factors like declines in foreign interest rates.  
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In Chapter 5, we compare the degree of sterilisation and de facto capital mobility by 
estimating sterilisation and offset coefficient with panel data on 30 countries (most of which 
IT countries and are grouped into five categories). For this, modifying previous studies 
(Brissimis et al. 2002, Ouyang et al. 2007), we derive a simple simultaneous equation and 
then estimate the two coefficients with fixed effects. The result of panel estimation show that 
most IT-emerging countries significantly increased their sterilisations from the late 1990s and 
were conducting almost complete or over-sterilisation in the 2000s.  The sterilisations in most 
countries appear successful in retaining monetary policy independence by limiting de facto 
capital mobility. Estimation of sterilisation effects on domestic interest rates based on 
Edwards and Khan (1985) suggest the possible sterilisation peril in some emerging countries 
(e.g. IT-Asia countries). Time series analyses for selected individual countries are carried out 
for comparison purpose.  
 
2.3.4 Sustainability of MSB-dependent sterilisation: Chapter 6 
 
CBs have several options for sterilizing capital inflows. The most frequently used 
sterilisation tool is OMOs, which are market-friendly and also used most frequently in 
advanced countries.  Specifically, CBs may sell treasury bonds (outright or by repurchase 
agreements) or issue MSBs in order to drain an excess liquidity in money markets.  Otherwise 
they can use less market-friendly sterilisation tools such as raising the required reserve ratio 
or swapping government deposits held with commercial banks for government bonds. MSBs 
meanwhile differ from other sterilisation tools: (i) Unlike the unremunerated reserve 
requirement, MSBs are interest-bearing instruments; (ii) MSBs have longer maturities and 
pay higher interest rates than repo transactions; and (iii) Issuance of MSBs increases the CB’s 
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debts (liabilities), while the selling of treasury bonds reduces its assets. It is hence expected 
that MSB-dependent sterilisations may have larger sterilisation peril, through driving up 
domestic interest rates and causing high sterilisation costs, than other types of sterilisation. 
 In this regard, an interesting and novel issue arises: (I) How can we evaluate the 
sustainability of MSB-dependent sterilisation policy? (ii) What is the condition for MSB-
dependent sterilisation to be sustainable permanently? (iii) Is a current MSB-dependent 
sterilisation policy in Korea sustainable? Although many previous studies have examined the 
profit/loss on sterilised FXIs or OMOs for sterilisation, none have attempted to assess MSB-
dependent sterilisation policy sustainability. Chapter 6 aims to answer these questions. Since 
there is no specific theory on sustainability of the CB’s debt policy, we need to apply the 
existing theories of fiscal sustainability.  Based on such fiscal sustainability theories as Barro 
(1979) and Bohn (1995), we first derive the inter-temporal budget constraint of the CB that 
relies on the issuance of MSBs as its main sterilisation tool. We next set up empirical models 
and then suggest a sequential procedure for sustainability testing. We provide evidence that 
current BOK’s sterilisation policy depending on MSBs may not be sustainable.  
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Figure 2.9 Sequence of sterilisation, relevant research questions to be addressed 
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CHAPTER 3 THE IMPACTS AND PROFITABILITY OF 
STERILISED FX MARKET INTERVENTIONS: 
Are sterilised FX interventions effective in stabilising exchange rates? 
3.1. Introduction 
In the context of textbook definition of exchange rate regimes, no FX intervention 
(hereafter FXI) will be conducted under a purely free float exchange rate regime (Frankel 
1997). CBs will stabilise an economy by adjusting short-term interest rates, which may 
influence exchange rates. Therefore, free float exchange regimes provide a higher degree of 
monetary independence to CBs.  In reality, however, many countries are assumed to intervene 
in the FX markets: (i) to counter (reverse) current, disorderly market conditions – “leaning 
against the wind”; (ii) to accelerate a current trend – “leaning with the wind”; (iii) to reduce 
excessive FX volatility or to slow down current trend – “smoothing”; (iv) to correct severe 
FX rate deviation from a long-run equilibrium level; (v) to make intervention profits; and (vi) 
to participate in coordinated interventions with foreign authorities. 
In particular, emerging countries under de jure free float regime are known to 
conduct FXIs and neutralise the impacts of the interventions by sterilisations, as evidenced by 
the sizable build-up of foreign reserves in most countries, 13  although many advanced 
countries recently seem reluctant to intervene. The policy makers of these countries tend to 
consider a sterilised intervention as an inevitable option to control exchange rates and interest 
rates simultaneously. In other words, sterilised interventions have been taken as an (imperfect) 
substitute for capital controls in order to avoid trilemma constraints (Steiner 2010 p5), 
13  The 10 largest holders of foreign reserves at the end of May 2012 are China (3,305 bill. USD), Japan (1,278), 
Russia (510), Taiwan (389), Switzerland(374), Brazil(372), Korea (311), Hong Kong (292), India (286) and 
Germany (239).  
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because both are similar in offsetting the effects of capital flows and thus ensuring monetary 
independence. However, although most market participants believe that sterilised 
interventions affect exchange rates,14 many literatures suggest that the intervention effects on 
exchange rates are ambiguous (relative to the unsterilised interventions) both theoretically and 
empirically. The sterilised intervention may lose its ground as an independent policy tool to 
avoid the trilemma constraint unless they have significant effects on FX rates.  
Despite numerous studies on the FXIs, there has been a considerable gap in previous 
literature. Firstly, most studies have been devoted to advanced countries like US, Japan and 
European countries, despite the fact that many small open emerging countries conduct active 
interventions (Beine 2010). Intervention motives and the channel of effects in emerging 
countries may be quite different from those in advanced countries. For example, because 
financial markets are thinner and economies are more export-driven in most emerging 
countries, FXIs are likely to be more asymmetric and influential in emerging countries than in 
advanced countries. In particular, asymmetric FXIs due to fear of appreciation, may cause 
CBs to make economic or fiscal losses and eventually hamper monetary policy independence 
from government or political parties (Nunes and Da Silva 2008).   
Secondly, previous literature appears to have less focus on the institutional features 
of interventions associated with domestic market operations and sterilisation costs. For 
example, previous studies assume that CBs make intervention decisions. However, in most 
countries, governments decide interventions, although CBs undertake intervention 
transactions. Given that two authorities have somewhat different policy objectives and that the 
coordination between them may be weak particularly in the emerging countries, it is probable 
14 Most survey studies suggest that both market participants and central bankers believe that the FXI can affect 
exchange rate movements into more aligned ways and thus help restore equilibrium (see Lecourt and Raymond 
2006, Cheung and Wong 2000 and Neely 2000 for the surveys on traders, and Neely 2008 and Mihaijek 2005, 
for the surveys on policy makers). 
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that the FXIs could be conducted irrespective of future monetary policy stances.  
If FXI can adjust the exchange rate level towards the desired direction or calm down 
severe fluctuations, the interventions are taken as “successful” (Ito 2003). The objective of 
stabilising FX rate would be achieved when FX interventions are profitable – that is, if a CB 
buys foreign currency when it is cheap and sell it when it is expensive, the interventions make 
profits (Friedman 1953). Thus, the assessment of intervention effects and profitability could 
provide overall views on the intervention performances. 
This chapter empirically investigates the efficacy of sterilised FXIs in three countries: 
Korea, Japan and Australia. These countries are known for actively intervening in FX markets. 
Our objectives are to assess the intervention effects on FX rate level and volatility and to 
estimate the intervention profits. We attempt to answer following questions in particular: (i) 
Do FXIs affect the FX rate level as desired? (ii) Do FXIs reduce FX volatility?  (iii) Do 
interventions differently influence long-term and short-term volatility? (iv)Through which 
channel do interventions influence FX rates?  (v) Are FXIs profitable?  When we can say “yes” 
to the question (i), (ii) and (v), we may conclude that the interventions are “successful”.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes stylised facts of 
FXIs in three countries. Section 3 reviews previous literature on the transmission channels of 
FXIs, and intervention effects on exchange rate level and volatility. In section 4, we firstly 
apply asymmetric component threshold (ACT) GARCH framework with daily data to three 
countries and estimate asymmetric intervention effects on exchange rate level and volatility. 
In particular, the decomposition of exchange rate volatility (into permanent and transitory 
components) is motivated by previous studies that suggest that the FX interventions appear to 
have different effects on short-term and long-term exchange rate volatility. In addition, we 
provide evidence on the profitability of FXIs. Section 5 draws conclusion. 
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3.2. Stylised facts of FX market interventions  
 
It is worthwhile to compare the three countries due to the differences and similarities 
in their natures of economy and policy regimes as summarized in Table 3.1.  The three 
countries are similar in that FX interventions have been relatively frequent in the 2000s 
compared to other countries such as the US and UK. The proportion of trades of Japan and 
Korea in the world economy is large, and main export goods of the two countries largely 
overlapped (e.g., electronics, automobile, shipbuilding, metal, chemical, etc.). Both Korea and 
Australia are adopting IT and considered as small open economy while Japan is a large 
economy with adopting monetary targeting. As a result, comparing the three countries would 
provide significant implications with regard to the relation between interventions and 
institutional, economic features.  
Table 3.1 Main economic and market indicators of Korea, Japan and Australia 
 Korea Japan Australia 
Nature of economy Small open emerging Large open developed Small open developed 
Monetary policy regime Inflation targeting Monetary targeting Inflation targeting 
Policy rate 
 
O/N unsecured call rate 
 
O/N unsecured call rate  
(with quantitative control) 
O/N cash rate 
 
Exchange regime Free float(1997) Free float(1973) Free float(1983) 
Export (Bill.USD, 2010)  466 (7th) 770(4th) 213((21th) 
Import (Bill.USD, 2010) 425 (10th) 694(4th) 202(19th) 
Daily FX turnover 
(Bill. USD, 2009) 
35 400 210 
Notes: 1. Trade and FX market statistics are collected from International Trade Statistics (WTO, 2011) and 
     BIS (2010), respectively. 
            2. Exchange regime classification follows IMF’s “Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and  
                Exchange Restrictions” (2008) 
 
Exchange rate regimes in three countries have been mostly classified as de facto 
independent float or free float (IMF 2008, Reinhart and Rogoff 2002, Shambaugh 2004, 
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Rogoff et al. 2004).15 Nevertheless, these countries are known to actively intervene in FX 
markets. As shown in Table 3.2, although a CB intervenes in FX markets as a legal agent for 
a government, a government, in general, has a priority on deciding interventions in most 
advanced countries. In some countries, FXIs are under the purview of CBs (e.g., Australia, 
Brazil, Czech Rep. Chile, Indonesia, etc.). 
 
Table 3.2 Main features of FX interventions in major economies 
 Authorities Funds for interventions Restrictions Communications 
Korea 
(1997M12) 
Treasury  
and BOK 
Government (Foreign 
Exchange Stabilisation 
Fund) and BOK 
The treasury bond issued 
for FXIs should be 
approved by the Congress 
Mostly keep secret practices; 
not disclose information 
 
Japan 
(1973M3) 
Treasury Government (Foreign 
Exchange Fund Special 
Account) 
BOJ follows the treasury’s 
directives 
Publicly announce beforehand in 
case of cooperative interventions 
with other CBs; publicly 
announced afterward and 
disclose information on the web 
Australia 
(1993M12) 
RBA RBA RBA needs to consult with 
government. 
Publicly announce interventions 
beforehand and afterward in most 
cases; disclose information on the 
web 
USA 
(1973M3) 
Treasury and  
the FRB 
Government (Foreign 
Exchange Stabilisation 
Fund) and FRB  
Treasury has priority with 
regard to the decision. 
 
Publicly announce beforehand in 
case of cooperative interventions 
with other CBs; quarterly report; 
report to the Congress; daily data 
with 1 year lag 
Euro Area 
(1999M1) 
ECB ECB FXI should be consistent 
with the general 
orientations formulated by 
members 
Publicly announce beforehand in 
case of cooperative interventions 
with other CBs ; publicly 
announced afterward but 
limited(amount and timing are 
not included); monthly bulletin 
UK 
(1992M10) 
Treasury and  
BOE 
Government (Foreign 
Exchange Operation 
Account) and BOE 
Intervention by BOE is 
restricted for monetary 
policy objective 
Publicly announce beforehand in 
case of cooperative interventions; 
disclose information on a 
monthly press release 
Note: The times in (       ) indicate the introduction of free float regime. 
Sources: Author’s summary based on the information from each CB’s homepage, Sarno and Taylor 
 (2001) and Menkhoff (2008)  
15  Korea’s exchange regime has changed from managed float to free float since 1997 financial crisis. In 
particular, Korea’s exchange regime has changed from a multi-currency basket peg (before March 1990) to 
market average exchange rate system (managed float) (Mar 1990 – Nov 1997) to free float (Dec 1997 – present). 
Daily margin for exchange rate movement are completely abolished in December 1997. 
 
               Daily margin for exchange rate movement in Korea (% relative to closing price of previous day) 
1990.3 1991.9 1992.7 1993.10 1994.11 1995.12 1997.11 1997.12 
±0.4 ±0.6 ±0.8 ±1.0 ±1.5 ±2.25 ±10.0 none 
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RBA has an initiative to determine interventions. In contrast, the treasury makes 
principal decisions on the FXIs in Korea and Japan. However, there is a significant difference 
between Korea and Japan. Treasury holds a full power over the interventions in Japan because 
intervention funds are financed by issuing government’s bonds. This is not the case in Korea. 
In Korea, cooperative discussions between the treasury and the BOK are forceful due to legal 
and practical reasons. In particular, the Act of BOK postulates that all interventions should be 
carried out with a consultation between the treasury and the BOK. The funds for the FXIs are 
shared equally by the treasury’s Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund (FESF) (which consists 
of KRW and USD and is financed by issuing Korean Treasury Bonds) and the BOK. The 
limited amount of the FESF, which is totally controlled by Korean Parliament, enables 
consultations between the two authorities to be more substantially forceful. 16  In contrast, 
intervention funds are, in general, solely financed by the treasury (in Japan) or RBA (in 
Australia). 
Korean authorities keep stronger secrecy in the procedure of interventions than most 
developed countries, because the authorities believe that keeping the secrecy is more helpful 
in preventing speculators from benefiting relevant information and in avoiding disputes over 
the validity of interventions (Rhee and Lee 2005, p 198). In particular, information on 
interventions is not announced either ex-ante or ex-post in Korea. BOK does not tend to 
notify its intervention intentions to its agent dealers. Japanese authorities also keep secrecy 
except for cooperative interventions with foreign authorities. The data on interventions are 
released ex-post in Japan and Australia. The authorities in Japan and Australia announce 
relevant information before interventions for enhancing intervention effects when they 
16Korea's official foreign reserves amounted to 290 billion dollars as of the end of September 2010. The reserves 
consist of  252.0 billion dollars of securities (87.0%), 33.2 billion dollars of deposits (11.4%), 3.6 billion dollars 
of Special Drawing Rights (1.2%), 1.0 billion dollars of its IMF reserve position (0.3%), and 0.1 billion dollars 
of Gold (0.03%). Among the foreign reserves, over 80%of the foreign reserves are held by the BOK.  
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undertake cooperative interventions with other CBs. Particularly, RBA interventions are 
thought as publicly disclosed, because RBA announces the intervention publicly before 
entering the broker market directly (Edison et al. 2006). 
In consideration of possible conflicts between a government and a CB – equivalently 
between FXIs and OMOs, it is plausible that the objectives of FXIs may not always be 
consistent with those of the current or future monetary policy stance. This is particularly true 
for the countries where FXIs and monetary policy are implemented by separate bodies (e.g. 
Korea, Japan, etc.), where the coordination between the two authorities is not strong and 
where CB independence is relatively weak.  As interventions cause changes in monetary base, 
frequent FXIs are likely to be associated with weaker CB independence. For example, Nune 
and Da Silva (2008), using panel analysis for 13 Latin American countries, find a negative 
relationship between the FXI coefficient and the CB independence index in 1990-2003.  
Under the managed floating regime (before December 1997), Korean authorities 
intervened in order to achieve current account equilibrium or to stabilise a REER by 
attempting to change exchange rates towards the desired direction. However, since the 
introduction of free float regime in 1998, the main objective has been to alleviate excessive 
FX volatility rather than to maintain a certain exchange rate target (Rhee and Lee 2005, pp. 
196-197). Thus, leaning against unilateral movements of FX rates or smoothing severe 
volatility may be the main intervention motives in Korea. The intervention objectives in Japan 
and Australia are similar to Korea’s: to smooth excessively rapid changes in FX rate and to 
adjust FX rate level into desired direction (Newman et al. 2011, Ito 2003).   
Oral interventions are used to facilitate market stabilisation beforehand or to convey 
the authorities’ concerns about FX rate movements in the three countries. In Korea, the BOK 
intervenes in both spot and forward FX markets. However, interventions in forward markets 
53 
rarely occur except for the period of financial crisis or severe speculation attacks in offshore 
non-delivered forward (NDF) markets, because the effect of the interventions at maturity 
would then be the opposite of what the interventions initially aims for (Rhee and Lee 2005, p 
197).   
BOK mainly aims to adjust the movements of KRW/USD exchange rate. Recently, 
the movements of KRW/JPY rate, however, also appear to be amongst the main concerns for 
Korean authorities since the market participants expect KRW to track JPY due to the intense 
export competitions between Korea and Japan (Rhee and Lee 2005, p 201). Note that 
interventions for resisting the appreciation of KRW against JPY cannot be conducted in a way 
of selling JPY in Korea, since there are no FX markets for KRW/JPY transaction. 17  In 
contrast, BOJ and RBA undertake non-USD interventions that trade domestic currency with 
foreign currencies other than USD: e.g. Euro, Indonesian Rupiah, British pound, etc.  
The BOK sterilises FX interventions fully and automatically on a daily basis by 
issuing MSBs (Rhee and Lee 2005). Japanese interventions were also almost completely 
sterilised before 2002 (Ito 2003).  However, Japanese interventions in 2003 appear to be 
unsterilised because BOJ’s current account balance money supply steadily increases with 
interventions (Spiegel 2003 pp. 1-2). This is because unsterilised interventions are little 
different from the sterilised ones under near-zero nominal interest rate. RBA sterilises the 
impact of interventions through foreign exchange swaps (Newman et al 2011). 
17  The interbank market for directly trading JPY and KRW opened in October in 1996 but closed in January 
1997 due to a lack of liquidity. Thus KRW-JPY exchange rates are determined as cross rate via the comparison 
of KRW-USD rates in Seoul FX markets and JPY-USD rates in Tokyo FX markets.    
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3.3 Literature review18 
Most recent studies investigate the effects of sterilised interventions because it has 
been theoretically and empirically supported that non-sterilised FXIs generally have 
significant effects on exchange rates by affecting the monetary base or interest rate19 − which 
is labeled as “monetary channel.” Under interest rate or monetary targeting, CBs have little to 
do non-sterilised interventions that occasionally conflict with monetary policy. Recently, non-
sterilised FXIs have been extremely rare, because most developed countries implement 
monetary policy by targeting short-term interest rates with the allowance of more flexible 
movements of FX rates. CBs have to sterilise the impacts of the FXIs on the monetary base 
mainly by OMOs in order to manage the short-term interest rates close to their targets. 
Therefore, monetary channel may not be applicable any longer to most developed countries.  
Most literatures on the sterilised FXIs examine the following issues (Edison 1993, 
Sarno and Taylor 2001, Neely 2005, Menkhoff 2008): (i) How does the intervention work? (ii) 
Whether the FXIs affect the level and volatility of exchange rates; (iii) To what conditions 
CBs intervene in the market; (iv) If interventions are effective, how the relevant factors (e.g. 
coordination, direction, secrecy and amount of interventions) influence the degree of the 
effects, and (v) Whether sterilised interventions are profitable.   
 
3.3.1 Transmission channels of FX market interventions 
To explain the effects of sterilised interventions, literature presents mainly four 
channels: (i) portfolio balance channel, (ii) signalling channel, (iii) microstructure channel or 
18 The important literatures on the effects of FXIs in the 1980s- 990s are well documented in Edison(1993) and 
Sarno & Taylor (2001) respectively. As for later studies, see Neely(2005a), Ito(2007) and Menkhoff(2008) for 
developed economies, and also refer to Disyatat & Galati(2007) and Menkhoff(2012) for emerging economies. 
19  Non-sterilised interventions change base money, and thus, monetary aggregates and interest rates. 
Accordingly, OMOs and non-sterilised FXIs are alike in that they are expected to work through the monetary 
channel to influence exchange rates. To put differently, non-sterilised FXIs are the OMOs carried out by 
transaction of foreign currency rather than domestic securities (Schwartz 2000).  
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order flow channel and (iv) coordination channel. The latter two channels can be seen as a 
broader interpretation of the signalling channel. The feasibility of each theory appears to have 
changed in line with the developments of financial markets. 
 
3.3.1.1 Portfolio balance channel 
Portfolio balance channel is normally considered in terms of mean-variance 
optimisation: risk-averse investors are assumed to determine the optimal composition of their 
portfolio in consideration of expected return and risk, and thus investors require risk premium 
for foreign assets. Here, foreign assets are considered as more risky due to additional risks 
incurred by FX rate changes aside from interest rate risk. In this respect, FXIs can affect FX 
rates by changing net supply of foreign assets and eventually shifting relative composition of 
private investors’ portfolio. Thus, interventions would be more effective when foreign and 
domestic assets are imperfect substitutes. The imbalance induced by the interventions 
necessitates the change in FX rates, interest rates or both, to restore equilibrium (Edison 1993, 
p18). Specifically, the risk premium can be expressed in the deviations from UIP condition:  
 
(3.3.1) tttttt SSEiirp  1
*    →  )( *1 ttttt iirpSE    
 
where trp  is a risk premium; ti  and 
*
ti are domestic and foreign interest rate, respectively; tS  
is the spot exchange rate (domestic per foreign currency); and tE  is the expectation operator. 
If CB sells domestic currency for foreign currency, the intervention increases the net supply of 
domestic currency. The sterilised intervention, with leaving domestic interest rate( ti ) 
unchanged, increases exchange rate ( tS ↑) mainly by raising risk premium for domestic 
currency ( trp ↑).  The existence of non-zero risk premium and its responses to the change in 
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relative supply of domestic and foreign asset are considered as evidence of effective 
interventions. Since portfolio channel covers direct impacts of interventions volume on net 
supply of foreign currency, it is likely that the intervention impact would be stronger as the 
intervention is larger. 
Edison (1993) reports that most studies conducted between mid-1980s and early 
1990s appear to fail to find either statistically or quantitatively significant relation between 
interventions and risk premium.  The two main reasons for the weak evidences on portfolio 
channel are that (i) intervention amount is rather small relative to the daily market turnover in 
FX markets and (ii) there seems to be a high level of substitution between the assets 
denominated in different currencies – particularly the major currencies. In addition, many 
conclusions of ineffective interventions may be largely based on the faith that FX rates are 
determined by fundamentals rather than by interventions (Williamson 1993 p193). However, 
the evidences against intervention effects in the 1980s have been challenged by later studies 
using official high frequency data20 and more accurate econometric techniques (Sarno and 
Taylor 2001, Menkhoff 2008).   
3.3.1.2 Signalling channel 
Since early 1990s, a series of empirical studies have attempted to scrutinize 
signalling channel and re-examine portfolio channel. The literature largely support signalling 
hypothesis that interventions are informative of future monetary stance in the developed 
country (particularly in the US), thereby influence the market expectation. In particular, 
20 Major CBs such as Fed, ECB and BOE have begun to release their official FX market intervention data since 
mid-1990s. Although most central bankers let alone economists agree positive relationship between transparency 
and effectiveness in implementing monetary policy, the information on FX market interventions frequently 
exempt from public announcement.  For instance, BOE is allowed to keep its market intervention information by 
Bank of England Act 15-2. The IMF also admits that it would not be always appropriate for CBs to provide 
detailed information on foreign exchange operations (IMF Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary 
and Financial Policies 3.3.2).  
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signalling model assumes that CBs conduct sterilised interventions for conveying private 
information about exchange rate fundamentals or about future monetary stance (Mussa 1981, 
Dominguez and Frankel 1993(a), Watanabe 1994, Lewis 1995, Kaminsky and Lewis 1996, 
Fatum and Hutchinson 1999, Kim and Sheen 2006). For instance, purchases (sales) of foreign 
currency should signal a future monetary expansion (contraction) more effectively than a 
simple announcement. Although signalling channel would work without actual interventions, 
most CBs actually trade their money, because the CBs need to stake its own money in order to 
support the future monetary policy and thus to acquire credibility from markets. According to 
signalling approach, sterilised interventions can still affect exchange rates even under perfect 
asset substitutability where trp =0. Thus, equation (3.3.1) can be transformed into: 
(3.3.2) 
t
tt
tt S
SE
ii 1*)1()1(   
The foreign-currency purchasing intervention causes the agents to expect the future 
monetary expansion and the depreciation of the domestic currency ( 1ttSE ↑).  In this case, 
given constant interest rates (i.e., ti  is fixed due to sterilisation and
*
ti is assumed exogenous), 
current exchange rates should be also depreciated for (3.3.2) to hold ( tS ↑).  
In this approach, interventions are expected to be more effective if (i) financial 
markets are so efficient that information spreads out without any distortion; (ii) CBs have 
information unknown to the market participants; (iii) monetary policy should be conducted in 
a consistent way and thus considered as credible; and (iv) interventions are conducted with 
coordination with other CBs or other domestic institutions. The empirical evidences mostly 
confirm the prior expectation. Interventions are more effective when they are: (i) clearly 
informed or communicated (Dominguez 1998, Fatum 2000); (ii) consistent with the 
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underlying stance of monetary or fiscal policy (Sarno and Taylor 2001, Menkhoff 2008); (iii) 
conducted in cooperation with other CBs (Humpage 1999, Fatum 2000, Lecourt and 
Raymond 2006, Menkhoff 2008, Fatum and Hutchison 2010).  
Although several countries have recently begun to publish intervention 
information with a time lag, many countries, in reality, conceal most information (i.e., time 
and amount of interventions). Few publicly announce them beforehand. This practice of 
secrecy is called ‘secret intervention puzzle’ because it appears contradictory to what 
signalling channel expects (Sarno and Taylor 2001).21 
Intervention effects may be also asymmetric, depending on institutional features such 
as compatibility with monetary policy and depth of financial markets. Theoretically, IT is not 
consistent with regular and persistent interventions (Rogers and Siklos 2003 p 396). Mishkin 
and Savastano(2001)’s work on Latin American countries suggests that too heavy and 
frequent interventions would risk transforming exchange rates into a nominal anchor that has 
preceded over IT. Their argument indicates that IT is compatible with the interventions for 
smoothing short-term fluctuations but not with those aiming to prevent exchange rates from 
reaching market-determined level over longer periods (Mishkin and Savastano 2001, p 439). 
Kamil (2008) finds that, under IT regime, interventions for resisting the appreciation are 
effective only during the monetary easing period in Colombia. Generally, the sizable 
interventions for resisting the appreciation become ineffective, as the large-scale interventions 
are regarded as incompatible with meeting the IT.  
21Ito(2007, pp 136-137) points out that the success of the clearly-announced intervention in accordance with 
Plaza Agreement, September 1985, encouraged many policymakers to hint or announce interventions. 
Nevertheless, there still exist rationales for supporting secret intervention (Cheung and Wong 2000, Hung 1997): 
(i) A secret intervention may be preferred when it is not consistent with monetary policy. (ii) Releasing 
intervention information may encourage speculations by revealing states of foreign reserves. (iii) A secret 
intervention is more effective when a CB tries to manipulate market by affecting technical traders especially in 
periods of thin trading day. In practice, survey results show that the main reasons for the secret interventions are 
either to minimize the effect on the market or to counter speculative attacks (BIS 2005). 
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3.3.1.3 Market microstructure channel 
Empirical studies based on traditional asset market approach appear to provide little 
evidence that macroeconomic variables have strong and consistent explanatory power over 
FX rate except in case of extraordinary circumstance like hyperinflation (Park 2011 p875). 
Recent studies have increasingly turned to technical or institutional aspects of FX markets. 
Market microstructure channel (sometimes named differently as ‘noise trader model’ or 
‘chartist-fundamentalist model’ 22 ) focuses on the features related to trades and market 
participants. According to this approach, sterilised FXIs have significant effects on FX rates 
when a CB can alter order flows with their own orders, and thereby change noise traders’ 
expectations (Hung 1997, Evans and Lyons 2004, Menkhoff 2008).23 
Microstructure approach could be regarded as one of the efforts to loosen efficient 
market assumptions behind fundamentals-based models (like portfolio-balance or signalling 
model). This approach reflects technical or nonfundamental aspects (of FX markets) such as 
herd behaviour, technical trading and heterogeneous informed market (Frankel and Froot 
1990, Popper and Montgomery 2001, Schmidt and Wollmershauser 2004). Consequently, this 
approach is appropriate to explain the movements of short-term exchange rates that are likely 
to be influence by nonfundamental forces (Cheung and Wong 2000).  For example, if foreign-
currency buying interventions influence the order flows, noise traders may take the 
interventions as changes in policy stance and expect domestic-currency depreciation. The 
22 Noise traders and chartists are market participants whose demand for currencies is affected by beliefs that are 
not fully consistent with economic fundamentals. Specifically, orders from noise traders are not perceived to be 
informative about exchange rate equilibrium. Thus, noise traders’ investment strategies are considered as main 
sources of systematic forecasting errors. CBs can take advantage of this property of the traders in order to affect 
FX rate. Noise traders are often called differently both in academic circles and in real-world financial markets: 
they normally correspond to uninformed traders. 
23  Hung (1997) firstly argues that CBs can affect FX rates by manipulating order flows. In general, CBs 
intervene in FX markets through limited number of agents sworn not to reveal the existence of market 
interventions. If the orders by agents are observed by influential traders, market participants will assume the 
presence of some fundamental momentum – not the interventions – and initiate positions of their own which 
reinforce the direction of the order flow. (Archer 2005 p 47)    
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noise traders then follow the direction of the intervention (i.e. they also attempt to increase the 
purchase of foreign currency) and the intervention effect can be more intensified.  
Note that the microstructure approach may be helpful to understand “puzzle of secret 
interventions” that could not be easily explained by the signalling approach. Bhattacharya and 
Weller (1997) and Vitale (1999) argue that an order flow itself is a signal even if CB 
intervenes anonymously, so that order flow channel may work even in secret interventions. 
Order flow approach expects that intervention impacts are stronger in a thinly traded market.  
If traders respond more strongly to the changes in order flows by influential private market 
participants rather than by CBs, secret interventions may be more effective. Allowing for 
information asymmetry, we can conjecture that even if the intervention amount is very small 
relative to market turnover, a single intervention may significantly affect exchange rates by 
triggering a multitude of subsequent trades.  Through the study on order flows in FX 
interventions, Evans and Lyon (2001) divide asymmetric information associated with 
interventions, into two basic types: (i) asymmetric information existing between a CB and the 
public, which is the necessary condition for signalling channel and (ii) asymmetric 
information between market participants, which plays a role in determining intervention 
impacts irrespective of the channel through which intervention works. 
3.3.1.4 Coordination channel 
This approach focuses on the fact that publicly announced interventions can remedy 
a coordination failure in FX markets. FX markets can be disrupted by irrational speculations 
brought by noneconomic factors like trend-following trading strategies of chartists or 
technical analysts (Frankel and Froot 1990, Allen and Taylor 1992). Once exchange rate is 
deviated far away from fundamental equilibrium due to herd behaviours and self-fulfilling 
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expectations, it is very hard for individual market participants to attempt to reverse the current 
trend even when they believe current FX rate to be severely distorted — this situation is 
called ‘coordination failure’. In this case, publicly announced interventions can play a 
significant role in coordinating trades in the direction of equilibrium by infusing ‘smart 
money’ into the FX markets (Sarno and Taylor 2001). Publicly announced interventions could 
reverse current distorted trend into equilibriumby changing market sentiments. This is 
because credible announcements lead the weights of chartists and trend-followers to become 
lower than those of the fundamentalists in the FX markets.  Hence, FXIs may play a crucial 
role in pricking the bubble before the bubble worsens (see Sarno and Taylor 2001). 
Communications or oral interventions may influence FX rates through the coordination 
channel. The coordination approach is closely related to the market microstructure approach, 
which concerns how information is incorporated into asset prices and emphasizes information 
heterogeneity in the FX markets (Fratzscher 2008a, p 1652).  
Sarno and Taylor (2001) argues that more weight should be given to the studies of 
the 1990s, which suggest that FXIs can have greater impacts on FX rates than previously 
assumed, than those of the 1980s. They insist, because of the lack of the data on official 
interventions and exchange rate expectation, the empirical studies in the 1980s, most of which 
used foreign reserves as a proxy for interventions, may have limited implications. Neely 
(2005a) points out that using high frequency data and new methodologies like event study and 
friction model have enhanced understanding of interventions. Currently, despite its various 
lag in the transmission of intervention effect, it appears to be generally accepted that sterilised 
interventions affect exchange rates – particularly in the short run – for example, even within 
the intervention day or within a couple of days after interventions.   
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Considering the evidences of concurrent studies and the future evolution of financial 
environments, we expect that the importance of the portfolio balance effect will be 
diminishing particularly in the developed countries.24 This presumption is supported by the 
recent surveys that the signalling effect is consistently put forward as the main intervention 
channel. In particular, the microstructure and coordination channel, both of which focus on 
the role of information, may be more helpful to understand the impacts of the FXIs in the 
futures. However, the portfolio balance model may still have implications for developing 
countries in which capital market is not yet freely open to international investors, and 
domestic currency is traded with an additional risk premium. 
 
3.3.2 Impacts of interventions on exchange rate level and volatility 
Most studies have used GARCH-type models consisting of mean equation (3.3.3) 
and variance equation (3.3.4) to see the impact of interventions on the FX rate, because FX 
rate movements typically show volatility clustering. 
(3.3.3) ),0(~,ln 21 tttttt AXINTS   : mean equation 
where St is the exchange rate, the vector of regressors Xit  is any other variables that 
might influence the exchange rate and t is a disturbance term. While interventions explain 
contemporaneous exchange rate change in (3.3.3), many literatures use lagged intervention 
data in order to avoid simultaneity problems. If coefficient β is significantly different from 
zero, the intervention could be interpreted to affect FX rate level. Estimating the effects on FX 
24 Sarno and Taylor (2001) suggests two main reason for lesser importance of the portfolio balance channel: (i) 
The degree of substitutability between financial assets denominated in the major currencies increases as 
international capital markets become increasingly integrated; (ii) Typical size of interventions is very small 
fraction of total FX market turnover. 
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rate volatility heavily depends on the definition of volatility. The effects are estimated mainly 
by two methods. First, ex-post volatility is normally measured as conditional variance from 
GARCH (1, 1)-type specification: 
 
(3.3.4) tttt INThh 3
2
2110     where ttt vh , N(0,1) ~tv ): variance equation 
If 3  is significant, the intervention influences FX volatility. Alternatively, if 
currency option markets are efficiently operated, then (ex-ante) implied volatility extracted 
from the option price provides an unbiased estimate of market forecast of volatility 
(Dominguez 1998). Aforementioned, intervention effects on FX rate level and volatility in the 
short-term perspective are evidenced positively since the mid-1990s, mainly by modified 
signalling approach such as microstructure and coordination channel. Nevertheless, most 
studies appear doubtful about the long-term effects of the interventions on exchange rates. 
With regard to frequency, timing and amount of interventions, it is widely supported 
that large, infrequent and concerted interventions tend to have more significant effects on FX 
rates (Ito 2003, Lecourt and Raymond 2006). Fatum and Hutchison (2003, 2006) also agree 
that interventions are effective when used selectively and aiming for short-run stabilisation of 
FX rates. Dominguez (2003a) argue that CBs should intervene in FX market during heavy 
trading periods to maximise the intervention effects. However, some studies argue that the 
FXIs (involving a large amount and being repeatedly conducted in the same direction) may 
conflict with monetary policy. In this case, first intervention is likely to be effective but 
subsequent ones may not. IT particularly appears not to be consistent with the regular, 
frequent or unidirectional FXIs. Rogers and Siklos (2003) find that, since the introduction of 
IT, interventions have affected volatility and uncertainty of FX rates differently in Australia 
and Canada. Tapia and Tokman (2004)’s study of the Chilean case also suggests that the 
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effect of interventions varied throughout the sample in line with monetary policy regime shift. 
There has been little evidence supporting that interventions systematically reduce FX 
volatility. Instead, many studies suggest that interventions are generally positively related 
with FX volatility, or with no effect at least in the short-run. This holds for (i) ex-post 
volatility captured by GARCH models(Baillie and Osterberg 1997, Dominguez 1998, Aguilar 
and Nydahl 2000, Edison et al. 2006, Kim and Sheen 2006), (ii) ex-ante or expected volatility 
measured by implied volatilities extracted from currency option prices (Bonser-Neal and 
Tanner 1996, Rogers and Siklos 2003, Frenkel et al 2005) and (iii) realised volatility 
measured by squared returns or integrated daily moments of exchange rate (Dominguez 2006, 
Beine et al. 2006, 2009). In particular, many studies show that secret interventions tend to 
increase FX volatility (Bonser-Neal 1996, Dominguez 1998, Frenkel et al. 2005, Kim and 
Sheen 2006).  Humpage (1999) is an exceptional work that the Fed’s leaning against the wind 
in 1987-1990 was effective in reducing FX rate volatility.  
Menkhoff (2008) documents that interventions increase FX rate volatility in the short 
run as they are regarded as information, although he admits that the interventions can reduce 
FX rate volatility in the longer period.  These results may suggest that while many CBs are 
often assumed to conduct the FXIs for smoothing short-term exchange rate volatility, 
however, in practice, they have rarely succeeded — particularly with secret interventions. 
Thus, some economists often interpret increases in volatility as an evidence of perverse or 
destabilising intervention effects. However, in the markets characterized by the information 
asymmetry, the increase in FX volatility may be associated with the spread of new 
information rather than the lack of effects of FXIs (Beine et al. 2009, p 120).  Accordingly, 
the rise of volatility may reflect the fact that traders react to the interventions. In the context 
of simultaneity problem, a comprehensive attention should be paid to examining the effects 
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on the volatility, since CBs tend to intervene during the period of high volatility.  
In summary, although the effects of sterilised interventions are not quantitatively 
large, recent evidences indicate that interventions may have very short-term effects on both 
FX rate level and volatility, particularly when the intervention is publicly informed, 
coordinated with other CBs and consistent with monetary or fiscal policy. Evidences are 
generally different depending on sample countries, sample periods and empirical 
specifications. While most studies prior to the 1990s, mostly based on portfolio balance 
channel, largely reject intervention effects, literature after the mid-1990s appears to support 
temporary or short-run intervention impacts. The evidences are not supportive of the long-
term effects both in level and in volatility. 
 
3.3.3 Profitability of sterilised FX interventions 
3.3.3.1 Theoretical discussion 
The profitability of FXIs provides one with an indirect way of assessing whether the 
intervention has been successful in stabilising exchange rates (Friedman 1953). According to 
Friedman, a CB should buy foreign currency when it is cheap and sell it when it is expensive 
in order to stabilise FX rate. Consequently, the interventions for exchange rate stabilisation 
should make a profit to be successful. Friedman’s argument would be right when CB leans 
against wind and interest earnings are not considered. Simple example is well depicted in 
Figure 3.1, which is modified from Pilbeam (2001, p 525).  
First, suppose that the BOK buys USD in the region ab where KRW appreciates and 
sells USD in the region eh where KRW depreciates. If FX rate follow the path dcfh, the 
BOK’s net purchase of USD assets will be zero and BOK will make a realised trading profit 
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at T=2, because BOK buys USD at a low price and sell it at a high price. However, if KRW 
continues to appreciate (to follow the path abi or abm), there will be a large cumulative net 
purchase of USD at T=2. In this case, the BOK experiences a (unrealised) loss by purchasing 
continuously depreciating USD. In contrast, when the BOK sells USD when KRW 
depreciates in the region dc but FX rate continues to depreciate (follow the path dcg), the 
BOK will have large cumulative net sales of USD, which will also incur loss to the BOK. 
 
Figure 3.1 Profitability of FX interventions and FX rate 
 
 
 
Consequently, if a CB succeeds in leaning against wind, and thus reverses the current 
trend of FX rate movements, intervention profits would exist. In contrast, if the CB is 
unsuccessful in leaning against the wind, the intervention will incur a loss. In this context, ex 
post intervention profit may reflect the FX rate-stabilising effect of the interventions. Shortly, 
it is likely that the intervention of “leaning against the wind”, if successful, leads to a profit. 
However, profitability does not always guarantee the effectiveness of FXIs. When FX rates 
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show an excessively persistent trend, the intervention resisting the trend can be considered 
effective in slowing down the trend, although it is not profitable. If the CB just aims for 
smoothing (or slowing down) current trend or fluctuations– not reversing it (as in the path dcl 
and abm), the intervention will be effective though unprofitable. 
Note that if the CB leans against the wind as Friedman presumed, any measurement 
of ex-post profitability will be inevitably biased by the cumulative amount of the interventions 
(Corrado and Taylor 1986). In the above figure, profits are more likely larger when net 
cumulative intervention is close to zero while intervention losses are likely to be bigger when 
net cumulative interventions are larger, i.e., when there is open long(or short) position on 
foreign currency. It naturally follows that profitability calculation heavily depends on how 
much cumulative intervention is arbitrarily allowed for – in practice, the choice of the start-
and-end dates of the interventions (Pilbeam 2001 p 525). Therefore, profitability is not 
considered a single criterion for evaluating the effect of interventions (Edison 1993 p 42; 
Sarno and Taylor 2000 p861). Furthermore, if interventions do not affect FX rates, as many 
previous studies argue, intervention could be (non)profitable without (de)stabilising FX rates. 
Accordingly, the main issue tends to change from whether intervention loss indicates 
destabilisation to whether intervention incurs loss to CBs (Sweeny 1997 p 1668).  
As for intervention profits, three arguments exist: (i) interventions are likely to be 
profitable, because CBs have more information; (ii) interventions are generally misguided and 
costly due to existence of intelligent and speculative market participants, so that the CBs are 
likely to suffer losses; and (iii) intervention losses (or profits) are expected to be zero, because 
current FX markets may be considered strong-form efficient relative to the interventions.   
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3.3.3.2 Evidence on intervention profitability 
 
True profits can be obtained from actual transaction data that are not released by any 
country. Thus, recent studies use daily intervention data at best. Because researchers generally 
do not know the exact exchange rates applied to the transaction, they mostly use end-of-day 
or daily average FX rates. Since the volatility of intra-daily FX rates is smaller than that of 
weekly, monthly or quarterly FX rate, using daily data is considered most appropriate to get 
true intervention profit (Leahy 1995, Sweeny 1997). The typical equation for measuring 
intervention profit is as follows (Edison 1993 p 43): 
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where t  is profits, iF is dollar purchased at time i,  and  are end-of period nominal 
exchange rates(domestic price of foreign currency) at time t and i respectively, and and  
are the foreign and domestic interest rates respectively at time i. According to (3.3.5), 
intervention profits are mainly determined by two elements: (i) trading profit (or capital gain) 
− the difference between the end of period exchange rate at time t and the exchange rate at 
which the intervention (to buy foreign currency) is undertaken, (ii) interest earning from 
holding foreign currency rather than domestic currency. Trading profits are divided into two 
categories: realised profits and unrealised profits.  If the CB adopts daily marking-to-market 
accounting, unrealised profits will change with daily FX rate changes. If the value of domestic 
currency continues to climb after USD-buying intervention, the CB makes a mark-to-market 
loss from the USDs accumulated. However, this loss would not actually matter for the CB, 
because there would be no immediate necessity to sell them in most cases. On the contrary, 
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the value of domestic currency falls after USD-selling interventions, there would be mark-to-
market loss from the domestic currency purchased. This loss matters for most CBs, because 
the loss occurs concurrently with reserves decrease.   
 Note that if CB sterilises the intervention, domestic interest rate does not change and 
then interest differential should be emphasized in calculating the profit. In this context, a 
sterilised FXI is a swap of interest-earning foreign assets (mostly USD-denominated) for 
interest-earning domestic assets or vice versa. Therefore, the choice of interest rates heavily 
affects the profitability calculation.  
Since previous studies mostly suggested “leaning against the wind” and “smoothing” 
as two main intervention motives, evidences on profitability are mixed. Early studies before 
the 1990s appear not to support the profitability of interventions (e.g., Taylor 1982; see 
Sweeny 1997 for the survey on empirical literatures before the mid-1990s). When CBs are 
partially successful in leaning against the wind or merely smooth out (or delay) the FX rate 
swings, they makes a loss at least in the short run as the US authority experienced in the 
1970s. However, these studies have limits in using foreign reserves as a proxy for 
interventions and in relying on too simplified calculations.   
Literature after the mid-1990s (which uses intervention data) seems to more support 
the positive profit. For example, Neely (1998) shows that CBs generally make profits in the 
long run, although the profits may vary depending on sample periods. Ito(2003), and Becker 
and Sinclair(2004) find that the interventions in Japan and Australia are profitable in terms of 
realised capital gains, unrealised capital gains, and interest earnings. Particularly, low 
domestic interest rate in Japan enabled Japanese authorities to gain persistent positive interest 
earnings throughout 1991-2001. See Appendix 3.1(c) for the results of concurrent studies on 
intervention profitability.  
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3.3.4 Impacts of oral interventions 
 
Recent studies have focused on the effect of communication or oral interventions 
used to convey the CB’s intention of intervention, since major developed economies have 
virtually abandoned actual FXIs since the late 1990s. Oral interventions or communication 
may affect exchange rates and interest rates via a coordination channel in which the CB 
statements play a role as a coordination that induces market views to converge and move in a 
desired direction (Sarno and Taylor 2001, Fratzscher 2008).  
The intervention communication appears to have somewhat stronger effect on FX 
volatility, but it still looks ambiguous in influencing exchange rate level.  General conclusion 
is that the effect of the communication is more significantly asymmetric than actual 
interventions and oral interventions for supporting domestic currency are more likely to fail 
than those for inducing domestic currency depreciation. According to this view, intervention 
communications during the crises periods may not have significant effects. Fatum and 
Hutchison (2002), using both time series and event study of news generated by the ECB, 
suggest that markets respond differently to several types of news about interventions. They 
argue that only negative statement denying past interventions or ruling out future 
interventions appears to have persistent effects, but the market participants apparently ignore 
official statements supporting euro. Park and Song (2003), using the statements reported in 
newspapers, analyze the effects of oral interventions by Japanese government. Oral 
interventions are effective when carried out with actual intervention and during peace times. 
The effects of oral interventions are insignificant during the turmoil times like financial crisis. 
Beine and Lecourt (2004) conclude that CB’s statements (during intervention periods) are 
effective, particularly in reducing FX volatility. Jansen and de Haan (2007) report that ECB 
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statements do not influence the FX level but decrease FX volatility temporarily. Oral 
interventions, if coinciding with releases of macroeconomic data, are effective in reducing FX 
volatility. They also agree with Fatum and Hutchison (2002) that the statements of supporting 
euro have not, in general, been successful. However, Fratzscher (2005, 2008a) argues that oral 
interventions can affect both FX level and volatility. Conducting an event study for the ECB, 
the Fed and the BOJ, he suggests that oral interventions have significant effects on daily 
exchange rates in the desired direction. Communications reduce FX volatility on the days 
following the interventions while actual interventions mostly increase volatility.  
 
3.3.5 Interventions in emerging economies 
It seems that the CBs in emerging economies tend to intervene more frequently than 
their counterparts in developed economies do due to their higher exchange rate pass-through, 
greater openness or greater foreign currency liability. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue that 
despite the increasing number of countries allowing more flexible FX rates, stabilising FX 
rates still remain as a high priority among emerging economies in which policy credibility is 
lower, and exchange rate pass-through to inflation is higher – that is ‘fear of floating’. More 
volatile exchange rate movements may force the authorities in these countries to intervene 
more. For example, Cavoli and Rajan (2006b, 2007) find that as exchange rates have, in 
general, become more volatile, the post-crisis interventions are more frequent than pre-crisis 
(but less frequent than during the crisis), due to the prevailing fear of floating in most of the 
crisis-experiencing emerging countries. Hausmann et al.(2001a, 2001b) document that 
emerging countries (with a formally flexible regime) are more inclined to intervene to reduce 
FX rate volatility because of their inability to borrow in international capital markets in their 
domestic currency, the so-called “original sin”. Aghion et al.(2000) theoretically show that 
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emerging countries with greater foreign currency debt will optimally choose less exchange 
rate flexibility and thus tend to more involve in FX interventions under de jure floating 
regimes. CBs in dollarized economies need to build up foreign reserves to serve as a lender of 
last resort to commercial banks with high level of foreign currency liabilities. Kamil (2008) 
and Fiess and Shankar (2009) provide evidence that the countries with high external liabilities 
relative to assets tend to maintain a high level of interventions. 
Some studies argue that the FXIs are likely to be more effective in emerging 
countries than in advanced countries due to (i) relatively less complete sterilisation, (ii) larger 
amount of intervention compared to market turnover, (iii) information advantage of CBs and 
(iv) moral persuasion (Canales-Kriljenko 2003). 
However, it is evident that frequent interventions may lead to inconsistencies 
between interventions and contemporaneous monetary stance particularly under inflation 
targeting. A few studies have recently paid attention to whether interventions take place 
independently of contemporaneous monetary policy implementation in emerging economies 
(Gnabo et al. 2010).  Evidences are ambiguous. For example, FXIs are conducted in 
cooperation with monetary setting in the Czech Republic but not in Brazil where both are 
carried out independently (Gnabo et al 2010). Overall, FXIs appear not effective as an 
independent policy tool under float regimes cum IT, because the interventions tend to be more 
effective when they are consistent with monetary stance, as signalling channel suggests.   
Empirical studies on intervention effects in emerging countries are still scant due to 
the very limited official intervention data and the difficulties in modeling policy reaction 
function with high-frequency time series analysis (Guimaraes and Karacadag 2004, p 3).  
Although being highly sample-dependent, several studies help to understand the cases of 
emerging economies broadly. With regard to the intervention channels, portfolio balance 
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model predicts that interventions are more effective in emerging countries than in advanced 
countries because of low asset substitutability. Moreover, portfolio channel may be supported 
by the facts that emerging countries have large foreign reserves relative to domestic FX 
market turnover or the stock of domestic bond outstanding. Microstructure channel, which 
expects that the amount of interventions relative to market turnover is crucial, also suggests 
that FXIs may be more effective in emerging economies (Archer 2005).   
On the contrary, from a signalling perspective, it is not clear whether interventions 
have stronger effects on exchange rates in emerging economies than in developed economies. 
As CBs in emerging countries have a shorter history of institutional backgrounds and lower 
policy credibility than their counterparts in developed countries, signalling channel may be 
weaker in emerging countries. Consequently, monetary policy signal to the market is not 
likely to influence the level or volatility of exchange rate (Domac and Mendoza 2002). On the 
other hand, because financial markets in emerging countries are less developed and thinner 
than those in advanced countries, CB may have superior information stemming from 
reporting requirements (Canales and Kriljenko 2003). In this case, if the CB credibly and 
publicly announces the information to the market, signalling channel can work well in the 
emerging markets (Tapia and Tokman 2004, Guimaraes and Karacadag 2004). In practice, 
however, few emerging countries release the information. 
FXIs, in general, appear effective for containing FX volatility in emerging economies 
(Oura 2008, Domac and Mendoza 2002, Abenoja 2003). For example, Abenoja(2003) 
suggests that Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas(BSP) has intervened less, in terms of frequency and 
magnitude, and has been relatively symmetric in its intervention since 1997 financial crisis. 
He suggests that sizable and persistent interventions do affect the exchange rate in the desired 
direction, and help to reduce FX rate volatility. Nevertheless, the evidence of intervention 
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effects on FX rate level in emerging economies are still relatively ambiguous just like those in 
developed countries (Disyatat and Galati 2005).  
In summary, recent empirical studies suggest several significant aspects of the FXIs 
in emerging economies: (i) The interventions in these countries may have somewhat stronger 
impacts on exchange rate than those in developed countries; (ii) The interventions may affect 
exchange rates volatility particularly in the short run; (iii) The intervention under IT may have 
different effects in line with the evolution of inflation; (iv) There may be more room for the 
application of portfolio balance model.  
 
3.3.6 Recent studies on FX interventions in Korea, Japan and Australia 
This section briefly summarizes the recent evidences on the intervention effects in 
Korea, Japan and Australia. The studies on FXIs in Korea have focused on the intervention 
effects during the managed float regime from early 1990 until 1997 using OLS, VAR or 
GARCH. Most studies have analyzed relatively long-term effects of interventions using 
monthly or quarterly foreign reserve data as a proxy for intervention.  As capital mobility has 
become rapid since the 1997 financial crisis, research interests have switched from portfolio 
balance to signalling model, because theories expect that FXIs work mainly through 
signalling effects under freer capital mobility. Most studies appear to suggest that (i) 
interventions affect the FX rate level only in the short run (e.g. at most within a month); (ii) 
main intervention motives are leaning-against-the-wind or smoothing; (iii) interventions are 
heavily influenced by the changes in trade competitiveness. 
 Using monthly data on foreign reserves and VAR model, Rhee (1997) suggests that 
the FXIs have only temporary effects on exchange rates and that intervention objective was 
mainly to lean against the wind. Park (1998) supports Rhee (1997) by using exchange market 
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pressure and intervention index. Ryou and Kim (1998) examine the motives for FXIs using a 
VECM consisting of six variables (current account, capital account, FXIs, domestic credit, 
inflation rate and won/dollar exchange rate). They find that the BOK responds more to capital 
account shock than to current account shocks. Lee et al. (1998) provide evidence of 
significant signalling channel by examining changes in the BOK’s daily foreign exchange 
position. They find that FXIs influence KRW/USD rate to the direction intended by the BOK. 
However, the effect does not last long.  
Both Ryou and Kim (1998) and Lee et al.(1998) report strong tendency for resisting 
KRW appreciation by examining statistical properties rather than by adopting elaborated 
econometric methods. Ryoo (2003), Choi (2001), and Rhee and Song (1999) find that 
sterilised interventions had significant, short-term effects on the level and direction of FX rate 
in Korea. However, these studies have limited implications for understanding current 
interventions, partly because sample periods are confined to the pre-crisis period when 
managed float was prevailed, and partly because the proxies for interventions were not perfect. 
As capital markets nearly completely opened to foreigners and monetary regime shifted from 
monetary targeting to IT after 1997-98 crisis, FXIs are likely to be less effective in Korea, as 
Rhee and Song (1999) predicted.  
The studies on the interventions of Australia and Japan have been based on longer 
historical time series and higher frequency data than those on Korea. The evidences on 
Australian interventions suggest that RBA interventions have fairly short-lived effects on FX 
rate level – interventions are mostly effective only on intervention day (Kearns and Rigobon 
2005, Newman et al. 2011). Interventions are not successful in reducing FX rate volatility in 
the short-term perspective (McKenzie 2004, Edison et al. 2003, Rogers and Siklos 2003). 
Most studies find that RBA intervenes in FX market to smooth FX rate fluctuations rather 
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than to change FX rate level (Kim and Sheen 2002, Kearns and Rigobon 2005).  However, 
most studies appear not entirely free from simultaneity problem (Newman et al 2011).  
The evidences on Japanese interventions provide somewhat different implications. 
Japanese interventions appear to have more significant effects on FX rate level and volatility 
than Australian ones do (Dominguez 2003a, Fatum and Hutchison 2006). In particular, 
interventions are effective irrespective of consistency with interest rate changes and secrecy 
(Fatum and Hutchison 2006). Japanese authority  appears to target explicit or implicit FX rate 
level – e.g. 125JPY/USD in 1991M4-2001M3 (Ito 2003) and implicit target in 1993M9-
1996M4(Galati et al 2005). However, in the 2000s, Japanese authorities appear to respond 
only to increasing uncertainty, i.e. severe fluctuation in FX rates, rather than targeting FX rate 
level (Galati et al 2005). In accordance with the changes in intervention objectives, 
intervention pattern appears to shift from small-scale and frequent to large-scale and 
infrequent interventions in the mid-1990s (Ito 2003, Ito and Yabu 2007). It is conceived that, 
in the short-run perspective, interventions are relatively successful in adjusting FX rate level 
as desired when interventions are infrequent and large (Ito 2003). Note that evidence on 
relatively successful intervention in Japan may be partly ascribed to non-sterilisation of FX 
intervention due to close-to-zero interest rate, which blurred the difference between sterilised 
and unsterilised interventions (Fatum and Hutchison 2006, Hillebrand and Schnabl 2003). 
That is, Japanese interventions were unsterilised sometimes – e.g. in 2003-2004(Fatum and 
Hutchison 2006), because unsterilised purchases of USD (sales of JPY) are expected to boost 
export and increase the monetary base. This contrasts to the other advanced economies where 
interventions are almost completely sterilised (Neely 2000). Many studies on Japanese 
intervention identify structural breaks in intervention policy in the mid-1990s (Ito 2003). See 
Appendix 3.1 for the main findings of recent studies on interventions in Japan and Australia. 
77 
3.4. Data and methodologies 
 
3.4.1 FX interventions in Korea, Japan and Australia 
 
We use daily data to delve into the impacts and profitability of sterilised 
interventions in Korea, Japan and Australia. Although there are several economies like the 
U.S and Euro area (in which daily intervention data are also available), we exclude these 
countries, because their last interventions were carried out a decade ago,25 and they are thus 
not appropriate for comparison analyses. Sample period is 2001M1-2010M3 for Korea, 
1991M4-2004M3 for Japan and 1989M1-2008M12 for Australia. Considering the 
institutional changes or the results of previous empirical studies (Taylor 2009, Ito and Yabu 
2007, Ito 2003, Newman et al. 2011), we divide samples into two subsamples26 and estimate 
parameter separately:  
 Korea: pre-subprime (10/9/2001-31/7/2007), post-subprime (1/8/2007-23/3/2010) 
 Japan: pre-Sakakibara (4/4/1990-30/6/1995), post-Sakakibara (1/7/1995-31/3/2004) 
 Australia: pre-IT (5/1/1989-31/7/1992), post-IT (3/8/1992-31/12/2008) 
 
Intervention data are domestic-currency values of interventions in US dollar. The 
daily intervention data on Japan and Australia are officially announced ones while the data on 
25 Since the late 1990s, FXIs have become much less frequent in many developed countries. For instance, FRB 
has intervened only twice since August 15, 1995. Similarly, both the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank 
ceased interventions entirely in 1995. The launch of the ECB in 1999 let member countries be free from the 
obligation of adjusting their exchange rates with a certain level under the ERM II. The ECB has not intervened 
since the late 2000. Even RBA and BOJ, traditionally frequent market interventors, have intervened less 
frequently last decade 
26BOJ and RBA did not intervene in the market after March 2004 and December 2008 until the end of 2010. 
Thus, we exclude the periods from our sample. Most important institutional changes are the introduction of IT in 
Australia (Jan. 1993), inauguration of Dr. Sakakibara as a chief of Japanese interventions (Jun. 1995), and the 
advent of US-subprime mortgage crisis in Korea (Aug. 2007).Taylor (2009, p1) supposes that the subprime crisis 
flared up and began to shock most major countries in August 2007. Ito (2003) and Ito and Yabu (2007) suggest 
that there was a significant shift of Japanese FX intervention operations in June 1995.  
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Korea are not actual intervention data but estimated ones.27 Nominal FX rates are closing spot 
rates in FX markets in Seoul, Tokyo and Sydney. Using end-of-day spot rate helps to address 
simultaneity problems. Money market rates are average overnight unsecured call rates in 
Japan and Korea, and average cash rate in Australia. The intervention amount (denominated 
as local currency) is measured as purchasing and selling amount of USD. For Japan, we 
include only JPY-USD interventions (345 observations during the sample period) and exclude 
19 euro-JPY and 4 Indonesian rupiah-USD interventions. All interventions in Korea were 
conducted in KRW-USD FX markets. These high frequency data on Korea are collected from 
the Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) and the Korean Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance. The data on Japan and Australia are all obtained from the website of the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance (www.mof.go.jp) and Reserve Bank of Australia 
(www.rba.gov.au), respectively. 
Table 3.3 shows that most interventions seem to have been conducted to resist 
domestic currency appreciation in Korea and Japan. In terms of the intervention amount 
(frequency), the ratios of USD-purchasing intervention (to total interventions) are 
63.8 %(69.8%) and 92.8%(90.4%) in Korea and Japan, respectively. Most interventions are to 
purchase USD in Japan and Korea except for the crisis periods - e.g. 1997-1998 financial 
crises in Japan and 2008-2009 subprime crises in Korea. This indicates that BOK and BOJ 
appear to more care about domestic-currency appreciation rather than depreciation in peaceful 
times. In contrast, most interventions in Australia were to aim for selling USD after the 
introduction of IT in 1993 − USD-buying interventions have not been undertaken since then. 
Note that Japanese intervention patterns significantly changed from frequent/small 
27 Korea’s daily intervention data is obtained from estimation of the changes in daily foreign exchange positions 
of the BOK and the Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund, with consideration of the valuation effects of FX rate 
changes and return from the foreign reserves. Thus, the intervention data may include BOK FX trading whose 
aim is not FX intervention (e.g. portfolio rebalancing). There is hence a limit on interpreting the estimation 
results in the case of Korea, because the data do not completely sort out non-intervention transactions. 
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scale to infrequent/large scale in June 1995, when Dr. Sakakibara became Director General of 
the International Finance Bureau of Ministry of Finance (Ito and Yabu 2007 p197). Average 
amount of USD-purchasing (USD-selling) intervention increased from 50.1(29.2) billion JPY 
to 328.6 (684.4) billion JPY between two subsample periods.  During the post-Sakakibara 
period, BOJ conducted the largest USD-selling intervention (19.9 billion USD) on 10, April 
1998 and the largest USD-purchasing intervention (13.6 billion USD) on 3, April 2000.   
 
Table 3.3 Statistics on the types of interventions in three countries 
(Unit: 100 mill. KRW, 100 mill. JPY, mill AUD) 
 
Purchase of USD Sales of USD Total intervention 
Amount 
(a) 
Frequency 
(b) 
Average 
(a/b) 
Amount 
(c) 
Frequency 
(d) 
Average 
(c/d) 
Amount 
(a+c) 
Frequency 
(b+d) 
K
or
ea
 Whole 
1,687,500 497 3,395 955,700 215 4,445 2,643,200 712 
(63.8) (69.8) 
 
(36.2) (30.2) 
 
(100.0) (100.0) 
Pre-
subprime 
1,337,500 393 3,403 65,900 35 1,883 1,403,400 428 
(95.3) (91.8)  (4.7) (8.2)  (100.0) (100.0) 
Post-
subprime 
350,000 104 3,365 889,800 180 4,943 1,239,800 284 
(28.2) (36.6)  (71.8) (63.4)  (100.0) (100.0) 
Ja
pa
n 
Whole 
635,402 312 2,037 48,933 33 1,483 684,335 345 
(92.8) (90.4) 
 
(7.2) (9.6) 
 
(100.0) (100.0) 
Pre-
Sakakibara 
70,126 140 501 7,872 27 292 77,998 167 
(89.9) (83.8)  (10.1) (16.2)  (100.0) (100.0) 
Post-
Sakakibara 
562,276 172 3,286 41,061 6 6,844 606,337 178 
(93.2) (96.6)  (6.8) (3.4)  (100.0) (100.0) 
A
us
tr
al
ia
 Whole 
16,016 293 55 28,699 180 159 44,715 473 
(35.8) (61.9) 
 
(64.2) (38.1) 
 
(100.0) (100.0) 
Pre-IT 
16,016 293 55 11,325 81 140 27,341 374 
(58.6) (78.3)  (41.4) (21.7)  (100.0) (100.0) 
Post-IT 
0 0 0 17,373 99 175 17,373 99 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (100.0) (100.0)  (100.0) (100.0) 
Note: 1. The data of Japan and Australia are official ones while those of Korea are estimated ones.  
          2. The figures in ( ) indicate the proportions to total interventions. 
 Sources: Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance, BOK, Japanese Ministry of Finance, BOJ, RBA 
 
Table 3.4 displays the magnitudes of market turnover and FX interventions in major 
countries. In terms of the absolute amount of market turnover, the size of FX market is much 
bigger in Japan and Australia than in Korea. However, the intervention amount (as share of 
market turnover) is much bigger in Korea than in Japan and Australia. For example, BOK’s 
average USD-purchasing intervention during the sample period occupies 1.47% of daily 
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market turnover of 2004 while USD-purchasing intervention of BOJ and RBA takes up 0.88% 
and 0.04%, respectively.  
Table 3.4 FX interventions as share of FX market turnover 
(Unit: billion USD, %) 
  
 FX market turnover1 FX intervention2 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 USD-buying USD-selling 
Korea 3.56 9.81 20.53 35.24 48.32  0.3021  0.3956 
  (0.17) (0.58) (0.99) (0.82) (0.96) <1.47> <1.93> 
Australia 48.31 54.03 107.14 176.29 192.05 0.0385 0.1120 
  (2.30) (3.19) (5.18) (4.12) (3.80) <0.04> <0.10> 
Japan 146.27 152.7 207.41 250.22 312.33 1.8287 1.3314 
  (6.97) (9.03) (10.03) (5.84) (6.18) <0.88> <0.64> 
UK 685.16  541.7 835.28  1483.21  1,853.59   
  (32.64) (32.02) (40.38) (34.65) (36.66)   
US 383.36 272.58 498.64  745.20  904.36   
  (18.26) (16.11) (24.11) (17.41) (17.89)   
World total 2099.42 1691.73 2068.49 4281.1 5056.44     
Notes: 1. BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity, September, 2010. 
            2. Average intervention amount (denominated by domestic currency) ÷ average FX rate (domestic currency/USD) 
 during sample periods. 
            3. (     ) indicates share to world total market turnover. 
            4. < > denotes share to FX market turnover in 2004. 
Data: BIS(2010), Datastream 
 
Figure 3.2 to 3.4 show FX rates and interventions in three countries. As expected, 
many observations have the value of zero during considerable periods and the interventions 
seem persistent. Overall, Korean and Japanese authorities seem to respond more sensitively to 
the domestic-currency appreciation than the depreciation while RBA appears more concerned 
about the domestic-currency depreciation.  Figure 3.2 demonstrates nominal FX rates of 
KRW against USD and 100 JPY, and the amount of FXIs by Korean authorities.  
KRW appreciated against both USD and JPY before the advent of sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the late 2007. A large interest rate differential (especially during the early 
period of IT) and capital inflows (associated with rapid economic recovery and completion of 
capital account opening in the early 2000s) were key factors to the KRW appreciation. Except 
for the sub-prime crisis periods (2007M7-2010M3), most interventions were to buy USDs.   
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Figure 3.2 FX interventions and FX rates in Korea (2001M9-2010M3) 
 
              Notes: 1.  Unlike Japan and Australia, Korean authorities do not officially release intervention data. The 
data used here are esimated from daily data on foreign exchange positions of the authorities.  
2. A cumulative FXI is measured by accumulative sum of net USD purchases. 
              Source: BOK, and Ministry of Strategy and Finance  (Unit of amount: 100 billion KRW) 
 
Note that KRW/JPY and KRW/USD rates diverged at times. For example, 
KRW/JPY rates fell while KRW/USD rate rose in early 2001 and KRW/JPY rates went up 
while KRW/USD rates went down in 2005. Thus, it is probable that USD-purchasing 
interventions occur while KRW depreciated against USD but appreciated against JPY, if BOK 
is concerned with export competitiveness. Cumulative FXIs (measured as cumulative net 
purchase of USD) persistently increased before the sub-prime crisis period. 
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Figure 3.3 illustrates that JPY/USD fluctuated within the relatively narrow bounds of 
135 and 105 for most sample period. JPY/USD rate reached its historical lows at 80.6 in April 
1995 from its peak 159.7 in April 1990, and then rose up to 144JPY/USD in April 1998. 
Japanese intervention appears to be predominantly against the appreciation of JPY except for 
the period of financial turmoil in late 1997- early 1998 when BOJ intervened to support 
crumpling JPY.   
 
Figure 3.3 FX interventions and FX rates in Japan (1991M4-2004M3) 
 
                          Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance (unit of amount: 100 billion JPY) 
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Ito (2003) and Ito and Yabu (2007) argue that BOJ sold USD (purchased JPY) when 
the JPY/USD rate were above 125 and purchased USD (sold JPY) when JPY/USD rates were 
below 125 during the 1990s. If this is the case, there will be large profit to BOJ. The plot of 
cumulative FXIs shows that BOJ have conducted persistent USD-buying interventions to 
induce the JPY-depreciation in the late-1990s and the early 2000s.  
Figure 3.4 demonstrates that although AUD appreciated persistently as a KRW did in 
the 2000s, RBA’s interventions seem significantly different from those of BOK. AUD 
depreciated against USD before 2001, and then continued to appreciate before sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in 2007-2008. However, RBA never conducted USD-purchasing interventions 
during the period of AUD appreciation in 2002-2007. Note that RBA’s cumulative FXIs have 
been negative since the late 1993 as RBA increased USD-selling intervention. This may 
indicate that RBA seems less concern about the pressure of AUD appreciation in recent times.  
Overall, RBA’s interventions became less frequent after mid 1992 like those of other 
CBs in most advanced countries. In particular, RBA shifted intervention pattern from 
alteration of USD-selling and USD-purchasing to a series of less frequent USD-selling 
intervention − no USD-purchasing intervention after mid-1992 (Newman et al 2011, p70). 
This shift is ascribed to RBA’s strong response to the consistent depreciation pressure in mid-
1990s-early 2000s (mainly stemming from current account deficit) in line with the 
introduction of inflation targeting in 1993. This sharply contrasts with the Korean case where 
BOK mostly undertook USD-buying intervention to address the appreciation pressure. 
The massive accumulations of foreign reserve in Korea and Japan are apparently 
ascribed to the predominance of USD-purchasing interventions while relatively slow increase 
in foreign reserves in Australia reflects the less frequency of USD purchasing interventions.   
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Figure 3.4 FX interventions and FX rates in Australia (1989M1-2008M12) 
 
                         Source: RBA (unit of amount: million AUD) 
 
 
 
3.4.2 Methodologies 
 
Simultaneity is a typical problem we encounter when estimating intervention effects 
on FX level and volatility. That is, both exchange rate (dependent variable) and intervention 
(explanatory variable) may be endogenous, because they are determined simultaneously 
(Neely 2005). In this case, covariance between explanatory variables and residual is not zero, 
so that standard OLS may yield biased estimators. The degree of endogeneity is large 
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particularly when we estimate intervention impacts on FX volatility, because interventions 
usually occur at volatile times. 
To address the simultaneity problem, three methods have been suggested. Firstly, 
many studies consider only lagged effects of interventions and exclude the contemporaneous 
effects (Lewis 1995; Beine 2004). However, this approach is not satisfactory since 
interventions are conducted in real time during a day and the effect is very short-lived, as 
shown by many literatures using intra-daily data.  Secondly, using dummies for persistent and 
large-scale interventions makes it possible to see whether the isolation of these unusual 
interventions can avoid the simultaneity bias (Kim and Sheen 2002, 2006, Newman et al. 
2011). Third approach is to use an identification scheme that allows for estimating the model 
that includes contemporaneous intervention impacts (Kearns and Rigobon 2005). We mainly 
follow the first and the second approach to address simultaneity problems. In addition, we 
estimate traditional intervention profit to see whether FX interventions are profitable and 
thereby stabilise the FX rates. From the general conclusion drawn from the previous literature, 
we consider several hypotheses to be tested:  
 
(i) FX interventions do not significantly affect FX rate level in three countries. If this is not 
the case, portfolio channel expects that intervention effects on FX rate level would be 
larger in Korea than in Japan and Australia because FX market in Korea is thinner and 
because Korea’s interventions are based on more secrecy.  
(ii) Interventions increase FX rate volatility rather than reduce it. This hypothesis is drawn 
from the general conclusion from the literature reviews as already seen in section 3.3.2 
(see also Edison 1993, Sarno and Taylor 2001).  
(iii) Interventions have more effects on short-term FX volatility rather than long-term one.  
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(iv) Interventions will be less profitable in emerging economies like Korea in which 
domestic interest rates are relatively higher than international interest rate. 
 
We apply the ACT GARCH model with daily intervention data for Korea, Japan and 
Australia in order to test hypothesis (i), (ii) and (iii) and follow Ito(2003) and Becker and 
Sinclair(2004) methodologies to test hypothesis (iv). 
 
3.4.2.1. Intervention effects:  Asymmetric Component Threshold GARCH 
 
Figure 3.5 shows end-day FX rates and their returns in Seoul, Tokyo and Sydney FX 
markets. The exchange rate returns exhibit typical volatility clustering property: large (small) 
changes are followed by large (small) changes. In other words, the volatility of FX rate return 
tends to be persistent, possibly requiring a long memory. In this case, GARCH model is 
considered most appropriate.   
 
 
Figure 3.5 Daily FX rate returns in Korea, Japan and Australia 
 
Korea (2001M6-2010M3)              Japan (1991M4-2004M3)        Australia (1989M1-2008M12) 
 
Data: Datastream 
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Spot exchange rate return
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Spot exchange rate
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Spot exchange rate return
60
80
100
120
140
160
92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Spot exchange rate
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
Spot exchange rate return
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
Spot exchange rate
87 
However, the standard GARCH model has a limit in explaining the effect of 
intervention on FX rate volatility. First, FX rate volatility is known to be asymmetrically 
affected by unexpected FX rate changes. For example, in the countries for pursuing export-
driven growth, FX rate volatility tends to respond more sensitively to the domestic-currency 
appreciation shocks than depreciation ones. Second, standard GARCH model assumes that 
FX rate volatility is constant over time. However, the volatility of FX rate return has highly 
persistent and long memory, and long-run volatility may not be constant but time-varying 
(Engle and Lee 1999). 
To tackle these limitations, we use an asymmetric component threshold (ACT) 
GARCH model suggested by Engle and Lee (1999) and applied by Guimaraes and Karacadag 
(2004) in intervention studies. Unlike the standard GARCH model with a constant long-term 
volatility, ACT-GARCH model decomposes the conditional variance into a (highly persistent 
long run) permanent component and a (very short-run) transitory component. The long-run 
component is, in general, assumed to be more persistent – equivalently, much more slowly 
mean reverting than the short-run one (Engle and Lee 1999 pp. 477-479). The core of this 
model is to allow for the mean reversion of the conditional volatility to the longer-run 
volatility and asymmetric responses of the conditional volatility to the unexpected exchange 
rate shocks. Setting up ACT-GARCH starts from the standard GARCH (1, 1) model in which 
a conditional variance is defined as:  
 
(3.4.5) )()( 121
2
1    ttt hh  
where th  is the conditional variance of t  in the mean equation (3.3.3)
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GARCH (1, 1) model, th is assumed to mean-reverts to a constant level ( ). Instead, we 
assume that th  mean-reverts to a time-varying long-run level tq  rather than constant  . 
(3.4.6) )()1()()( 1
2
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2
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Then, (3.4.5) can be transformed into:  
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Here, equation (3.4.7) is similar to (3.4.5) except that tq  replaces  . The equation 
(3.4.6) and (3.4.7) are two components of volatility in component GARCH model.28ACT-
GARCH model can be easily constructed by combining the component model with the 
asymmetric threshold ARCH model in which asymmetric effects are introduced in the 
transitory equation (3.4.7): 
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where tz is the dummy indicating negative shocks (i.e., 1tz  if 01 t  or 0tz , 
otherwise). The ACT-GARCH model consisting of (3.4.6) and (3.4.8), provides several 
implications: (i) Short-term transitory component )( tt qh   mean-reverts to zero with power of 
)( 1321  tz if 1)(0 1321  tz ; (ii) The long-run permanent component( tq ) 
converges to the constant level( ) with power of 1 , if tq  follows auto-regressive process 
(i.e., )10 1  ; (iii) This model assumes that 1)(0 11321    tz , which implies 
28Combining the permanent volatility equation (3.4.6) and  the transitory volatility equation (3.4.7) lead to:  
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That is, the component GARCH model is a (nonlinear) restricted GARCH(2, 2) model.  
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that mean-reverting speed of long-run volatility component is slower than that of short-term 
one; (iv) 3 > 0 implies the existence of transitory leverage effect
29 in conditional volatility. 
 Thus, our model allows FXIs to have different effects on short-term and long-term 
volatility component of exchange rates. Note that, in general, “the volatility of short-term 
volatility is much greater than for long horizon volatility” (Engle and Lee 1999 p 476). 
Therefore, although the intervention effects may be the parallel movement of implied FX rate 
volatilities of various maturities, the magnitude of the impact is likely to be much greater for 
the short-term volatility. The component model enables us to examine both transitory and 
(relatively) permanent volatility shock caused by FXIs.  
Based on the aforementioned theoretical background, our model consists of three 
equations: a mean equation (3.4.9) which estimates whether interventions could affect the 
level of FX rate return, two variance equations (3.4.10) and (3.4.11), which jointly estimate 
intervention effects on volatility in both short-term and long-term horizon. We include the 
same exogenous variables in both mean equation and two variance equations. Based on the 
previous studies, we consider the possibility that interventions, interest rate differential and 
country risk premium affect the FX rates. To avoid the downward bias caused by simultaneity 
problem, we include dummies for cumulative and large-sized interventions in both mean and 
variance equations, following Kim and Sheen (2002, 2006).  Holiday or weekend effects are 
not considered because inclusion of dummies for the day of the week and holiday effect in 
variance equation may lead to degenerated likelihood surface (Doornik and Ooms 2003). We 
estimate effects of USD purchases and USD sales separately to see the asymmetric effects of 
29 Leverage effect indicates the asymmetric responses of market volatility to price shocks. For example, in stock 
markets, the volatility of stock return tends to increase more by “bad” news(negative shocks) than by “good” 
news(positive shocks). Likewise, if 
3 > 0, the impact of the unexpected domestic currency appreciation ( t <0) 
on the short-term volatility component (
31   ) is greater than the impact of the unexpected depreciation ( 1 ) 
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FXIs more closely.  
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where 
tS : Log difference of end-of-the day spot FX rate (domestic currency price of USD) times 100 
B
tINT : Net purchase of USD by BOK (BOJ, RBA), which represents (average) one-off interventions 
 in 1 trill. KRW (1 trill. JPY, 1 bill. AUD) 
S
tINT : Net sales of USD by BOK (BOJ, RBA) in 1 trill. KRW (1 trill. JPY, 1 bill. AUD) 
tPERSD : Intervention persistency dummy (PERSDt=1 if the intervention at day t is preceded by the 
interventions in the same direction at day t-1 and t-2, and PERSDt=0 otherwise), which 
represents the intensity of the successive interventions (Kim and Sheen 2006). 
tSIZED : Intervention size dummy (SIZEDt=1 if the amount of intervention at day t is larger than the 
whole sample average of daily net market purchase of USD (equivalent to 340 bill. KRW; 
204 bill. JPY; 55 mill. AUD) or net market sales of USD (equivalent to 445 bill. KRW; 148 
bill. JPY; 159 mill. AUD), and SIZEDt=0 otherwise), which represents large-scale 
interventions. (Kim and Sheen 2006)   
1tDIFF : O/N interest rate differential (domestic minus US fed fund rate, percent per annum) 
1tCDS   : Credit default swap premium for 5 year Korean Treasury Bond (unit: basis point) available 
 since September 2001 for Korea; proxy for country risk (Guimaraes and Karacadag 2004) 
1 tSTOCK : Log difference of closing  stock price (KOSPI, NIKKEI 225, S&P/ASX 200) times 100; 
 proxy for the shock from asset markets(Bonser-Neal and Tanner 1996) or for portfolio 
 investments 
),0(~ 2 tt  : Error term to indicate the unexpected change in the exchange rate return 
 
Since most interventions are conducted during trading time in all three countries, the 
use of end-of-day spot rate contribute to avoiding simultaneity problems. Note, however, that 
this method also has limits because it does not reflect the intra-daily effect of interventions 
and the effects of oral interventions that frequently occur after trading time. Dummy variables 
( tPERSD  and tSIZED ) are included because successive or massive interventions may be 
considered as more credible by market participants and thus have more effects on FX rate 
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level and volatility than one-off or usual ones, (Ito 2002, Kim and Sheen 2002, Lecourt and 
Raymond 2006, Newman et al. 2011). Hence, it is probable that the coefficients of one-off 
interventions are not significant while massive or persistent interventions are significant (Ito 
2003, Lecourt and Raymond 2006). Portfolio model predicts that larger interventions would 
be more effective than average one-off interventions while signalling channel expects that 
persistent interventions are likely to have stronger effects than one-off interventions, other 
things being equal (Kim and Sheen 2002 p 629). 
However, if interventions are inconsistent with monetary policy, it may be possible 
that a first or one-off intervention is significant but subsequent or persistent interventions are 
not significant (Dominguez 2003a). In general, expected signs of B , SIZEDB,  and PERSDB,  are 
positive while S , SIZEDS ,  and PERSDS ,  are negative under ‘leaning-against-the-wind.’ If 
aforementioned coefficients have opposite signs, it implies that the CBs may lean with the 
wind. That is, the CBs wish current trends of exchange rate movement to be continued or 
strengthened. However, this is probably not the case in our sample. For example, Figure 3.2 
shows that most USD-selling interventions occurred during the US-subprime crisis in Korea, 
when the CBs had to stop rapid depreciation of KRW – that is, ‘lean against the wind.’ 
diff estimates possible impact of the changes in policy interest rate or OMOs on FX 
rate. For example, a rise in exogenous US policy interest rate and resultant decrease in interest 
rate differential may lead to an excessive overshooting(i.e. depreciation of domestic currency).
cds  measures the impacts of country risk and stock  reflects the impact of shocks from asset 
markets on FX rates. Prior expected sign of diff  and cds  may be negative and positive, 
respectively, because a larger interest rate differential and lower country risk appreciate the 
domestic currency.  
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In (3.4.10), the conditional variance of daily exchange rate return( th ) is explained as 
a function of a time-varying long-run variance( tq ), unexpected shocks relative to long-run 
variance in the previous period( 1
2
1   tt q ), transitory variance component (in the previous 
period) measured by the deviation of a conditional variance from long-term trend ( 11   tt qh ), 
interventions( BtINT and 
s
tINT ), interest rate differential( tDIFF ), country risk( tCDS ) and stock 
price changes(
tSTOCK ).   
 
(3.4.10)  short-run variance equation: 
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where tz is a dummy indicating negative shocks (i.e. unexpected FX rate 
appreciations), that is, tz = 1, when t < 0, and tz = 0 otherwise. In this component volatility 
model, an additional specification like (3.4.11) is needed to represent how time-varying long-
term volatility ( tq ) is determined.  
 
(3.4.11) Long-run variance equation: 
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In particular, tq  depends on interventions, interest rate differential ( tDIFF ), country 
risk (
tCDS ), stock price changes ( tSTOCK ), its own lag ( 1tq ) and past unexpected shock 
( 2 1t ). Here, tq  is allowed to evolve slowly in an autoregressive manner and converges to a 
constant mean ( ) while short-term volatility does not.   
 
3.4.2.2 Profitability of FX interventions 
 
The measurements of intervention profits are sensitive to the choice of sample period, 
end-of-sample FX rate, interest-rate differentials or whether profits are adjusted for risk. In 
this section, we follow a similar procedure used by Becker and Sinclair (2004) and Ito (2003). 
We assume that (i) an initial intervention position in the first date of the sample contains no 
assets and no liabilities of either currency as in Leahy (1995); (ii) we use daily average FX 
rates as the price applied to all intervention transactions during that day; and (iii) all foreign 
assets consist of USD-denominated ones; (iv) transaction costs (e.g. bid-ask spreads) are not 
considered. In addition, we do not account for the compound calculation of interest rates and 
risk adjustments as in Leahy (1995) and Becker and Sinclair (2004). Total profits ( ) 
measured in domestic currency, are calculated as the sum of realised trading profits (or capital 
gain)( ), unrealised trading profits( ) and net interest earning (or realised carry 
cost)( ), at any point of time: 
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where: is the reduction in an existing USD position, with mi > 0 for sales of USD in a long 
position, and mi < 0 for purchases of USD in a short position; 
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            is the addition to an existing USD position, with vi> 0 for purchases of USD in a long 
position, and vi< 0 for sales of USD in a short position; 
   is the FX rate at which a transaction is made (domestic currency per a USD); 
   is the weighted average FX rate at which the position is acquired; For period  t,  is 
      calculated as:  
              and are O/N domestic interest rate (i.e. unsecured call interest rate in Korea and 
Japan and cash rate in Australian) and US federal fund rate. 
 
In words, rp
t  is calculated by comparing the FX rate(et) at which USD is bought/sold 
to close out a position with the average FX rate(St) at which the position was acquired.Note 
that as a CB continues to buy (sell) USD assets, the average FX rate at which its long(short) 
position has been acquired is recalculated. Thus, St can be interpreted as an average 
purchasing (selling) price.    
rp
t is realised only when USD long (short) position is reversed by selling (buying) 
USD(i.e., when ∆mt≠0). 
up
t  is the unrealised capital gain on the remaining open USD 
position(vt) at the end of the period, and calculated by comparing average cost of establishing 
that position and the mark-to-market value of the position at the end the sample period. nit  is 
the profit (loss) stemming from the difference in interest income from holding USD assets 
(liabilities) and interest payments of maintaining the equivalent domestic currency liabilities 
(assets), summed up over the sample period.  
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3.5 Estimation results 
 
3.5.1 Impacts of interventions: ACT-GARCH model 
We conduct the unit root test for the variables included in ACT-GARCH. As seen in 
Table 3.5 intervention amounts (INT, INTs, INTb), FX rate deviation from its trend (FXDEV) 
and stock price change (∆STOCK) are I(0) while interest rate differential (DIFF) and CDS 
premium (CDS) are I (1) in three countries. Among the variables used only for Korea, MSB 
are I(1) whereas foreigners’ net purchase of Korean stock(NBUY) is I(0). Thus, we use the 
first differences of DIFF, CDS, MSB and STOCK, and the levels of INT, INTs, INTb, FXDEV 
and NBUY. 
 
Table 3.5 ADF unit root tests for intervention variables 
 Korea  Australia  Japan 
 statistics p-value  statistics p-value  statistics p-value 
INT -10.279  0.0000  -13.4081 0.0000  -17.317  0.0000 
INTb -7.6644  0.0000  -10.4056 0.0000  -16.848  0.0000 
INTs -9.1843  0.0000  -13.8492 0.0000  -55.159  0.0001 
FXDEV -2.3362  0.0189  -4.2389 0.0006  -3.4996  0.0081 
DIFF
 
-1.3461  0.8758  -0.8656 0.9581  -0.2622  0.9917 
CDS -2.4128  0.1383  -1.0903 0.7216  -2.9257 0.1558 
∆STOCK -45.5565  0.0001  -72.3719  0.0001  -61.2098  0.0001 
MSB -1.2578  0.8972  - -  - - 
NBUY -12.202  0.0000  - -  - - 
Notes: 1. An intercept is included in testing FXEDV and NBUY. Both intercept and trend term are included for DIFF, MSB, 
 STOCK and CDS; Both intercept and trends are not included in testing INT, INTb and INTs. 
            2. The number of lags is determined by SIC 
            3. CDS premium of Australia and Japan are only available for sub-periods (2/1/2003- 31/12/2008  for  Australia  
               and 6/1/2003-31/4/2004  for Japan) 
 
Here, we assume that the intervention is effective when (i) USD-selling (USD-
purchasing) interventions lead to the domestic-currency appreciation (depreciation) or (ii) 
interventions reduce FX volatility. We estimate ACT-GARCH model in two ways in order to 
investigate whether the model with considering the persistency and magnitude of intervention 
provides different estimation result from the model without them.  Model 1 does not consider 
the size and persistence of interventions while model 2 does.  
96 
The estimated models are, in general, appropriate for most periods in that all 
specifications pass diagnostic tests that are presented in the estimation result. In a few models 
(e.g. model 2 for Korea during the post-subprime period), we cannot reject autocorrelation at 
10% significant level. However, this may not be critical issues for the inference because the 
residuals are all not serially correlated at typical significant level (5%) and because we use 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992)’s robust standard errors and covariance. 
 
3.5.1.1 Korea 
3.5.1.1(a) Impacts on FX rate level 
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.6(a), 3.6(b) and 3.6(c)30.  Model 2 
appears to provide more detailed information about intervention effects than model 1.  First, 
model 1 suggests that BOK interventions do not significantly affect FX rate level regardless 
of sample periods while model 2 suggests that large interventions significantly influence the 
FX rate level.  In model 1, all coefficients on interventions are insignificant for all periods.  In 
model 2 for the whole period, estimated βB(–0.045) and βs(=0.073) are significant but wrongly 
signed while βB,SIZED (=0.039) and βS,SIZED (= –0.095) are significant and rightly signed. This 
indicates that one-off average purchasing (selling) interventions are not effective, but large-
scale USD-purchasing (selling) ones have significant effects on depreciating (appreciating) 
KRW.   
However, both βB,SIZED and βS,SIZED (although statistically significant), appear 
economically trivial, because the results indicate that a large-scale purchase(sales) of USD 
equivalent to 1 trillion KRW leads to a rise (a fall) in KRW/USD rate by 0.039%(0.095%). 
Considering average amount of interventions (approximately 340 billion KRW for USD-
30Three tables are part of a big table that shows the results of ACT-GARCH model. Thus, the information 
regarding the sample size and diagnostics are coming up in the final part of Table 3.6(c). 
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purchasing and 445 billion KRW for USD-selling, respectively; see Table 3.3) and daily 
average standard deviation of KRW/USD rate movement (0.7% for the entire sample period, 
see Appendix 3.2(b)), the effect of both interventions may be too much small.  
Second, relatively infrequent USD-selling interventions may be effective but 
frequent USD-purchasing interventions may not. USD-selling interventions are significant 
and rightly signed in all periods once they are either large or persistent.  See βS,SIZED(= –0.095) 
for the whole period,  βS,PERSD(= –0.124) for the pre-subprime period and  βS,SIZED(= –0.068) 
for the post-subprime period. Overall, infrequent interventions (but are persistent or large 
once they occur) may have more significant effects than frequent and usual ones. Intervention 
effects look more prominent in USD-selling interventions that have been carried out less 
frequently (but more intensively) than USD-purchasing interventions.  
Third, country risk significantly affects FX rate level particularly for crisis period in 
Korea as does in other small open emerging countries (see Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004) 
for the case of Mexico and Turkey). Model 2 suggests that 1 basis point increase in CDS 
spread depreciates KRW against USD by 0.016% during the post-subprime period. Because 
foreigners’ share in Korean stock market has maintained around 30-40%31 during the entire 
sample period − highest in Asia, it appears that volatile short-term portfolio investments 
(which are sensitive to changes in country risk) play a crucial role in FX rate movements. This 
somewhat contrasts with Japan and Australia in which country risk is relatively more stable, 
so that it is less influential in FX rate movements.32 
31 Foreigners’ share in total market value of all-listed Korean equities has increased since the limit on foreigners’ 
investments was completely lifted in 2000: 19.6%(1998)→30.1%(2000)→  36.0%(2002)→42.0%(2004)→
37.3%(2006)→29.4%(2010M11) (source: Korea Exchange - http://eng.krx.co.kr). The survey on foreigners’ 
share in stock market among 33 countries shows that the foreigners’ share is the highest in Korea among 
emerging countries as of the end of 2006 (Korean Financial Service Commission 2007) 
32 When we estimate mean equations with CDS spreads for the sub-periods (2/1/2003-31/12/2008 for Australia 
and 6/1/2003-31/4/2004 for Japan), the coefficients on CDS are insignificant in both countries. βcds is 0.0042 
with p-value 0.5212 in case of Japan and  βcds  is 0.0092 with p-value 0.6874  in case of Australia. 
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Fourth, interest rate differential appears not to influence FX rate level in Korea as in 
Australia and Japan, indicating that monetary channel may not work or that there is little 
possibility of overshooting on a daily basis. This result appears consistent with several 
previous studies on the relationship between short-term interest rate and FX rates. For 
example, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) find that the change in policy interest rates by the 
BOE, the Fed and the ECB do not influence FX rates. Jansen and de Haan (2007) also report 
that the ECB’s statements of raising policy interest rate lead to a slight depreciation of euro, 
contrary to the standard monetary theory. The weak relationship between interest rate 
differential and FX rates may be because monetary policies deeply synchronized and because 
policy interest rates remained at a low level in major countries with international financial 
markets rapidly integrated during the last decade.  However, our evidence may have 
limitations, because it considers only short-term (daily-based) impact of interest rate 
differential on FX rates. Intuitively, sustained large interest rate differential could encourage 
portfolio investments to move from low-interest-rate to high-interest-rate country, and thereby 
influence the FX rates.  
Fifth, stock price changes do not have economically significant effect on FX rates 
level. Model 2 suggests that βstock is insignificant in all periods. According to Model 1 for the 
entire period, βstock (=0.00058) is statistically significant but economically trivial, because the 
coefficient indicates that 1% increase in stock price lead to the depreciation of KRW by 
0.0006%.33 
33 As for the relationship between FX rates and stock price, previous studies have provided mixed results. 
Granger et al. (2000)’s work for Asian countries support the bivariate causality between two while Ajayi and 
Mougoue (1996)’s study for 8 advanced economies suggest that stock price increases cause the depreciation of 
domestic currency especially in the U.S. and the U.K. Ajayi and Mougoue (1996) interpret the results as follows:  
stock price ↑→ expectation on expanding economy ↑→ expected inflation ↑→ value of domestic currency ↓. 
In contrast, the positive relationship between stock price and FX rate is interpreted as follows: stock price ↑→ 
expectation on expanding economy ↑→ capital inflows ↑→ value of domestic currency ↑. 
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Table 3.6(a) Mean equation of ACT – GARCH: Korea 
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Whole sample(10/9/2001-23/3/2010) Pre-subprime(10/9/2001-31/7/2007) Post-subprime(1/8/2007-23/3/2010) 
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
(i) Constant (β0)  -0.02656
*** 0.0050 0.00167 0.8974 -0.03468*** 0.0025 -0.02336*** 0.0070 -0.03189* 0.0670 0.00713 0.6600 
(ii)USD-purchasing intervention              
 One-off (βB) (+) 0.00117 0.8170 -0.04536*** 0.0042 0.00090 0.8506 -0.03505** 0.0117 0.00809 0.2118 -0.01917 0.5456 
 Persistent (βB,PERSD) (+)   0.00683 0.6627   -0.00731 0.2225   -0.02563 0.1350 
 Large-scale (βB,SIZED) (+)   0.03901** 0.0131   0.04168*** 0.0025   0.02793 0.3816 
(iii)USD-selling intervention              
 One-off (βS) (-) -0.00156 0.7868 0.07287** 0.0399 -0.00655 0.7926 0.04462 0.1855 -0.00073 0.8660 0.05967*** 0.0074 
 Persistent (βS,PERSDD) (-)   0.02161 0.3882   -0.12423*** 0.0010   -0.00931 0.2968 
 Large-scale  (βS,SIZED) (-)   -0.09489*** 0.0083   0.00156 0.9732   -0.06801*** 0.0032 
(iv) Interest differential(βdiff) (-) 0.11807 0.1259 0.19159 0.3121 0.17493
* 0.0846 0.13774 0.1519 -0.08917 0.1268 -0.11466 0.3810 
(v) CDS spread (βcds) (+) 0.00315 0.2066 0.01709
* 0.0568 0.00132 0.6608 0.00225 0.1170 0.01407* 0.0957 0.01577** 0.0165 
(vi) Stock price (βstock)  0.00058
** 0.0487 -0.00507 0.4991 0.00155 0.8051 -0.00533 0.3806 0.00862* 0.0599 0.00217 0.8454 
Notes:  1. ***, ** and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
             2. The coefficients on interventions in mean equation give the impact of the intervention of purchasing (selling) USD equivalent to 1 trill.KRW. 
             3.  Signs of coefficients indicate the prior expectation when the intervention is effective in leaning against the wind. 
             4. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors and covariances are used. 
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3.5.1.1(b) Impacts on FX rate volatility 
Table 3.6(b) and 3.6(c) present the estimation of two variance equations. In Table 
3.6(b), the coefficient η1 (that is close to 1) shows the persistence of long-term volatility 
components as this model expects. Overall, interventions appear not to influence the long-
term volatility irrespective of model specification and sample periods concerned. All 
coefficients of interventions (ψB, ψB,PERSD, ψB,SIZED, ψS, ψS,PERSD, ψS,SIZED) are insignificant 
regardless of models, so that the long-term volatility components appears to be affected by 
non-intervention factors like economic fundamentals. Model 2 suggests that CDS spread 
increases long-term volatility components, indicating a consistent effect of country risk on 
long-term volatility: ψcds is significant in all periods in 3.6(b), implying that a rise in CDS 
spread increases long-term volatility. 
Table 3.6(c) shows the factors affecting short-term FX volatility. Comparing Table 
3.6(b) and 3.6(c), we can find that (γ1+γ2)<η1, γ1>η2 and 1)(0 11321    tz , indicating 
that mean-reverting speed of long-run volatility is slower than that of short-term one. These 
results show that this model reflects higher persistence of long-term volatility than short-term 
volatility. Model 1 suggests that most interventions do not have significant effects on short-
term volatility: λB and λs are insignificant in all periods, implying that one-off average 
interventions are not effective. Model 2, however, suggests that interventions possibly have an 
effect on reducing volatility in short-term perspective. For example, λB,SIZED (=− 0.005)is 
significant at 5% level for the pre-subprime period, indicating large-scale USD-purchasing 
interventions reduce short-term volatility in peaceful times.  
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Table 3.6(b) Long-term variance equation of A CT–GARCH: Korea 
 
 
Whole sample(10/9/2001-23/3/2010) Pre-subprime(10/9/2001-31/7/2007) Post-subprime(1/8/2007-23/3/2010) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
(i)  Constant(ω) 0.20196*** 0.0005 0.44130*** 0.0000 0.12673*** 0.0000 0.11169*** 0.0000 0.36868*** 0.0008 0.41819** 0.0460 
(ii)  Own lag(η1) 0.97609
*** 0.0000 0.83016*** 0.0000 0.94445*** 0.0000 0.86045*** 0.0000 0.88315*** 0.0000 0.97148*** 0.0000 
(iii) Unexpected shocks (η2) 0.10464
*** 0.0000 0.04996*** 0.0000 0.05921 0.8105 0.32520 0.7609 0.16539** 0.0176 0.14667 0.2056 
(iv)  USD-Purchasing intervention             
 One-off  (ψB) 0.00083 0.2814 0.03632 0.5632 0.02208 0.3331 0.02623 0.7681 0.01241 0.2476 0.03086 0.2799 
 Persistent(ψB,PERSD)   -0.02744 0.7358   -0.00210 0.9328   -0.04368 0.5534 
 Large-scale (ψB,SIZED)   -0.00251 0.9205   -0.00297 0.9459   -0.00481 0.8570 
(v)  USD-Selling intervention             
 One-off (ψS) 0.00111 0.4328 0.00293 0.7799 -0.14081 0.4327 0.01225 0.9297 -0.00198 0.4408 0.00846 0.6796 
 Persistent (ψS,PERSD)   0.00292 0.6817   -0.01047 0.9609   -0.02621 0.1923 
 Large-scale  (ψS,SIZED)   0.00335 0.6789   0.11402 0.8005   0.01101 0.5988 
(vi) Interest  differential(ψdiff) 0.01243 0.7173 -0.01080 0.8891 -0.01531 0.9787 -0.31632 0.8141 -0.31849
*** 0.0015 -0.10397 0.6825 
(vii) CDS spread (ψcds) 0.00042 0.7139 0.00060
* 0.0991 -0.00252 0.3092 0.00167** 0.0237 0.00076 0.8935 0.00011* 0.0995 
(vii) Stock price(ψstock) -0.00325 0.1768 -0.00058 0.9876 -0.00995 0.7766 -0.07381 0.8005 -0.03698
*** 0.0100 -0.01978 0.1689 
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Table 3.6(c) Short-term variance equation of ACT–GARCH: Korea 
 
 
Whole sample(10/9/2001-23/3/2010) Pre-subprime(10/9/2001-31/7/2007) Post-subprime(1/8/2007-23/3/2010) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
(i) Unexpected shocks(γ1) 0.12575 0.3247 0.11325
** 0.0496 0.06531 0.1005 0.16371 0.1532 0.01095** 0.0458 0.18703* 0.0589 
(ii) Deviation from its long-run  
      component(γ2) 
0.83421*** 0.0000 0.67555 0.1482 0.80056*** 0.0008 0.48894*** 0.0019 0.16370* 0.0569 0.70863 0.5383 
(iii) Negative shock (γ3) 0.08728
** 0.0472 0.16607* 0.0721 0.07551* 0.0580 0.23111* 0.0095 0.17020 0.4332 0.02336 0.7363 
(iv)  USD-Purchasing             
 One-off (λB) -0.00146 0.6215 0.00186
* 0.0522 -0.02284 0.3187 0.01478* 0.0691 -0.02192* 0.0987 -0.00379 0.9221 
 Persistent (λB,PERSD)   -0.03062 0.6268   -0.00673 0.1860   -0.03549 0.6454 
 Large-scale (λB,SIZED)   -0.00199
* 0.0738   -0.00520** 0.0243   -0.00125 0.9591 
(v)  USD-selling              
 One-off (λS) 0.00330 0.4398 0.00511 0.8822 0.14140 0.4413 -0.02248 0.8767 -0.00316 0.4152 0.01666 0.4600 
 Persistent (λS,PERSD)   0.00791 0.7537   -0.04815 0.8177   0.01039 0.6392 
 Large-scale (λS,SIZED)   0.00381 0.3768   -0.10847 0.8117   -0.03324 0.1517 
(vi) Interest differential(λdiff) -0.00579 0.2212 -0.00812 0.3385 -0.04294 0.9402 0.30080 0.3231 0.14487 0.2032 0.01461 0.9563 
(vii) CDS spread (λcds) 0.00510
* 0.0842 0.00045* 0.0936 0.00266 0.2790 0.00410* 0.0731 0.00795 0.1983 0.00649* 0.0634 
(viii) Stock price (λstock) 0.00131 0.6592 0.00145 0.9713 0.00385 0.9137 0.07444 0.7990 0.02754
* 0.0616 0.00916 0.5264 
 Diagnostics              
 Skewness 0.116  0.226  -0.001  -0.019  0.087  0.327  
 Kurtosis 4.591  8.844  3.891  4.120  5.727  5.082  
 Q(15) 19.925 0.133 19.624 0.187 17.276 0.242 23.162* 0.075 17.693 0.221 24.712* 0.054 
 Q2(15) 9.244 0.815 12.461 0.132 11.873 0.616 23.837* 0.068 11.475 0.648 21.706* 0.078 
 ARCH-LM test 9.316 0.860 13.277 0.580 10.686 0.775 22.038 0.107 10.832 0.764 23.986* 0.052 
 no. of observations 2121 1461 660 
Notes: 1. When the coefficient of the negative shock is positive (i.e. γ3>0), an impact of the unexpected domestic currency appreciation (εt<0) on the short-term volatility  
  component (γ1+ γ3) is greater than the impact of the unexpected depreciation (γ1).  
           2. Q(Q2) is the modified Ljung-Box’s Q statistics for testing the null of no autocorrelation up to 15 lags for the standardised(squared standardized) residual. 
           3. ARCH LM test is the heteroskedasticity test with the null hypothesis that there are no remaining ARCH effects in the residual up to the number of lags in (  ). 
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As for the effects of USD-selling interventions (which mostly occurred during crisis 
periods in Korea), both models suggest that the interventions seem futile in reducing the 
short-term volatility in all periods. In Table 3.6(c), λS, λS,PERSD and λS,SIZED are all insignificant 
or positive. It may be inferred that the USD-selling interventions in small open economy (like 
Korea) may not stabilise short-term FX rate volatility in crises period due to the credibility 
problem of the USD-selling interventions. That is, USD-selling interventions are likely to be 
limited in terms of feasibility due to the loss of foreign reserves. This “fear of losing foreign 
reserves” may keep the CBs in small open economies from reacting strongly to the 
depreciation pressure (Aizenman and Yi 2009).  In both model 1 and model 2, 3 > 0 for the 
pre-subprime period implies the existence of transitory leverage effect in conditional short-
term variance in the non-crisis period. Hence, the impacts of unexpected appreciations on the 
short-term FX rate volatility appear larger than unexpected depreciation, suggesting that the 
KRW-appreciation may raise concerns about loss of trade competitiveness.  
3.5.1.2 Japan 
3.5.1.2(a) Impacts on FX rate level 
Table 3.7(a) shows that BOJ’s USD-purchasing interventions, in general, do not have 
significant effects on FX rate level in the pre-Sakakibara era, irrespective of model 
specifications − βB, βB,PERSD, and βB,SIZED are all insignificant. During the post-Sakakibara 
period, one-off or large-scale USD-purchasing interventions lead to the depreciation of JPY. 
For example, βB(=0.185) in the period indicates that USD-purchasing intervention equivalent 
to 1 trillion JPY results in a rise in JPY/USD rate approximately by 0.19%. In contrast, USD-
selling interventions appear effective in the pre-Sakakibara period. For example, Model 2 
suggests that when the intervention is large-scale one, sales of USD equivalent to 1 trillion 
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JPY appreciates JPY by 1.3% (see βS,SIZED = –1.336 for the pre-Sakakibara period in Table 
3.7(a)). Note that βS(=1.233)for the period in model 2 is highly significant but wrongly signed, 
indicating one-off USD-selling interventions may not be effective. To sum up, large USD-
selling interventions are effective in the pre-Sakakibara period while one-off or large USD-
buying interventions are effective in the post-Sakakibara period.34 
 Although there was the largest USD-selling intervention in 10 April 1998, our 
estimation suggests that the USD-selling interventions were overall ineffective in the post-
Sakakibara period. It is necessary to be cautious about the interpretation of this result, because 
the number of USD-selling intervention episodes during the post-Sakakibara period is only 
six (see Table 3.3), which may not be enough to evaluate intervention effects. In this case, 
event study on individual USD-selling episodes may be more appropriate (see Fatum and 
Hutchison 2003).  Our finding is somewhat inconsistent with Ito (2003) that both USD-selling 
and USD-purchasing interventions are effective during the post-Sakakibara period. The 
different result may come from different model specification. Our model is different from Ito 
(2003) in that we consider the persistence and magnitude of interventions and USD-buying 
and USD-selling interventions are separately considered.  
Interest rate differentials do not have significant effects on FX rate level like Korea. 
Increases in stock price depreciate the JPY – see βstock =0.019(model 1) and 0.013(model 2) 
for the whole period. The significantly positive relationship between stock price and FX rate 
may indicate that a current rise in stock price reflects the increasing expectation on future 
inflation rather than the expanding economies (Ajayi and Mougoue 1996). 
34 During pre-Sakakibara period, there is a distinct episode of USD-selling interventions which are typically 
cited as successful ones (Dominguez 2003a). BOJ sold 28 times USDs equivalent to 787 billion JPY from 
1991M3 to 1992M8 when JPY/USD rate mostly moved beyond 125JPY/USD. At that time, the BOJ’s stated 
goal was to strengthen the JPY against the USD(see Ito 2003) and the FX rate fell from 138.7(JPY/USD) to 
127.9(JPY/USD), so the interventions are typically cited as successful ones. 
105 
3.5.1.2(b) Impacts on FX rate volatility 
In most cases, interventions do not help to reduce both long-term and short-term FX 
rate volatility. Table 3.7(b) suggests that BOJ interventions, in general, do not have significant 
effects on long-term volatility irrespective of samples and model specifications. Most 
coefficients of interventions are insignificant except for those on USD-selling interventions in 
the post-Sakakibara period (ψS,SIZED = – 0.127 with p-value 0.018 in model 2).The magnitudes 
of η1 are mostly 0.95 – 0.99 irrespective of model specification and estimated ω,η1 and η2 are 
mostly highly significant, implying that there is much stronger persistence of long-term 
volatility in Japan than in Korea where  estimated η1  is 0.83 - 0.97.    
Table 3.7 (c) shows the result of short-term variance equation. Firstly, 3 > 0 (in both 
model 1 and model 2) for the post-Sakakibara period, suggests that the transitory leverage 
effect exists in the conditional variance. This result may indicate that Japanese economy 
became more sensitive to trade competitiveness for the post-Sakakibara period, because 
policy makers had very limited policy options against deepening economic depression.  
Second, interventions mostly increase short-term FX volatility. In model 1, λB = 
0.008 for the pre-Sakakibara period and the λS = 0.431 for the post-Sakakibara period, indicate 
that both USD-purchasing and selling interventions increase short-term FX volatility. In 
model 2, λS = – 0.09 and λS,SIZED =0.18 for the post-Sakakibara period, suggests that one-off 
USD-selling interventions reduce the short-term volatility, but large-scale USD-selling 
interventions increase short-term volatility. Overall, model 2 also indicates that USD-selling 
interventions increase short-term FX volatility, because λS +λS,SIZED = 0.09 >0. This evidence is 
consistent with previous studies (Dominguez 1998, Edison et al. 2003, Kim and Sheen 2006) 
which generally do not decompose FX volatility. Third, interest rate differential and stock 
price change do not significantly influence both long-term and short-term FX rate volatility. 
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Table 3.7(a) Mean equation of ACT–GARCH: Japan 
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Whole sample(8/4/1991-31/3/2004) Pre-Sakakibara(8/4/1991-30/6/1995) Post-Sakakibara(1/7/1995-31/3/2004) 
 
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
(i) Constant (β0)  0.00292 0.7643 0.00300 0.7701 -0.02705
* 0.0871 -0.02013** 0.0247 0.02080* 0.0984 0.01954 0.1277 
(ii) USD-purchasing intervention              
 One-off (βB) (+) 0.06788 0.4349 -0.74779 0.3765 -0.10392 0.4176 -0.83943 0.1129 0.00520 0.5903 0.18492*** 0.0095 
 Persistent (βB,PERSD) (+)   0.05582 0.6473   0.17632 0.9605   -0.00605 0.6155 
 Large-scale (βB,SIZED) (+)   0.74713 0.3832   0.99016 0.5636   0.18619*** 0.0074 
(iii)USD-selling intervention              
 One-off (βS) (-) -0.17338* 0.0701 1.14692*** 0.0018 -0.09150 0.8281 1.23328** 0.0127 -0.18762 0.1565 0.56565 0.2894 
 Persistent (βS,PERSD) (-)   0.18299 0.1792   0.37719 0.4612   -0.04792 0.4355 
 Large-scale (βS,SIZED) (-)   -1.24352*** 0.0051   -1.33598*** 0.0013   -0.56300 0.2935 
(iv) Interest differential(βdiff) (-) 0.03041 0.3924 0.01555 0.6812 0.12241
*** 0.0000 0.07211 0.1423 -0.05355 0.2956 -0.04185 0.4067 
(v) Stock price(βstock)  0.01865
** 0.0103 0.01332* 0.0827 -0.00618 0.5506 0.00456 0.6113 0.03070*** 0.0038 0.02591*** 0.0093 
Notes:   1. ***, ** and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
              2. The coefficients on interventions in mean equation give the impact of the intervention of purchasing (selling) USD equivalent to 1 trill.JPY. 
              3.  Signs of coefficients on intervention indicate the prior expectation when the intervention is effective in leaning against the wind. 
              4. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors and covariances are used. 
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Table 3.7(b) Long-term variance equation of ACT–GARCH: Japan 
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Whole sample(8/4/1991-31/3/2004) Pre-Sakakibara(8/4/1991-30/6/1995) Post-Sakakibara(1/7/1995-31/3/2004) 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
(i)  Constant(ω) 0.39747*** 0.0000  0.38768*** 0.0000 0.27870*** 0.0000 0.37756*** 0.0000 0.43197*** 0.0000 0.42736*** 0.0000 
(ii)  Own lag(η1) 0.98508
*** 0.0000  0.95889*** 0.0000 0.95648*** 0.0000 0.98696*** 0.0021 0.98460*** 0.0000 0.94980*** 0.0000 
(iii) Unexpected shocks (η2) 0.03805
*** 0.0000  0.06494*** 0.0000 0.04563*** 0.0328 0.04441*** 0.0004 0.04252*** 0.0001 0.09153*** 0.0000 
(iv)  Purchasing intervention              
 One-off  (ψB) 0.00027 0.8819  0.03060 0.1977 0.06656 0.1081 0.04941 0.9649 -0.00028 0.8750 0.02525 0.2417 
 Persistent (ψB,PERSD)    -0.00992 0.1553   0.00796 0.9948   -0.00937 0.2256 
 Large-scale (ψB,SIZED)    -0.01664 0.4888   -0.04720 0.9290   -0.01246 0.5662 
(v)  Selling intervention              
 One-off (ψS) 0.05472 0.1098  0.01591 0.2698 0.05404 0.4399 0.11753 0.8662 0.05123 0.1260 0.12631
** 0.0417 
 Persistent (ψS,PERSD)    -0.02116 0.5383   -0.45618 0.8244   0.06479 0.5900 
 Large-scale  (ψS,SIZED)    -0.01692 0.3665   -0.08407 0.8773   -0.12774
** 0.0186 
(vi) Interest  differential(ψdiff) -0.03362 0.5612  -0.03847 0.6372 0.05455 0.3869 0.02453 0.9322 -0.05064 0.5475 -0.10232 0.4457 
(vii) Stock price(ψstock) 0.00494 0.1705  0.00305 0.5734 0.00690 0.2815 -0.00061 0.9877 0.00492 0.3810 0.00967 0.2501 
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Table 3.7(c) Short-term variance equation of ACT–GARCH: Japan 
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Whole sample(8/4/1991-31/3/2004) Pre-Sakakibara(8/4/1991-30/6/1995) Post-Sakakibara(1/7/1995-31/3/2004) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
(i) Unexpected shocks(γ1) 0.00737
* 0.0896 0.03676* 0.1000 0.03633 0.3706 0.00408 0.4784 0.04145* 0.0960 0.07795*** 0.0058 
(ii) Deviation from its  long- 
 run component(γ2) 0.03642
* 0.0903 0.24019 0.3136 0.15685 0.2462 0.09060 0.8481 0.27202 0.1632 0.46511** 0.0342 
(iii) Negative shock (γ3) 0.09174 0.1722 0.08244
* 0.0694 0.06625 0.2274 0.04538 0.5477 0.10942** 0.0390 0.11573** 0.0296 
(iv)  USD-Purchasing             
 One-off (λB) 0.00773 0.5607 -0.00656 0.9367 0.00814
* 0.0702 0.01690 0.9900 -0.00285 0.7609 -0.00988 0.8243 
 Persistent (λB,PERSD)   -0.00825 0.6070   0.01079 0.9924   -0.00767 0.6100 
 Large-scale (λB,SIZED)   -0.01457 0.8586   -0.12377 0.8926   -0.00665 0.8789 
(v)  USD-selling              
 One-off (λS) 0.41774
** 0.0354 -0.00964 0.1652 0.56028 0.1414 0.02086 0.9763 0.43084** 0.0381 -0.09393* 0.0893 
 Persistent (λS,PERSD)   -0.20917 0.2639   -0.13504 0.5882   -0.11331 0.1687 
 Large-scale (λS,SIZED)   0.12607 0.1029   0.02572 0.9720   0.17649
* 0.0905 
(vi) Interest differential(λdiff) 0.00884 0.1167 0.08921 0.1846 0.03674 0.1349 0.11902 0.2848 0.01937 0.6748 0.02860 0.9133 
(vii) Stock price(λstock) 0.00077 0.9486 0.00076 0.9372 -0.00212 0.8943 -0.00640 0.6350 0.01048 0.3822 0.00049 0.9893 
Diagnostics              
 Skewness -0.258  -0.248  -0.507  -0.350  -0.063      -0.068  
 Kurtosis 5.362  5.326  6.272  6.382  4.857  4.814  
 Q(15) 18.665 0.229 15.122 0.443 20.729 0.146 23.103* 0.082 10.870 0.762 8.9598 0.880 
 Q2(15) 7.714 0.935 9.551 0.847 8.4111 0.906 21.837 0.112 11.611 0.708 11.803 0.694 
 ARCH-LM test 7.541 0.941 8.984 0.878 8.5712 0.899 22.031
* 0.096 12.357 0.652 11.770 0.696 
No. of observations 3566 1272 2294 
Notes: 1. When the coefficient of the negative shock is positive (i.e. γ3>0), the impact of the unexpected domestic currency appreciation (εt<0) on the short-term volatility  
             component(γ1+ γ3) is greater than the impact of the unexpected depreciation (γ1).  
            2. Q(Q2) is the modified Ljung-Box’s Q statistics for testing the null of no autocorrelation up to 15 lags for the standardized(squared standardized) residual. 
            3. ARCH LM test is the heteroskedasticity test with the null hypothesis that there are no remaining ARCH effects in the residual up to the number of lags in (  ). 
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3.5.1.3 Australia 
 
3.5.1.3(a) Impacts on FX rate level 
 
In Table 3.8(a), the coefficients on the USD-buying interventions (i.e, βB, βB,PERSD, 
βB,SIZED) are all insignificant in all periods irrespective of model specifications, implying that 
USD-buying interventions seem ineffective in changing FX rate level. The coefficients on the 
USD-selling interventions are mostly insignificant or wrongly signed except for the pre-IT 
period.  Model 2 reports that βS = 1.30 with p-value 0.08 but βS,SIZED = –1.80 with p-value 0.09 
(and thus βS + βS,SIZED = –0.50 < 0) for the pre-IT period, which indicates that one-off 
interventions are ineffective, but that large-scale sales of USD equivalent to 1 billion AUD 
would lead to the appreciation of AUD by 0.5 percent. This is similar to Newman et al. (2011 
pp. 75-76) which suggests that the sales (purchases) of USD equivalent to 1 billion AUD 
appreciate (depreciate) AUD by 0.7 per cent. However, they are marginally significant. 
Overall, our finding suggests that RBA interventions appear to fail to reverse the trend of FX 
rates except for some large-scale USD-selling interventions. 
Like Korea, there is a significant negative relationship between stock price and FX 
rate in Australia. Both model 1 and 2 suggests that βstock = – 0.080 for the post-IT period and 
βstock = – 0.055 to – 0.065 for the whole period with p-value 0.000, indicating that a rise in 
stock price leads to the appreciation of AUD. This indicates that a rise in stock price may be 
considered as a sign of an expanding economy that induces capital inflows and thereby leads 
to the appreciation of AUD. The negative relationship between stock price and FX rates in 
Australia and Korea contrasts with the positive relationship in Japan.  
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3.5.1.3(b) Intervention impacts on FX rate volatility 
 
Estimation results for two variance equations are presented in Table 3.8(b) and 3.8(c). 
In Table 3.8(b), η1 is mostly close to 1, η1> (γ1 + γ2) >0 and  γ2 > η2 > 0, indicating the 
persistence of long-term volatility components. Both USD-purchasing and USD-selling 
interventions do not significantly affect the long-term FX volatility.   
In Table 3.8(c), model 1 overall provides evidence that interventions increase short-
term volatility: e.g. λB =0.56 with p-value 0.09 and λS = 0.34 with p-value 0.00 for the pre-IT 
period. In contrast, model 2 presents λB,PERSD = – 2.83 with p-value 0.01 and λS,SIZED = – 2.02 
with p-value 0.00 for the whole period, implying that RBA’s interventions have some 
stabilising effects on short-term volatility when the interventions are either sustained or 
massive. This finding is consistent with previous studies. For example, Kim and Sheen (2002) 
report that persistent and large interventions contribute to stabilising the level and volatility of 
FX rate in Australia. 
Unlike Korea and Japan, γ3 is mostly significantly negative or insignificantly positive 
(model 2), suggesting that there is no transitory leverage effect in the conditional variance. 
This finding indicates that the impacts of the unexpected appreciation of AUD on the short-
term volatility are not significantly larger than those of unexpected depreciation are. Model 1 
suggests that interest rate differential seems somewhat pertinent to explain both short-term 
and long-term FX rate volatility in Australia.  
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Table 3.8(a) Mean equation of ACT–GARCH : Australia 
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Whole sample(4/1/1989-31/12/2008) Pre-IT (5/1/1989-31/7/1992) Post-IT(3/8/1992- 31/12/2008) 
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
(i) Constant (β0)  -0.00869
** 0.0476 -0.00763*** 0.0000 -0.01852* 0.0945 0.00116** 0.0455 -0.01094 0.2114 -0.00937 0.2900 
(ii) USD-purchasing intervention              
 One-off (βB) (+) 0.44913 0.3867 -1.11974 0.3344 0.54924 0.3052 -0.64395 0.6176 n.a
1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 Persistent (βB,PERSD) (+)   -0.23754 0.7860   -0.98536 0.3129 n.a
1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 Large-scale (βB,SIZED) (+)   1.65715 0.1859   1.59354 0.2293 n.a
1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
(iii)USD-selling intervention              
 One-off (βS) (-) 0.38079
* 0.0930 0.14583 0.3391 -0.12199 0.7110 1.30175* 0.0758 0.39682* 0.0901 -0.71475 0.3945 
 Persistent (βS,PERSD) (-)   -0.99093 0.1588   -0.01602 0.2858   -0.90686 0.2365 
 Large-scale (βS,SIZED) (-)   0.54930
* 0.0634   -1.79963* 0.0883   1.41404* 0.0914 
(iv) Interest differential(βdiff) (-) -0.01485 0.6056 -0.02467 0.4028 0.00968 0.1575 0.00785 0.8378 -0.03646 0.4275 -0.03126 0.4893 
(v) Stock price(βstock)  -0.05466
*** 0.0000 -0.06478*** 0.0000 0.02093 0.1995 0.01945 0.3344 -0.08012*** 0.0000 -0.07993*** 0.0000 
Notes:   1. RBA did not conduct USD-buying intervention in 1992M8-2008M12. 
             2. ***, ** and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
             3. The coefficients on interventions in mean equation give the impact of the intervention of purchasing (selling) USD equivalent to 1 billion AUD. 
             4.  Signs of coefficients on intervention indicate the prior expectation when the intervention is effective in leaning against the wind. 
             5. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors and covariances are used. 
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Table 3.8(b) Long-term variance equation of ACT– GARCH: Australia 
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Whole sample(4/1/1989-31/12/2008) Pre-IT (5/1/1989-31/7/1992) Post-IT(3/8/1992- 31/12/2008) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
(i)  Constant(ω) 0.51992*** 0.0016 0.37974*** 0.0000 0.23580** 0.0292 0.26644*** 0.0000 0.51078*** 0.0003 0.50201*** 0.0003 
(ii)  Own lag(η1) 0.99393
*** 0.0000 0.90576*** 0.0000 0.97315*** 0.0000 0.85212*** 0.0000 0.99327*** 0.0000 0.99346*** 0.0000 
(iii) Unexpected shocks (η2) 0.04827
*** 0.0000 0.05155* 0.0710 0.08753*** 0.0006 0.07196 0.2628 0.04310*** 0.0000 0.04087*** 0.0000 
(iv)  Purchasing intervention             
 One-off  (ψB) -0.07287 0.1579 -0.47021 0.5598 0.02859 0.1415 0.04533 0.9634 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 Persistent (ψB,PERSD)   0.95270 0.1923   -0.16319 0.7281 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 Large-scale (ψB,SIZED)   -0.53620 0.4205   -0.01711 0.9870 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
(v)  Selling intervention             
 One-off (ψS) 0.01766 0.6005 0.82921 0.1289 -0.07392 0.1213 0.05138 0.9652 0.02271 0.5139 -0.08244 0.6934 
 Persistent (ψS,PERSD)   -0.50119 0.2478   0.10946 0.9637   -0.09900 0.6854 
 Large-scale  (ψS,SIZED)   -0.43531 0.4524   0.12005 0.9443   0.19443 0.5425 
(vi) Interest  differential(ψdiff) -0.03956
* 0.0776 0.02097 0.1003 0.00399 0.8229 0.00158 0.9799 -0.15016 0.2522 -0.03832 0.2867 
(vii) Stock price(ψstock) -0.00487 0.1666 -0.00154 0.8806 -0.00266 0.6602 -0.00548 0.7830 -0.00767 0.1106 -0.00801
* 0.0661 
Note: RBA did not conduct USD-buying intervention in 1992M8-2008M12 
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Table 3.8(c) Short-term variance equation of ACT– GARCH: Australia 
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Whole sample(4/1/1989-31/12/2008) Pre-IT (5/1/1989-31/7/1992) Post-IT(3/8/1992- 31/12/2008) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
(i) Unexpected shocks(γ1) 0.03233
* 0.0798 0.01788 0.6920 0.13699*** 0.0000 0.01681* 0.0873 0.00807 0.6509 0.00888 0.7231 
(ii) Deviation from its   long-  
      run component(γ2) 
0.23076** 0.0409 0.46601*** 0.0000 0.62378*** 0.0000 0.21236** 0.0413 0.84762*** 0.0000 0.56765*** 0.0065 
(iii) Negative shock (γ3) -0.02154 0.5999 -0.17421
** 0.0125 -0.10535* 0.0964 0.08518 0.4487 -0.02833 0.2117 -0.22418* 0.0580 
(iv)  USD-Purchasing             
 One-off (λB) 0.77713 0.1485 0.34096 0.7683 0.55538
* 0.0938 0.10699 0.4526 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 Persistent (λB,PERSD)   -2.82832
*** 0.0104   -0.16129 0.1008 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 Large-scale (λB,SIZED)   1.53141 0.1599   0.11196 0.5541 n.a
1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
(v)  USD-selling              
 One-off (λS) 0.02514 0.8902 2.59965
*** 0.0001 0.33597*** 0.0005 0.04688 0.9135 0.09004 0.3581 -0.60164 0.3709 
 Persistent (λS,PERSD)   1.83513
* 0.0823   -0.78100 0.7350   1.12412 0.1466 
 Large-scale (λS,SIZED)   -2.02380
*** 0.0027   -0.05649 0.9785   0.48191 0.4758 
(vi) Interest differential(λdiff) -0.03177
*** 0.0052 -0.10371 0.1260 -0.03844*** 0.0000 -0.01129 0.8489 -0.01590 0.8483 -0.03400 0.6261 
(vii) Stock price(λstock) -0.01217 0.1567 -0.02462
* 0.0757 -0.00927 0.3634 -0.00543 0.7977 -0.01183 0.1960 -0.01798 0.0876 
Diagnostics              
 Skewness 0.3162  0.3903  0.4184  0.0124  0.2780  0.2868  
 Kurtosis 4.7260  6.0428  4.7660  4.9404  4.6866  4.6598  
 Q(15) 22.520* 0.075 21.796 0.113 20.496 0.154 22.972* 0.065 20.338 0.159 20.943 0.139 
 Q2(15) 15.591 0.410 18.928 0.217 14.924 0.457 11.776 0.696 13.994 0.526 14.387 0.496 
 ARCH-LM test 15.065 0.447 18.774 0.224 14.229 0.508 11.207 0.738 13.560 0.559 13.994 0.526 
No. of observations  5215  933 4283 
Notes: 1. RBA did not conduct USD-buying intervention in 1992M8-2008M12 
            2. When the coefficient of the negative shock is positive (i.e. γ3>0), the impact of the unexpected domestic currency appreciation (εt<0) on the short-term  volatility 
  component (γ1+ γ3) is greater than the impact of the unexpected depreciation (γ1).  
            3. Q(Q2) is the modified Ljung-Box’s Q statistics for testing the null of no autocorrelation up to 15 lags for the standardized(squared standardized) residual. 
            4. ARCH LM test is the heteroskedasticity test with the null hypothesis that there are no remaining ARCH effects in the residual up to the number of lags in (  ). 
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3.5.2 Profitability of sterilised FX interventions 
 
Table 3.9 reports main statistics on the variables affecting intervention profits and 
results of profit estimations for three countries. We present the intervention profits estimated 
by both Ito (2003) and Becker & Sinclair (2004) methodologies. The former used the period-
average figures (e.g., accumulated intervention amount and average FX rates over the entire 
period) while the latter calculates the profit with daily marking-to-market (See Appendix 3.3 
for the detailed calculation procedures). Note that cumulative net purchases of USD are 
positive in Korea (67.7 bill. USD) and in Japan (540.9 bill. USD) but negative in Australia (-
6.5 bill. USD). The positive (negative) cumulative net purchase of USD can be interpreted, on 
average, as long (short) USD position during sample periods. The estimated results are mostly 
consistent with prior expectations. 
First, USD-selling prices are on average higher than USD-purchasing costs in all 
countries, so that all three CBs obtain trading margins. This indicates that three CBs mostly 
bought USDs cheap and sold them expensive, and thereby made realised trading gain from 
interventions. It follows that all three CBs have leaned against the wind. The domestic-foreign 
interest rate differential (measured by domestic O/N money market rate – US O/N fed fund 
rates) is positive in Korea and Australia, but negative in Japan. The positive differentials lead 
to interest losses to USD long-position holder (i.e., Korea) and interest earnings to USD short-
position holder (i.e., Australia).  On the other hand, negative differential causes USD long-
position holder (i.e. Japan) to make significant interest earning. 
Aforementioned, unrealised gains are heavily dependent on the FX rate at the day 
when the position is valued. When we use end-of-day FX rates, only BOK makes an 
unrealised gain of 1,387 billion KRW. When we use the weighted average exchange rate with 
daily marking-to-market, only Japan makes an unrealised gain of 1,089 billion JPY.   
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Table 3.9 Estimated profits from FX interventions  
 
 Korea 
(2001M09-2010M03) 
Australia 
(1989M1-2008M12) 
Japan 
(1991M4-2004M3) 
Cumulative USD purchase(a) 151.2 12.6 578.5 
Cumulative USD selling(b) 83.5 19.1 37.6 
Cumulative net purchases of USD 
(a-b) (bill. USD) 
67.7  -6.5  540.9  
Average FX rate to buy USD(c) 1151.28 1.2663 107.65 
Average FX rate to sell USD(d) 1193.26 1.4217 131.24 
Trading margin (e=d-c) 41.98 0.1554 23.59 
Average FX rate 1117.57 1.4290 115.59 
Interest differential 
(domestic-US; % per annum) 
1.44 2.46 -2.76 
Realised trading gains(e) 
(bill. KRW; bill. JPY; mill. AUD) 
2360.8  2862.3  763.3 
(3664.5)  (4487.1) (994.2) 
Net interest earning(f) 
-5131.8  1277.2 4485.4 
(-3777.3)  1259.7 (3954.6) 
Unrealised trading gains(g) 
1387.2 -1140.4 -3180.5 
(-4539.6) (-284.0) (1088.9) 
Total profit (e+f+g) 
-1383.8 3035.1 2068.2 
(-4652.4) (5462.8) (6037.7) 
Notes: 1. FX rates are the prices of domestic currency per a unit USD. 
            2. Interest differential = O/N domestic money market rate -O/N US fed fund rate 
            3. In estimated profits, the figures in upper rows are profits based on Ito(2003) while the figures in lower 
rows are those with daily marking-to-market as in Becker and Sinclair (2004). 
            4. Realised gains and net interest earnings are total profits made during the sample periods. 
 
 
Despite the conflicting results of unrealised profits, above estimation suggests that 
the interventions of BOJ and RBA were profitable but the BOK’s was not. In Table 3.12, total 
intervention losses are estimated as 1,384 billion KRW (based on period average calculation) 
or 4,652 billion KRW (based on marking-to-market calculation). The losses mainly come 
from considerable net interest losses. In contrast, Japanese interventions appear profitable, 
owing to massive interest earning of 4,485 (or 3,955) billion JPY. Apparently, low domestic 
interest rate in Japan significantly contributed to the net interest earnings. In Australia, most 
of the profits came from realised trading gains.   
Figure 3.6 shows the accumulation of total profit and its three components over time. 
BOK made modest but sustained realised trading gains before the advent of sub-prime crisis 
in July 2007 but experienced temporary but massive realised trading losses at the early stage 
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of US-subprime crisis. These trading losses are due to massive USD-selling interventions in 
response to the rapid depreciation of KRW in this period. In 2007M7-2008M8, the weighted-
average FX rate at which the BOK sold USDs, i.e. average USD-selling price, was 1088 
KRW/USD, which was on average much lower than average USD-purchasing cost, 1175 
KRW/USD in the pre-crisis periods. As KRW/USD rates rose rapidly, the BOK could not but 
sell USD to defend KRW, although the FX rates at the sales of USD were below the average 
USD-purchasing price. 
In Korea, net interest losses were made through the entire sample period and became 
substantial in recent years.  This contrasts with the case of Australia in which domestic 
interest rate is higher than US interest rate. Like BOK, RBA made net interest losses in the 
early 1990s when RBA was net buyer of USD.  However, RBA made net interest gains after 
1993 because it became a net seller of USD.  Steady realised trading gains are found in Japan 
and Australia.  In case of Japan where USD long position is sustained during the whole period, 
there were a few USD-selling interventions that acted in the direction of closing out the long 
position. Thus, realised trading gains in Japan are relatively modest compared to those in 
Australia where RBA conducted frequent sales of USD to close out its long position which 
was acquired in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.  
Overall findings in this section may be interpreted as evidence that interventions in 
Korea during 2000s were not profitable and thus appear not to contribute to stabilising the FX 
rates in the long term. On the contrary, BOJ and RBA look profitable fund managers in the 
intervention activities, implying that they are both 'stabilising speculator', in the sense that the 
interventions appears to help to stabilise FX rate movement. The evidences in Japan and 
Australia are in line with similar previous studies (Ito 2003, Becker and Sinclair 2004) 
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Figure 3.6 Cumulative profits of foreign exchange interventions 
 
A. Korea 
 
B. Australia 
 
C. Japan 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
3.6.1 Summary of main findings  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to estimate the effects of sterilised FX interventions on 
FX rates and intervention profit in Korea(2001M9-2010M3), Japan(1991M4-2004M3) and 
Australia(1989M1-2008M12) which still intervene in FX markets actively. We first apply 
Engle and Lee (1998)’s ACT GARCH model to the interventions in three countries with daily 
data to estimate the intervention effects on FX rate level and volatility. ACT-GARCH model 
enables one to examine the intervention effects on long-term and short-term volatility 
separately and to catch transient leverage effects on the conditional variance. We estimate the 
model in two ways. Model 1 does not differentiate the types of intervention like Guimaraes 
and Karacadag (2004) whereas model 2 uses dummies to reflect a large-scale and a persistent 
intervention. As Kim and Sheen (2002 p 621) pointed out, separate considerations of the 
persistence or magnitude of interventions (like model 2) may be more helpful for assessing 
the intervention effects accurately. Overall, estimation results support Kim and Sheen. In 
general, a one-off intervention appears ineffective, but large interventions affect FX rate level 
or volatility in three countries. For example, model 1 suggests no intervention effects on FX 
rate level while mode1 2 suggests that a large intervention significantly affects FX rate level 
in Korea. Main findings obtained from ACT-GARCH model are as follows. 
First, intervention effects on FX rate level appear most significant in Korea. BOK’s 
one-off USD-purchasing (selling) interventions are not effective while its large or persistent 
USD-purchasing (selling) interventions are effective in depreciating (appreciating) KRW, 
although the magnitudes seem quantitatively trivial. BOJ’s large-scale USD-purchasing 
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interventions, in general, do not significant effects on reversing FX rate level trend but large-
scale USD-selling interventions appear effective in resisting the depreciation of JPY. RBA’s 
USD-selling and USD-buying interventions appear ineffective in reversing the trend of FX 
rate level, irrespective of intervention amount and persistence.  
Different features in FX market structures and intervention patterns may explain the 
different intervention effects on FX rate level in three countries. Greater significance of 
intervention size in Korea and Japan than in Australia appears to support portfolio balance 
channel rather than signalling channel. This is because intervention amount (compared to FX 
market turnover) in Korea and Japan is much bigger than that of Australia (see Table 3.4), and 
because the interventions in Korea and Japan depend more on secret intervention.  
Second, interventions appear to affect short-term rather than long-term FX rate 
volatility in three countries. The insignificant effect on long-term volatility is consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Diyatat and Galati 2005) that interventions leave volatility broadly 
unchanged. FX interventions have a limitation in influencing long-term volatility that is more 
persistent than short-term volatility. In addition, there are some differences in intervention 
effects on short-term volatility among countries. In Korea, USD-selling interventions seem 
futile in reducing the short-term volatility irrespective of the model specifications and samples. 
This is probably due to the lack of credibility of the USD-selling interventions since the CBs 
in small open emerging economies generally suffer from the “fear of losing foreign reserves” 
(Aizenman and Yi 2009). However, a large USD-purchasing intervention, (which may be 
more feasible than USD-selling interventions), may contribute to reducing short-term FX 
volatility, although a one-off USD-purchasing intervention increases short-term volatility. In 
Japan, interventions generally tend to increase short-term volatility in most cases. In 
Australia, RBA’s one-off interventions increase short-term volatility while persistent or large 
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interventions have some stabilising effects on short-term volatility. Unlike Korea, not only 
USD-purchasing but also USD-selling interventions have a stabilising effect on short-term 
volatility in Australia, once the interventions are sustained or larger.  
Third, transitory leverage effects in conditional volatility exist in both Korea and 
Japan, but, not in Australia, which indicates that the authorities and market participants in two 
countries appear to worry more about rapid appreciation of their currency than Australian 
counterparty does. Hence, the news about unexpected appreciation affects short-term 
volatility more than those about unexpected depreciation do in two countries. This may be 
because both countries appear more sensitive to trade competitiveness than Australia. 
Relatively, RBA seems less concerned about the AUD-appreciation than the depreciation.  
Fourth, interest rate differentials do not significantly affect the FX rate level and 
volatility in three countries, which is consistent with Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004)’s 
evidence for Turkey and Kim and Sheen (2002)’s evidence for Australia. As we use overnight 
interest rates that are controlled by the CBs, the coefficient on interest rate differentials here 
reflects exogenous monetary policy shocks to FX rates. Thus, insignificance of interest rate 
differential implies that the change in monetary operations or policy rate changes do not 
significantly affect exchange rates – there is no monetary channel on a daily basis. The 
heightened country risk proxied by a large CDS spread has significant effects on not only FX 
rate level but also FX rate volatility in Korea – increases in CDS spread depreciates KRW and 
increases FX volatility at the same time, particularly for crisis period, as does in other small 
open emerging countries.    
Fifth, profit estimations for the three countries indicate that the interventions of BOJ 
and RBA were profitable but the BOK’s was not. The BOK’s intervention loss mainly comes 
from net interest losses, which is ascribed to the BOK’s persistent USD-purchasing 
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interventions under the circumstance where domestic interest is higher than foreign interest 
rates. Three CBs made realised gains from intervention transactions by purchasing USDs 
cheap and selling them expensive, implying that the CBs aim for leaning-against-the-wind 
and stabilise FX rate. Accumulated BOK’s net interest losses may cast a question on the 
sustainability of its sterilised interventions. 
 
3.6.2 Discussion and future research 
 
Our findings, in general, suggest that large-scale interventions appear more effective 
in reversing current trend of FX rate level and volatility than one-off or consecutive 
interventions. It is generally accepted that intervention amount is important in portfolio 
balance channel or order flows channel while the authorities’ intention or credibility of 
interventions (which are well reflected by a series of persistent interventions regardless of 
amount) is more meaningful in signalling channel (Edison 1993). Hence, the significant 
coefficients for size dummy and insignificant coefficients for persistence dummies and one-
off interventions may suggest that portfolio balance or order flow channel rather than 
signalling channel works more.35 This may be particularly true for Korea that mostly adheres 
to intervention secrecy. Under the secret intervention, persistent interventions may not be 
easily recognized by markets unless they are considerably large. Our methodology does not 
provide information on which channel between portfolio balance and order flows works more.  
When using the dummies for large-scale and persistent interventions, we have found 
the cases where the coefficients for one-off, large and persistent interventions have different 
35 However, this interpretation has also limits in that the magnitudes of interventions may also signal the CB’ 
strong will of stabilizing FX rates to markets. That is, the credibility of signal can be linked to the intervention 
amount because putting more money in the transaction may represent the degree of CB’s commitment to 
stabilizing FX rates. 
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signs. For example, ACT-GARCH model 2 for Japan during the entire period presents 
λS=−0.09393 and λS,SIZED=0.17649, indicating that one-off USD-selling interventions help to 
stabilise the short-term volatility but large-scale ones increase the volatility. Newman et al. 
(2011, p 75) and Kim & Sheen (2002, pp. 631-632) report similar evidences that the effect of 
one-off interventions is different from persistent or large interventions. For example, Kim and 
Sheen(2002) report that a one-off USD-selling intervention is effective in stabilising FX rate 
by appreciating AUD whereas large or successive ones depreciate rather than appreciate AUD 
and thereby accelerate the depreciation trend.  
The inference of these evidences looks somewhat tricky. Except for the possibility of 
unsolved simultaneity problem, one plausible interpretation may be as follows. Under secret 
intervention scheme, the direction of the effect of intensified (unusual) interventions may be 
not what CBs expect from initial one-off (average) interventions. This is because the lack of 
credibility and transparency in secret interventions frequently keeps the market participants 
from responding consistently to the intensified interventions. For example, one-off USD-
selling interventions have an effect on reducing FX rate volatility under increasing 
depreciation pressure, but unusually large interventions (aiming for intensifying initially-
intended effects) may not succeed or yield unexpected effects, because unusually large 
interventions may wrongly signal that the CB are in a desperate situation to  resist the present 
depreciation trend and thereby cause to accelerate depreciation pace. 
Although comparing the cases of secret interventions (e.g. Korea) and publicly 
announced case (e.g. Australia) in this chapter, we do not provide direct evidence on which 
practice is more effective in stabilising FX markets. Given that the issues related to 
communication become more important in monetary policy, it is necessary to directly estimate 
and compare the effect of both types of intervention practice. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE MOTIVATIONS OF STERILISED  
FX MARKET INTERVENTIONS:  
Do central banks fear the appreciation of domestic currency? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
According to the trilemma hypothesis, given free capital mobility, monetary policy 
and exchange rate policy should not be treated as two independent instruments, and thus 
exchange rates should play a relatively minor role in inflation targeting (hereafter IT).  It is 
recommended that FX rates should be benignly ignored or function as one of the information 
variables in setting a policy interest rate under an IT regime. A considerable degree of 
flexibility in exchange rates is required under a credible IT regime (Svensson 2010, Fischer 
2001). An IT regime is often interpreted as an attempt to build CB independence and policy 
credibility while allowing more flexible exchange rates.   
However, many emerging IT countries (cum de jure free float) have relied on 
sterilised interventions since the late 1990s. The interventions in these countries seem to be 
lenient with depreciation but strict with appreciation of domestic currency – CBs respond 
asymmetrically to domestic currency depreciation and appreciation (Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger 2007). (Hereafter, asymmetric interventions indicate stronger resistance to the 
appreciation of domestic currency). The preference for asymmetric interventions in these 
countries seems to contrast with those of developed countries under IT, which appear to 
abstain from interventions and seem to conduct symmetric interventions (e.g. the UK, New 
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Zealand, Canada) (Rose 2010,  pp. 9-14).36 
Theoretically and practically, asymmetric interventions appear more sustainable and 
beneficial than their counterpart, particularly in emerging economies.   
First, there is no limit to interventions of selling local currency for purchasing 
foreign currency, since CBs can always print money.  On the contrary, when conducting 
interventions to aim at encouraging local currency appreciation, CBs are confronted with hard 
budget constraints owing to the risk of exhausting foreign reserves (Bofinger and 
Wollmershauser 2001).  
Second, considering valuation effects on foreign reserves, asymmetric interventions 
may be preferable in emerging countries where CBs have a considerable amount of foreign 
assets in their balance sheets. E-type CBs 37  are likely to have an incentive to conduct 
asymmetric interventions as much as possible (see Appendix 4.2). Third, asymmetric 
interventions and the resultant accumulation of foreign reserves are more advantageous for 
emerging countries to promote economic growth (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2007) and to 
meet precautionary demand for foreign reserves.  
In the last decade, low-inflation environments may have encouraged small open IT 
economies with de jure free floats to implicitly target a weaker exchange rate than the markets.  
Therefore, it could be naturally conjectured that asymmetric interventions have been effective 
for emerging countries to stick to de facto intermediate regimes. That is, CBs pursue 
domestically orientated interest rate policy and simultaneously target one-sided exchange rate 
36As of the end of 2009, 26 countries adopted IT with floating regimes, and most of them have rarely intervened 
in FX markets. For example, New Zealand has intervened once in June 2007 since the introduction of free float 
in 1985. ECB and Bank of Canada’s last interventions date back to early 2000 and 1998, respectively. The UK 
has not intervened since the BOE acquired its independence in 1997, except for one occasion in September 2000, 
when the UK government, via EEA, participated in a joint G7 intervention to support the euro (see Annual Debt 
and Reserves Management Reports 2009 and monthly press release of the UK Treasury). 
37 E-type (ECB-type) CBs, unlike F-type (Fed-type) CBs, have considerable amounts of assets denominated by 
foreign currency among their total assets (Sims 2004). Most CBs are classified as E-type.      
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paths compatible with foreign-domestic interest rate differentials.  The ‘fear of appreciation’ 
is used as a label to describe the intervention tendency of preventing domestic currency 
appreciation (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2007).   
In this chapter, we examine the motives for sterilised interventions in several 
countries. Previous studies suggest various intervention motives. In the literature, short-term 
motives, such as resisting current trends and reducing excessive FX volatility, are more 
apparent than long-term ones such as correcting medium or long-term misalignments of 
exchange rates deviated from fundamentals (see Neely 2000 for details). However, the 
asymmetric property of FX interventions has not been profoundly explored.  In particular, we 
attempt to look at three questions: (i) What are the determinants of intervention decisions? (ii) 
Do CBs favour domestic currency depreciation rather appreciation? (iii) Is there any 
difference in the degrees of asymmetric intervention preference among countries?   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the global 
phenomenon of reserves accumulation, which may reflect the prevalence of asymmetric 
interventions. Section 3 reviews previous literature on intervention motives and fear of 
appreciation. In section 4, for the purpose of the estimation of asymmetric intervention 
motives, we first investigate the long-term relationship between foreign reserve changes and 
exchange rate movements by using a bound test (Pesaran et al. 2001) with monthly reserves 
data on 11 countries. A buffer stock model for reserve demand provides theoretical 
background for testable regression equations. However, foreign reserves cannot be a complete 
proxy for interventions. Hence, using a probit and friction model with daily intervention data 
on Korea, Australia and Japan, we delve more profoundly into intervention motives. In 
particular, the friction model will provide us with better insights into the characteristics of 
asymmetric interventions. Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 Literature review  
4.2.1 Intervention motives  
Intervention motives are examined by a CB’s reaction function. To specify the 
intervention motives, consider following a conventional linear reaction function frequently 
used in previous studies:  
 
(4.2.1) ttt
T
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where tINT  is the amount of intervention at time t (with tINT >0 for purchases of foreign 
currency); tS and 
T
tS are actual and target FX rate (calculated by the moving average of past 
FX rates or by the long-term equilibrium rate derived from purchasing power parity), which 
are expressed by domestic currency price of a unit of foreign currency;   is a first difference 
operator; tX  is a vector of control variables affecting current interventions (e.g. lagged 
interventions, trade balance or interest rate differentials, etc.); and tu  is an error term. If CB is 
to stabilise FX rates around the target, coefficient 1  is expected to have a negative sign, 
because CB should sell foreign currency when actual FX rates exceed the target. Under the 
policy of “leaning against the wind”, a priori expected sign of 2  should also be negative, 
since CB must sell foreign currency when domestic currency depreciates.  
Empirical evidence shows that intervention motives are highly sample-dependent, 
but commonly suggest two main motives: “smoothing” and “leaning against the wind”.  
Leaning-against-the-wind appears most frequently reported as a short-term intervention 
motive in the recent literature (Baillie and Osterberg 1997, Rogers and Siklos 2003, Kearns 
and Rigobon 2005, Lecourt and Rayonds 2006). However, it may be impossible for market 
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participants to differentiate leaning-against-the-wind and smoothing unless the CB announces 
its intentions.  
The medium to long-term objectives of FXIs are somewhat different. CBs may not 
intervene in markets with a short-term perspective in order to correct a severe deviation of the 
exchange rate from fundamentals (Almekinders and Eiffinger 1994). Thus, it is likely that the 
reaction function of an individual CB could be varied or be interpreted differently at different 
times.  For this reason, previous studies have used different trends in exchange rates as 
intervention targets in their reaction function. For example, target rates (generally modelled as 
a moving average of past exchange rates) are defined and used differently in previous studies: 
a 5 day (Almekinders and Eijffinger 1994), 10 day (Humpage 1998) or 150 day moving 
average (Kim and Sheen 2002, Neely 1998). 
 
4.2.2 Asymmetric interventions motives in small open emerging economies 
Most studies suggest that CBs are likely to resist domestic-currency appreciation 
more strongly than depreciation in both developed and emerging economies – except for in 
crisis periods or in high-inflation period. Interventions appear to aim at limiting appreciation 
rather than depreciation in most cases (and increasingly so in the 2000s) (Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger 2007). For example, Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) find that, during the 
post-Louvre periods, the US Fed and Bundesbank attempted to respond more strongly to the 
appreciation than the depreciation of their domestic currencies.  
The “fear of appreciation” is more prominent in small open emerging economies. 
Asymmetric intervention motives may come from the purpose of protecting trade 
competitiveness (Dooley et al. 2003) or of gaining revaluation effects from foreign assets in 
the case of E-type CBs (see Appendix 4.2). Specifically, many studies have proposed that the 
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main reason for massive build-ups of foreign reserves in emerging countries is not a 
precautionary motive for minimizing the probability of sudden reversal of capital flows, but 
asymmetric interventions. In particular, frequent or sustained asymmetric interventions and 
the resultant large amount of foreign reserves have been referred to as explicit evidence of the 
prevalence of the de facto intermediate regime (dirty floats) among emerging IT countries 
within de jure free float.38 
 Theoretically and practically, it has been assumed that interventions for preventing 
domestic currency depreciation are less sustainable than their counterpart, since the former 
eventually leads to increasing risk of exhausting foreign reserves (Bofinger et al. 2001). There 
are no limits in funds for foreign currency purchasing interventions because the CB can print 
money. In addition, asymmetric interventions are more helpful for strengthening trade 
competitiveness and for improving the CB’s balance sheet. These advantages have 
contributed to the accumulation of foreign reserves over time in emerging economies such as 
China, India, Taiwan and Korea.39 
However, sustained “fear of appreciation” may not only postpone necessary 
adjustments but also make future sterilisations more difficult. First, sustained interventions 
may damage the credibility of monetary policy. Particularly, under IT, sustained asymmetric 
interventions may weaken market credibility for the CB’s will to keep inflation under control, 
and thus make their future tasks more difficult – there is a risk of a “vicious circle of 
depreciation and inflation”.  For example, according to Brenner and Sokoler (2010)’s study 
38 According to Flood and Marion (2002), Jeanne (2007) and Steiner (2010), after the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system, which supposedly caused most countries to introduce more flexible exchange regimes, global 
international reserve holdings (as a fraction of world GDP) increased sharply from less than 2% in 1960 to 6% in 
1999 and to 18% in 2006. This trend has been accelerated since the financial crisis in the late 1990s—
particularly in emerging economies. Since 1990, the average ratio of reserve to GDP in emerging countries has 
increased from 4% to 20% while the ratio of the advanced countries has been steady at approximately 4%.    
39Égert (2007) suggests that interventions in six Eastern European emerging countries are more effective in 
resisting appreciation pressures. Dooley et al. (2003) argue that East Asian economies are intentionally 
undervaluing their currency so as to stimulate exports to the US, as a developing strategy.   
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on Israel, FXIs and inflation targeting policy cannot sustain each other in the long run, 
because the potential conflict between the two policies incurs unbearable costs to the 
economy and eventually the authorities should abandon one of the two policies. Furthermore, 
if FXIs do not have significant effects on exchange rates, FXIs and OMOs cannot be used as 
independent policy tools for managing trade-off between monetary independence and 
exchange rate stability, even in the short run.  
Second, the discretionary procedures of the interventions may conflict with an IT 
regime which emphasizes clear rules and transparent communications. Most IT countries 
seem to prefer secret and discretionary FXIs, and do not reveal even ex-post information on 
interventions (BIS 2005). Transparent rules such as PPP rules may be difficult to be used as a 
rule for FXIs due to intrinsic differences between the characteristics of exchange rates and the 
prices of national outputs (Frankel 1983, p 51).40 
Third, excessive sterilisations can impose heavy fiscal costs and cause CBs to make 
financial losses.  Particularly, severe “fear of appreciation” renders the CB to be the net 
debtor of a banking system, since the CB has to absorb the surplus of domestic liquidity 
caused by FXIs.  As Bofinger et al.(2001) points out, CBs (aiming at targeting constant 
nominal exchange rates), are not able to defend a strong appreciation pressure of domestic 
currency for long, when the domestic interest rate is higher than the foreign rate. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, accumulated fiscal losses (stemming from 
sterilisation costs) may threaten the sustainability of sterilisations and endanger the CB’s 
independence from the government (Stella 2005).  Non-market friendly sterilisation tools for 
reducing sterilisation costs possibly impair the stability of domestic financial systems 
40 For example, PPP rules propose that when FX rates move more than relative price levels, CBs are expected to 
intervene so as to ensure the PPP. However, large FX rate movement with regard to PPP is not sufficient 
evidence that FX rate volatility is excessive, because FX rates tend to depend on expectations rather than relative 
price level. Thus, interventions based on the PPP may lead to misleading results. 
130 
(Mohanty and Turner 2005). In particular, implicit and explicit sterilisation costs become 
prominent when inflation pressure is high, so that the “fear of appreciation” should be 
supported by effective or cost-minimizing sterilisation tools.  
Empirical studies have provided evidence of significant asymmetric FXIs in 
emerging countries (Ramachandran and Srinivasan 2007, Pontines and Rajan 2008, Pontines 
and Siregar 2010).41  On the contrary, there are only a few studies suggesting that CBs resist 
depreciation more strongly than appreciation (see Carlson & Lo 2004 for the case of Taiwan).   
 
4.2.3 Optimal reserve hoarding and asymmetric interventions 
The preference for asymmetric interventions or fear of domestic-currency 
appreciation is deeply associated with the issues of optimal reserve holding. The asymmetric 
interventions result in massive holdings of foreign reserves that are deviated from optimal 
level (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2007).  With regard to large holdings of reserves in 
emerging economies, many studies have typically focused on precautionary reasons. That is, 
reserve build-up is to insure against sudden stop and reversal of capital inflows, which are the 
precursors of currency crises. The resilience of the high-reserve economies during recent sub-
prime crisis partly validates the self-insurance motives in emerging countries.  
However, as seen in 4.1, most emerging countries meet precautionary reserve bench 
marks such as reserves to short-term external debt, reserves to M2 and reserves to import. 
Actual level of reserve holdings in these countries is well above precautionary-motive-type 
optimal levels. Consequently, precautionary needs or self-insurance motives have limited 
41Ramachandran and Srinivasan (2007), using the reserve demand model, find that Indian interventions are 
significantly asymmetric due to concerns about export competitiveness. Pontines and Rajan (2008) find an 
asymmetric tendency in the interventions of 5 emerging Asian countries by using a cubic loss function. Pontines 
and Siregar (2010), using a regime switching model, confirm the asymmetric interventions in 4 Asian IT 
countries. But these studies have a limit in explaining asymmetric interventions, because they use changes in 
foreign reserves as a proxy for the amount of actual interventions.  
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explanatory power to fully account for the recent pattern of reserves accumulation. For 
example, Jeanne (2007) shows that, from the point of view of crisis insurance, reserve build-
up was excessive in Asian emerging countries during 2000-2005 in that the vulnerability of 
the counties to financial crisis was too low to justify the cost of accumulated reserves.42 
Hence, some studies have paid attention to what (other than precautionary motives) 
drives CBs to favour asymmetric interventions and to build up large reserves. First of all, CBs 
in a high degree of dollarization in the banking system may need foreign reserves to serve as a 
lender of last resort to the commercial banks with large (Calvo et al 2012).  Second, (so called) 
neo-mercantilist motives account for reserves hoarding in developing countries as one of their 
developing strategies. When developing countries’ growth is impeded by undeveloped 
domestic financial markets, the countries could export their gross savings in the form of 
foreign reserves and then have them back via more efficient channel like FDI. In this case, 
large holdings of reserves function as collateral for encouraging FDIs (Dooley et al 2008).  
Third, some economists point out that conventional cost-benefit models of optimal 
reserves appear to fail to account for the reserve build-up in many emerging countries (Jeanne 
2007, Levy-Yeyati 2008). According to them, precautionary motives have overlooked 
potentially benign side-effect of the asymmetric interventions - reduction in domestic 
residents’ financing cost from abroad (Levy-Yeyati 2008).  According to Levy-Yeyati (2008), 
marginal cost of holing reserves in emerging countries could be substantially reduced (e.g. by 
more than 50%) if the benefits of holding reserves are properly considered. Hence, our 
measurement of intervention profits in Ch. 3 may possibly overstate the cost incurred by 
USD-purchasing interventions in Korea.  
42 However, Calvo et al. (2012) find that there is no significant over-accumulation of reserve in 27 emerging 
countries, according to their model based on optimal level of reserves maximising expected return net of cost. 
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4.3 Data and methodologies 
 
4.3.1 Foreign reserves and exchange rates in selected countries 
 
We first investigate asymmetric aspects of FX interventions in 11countries (Korea, 
Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia, India, Brazil, Turkey) 
by using monthly reserves data from 1999M1 to 2010M4. Figure 4.1 presents the plots of FX 
rates and foreign reserves in major countries. Recently, foreign reserve accumulations appear 
to have been a common phenomenon in most countries, irrespective of monetary policy and 
exchange rate regimes. In particular, the accumulations are most prominent in Asian emerging 
countries, most of which experienced current account surplus or capital inflows in the last 
decade. Theoretically, given capital inflows, foreign reserve accumulation should be more 
prominent in fixed or managed float regimes than in free float regimes, because flexible 
exchange rates are known to adjust imbalances automatically. 
However, some countries seem to accumulate reserves more rapidly after the 
introduction of IT with free float regimes (see Figure 4.1(a) East Asian IT countries), which 
contrasts with relatively slower accumulation in countries with a longer history of IT(see 
Figure 4.1(c)).  In this regard, there are some arguments that the continued accumulation of 
foreign reserves in emerging countries (even in Japan) may substantiate asymmetric 
interventions whose goal is to maintain competitiveness-protecting exchange rates.  That is, 
the intervention motive is not just for “smoothing” (as claimed by the CBs) but for inducing 
domestic currency depreciation (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2007). Foreign reserves would 
not consistently increase but would move around a certain level if intervention responses were 
symmetric to appreciation and depreciation. Asymmetric interventions would lead to not only 
increasing inflation in the intervening countries but also creating excessive global liquidity.  
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Figure 4.1 Foreign reserves (FR) and exchange rates(FX) in major countries 
 
(a) East Asian IT countries 
 
 
(b) Non-Asian IT countries 
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   (c) Countries with a longer history of IT 
 
 
(d) Non-IT countries: managed or free float 
 
 
   (e) Non-IT countries: fixed FX regime 
 
              Note: As for IT countries, the figures in (  ) indicate the years of introducing IT regime.  
              Source: IMF IFS 
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A buffer stock model may be appropriate for the analysis of the countries with either 
managed or free float regimes. Fixed FX regime countries (e.g. China) are excluded from 
samples, because the buffer stock model assumes that the demand for foreign reserves is 
determined by FX rate movements, volatility of reserves and the opportunity cost of holding 
reserves. When FX rates are invariant over time as in fixed regimes, the model does not 
provide significant insights into the relationship between foreign reserves and FX rate change.  
Figure 4.1 suggests that foreign reserves have evolved in the opposite direction to FX 
rates in float or managed regime countries in recent times. This indicates that the CBs’ 
demand for foreign reserves may be related to their responses to exchange rate movements, so 
the buffer stock model can be applied to the investigation of the CB intervention motives. At 
a glance, CBs appear to purchase foreign reserves against appreciation pressure. The inverse 
relation between foreign reserves and FX rates suggests the prevalence of leaning-against-the-
wind. If foreign reserves continue to increase irrespective of the direction of FX rate 
movements, this may indicate the asymmetric preference for USD-purchasing interventions. 
Table 4.1 shows the main indicators associated with foreign reserves during the non-
crisis period of 2000-2007.  In terms of the growth in foreign reserves, and the ratio of foreign 
reserves to import, M2 and foreign liabilities, there are no distinguishing features specific to 
Korea compared to other countries. The pattern of reserve accumulation in Korea is similar to 
that in Japan and other East Asian countries, except for China. China has recorded an 
unprecedentedly rapid increase in foreign reserves. Korea’s foreign reserves (in terms of the 
ratios to monthly import and M2) increased while the ratios to short-term liabilities 
unchanged. Three indicators were all improved in Latin countries but degraded in East 
European countries despite the rapid increase in foreign reserves. Notice that emerging 
countries have accumulated foreign reserves above conventional benchmarks to cover short-
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term foreign liabilities. This is in contrast to developed countries, where foreign reserves are 
much less than a half of short-term foreign liabilities.  
It may be somewhat difficult to explain the rapid accumulation of foreign reserves in 
emerging countries only by precautionary demands for addressing the rising volatility of 
external transactions, because some relevant indicators show that most emerging countries 
(except for Eastern Europe) have already held foreign reserves well above the appropriate 
levels suggested by some academic circles or international institutions.  For example, 
reserves-to-monthly average import and reserves-to-short term liabilities in most emerging 
countries are well above 3 and 1 respectively, which are conventionally accepted as an 
appropriate level (Fisher 2001, Greenspan 1999).  Thus, it is likely that the accumulation of 
foreign reserves may reflect the asymmetric properties of FX interventions.   
 
Table 4.1 Main indicators of foreign reserves 
 Foreign reserves(FR) 
(Bill. USD) 
FR/monthly 
average import6 
FR/M2 
(%) 
FR/short-term 
foreign liabilities7 
 2000(A) 2007(B) B/A 2000 2007 2000 2007 2000 2007 
Korea 96 262 2.7 7 9 29 43 2 2 
Japan 347 948 2.7 11 18 6 15 2 2 
Australia 18 25 1.4 3 2 14 34 08 08 
China 166 1,528 9.2 9 19 10 28 8 14 
Taiwan 107 270 2.5 9 16 19 34 8 7 
Russia 24 464 19.3 6 23 44 78 2 5 
Other Asia1 325 852 2.6 6 8 27 32 2 2 
Latin2 136 397 2.9 5 7 23 32 1 3 
Arab3 75 271 3.6 9 11 25 38 2 3 
Eastern Europe4 66 223 3.4 5 4 39 34 2 1 
Developed5 344 380 1.1 1 1 3 2 08 08 
Notes: 1. Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine, Singapore, Thailand 
2. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Columbia, Peru, Venezuela 
           3. Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Arab Emirate 
           4. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cheche Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
5. Canada, Euro Area, Swiss, UK, US 
           6. This ratio reflects a country’s current account vulnerability: 3 and 4 would be proper (Fisher 2001). 
           7. This measures a country’s capability of servicing its external liabilities in the forthcoming year, if external 
 financing conditions rapidly deteriorate. The ratio should be above 1 (Greenspan1999) 
           8. All ratios are rounded to the nearest integer.  
 Source: BIS(2008), BOK(2010), IMF IFS(2011, July) 
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4.3.2 Data description 
Figure 4.2 depicts three CBs’ net interest earning (resulting from FXIs), domestic-
foreign interest rate differentials, exchange rates and the deviation of the current FX rate from 
a 200-day moving average. Over most of the sample periods, interest rate differentials are 
positive in Korea and Australia while negative in Japan.   
It is more apparent that FX rates move in the same direction as interest rate 
differentials in Korea than in Australia and Japan in the long-run perspective. Correlation 
coefficients between the two series are 0.70 (Korea), -0.36 (Australia) and 0.34 (Japan) during 
the sample period.  The causality between the two variables seems different depending on 
theories, particularly the assumption on price. Typically, the theoretical relationship between 
two variables is considered to be negative in the short run due to sticky prices and positive in 
the long run with flexible price (Hacker et al. 2010).43 
The persistent appreciation of KRW before the advent of the sub-prime crisis in mid-
2007 may reflect current account surpluses and capital inflows. Sterilisations may have 
contributed to the high domestic-foreign interest rate differential in 2001-2004, which 
possibly induced further capital inflows. While KRW persistently appreciated before late 
2007, the interest differential became negative in the mid-2000s. This may be due mainly to 
rapid rises in the US fed fund rates rather than falls in Korean interest rates.  The plot of 
exchange rate deviation from its trend shows that, unlike the JPY/USD and AUD/USD rate, 
the KRW/USD rate persistently downwardly deviated from its trend except during the 
43 Monetary approaches provide two theoretical explanations for the relationship between nominal interest 
differential and nominal FX rates (Simone and Razzak 1999, pp.3-4). First is the sticky-price monetary approach, 
in which a relative rise in domestic interest rates will stimulate capital inflows and thereby appreciate domestic 
currency. Consequently, interest rate differentials and FX rates move in the opposite direction (Dornbusch1976, 
Frankel 1979). The flexible price monetary approach assumes that a relative rise in domestic rates indicates an 
increase in expected inflation, which leads to the depreciation of domestic currency by reducing demands for 
domestic money. In this case, interest rate differentials and FX rates move in the same direction (Mussa 1979). 
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subprime crisis period in 2007-2010. Hence, the BOK may have strong intervention motives 
for resisting the KRW appreciation. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Interest earnings, interest differentials and FX rates in three countries  
                         Korea                                           Australia                                               Japan 
              (2001M1-2010M3)                         (1989M1-2008M12)                          (1991M4-2004M3) 
 
 
Notes: 1. Interest rate differentials = O/N money market rates - O/N US fed fund rates. 
            2. FX rates are the price of domestic currency per one USD. 
            3. The calculation of net interest earning follows Ito (2003) and Becker and Sinclair (2004), See Chapter 3.    
            4. Deviation = current FX rate - 200 day backward moving average; both are scaled by logarithm  
Sources: IMF IFS and each central bank homepage 
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4.3.3 Methodologies 
In this section, we first compare the degree of asymmetric intervention preference of 
11 countries by using the buffer stock model with monthly foreign reserves data. Provided 
that changes in foreign reserves reflect FX interventions, we examine the existence of long-
run relationships between foreign reserves changes and FX rate movements via the buffer 
stock model.  This approach enables us to conduct cross-country analysis for as many 
countries as possible, because we can easily access foreign reserve data on most countries. 
However, foreign reserve is not a perfect proxy for interventions, so we set up a reaction 
function for three countries (Korea, Japan and Australia) with daily data. 
According to the general conclusion drawn from the previous literature, three main 
hypotheses are tested. First, CBs mostly lean against the wind (see Sarno and Taylor 2001).  
Second, CBs in small open emerging economies (e.g. Korea) have a stronger asymmetric 
preference for USD-buying intervention than large economies (e.g. Japan) or small open 
advanced economies (e.g. Australia). This hypothesis owes to the “fear of appreciation”: 
asymmetric preference may be prominent in small open emerging economies which are more 
export-oriented for growth or are vulnerable to capital mobility. Third, CBs aim for calming 
down markets by reducing both deviations of FX rates from their level and volatility trend. 
 
4.3.3.1 Analysis with monthly foreign reserves: ARDL cointegration approach  
 
In this section, we examine the asymmetric aspects of interventions in selected 
countries by using demand functions for foreign reserves based on the buffer stock (or 
inventory) model. According to this model, the optimal level of foreign reserves should be 
what balances macroeconomic adjustment costs (incurred in the absence of reserves) with the 
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opportunity cost of holding reserves (Aizenman and Marion 2004, p571).  If we modify the 
conventional buffer stock model,44 the demand for foreign reserves may be represented in 
either of the following equations (Ramachandran and Srinivasan 2007).  
 
(4.3.1) sttttot SdifFR   2
2
1 )log()log(  
(4.3.2) at
d
t
a
tttot SSdifFR   212
2
1 )log()log(  
 
where tFR is the level of foreign reserves; 
2
t  is a variance of reserves increment measured by 
ARCH(1,1) process; tdif is an opportunity cost of holding reserves measured as domestic-
foreign interest rate differential; st and at are white noise errors; tS  is the log difference of 
FX rate; t
a
t SdumS  1 where dum1=1 if 0 tS  (appreciation) and zero otherwise; 
t
d
t SdumS  2  where dum2=1 if 0 tS  (depreciation) and zero otherwise. 
The two equations are exactly same except that (4.3.2) considers asymmetric 
responses of reserve demand to the direction of FX rates changes. The sign of 2t  and tdif  
should be positive and negative respectively, because optimal reserve holdings should 
increase with the increase in reserve volatility or reduction in opportunity cost. The constants 
are expected to be positive, since they represent country-specific adjustment costs.   
The interpretations of the coefficient on tS are not directly associated with the 
original buffer stock model. In (4.3.1),  <0 implies that CBs lean against the wind and 
44 In the empirical context, the buffer stock model was firstly applied for examining foreign reserves by Frenkel 
and Jovanovic (1981) and extended by Edwards (1985) and Flood and Marion (2001). Frenkel and Jovanovic 
(1981) use the following equation for reserve demand:
5.0
*
r
cFR  , where 
*FR = optimal level for reserves 
after restocking; c =country-specific constant to capture the fixed adjustment cost; r =opportunity cost (e.g. risk 
free rate); and  =volatility of reserve increments. Thus, increases in c or  lead to increases in the demand for 
reserves, while increases in r cause reserve demand to reduce. Log transformation presents a useful starting-
point for the empirical specification similar to (4.3.1):  )log(25.0)log(5.0)log( * rcFR    
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exchange rate variations have a symmetric impact on reserve demands. Equation (4.3.2) 
considers the asymmetric responses of foreign reserves to changes in exchange rates: λ1 and 
λ2 measure the response of reserve demand to appreciation and depreciation, respectively. 
Note that both λ1 and λ2 should be negative under a “leaning against the wind” policy but 
positive under a “leaning with the wind” policy. For example, λ1<0 indicates the purchase of 
foreign reserves ( tFR ) in response to appreciation ( tS <0) while λ2 < 0 implies the sales of 
foreign reserves ( tFR ) in response to depreciation ( tS >0). Thus, CBs react more to 
appreciation than to depreciation when λ1<0and λ2<0and 21    or when λ1<0 and λ2 > 0.  
As will be shown later, we cannot use ordinary least square because the dependent 
variable ( tFR ) is I(1) but the regressors are either I(1) or I(0). Simple OLS may be subject to 
a spurious regression problem. Hence, we need to see whether the variables are cointegrated.  
Several cointegration approaches are available, such as Engle and Granger’s (1987) two-step 
approach, Johansen and Juselius’ (1990) approach and Pesaran et al.’ (1996, 2001) ARDL 
approach, normally called the “bounds test”, etc.  
Both Johansen and Juselius’ approach and the bounds test can be used when 
variables are integrated of different orders – e.g. I(1) and I(0). In particular, provided that 
variables are at most I(1), Johansen’s cointegrated VAR model may be appropriate. However, 
when Johansen approach is used in the case of a small sample with mixtures of I(1) and I(0), 
it is possible that the coefficient of the I(0) variables cannot be identified.  In contrast, Pesaran 
et al.’s (2001) approach enables one to obtain more consistent estimates in the case of small 
sample. Considering that our sample is small, covering only 11 years,45 and that variables are 
integrated of different orders with I(1) and I(0) in a single equation, the bounds test appears 
45  In estimating cointegration, what matters is the length of the period rather than the number of observations. 
Increasing the number of observations through using monthly data does not increase the robustness of the 
cointegration (Hakkio and Rush 1991b).    
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more appropriate.46To use the bounds test, we first estimate the following unrestricted error 
correction model (ECM) to see whether there is a long-run relationship among the variables 
(Pesaran et al. 2001, pp. 295-296). 
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where i  are long-run coefficients; ib ic id if  and ig  are short-run coefficients. If 
we reject the null of no cointegration ( 054321   ), then it could be 
concluded that there is a long-run cointegration among tFR ,
2
t , tdif , 
a
tS  and
d
tS . Equation 
(4.3.3) is an error correction version of the autoregressive distribution lag (ARDL) model of 
order (m, n1, n2, n3, n4). The number of lags is determined by AIC (with a maximum lag of 
8). We additionally include a monthly amount of import and M2 to see whether CBs concern 
other precautionary demands for foreign currency. If the null is rejected, then we estimate the 
long-run coefficients by using the following ARDL model.47 
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46 Pesaran et al.’s (2001) approach to cointegration has a advantages over Engle and Granger’s (1987) and 
Johansen and Juselius’ (1990) approach: (i) Once the order of ARDL is identified, OLS can be used for the 
estimation; (ii) Bounds test makes it possible to estimate consistent coefficient on I(0) variables even in the case 
of a small sample. However, the bounds test is feasible only in a single equation and assumes that there exists 
only one cointegration. So the bounds test is less general than Johansen’s cointegrated VAR approach.   
47 A conditional long-term model for FRlog  can be obtained from the reduced-form solution of (4.3.3) when 
0loglog 2  da SSdifFR  : )/()/()/()/(log)/()/(log 1151413
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d
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a
tttt SSdifaFR  . 
Under the assumption of q1=1 and q2=q3=q4=q5=0, (4.3.4) can be rewritten:  
t
d
it
a
ttttot vSSdifFRaFR   504030
2
20111 logloglog  . Thus, we can obtain coefficients; )/( 10 aa  , 
)/( 1211   , )/( 1320   , )/( 1430   , )/( 1540   .We assume that the numbers of lags in distribution 
lag term of (4.3.4) are the same, that is symmetric lag number (i.e., q2=q3=q4=q5). 
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4.3.3.2 Analyses with daily intervention data 
Daily intervention data have unusual distributions due to sporadic or infrequent 
interventions. As for most of the daily observations, the amount of intervention has the value 
of zero and thus intervention series are discontinuous as seen in Figure 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 in 
Chapter 3. Consequently, modelling the intervention reaction function (in which most of the 
dependent variables are zero while regressors are non-zero) has become a major challenge to 
researchers. Conventional linear reaction functions have significant limits, because (i) they are 
likely to confront severe simultaneity problems between FX rates and interventions; and (ii) 
they disregard the properties of intervention data in which most observations show zeros. 
Standard regression estimation without considering the features of intervention data may 
produce biased estimators, because errors from the regression may not be asymptotically 
normally distributed. Hence, as Neely (2005) points out, considerations of nonlinearity of 
interventions could be helpful in identifying intervention motives and lessening simultaneity 
problems.  In this context, censored regression or limited dependent variable models tend to 
be preferred to linear models in modelling an intervention reaction function.  
In particular, previous studies mostly modelled the probability rather than the amount 
of interventions by using (ordered) probit models (Baillie and Osterberg 1997; Dominguez 
1998; Kim and Sheen 2002; Guimaraes and Karacadag 2004, Ito and Yabu 2007), or a logit 
model (Frenkel and Stadtmann 2001; Frenkel et al. 2005). If the amount of interventions 
rather than the probability of interventions is of interest, economists model a reaction function 
by using the Tobit model (Almekinders and Eijffinger 1994; Humpage 1999; Herrera and 
Özbay 2005) or friction model (Almekinders and Eijffinger 1996; Kim and Sheen 2002, 2006; 
Neely 2007; Jun 2008, Gnabo et al. 2010).  A friction or a Tobit model seems preferred to a 
probit model in the recent literature. Recently, the friction model is considered as the most 
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appropriate for intervention studies (Neely 2007). 
In this chapter, we apply both probit and friction model. The probit models the 
probability of two types of interventions: USD-buying and selling interventions. The friction 
model considers three different states of interventions (USD-buying, USD-selling intervention 
and no-intervention) which are drawn from different distributions (Kim and Sheen 2002, p 
636).We use the same daily intervention data on Korea, Japan and Australia as in Chapter 3. 
The sample periods and subsample periods are also same (see Section 3.4.1 in Chapter 3).    
 Korea: pre-subprime(12/9/2001-31/7/2007), post-subprime(1/8/2007-23/3/2010)  
 Japan:pre-Sakakibara(8/4/1991-20/6/1995), post-Sakakibara(21/6/1995-1/3/2004) 
 Australia: pre-IT  (2/1/1989-30/6/1992), post-IT  (1/7/1992-30/12/2008) 
 
It is worthwhile to note three points with regard to interventions in the subsample 
periods. (i) KRW was usually under appreciation pressure during the pre-subprime period 
(that reflects ordinary or peaceful times), while it was under strong depreciation pressure 
during the post-subprime (crisis) period. Thus, USD-selling interventions are concentrated in 
the post-subprime period.(ii) The pre-Sakakibara period was characterized by frequent and 
relatively small-scale interventions while the post-Sakakibara period by infrequent but large 
interventions. (iii) RBA never conducted USD-purchasing interventions in the post-IT period. 
4.3.2.2(a) Probit model 
We first estimate the probit model where the dummies for intervention and no-
intervention outcomes are generated for each of two intervention types. The probit model 
provides us with a simple way to gain an overview on intervention motives, contributes to 
enhancing the robustness of estimations using the friction model, and helps us to interpret the 
friction model (Kim and Sheen 2002, pp. 640-642).  
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      where 1buytINT  if USD-purchasing amount > 0, and zero otherwise 
                1
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tINT  if USD-selling amount > 0, and zero otherwise 
               200
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S
SFXDEV : FX rate deviation from 200-day backward moving average
48 
               th : Conditional volatility of daily return on FX rate change, obtained from the ACT-    
                       GARCH model in chapter 3 
                tDIFF  : Overnight interest rate differential (domestic- foreign): a proxy for potential  
      overshooting of FX rate (Dornbusch 1976, Kim and Sheen 2002) 
               tMSB : 90-day backward moving average of changes in MSB (used only for Korea) 
               tNBUY : Foreign investors’ net purchase of Korean stock (used only for Korea) 
 
Note that tMSB  and tNBUY  are used only in examining Korea owing to the lack of 
relevant historical daily data on Japan and Australia. tCDS  is included in the estimation for 
Japan and Australia over subsample periods owing to the limited data availability. Assuming 
that CBs attempt to calm FX markets and to reduce the overshooting of FX rates, the expected 
signs of the coefficients are as follows: 
(i) 02 a : A fall in FX rate from its trend (i.e., FXDEV<0; appreciation) increases the 
probability of USD-buying interventions. 
(ii) 02 b : A rise in FX rate from its trend (i.e., FXDEV>0; depreciation) increases the 
probability of USD-selling interventions. 
(iii) 03 a , 03 b : A high FX volatility prompts USD-buying or USD-selling 
interventions. 
(iv) 04 a , 04 b : A rise (fall) in the US interest rate and resultant decrease (increase) 
in the interest rate differential may lead to excessive overshooting, i.e. distorted 
depreciation (rapid appreciation), which prompts USD-selling (USD-purchasing) 
interventions. 
48 We use a 200-day (simple) moving average because this is most widely used as a main indicator to show the 
long-term trend of FX rates in the market. See the following articles: 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-09/won-may-gain-5-after-break-of-200-day-moving-average-
technical-analysis.html or http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchiveandsid =a7BmtkqCaZkA) 
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(v) 05 a , 05 b : An increase (decrease) in a country risk and resultant depreciation 
(appreciation) pressure increases(decreases) the possibility of USD-selling (USD-
purchasing) interventions. 
(vi) 06 a , 06 b : Most CBs intervene consecutively in the same direction once 
initiating interventions. 
(vii) 07 a , 07 b : If BOK is concerned about sterilisation costs, an increase in MSB 
may lead to a reduction in any kind of sterilised intervention. 
(viii) 08 a , 08 b : Foreigners’ purchase (sale) of Korean stocks causes BOK to buy 
(sell) USD. 
 
4.3.2.2(b) Friction model 
 
Because the probit model does not provide direct information on the extent of 
asymmetric intervention, the second step is to estimate a friction model. A friction model, 
firstly suggested by Rosett(1959), is appropriate to describe the interventions as cost-
minimizing behaviours. In practice, CBs do not intervene whenever the FX rate deviates from 
its trend or fluctuates. CBs tend to intervene when FX rate changes are so severe as to breach 
a certain threshold set by the CB owing to the fixed costs of interventions (e.g., brokerage fees 
or bid-ask spreads).  The friction model provides information on the threshold. 
The friction model has several advantages over the Tobit model. Both models reflect 
the discontinuous intervention process, allowing a dependent variable (here intervention 
amounts) to be insensitive to its determinants over a range of values. However, the friction 
model appears more appropriate, since it is consistent with a reasonable assumption that CBs 
intervene when the intervention necessity grows beyond a certain threshold (Jun 2008, p 477; 
Kim and Sheen 2002, p 621). In addition, while the Tobit model may take either USD-
purchasing or USD-selling amounts as the dependent variable but not both, the friction model 
allows both interventions to be included simultaneously in a single reaction function and thus 
makes the specification more parsimonious. 
147 
Following Kim and Sheen (2006), and Neely (2008), we assume that the CBs do not 
target a specific FX rate level under a (de jure) free float regime. This is because most CBs 
have not declared their target under free float (Rhee 2005, Kim and Sheen 2002, p 626) and 
because there are still unsolved disputes about equilibrium FX rates reflecting fundamentals. 
Instead, we hypothesize that CBs conduct interventions to achieve the following objectives: (i) 
correcting short-term deviations of the FX rate from its trend; (ii) smoothing FX rates; (iii) 
adjusting FX rate changes possibly caused by interest rate differentials; (iv) rebalancing their 
portfolio; and (v) limiting cumulative losses incurred by previous interventions. Considering 
these motives, we set up the following reaction function:  
 
(4.3.7)     
ttmsbtdifftthsizetdshsizetdsc
ttsizesizetcumcumtdevdevtt
MSBDIFFhIII
FXDEVIIIINTINT



 
)(
)(
,,,
,,,11  
where 
tINT : Net market purchase of USD with KRW (JPY, AUD) by the BOK (BOJ, RBA), in 1 trill KRW 
          (1 trill. JPY, 10 mill. AUD) (negative values indicate net market sales of USD) 
tdevI , : Dummy that takes +1(-1) if 0tFXDEV )0( tFXDEV  and 0 otherwise. 0tFXDEV
 indicates that KRW (JPY, AUD) is depreciating against the USD 
tcumI , : Dummy that takes +1(-1) if 0tFXDEV )0( tFXDEV  for three consecutive days (i.e. t-2 to t) 
and 0 otherwise 
tsizeI , : Dummy that takes +1(-1) if 0tFXDEV )0( tFXDEV  and by more than 5%, and 0 otherwise 
tdsI , : Dummy that takes +1(-1) if 0 tS )0(  tS  , and 0 otherwise 
thsizeI , : Dummy that takes 1 if current conditional variance is higher than unconditional (or average 
conditional) variance for each sample 
th : Conditional variance of daily exchange rate returns generated from variance equation (3.4.10) 
t : error term, t ~ ),0(
2N  
 
In (4.3.7), the prior expected signs of the coefficients are as follows:  
 
(i) If CBs lean against the wind, exchange rate fall (rise) excessively deviated from the 
trend in both level and volatility is likely to result in USD–buying (selling) 
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interventions ( 0dev , 0c , 0size , 0hsize ).  However, it is possible that the 
coefficients have positive signs in case of leaning-with-the-wind interventions49. 
(ii) In the case of leaning against the wind, the more persistent the deviation, the larger the 
intervention ( 0cum ).  
(iii) Large domestic-foreign interest rate differentials may result in a possibly distorting 
appreciation of KRW(JPY, AUD), leading to USD-buying interventions( 0diff ). 
(iv) Persistent interventions may improve the intervention impact, so that interventions are 
likely to occur consecutively in the same direction (0≤ 1 ≤1).  
(v) If BOK is concerned about sterilisation cost, increases in MSB weaken the motive for 
USD-purchasing intervention ( msb < 0).  
 
Considering intervention costs, CBs would conduct interventions only when positive 
or negative thresholds were trespassed. Denoting *tINT  as the right hand side of equation 
(4.3.7), excluding error terms, and I  and I  as the positive and negative thresholds, 
respectively, we can write a friction model as follows: 
 
                               tItINT   
*   if  0*  ItINT        :  USD-buying intervention 
(4.3.8)   tINT  =           0                 if    ItI INT 
*    :   No intervention 
                               tItINT   
*  if 0*  ItINT          :  USD-selling intervention        
 
Note that the latent variable *tINT is the desirable amount of interventions only 
known to the CBs, while tINT  is the actual amount of interventions. Thus, 
*
tINT measures the 
necessary amount of the intervention when the CBs attempt to counter market misalignment 
49 Note that 
size  is less subject to the endogeneity problem than dev . The three coefficients ( dev cum size  ) 
would pick up the disaggregated effects of the deviations of the FX rate level from its trend: 
dev  reflects an 
average effect of deviations, 
cum  indicates the effect of persistent deviations, and size  deals with large current 
deviations (Kim and Sheen 2002, p 639). Similarly, c and hsize  indicate the effect of average and large 
deviation of the FX rate volatility from its trend, respectively.  
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as in a fixed exchange regime. Equation (4.3.8) suggests that, owing to intervention costs, the 
CBs under free float regimes conduct actual interventions only if *tINT > I  or 
*
tINT < I . 
The estimates of two thresholds indicate the degree of asymmetric intervention. If |δI-|>| δI+|, 
FXIs are asymmetric in the sense that the CBs respond more sensitively to appreciation.  
 
Figure 4.3 Friction model 
 
The parameters in (4.3.7) and (4.3.8) can be estimated by maximum likelihood (see 
Almekinders & Eijffinger (1996) and Neely (2007) for details) and the likelihood function ( tL ) 
can be written as:   
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 where   denotes the probability density of the N(0,1) distribution. 
INT (USD-purchasing amount) 
USD-selling amount 
(a) Symmetric intervention (|δI-|=|δI+|) 
INT (USD-purchasing amount) 
USD-selling amount 
(b)  Asymmetric intervention (|δI-|>|δI+|) 
 
INT* δI+ δI- δI+ δI- INT* 
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4.4 Estimation results 
 
4.4.1 Long-run relationship between FX rates and reserves: Bounds test 
 
Before examining a long-run relationship among foreign reserves ( tFR ) and other 
variables, i.e., tdif ,
2
t , 
a
tS ,
d
tS , IMPt and M2, we conduct ADF unit root tests for the variables.  
The results are presented in Table 4.2.  tFR , IMPt and M2t are I(1) while 
a
tS  and 
d
tS  are I(0) 
in all countries. However, the integration properties of tdif and 
2
t  are different depending on 
countries. 
 
Table 4.2 ADF unit root test  
 
 
Foreign 
Reserves 
(FR) 
Volatility  
of reserve 
change( 2
t ) 
Interest  
differential 
(dif) 
Appreciate 
( aS ) 
Depreciate 
( dS ) 
Import 
(IMP) 
M2 
Korea 
  
0.404 
(0.982) 
-7.009*** 
(0.000) 
-2.330 
(0.163) 
-6.795*** 
(0.000) 
-9.671*** 
(0.000) 
-0.440 
(0.898) 
0.182 
(0.997) 
Australia 
  
-1.702 
(0.428) 
-2.954** 
(0.040) 
-2.160 
(0.221) 
-11.683*** 
(0.000) 
-10.105*** 
(0.000) 
N.A N.A 
 India 
  
-0.118 
(0.944) 
-4.362*** 
(0.001) 
-1.343 
(0.608) 
-7.980*** 
(0.000) 
-8.042*** 
(0.000) 
-2.560 
(0.299) 
-2.604 
(0.279) 
Japan 
  
0.738 
(0.992) 
-7.946*** 
(0.000) 
-1.497 
(0.533) 
-12.002*** 
(0.000) 
-12.760*** 
(0.000) 
-2.927 
(0.157) 
-1.384 
(0.861) 
Indonesia 
  
0.617 
(0.999) 
-2.371 
(0.392) 
-2.569 
(0.101) 
-11.109*** 
(0.000) 
-3.922*** 
(0.002) 
-1.102 
(0.713) 
N.A 
Philippines 
  
0.310 
(0.998) 
-3.300* 
(0.070) 
-3.773*** 
(0.004) 
-10.341*** 
(0.000) 
-5.682*** 
(0.000) 
-2.342 
(0.160) 
N.A 
Thailand 
  
2.748 
(0.999) 
-0.895 
(0.953) 
-2.615* 
(0.091) 
-9.048*** 
(0.000) 
-4.572*** 
(0.001) 
0.0712 
(0.962) 
N.A 
Taiwan -1.467 
(0.836) 
0.306 
(0.977) 
-2.806* 
(0.058) 
-11.705*** 
(0.000) 
-10.358*** 
(0.000) 
-1.885 
(0.338) 
N.A  
  
Singapore 
  
-1.134 
(0.918) 
-2.271 
(0.182) 
-1.143 
0.697 
-9.612*** 
(0.000) 
-8.431*** 
(0.000) 
-0.986 
(0.757) 
-0.197 
(0.992) 
Brazil 
  
1.554 
(0.999) 
0.498 
(0.986) 
-3.146** 
(0.024) 
-14.640*** 
(0.000) 
-11.920*** 
(0.000) 
-1.218 
(0.666) 
N.A 
Turkey 
  
-1.181 
(0.680) 
-1.250 
(0.893) 
-3.893*** 
(0.003) 
-8.202*** 
(0.000) 
-6.949*** 
(0.000) 
-1.753 
(0.402) 
N.A 
Notes:1 Both an intercept and a trend are included in testing FR, IMP and M2; Only an intercept is included in testing 
others;  The number of lags is determined by AIC. 
2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null of unit root at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
        3. p-value in ( ) 
        4. N.A indicates that data is not available. 
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For example, tdif is I(1) in Korea, Japan, Australia, India, Japan, Indonesia and 
Singapore but I(0) in Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Brazil and Turkey. 2t  is I(0) in Korea, 
Australia, India and Philippines, and I(1) in the other countries. All variables are at most I(1). 
The results of the bounds test are presented in Table 4.3. Five variables ( tFR
2
t tdif
a
tS and
d
tS ) are firstly considered (just as the original buffer stock model suggests) and then 
two variables (IMPt and M2t) are added sequently. After obtaining F-statistics for testing the 
existence of a cointegration, we select the specification for estimating long-run coefficients 
according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).For example, as for the specification for 
Korea with 5 variables, AIC suggests that the most appropriate number of lags is 4, but the 
null of no-cointegration is not rejected in this specification. Thus, we may conclude that there 
exists no long-run relationship among 5 variables up to 8 lags in the case of Korea.  In the 
case of 6 variable specifications for Korea, AIC suggests a model with 1 lag where the null of 
no-cointegration can be rejected. Consequently, it may be concluded that there exists a long-
run relationship in the specification with 6 variables and 1 lag.   
Applying the same procedures to other countries, we select the specification with 6 
variables and 1 lag for Korea, Japan and India, and with 5 variables and 1 lag for Taiwan.  In 
the 5-variable specification for Thailand, a cointegration relation is found with 4 and 8 lags at 
1% significance level, but AICs suggest that the model with 1 lag is most appropriate. As a 
result, it may be concluded that there is no long-term relationship in the case of Thailand. As 
for the other 6 countries (i.e., Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Turkey), 
the null of no-cointegration cannot be rejected in most models regardless of the number of 
lags and variables (see Appendix 4.1 for the result of bound test for other countries). Hence, 
we narrow the analysis down onto 4 countries: Korea, Japan, India and Taiwan.  
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Table 4.3 F-statistics for testing the existence of a cointegration  
         Symmetric lags 
No. of variable1 
1 2 4 6 8 
cointe-
gration 
Korea 
5 
4.00** 
<-5.191> 
3.68* 
<-5.162> 
-1.74 
<-5.192> 
1.13 
<-5.170> 
1.58 
<-5.143> 
No 
6 
10.28*** 
<-5.248> 
2.98 
<-5.206> 
1.08 
<-5.185> 
1.48 
<-5.164> 
1.16 
<-5.181> 
Yes 
7 
3.03 
<-5.253> 
2.38 
<-5.244> 
2.47 
<-5.238> 
3.14* 
<-5.207> 
3.94** 
<-5.299> 
Yes 
Japan 
5 
2.84 
<-4.891> 
2.68 
<-4.832> 
2.45 
<-4.877> 
1.83 
<-4.739> 
2.09 
<-4.622> 
No 
6 
3.63* 
<-4.941> 
2.86 
<-4.875> 
3.97* 
<-4.783> 
3.05 
<-4.686> 
3.99** 
<-4.693> 
Yes 
7 
3.00 
<-4.825> 
2.53 
<-4.899> 
2.97 
<-4.881> 
2.91 
<-4.910> 
2.94 
<-4.711> 
No 
India 
5 
3.55* 
<-4.451> 
3.38* 
<-4.407> 
4.71*** 
<-4.408> 
3.65* 
<-4.352> 
2.06 
<-4.298> 
Yes 
6 
3.81* 
<-4.475> 
3.49* 
<-4.418> 
4.38** 
<-4.436> 
4.53*** 
<-4.424> 
1.93 
<-4.405> 
Yes 
7 
3.34* 
<-4.453> 
3.10 
<-4.384> 
3.60* 
<-4.401> 
3.58* 
<-4.373> 
1.79 
<-4.382> 
Yes 
Taiwan 
5 
4.82*** 
<-5.686> 
3.39* 
<-5.633> 
3.19 
<-5.545> 
3.74* 
<-5.491> 
3.30 
<-5.520> 
Yes 
6 
3.96* 
<-5.649> 
2.80 
<-5.583> 
2.41 
<-5.484> 
3.06 
<-5.425> 
2.27 
<-5.418> 
Yes 
Thailand 
5 
2.93 
<-4.766> 
3.05 
<-4.741> 
4.97*** 
<-4.722> 
3.77* 
<-4.602> 
4.91*** 
<-4.634> 
No 
6 
2.55 
<-4.766> 
2.69 
<-4.794> 
3.94* 
<-4.683> 
3.13 
<-4.544> 
4.79*** 
<-4.620> 
No 
Notes: 1. 5 variables: d
t
a
tttt SSdifFR ,,,,
2 ;  6 variables: t
d
t
a
tttt IMPSSdifFR ,,,,,
2   7 variables: tt
d
t
a
tttt MIMPSSdifFR 2,,,,,,
2  
            2. The critical value bounds are given in Pesaran et al.(2001, pp. 300-301), Table CI(iii) (unrestricted intercept and no  
time trend). The lower bound(FL) and upper bound(FU) are as follows: 
significance  10%  5%  1% 
No. of variables  FL FU  FL FU  FL FU 
5  2.26 3.35  2.62 3.79  3.41 4.68 
6  2.12 3.23  2.75 3.99  3.15 4.43 
7  2.03 3.13  2.60 3.84  2.96 4.26 
              If F>FU, the null of no-cointegration can be rejected; If F < FL, the null cannot be rejected, and thus no long-run 
 relationship exists. If FL<F<FU, the inference is inconclusive. 
            3.***, ** and* denote the rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance  level, respectively. 
            4. The numbers in <> are the value of AIC and the shaded denote the best specification suggested by AIC. 
 
Next, the existence of cointegration leads us to obtain long-run coefficients for the 
four countries by estimating equation (4.3.4). Table 4.4 summarizes the main results of the 
estimation of long-run coefficients. The signs of the coefficients are mostly consistent with 
what the buffer stock model suggests. The coefficients on opportunity cost (proxied by 
interest rate differential) are significantly negative at a 1% or 5 % level in all countries. The 
coefficients on reserve volatility are significantly positive for Korea and Japan.   
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Table 4.4 Estimates of long-run coefficients  
at
d
t
a
ttttot SSIMPdifFR   2132
2
1 )log()log(  
coefficient sign Korea Japan India Taiwan 
Intercept(β0) + 
0.362** 
(0.038) 
-0.0148 
(0.867) 
0.077 
(0.593) 
0.138* 
(0.072) 
Volatility of reserves(β1) + 
0.004** 
(0.016) 
0.010*** 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.154) 
0.002 
(0.198) 
Interest differentia(β2) - 
-0.003*** 
(0.006) 
-0.002*** 
(0.006) 
-0.003** 
(0.048) 
0.004*** 
(0.002) 
Import(β3 ) + 
0.010 
(0.529) 
-0.007 
(0.459) 
-0.030* 
(0.078) 
-0.019 
(0.351). 
Appreciation(λ1) - 
-0.288* 
(0.076) 
-0.238** 
(0.048) 
-0.329 
(0.275) 
-0.156 
(0.520) 
Depreciation(λ2) - 
-0.039 
(0.162) 
-0.237* 
(0.084) 
-0.927*** 
(0.001) 
-0.296 
(0.208) 
F-statistics 
13.922*** 
(0.000) 
12.177*** 
(0.000) 
7.496*** 
(0.000) 
15.213*** 
(0.000) 
Adjusted  R2 0.364 0.452 0.213 0.332 
Notes: 1. Newey and West HAC covariance is used. 
          2. ***,** and* denote the rejection of the null  at 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively, and the 
numbers in (  ) are p-values. 
          3. The number of lags in ARDL specification is determined by AIC.AIC suggests that ARDL order 
of (1,0,0,0,0,0) for Korea, India and Taiwan, and (2,0,0,0,0,0) for Japan. 
          4. The signs are prior expectations 
 
However, the coefficients of import are either wrongly signed or insignificant in the 
four countries, indicating that reserve holding may not be significantly related to 
precautionary needs for increasing import payments.  This is because most Asian emerging 
countries had already retained sufficient reserves to meet import payments in the early 2000s 
(Gosselin and Parent 2005).50 
The coefficients on the appreciation and depreciation, which are the main interests, 
show that reserves respond asymmetrically to FX rate movements in Korea and India but 
symmetrically in Japan.  Particularly in Korea, the coefficient on KRW appreciation (-0.288) 
50 Gosselin and Parent (2005, p3) document that the main indicators (representing the adequateness of reserve 
holdings) were above the standard benchmark in most emerging Asian counties (such as China, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). 
Indicators benchmark 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Reserves/short-term external debt 1 - 0.7 2.9 3.3 4.2 4.5 
Reserves/monthly import 3-4 2 4 6 7 8 9 
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is significant – although marginally - and much larger than the coefficient (-0.039) on KRW 
depreciation in absolute value. This suggests that the BOK seems to buy foreign reserves in 
response to KRW appreciation but does not decrease reserves in case of KRW depreciation.   
In contrast, the India appears to be more concerned about domestic currency 
depreciation. The coefficient on depreciation is significant with -0.927, much larger than the 
coefficient on appreciation (-0.329) in absolute value. It may be interpreted that the India 
appears to respond more to domestic-currency depreciation than appreciation, owing to the 
concern about strong inflation pressure. In particular, the monthly inflation rate of India in 
1999-2010 was 0.52% on average, which is much higher than that of other countries (data: 
IMF IFS September 2010) – e.g. Korea (0.26%), Japan (-0.02%), Philippines (0.38%), 
Thailand (0.21%), Singapore (0.14%), etc. The BOJ responds symmetrically to the 
appreciation and the depreciation of the JPY. The coefficients of depreciation (-0.237) and 
appreciation (-0.238) are almost same. For Taiwan, the depreciation coefficient (-0.296) is 
larger than the appreciation coefficient (-0.156) in absolute value, but both are insignificant.  
The above results have limits in explaining asymmetric intervention behaviours, 
because the changes in foreign reserves include non-intervention transactions.  Hence, we 
need to confirm the existence of a propensity for asymmetric interventions by using more 
intervention-related data in the next section.  
 
4.4.2 Measurement of the probability of interventions: Probit model  
Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 report the estimation results of probit models for Korea, Japan 
and Australia, respectively. The signs of most coefficients are consistent with prior 
expectations, not only during the entire period but also during the subsample periods. 
Hosmer-Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit tests (H0: the fit is sufficient to the data) have p-values 
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over 0.10 in most cases, implying that the goodness-of-fit is quite acceptable and that we 
expect the forecast ability of the model to perform well. 
 
4.4.2.1. FX rate deviation from its level trend51 
FX rate deviations from its level trend have significant effects on the probability of 
both USD-purchasing and USD-selling interventions in three countries. In Korea, the 
coefficients on the deviation are significantly positive for USD-selling interventions 
)00068.0( 2 b  and significantly negative for USD-purchasing interventions )00047.0( 2 a  
in the pre-subprime crisis period (see Table 4.5). However, the coefficients become 
insignificant in the post-subprime crisis period.  This may be because of the “fear of losing 
international reserves” (Aizenman and Yi 2009)52 that the BOK did not significantly sell USD 
against the rapid depreciation of KRW in the sub-prime crisis period.  
2a  is highly significant while 2b is insignificant during the entire period, possibly 
indicating that BOK may pay more attention to USD-buying interventions in response to FX 
rate deviation from its trend (i.e., KRW appreciation). This result may provide an indirect 
evidence of asymmetric intervention preferences in Korea – this can be more clearly 
discussed in the next section by using the friction model.  
In Australia, the coefficient on the deviation is significantly positive with correct signs 
51 As the probit model is based on the cumulative normal probability distribution, the interpretations of 
coefficients are different from the normal OLS. The coefficients indicate the effects on a cumulative normal 
function of the probabilities that the dependent variable(=INT) is one. In particular, the coefficients give the 
change in the z-score for a one unit change in the regressor (See Gujarati 2004).  
52
2b is significantly positive for USD-selling interventions in the pre-subprime periods but not in the sub-prime 
crisis period. At first glance, this result appears inconsistent with common sense, because the CBs in small open 
economies need to sell USD during financial crises when local currency is severely depreciating. However, 
USD-selling interventions could be less feasible in practice due to the risk of exhausting foreign reserves. This is 
because dwindling reserves may signal greater vulnerability of their economies. Hence, CBs cannot always sell 
foreign assets in line with domestic currency depreciation. In this case, the coefficients of USD-selling 
interventions may be insignificant with regard to the changes in FX rates.    
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for USD sales through all periods (see 02 b  in Table 4.6) but not for USD purchases: 2a is 
wrongly signed (positive). This evidence indicates that RBA appears to be more concerned 
about AUD depreciation than appreciation. In consideration of the fact that RBA has never 
conducted USD-buying interventions since mid-1992 when IT was introduced, RBA’s more 
sensitive response to AUD depreciation may be related to its attempt to prevent inflation 
pressure caused by AUD depreciation.  
 
Table 4.5 Intervention motives in Korea: Probit model      
 Whole  period 
(5/9/2001-23/3/2010) 
Pre-subprime crisis 
(5/9/2001-31/7/2007) 
Post-subprime crisis 
(1/8/2007-23/3/2010) 
coefficient P-value coefficient P-value coefficient P-value 
P
ur
ch
as
in
g 
U
S
 d
ol
la
r 
 Constant (
1a )  -1.1319
*** 0.0000  -1.0623*** 0.0000  -1.1890*** 0.0000  
 Deviation from trend (
2a ) - -0.0016
** 0.0109  -0.0047*** 0.0001  -0.0011  0.1167  
 FX rate volatility(
3a ) + 0.0593  0.1974  -0.8649  0.1222  0.0760
* 0.0930  
 Interest differential(
4a ) + -0.0164  0.9455  0.5287  0.2044  -0.2053  0.4384  
 Change in CDS spread(
5a ) - -0.0107
*** 0.0053  -0.0173  0.1042  -0.0092** 0.0151  
 Previous intervention(
6a ) + 1.1738
*** 0.0000  1.2621*** 0.0000  0.7140*** 0.0000  
 Change in MSB (
7a ) - -1.3053  0.7083  -0.5527  0.8969  -6.3063  0.2759  
 Foreigner’s net buying(
8a ) + 0.0066
*** 0.0001  0.0101*** 0.0001  0.0035* 0.0825  
 
 Log likelihood -978.65 -688.34 -331.16 
 LR statistics 362.11*** 0.0000 324.66*** 0.0000 48.11*** 0.0000 
 McFadden R2 0.157 0.191 0.106 
  Hosmer-Lemeshow  Statistic 7.9756 0.6312 6.1766 0.6275 4.4786 0.8116 
S
el
li
ng
 U
S
 d
ol
la
r 
 Constant  (
1b )  -1.5717
*** 0.0000  -2.3417*** 0.0000  -0.8988*** 0.0000  
 Deviation from trend(
2b ) + 0.0005  0.2562  0.0068
** 0.0173  -0.0005  0.3639  
 FX rate volatility(
3b ) + 0.1219
*** 0.0000  2.6242*** 0.0080  0.0754** 0.0149  
 Interest differential(
4b ) - -0.0689  0.8065  -0.4798  0.6735  0.0197  0.9491  
 Change in CDS spread(
5b ) + 0.0082
** 0.0217  -0.0044  0.8488  0.0081** 0.0232  
 Previous intervention(
6b ) + 1.1642
*** 0.0000  1.1197*** 0.0000  0.6701*** 0.0000  
 Change in MSB (
7b ) - -2.7239  0.4837  -2.7172  0.7397  -3.0417  0.5738  
 Foreigner’s net buying(
8b ) - -0.0037
** 0.0126  -0.0015  0.7065  -0.0038** 0.0422  
  Log likelihood -584.31 -144.27 -359.40 
 LR statistics 223.07*** 0.0000 41.82*** 0.0000 54.65*** 0.0000 
 McFadden R2 0.160 0.127 0.070 
  Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistic 10.9062 0.3699 0.3649 0.7261 7.0384 0.5325 
 No of observations 2121 1461 660 
Notes: 1. Huber-White’s robust standard errors and covariances are used. 
            2. Hosmer-Lemeshow tests are goodness-of-fit evaluation for binary specification. A null hypothesis is that the fit is 
sufficient to the data. 
            3. + and – indicate a priori expectation about the signs of coefficients under leaning-against-the-wind. 
            4. ***, ** and * are significant at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.     
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In Japan, deviations from FX rate level trends have significant effects on both USD-
selling and purchasing intervention decisions through all periods. In Table 4.7,  )0(2 a  and 
)0(2 b  are correctly signed and significant at 1% level, which supports the evidence that 
BOJ tends to aim at adjusting FX rates into a certain level, e.g. 125JPY/USD in the early 
1990s (Ito 2003, Ito and Yabu 2007).  
In summary, BOK and BOJ lean against the wind: the more depreciated (appreciated) 
the domestic currency, the less (more) probable are USD-buying interventions and the more 
(less) probable are USD-selling interventions. However, BOK appears to less resist the 
depreciation of KRW during the post-subprime period, because of “fear of depleting foreign 
reserves” or its preference for asymmetric interventions. BOJ appears responds to both 
appreciation and depreciation of JPY. RBA appears to lean against the wind only when AUD 
depreciates in consideration of inflation.  
 
4.4.2.2 FX rate volatility 
In Korea and Australia, conditional volatility of the FX rate has a significant effect on 
the probability of USD-selling interventions but not on USD-purchasing interventions.  is 
not significant while 3b  is significant in both countries through all periods, indicating that 
increasing FX volatility leads to a higher probability of USD-selling intervention in Korea 
and Australia but not USD-purchasing intervention. In contrast, both 3a  and 3b  are 
insignificant in Japan through all periods.  This finding may reflect the different economic 
structures in three countries. That is, small open economies such as Korea and Australia are 
more likely to be vulnerable to turbulent and volatile FX rates (mostly stemming from rapid 
depreciation) than a large economy like Japan.  Note that Japanese yen is one of the 
3a
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international vehicle currencies, so that its value is likely much safer and more stable than the 
currencies of small open economies. 
 
Table 4.6 Intervention motives in Australia: Probit model       
  
Whole period 
(2/1/1989-31/12/2008) 
Pre-IT Post-IT 
(2/1/1989-30/6/1992)  CDS excluded 
(1/7/1992-31/12/2008) 
 CDS included 
(2/12003-31/12/2008) 
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value 
P
ur
ch
as
in
g 
U
S
 d
ol
la
r 
 Constant (
1a )  -2.0383
*** 0.0000  -0.9734*** 0.0000  n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 Deviation from trend (
2a ) - 0.5151
* 0.0863  0.6864  0.5461  n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 FX rate volatility(
3a ) + 0.0005  0.2515  0.0007  0.4576  n.a
1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 Interest differential(
4a ) + -0.1721  0.2571  -0.1213  0.3286  n.a
1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 Change in CDS spread(
5a ) - - - - - n.a
1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 Previous intervention(
6a ) + 2.4009
*** 0.0000 1.3343*** 0.0000 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 n.a1 
 Log likelihood -692.93 -469.99   
 LR statistic 864.99*** 0.0000 202.12*** 0.0000   
 McFadden R-squared 0.384 0.177   
 Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistic 8.5136 0.3850 6.1641 0.6289   
S
el
li
ng
 U
S
 d
ol
la
r 
 Constant  (
1b )  -2.1582
*** 0.0000  -2.1655*** 0.0000  -2.1664*** 0.0000  -3.2353*** 0.0000  
 Deviation from trend(
2b ) + 3.8762
*** 0.0000  4.2154* 0.0829  4.0353*** 0.0000  4.3581*** 0.0000  
 FX rate volatility(
3b ) + 0.0014
*** 0.0021  0.0028* 0.0712  0.0012** 0.0129  0.0034*** 0.0000  
 Interest differential(
4b ) - -0.0763  0.6209  0.0532  0.7242  -0.1212  0.5694  -0.7754  0.3595  
 Change in CDS spread(
5b ) + - - - - - - 0.0465
*** 0.0023  
 Previous intervention(
6b ) + 1.4811
*** 0.0000 1.8438*** 0.0000 1.3613*** 0.0000 -0.0211  0.1699  
 Log likelihood -584.34 -104.52 -475.86 -27.64 
 LR statistic 396.98*** 0.0000 94.05*** 0.0000 310.00*** 0.0000 65.67*** 0.0000 
 McFadden R-squared 0.254 0.310 0.246 0.542 
 Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistic 10.7767 0.3752 6.9486 0.5422 11.0476 0.3538 0.6523 0.9996 
No of observations 5216 910 4306 1563 
Notes: 1. There were no USD-purchasing interventions in 1/7/1992-31/12/2008. 
            2. Huber-White’s robust standard errors and covariances are used.  
            3. Hosmer-Lemeshow tests are goodness-of-fit evaluation for binary specification. A null hypothesis is that the fit is 
sufficient to the data. 
            4. + and – indicate a priori expectation about the signs of coefficients under leaning-against-the-wind. 
            5. ***, ** and * are significant at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
 
4.4.2.3 Interest rate differential 
The interest rate differential appears not to influence the probability of USD-
purchasing and selling interventions during all periods in the three countries. and  are 
insignificant or wrongly signed for all periods. In particular, the insignificance of the 
coefficient 4a  suggests that BOK, RBA and BOJ may not consider seriously the possibility of 
overshooting of the FX rate caused by changes in the interest rate differential in the short run. 
4a 4b
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Another interpretation for this is that interventions may support current monetary stance by 
not immediately responding to the change in the interest rate differential (Kim and Sheen 
2002).  For example, immediate USD-buying interventions in response to a fall in US interest 
rates are likely to distort the current monetary stance, because the intervention leads to an 
increase in the monetary base.   
 
4.4.2.4 Country risk 
CDS spread reflects the changes in a country risk.  The country risk of emerging or 
small open countries may be more volatile than that of a large economy, because the former 
are more sensitive to external shocks than the latter. In particular, the CDS spread of emerging 
countries tends to fluctuate more during international financial crises, and thus the effects of 
CDS spreads on intervention decisions are expected to be more prominent in crisis periods.  
As expected, the coefficients of CDS spread are significantly negative for USD-
purchasing interventions and positive for USD-selling interventions over the entire period and 
the post-subprime crisis period in Korea ( 05 a , 05 b  in Table 4.5). Figure 4.4 shows that the 
CDS spreads of Korea appear negatively correlated with net purchases of USD, particularly 
during the subprime crisis period. When CDS spread is included in the specifications for 
Japan and Australia in the subsamples, the coefficient on the CDS spread is significantly 
positive in Australia ( 0047.05 b  with p-value 0.002 in Table 4.6) but not in 
Japan( 015.05 a with p-value 0.889 in Table 4.7). This finding suggests that changes in 
country risk significantly influence intervention decisions particularly in small open 
economies.53 
53 This interpretation may be very limited, because the subsample for Australia (2003M01-2008M12) includes 
the US sub-prime crisis period, while the sub-sample for Japan (2003M01-2004M03) does not include any 
periods of international financial crisis.  
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Figure 4.4 FX Intervention and CDS spread of Korea 
 
        Notes: 1. FX intervention indicates the amount of net purchase of USD (equivalent to100 million KRW)    
                    2. CDS spreads are depicted as a basis point  
        Data: BOK and Bloomberg 
 
4.4.2.5 Previous intervention 
The coefficients of previous interventions are significantly positive for all periods in 
three countries ( 06 a , 06 b ), suggesting that interventions are persistent. A USD-
purchasing (selling) intervention was usually followed by another USD-purchasing (selling) 
intervention on the following day. CBs tend to conduct interventions consecutively over 
several days to reinforce their effects.   
 
4.4.2.6 Foreigners’ purchase of Korean stocks and MSB (Korea) 
Foreigners’ net purchases of Korean stock and changes in MSB are used only in the 
regression for Korea, owing to data availability. Foreigners’ purchases (sales) of Korean stock 
significantly increase the probability of the BOK’s USD-purchasing (USD-selling) 
interventions ( 8a >0, 8b <0 for most sample periods in Table 4.5). This indicates that the 
BOK is keen to sterilise its portfolio investments on a daily basis. However, the coefficients 
for the subsample are somewhat different. In Table 4.5, 8a  is significant for all periods, while 
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8b  is significant only for the post-subprime crisis period. This suggests that BOK is reluctant 
to sell USD and prefers to purchase USD particularly in peacetime, reflecting “fear of 
appreciation and of depleting foreign reserves” in small open emerging economies.  
The coefficients on ΔMSB are not significant in all periods, indicating that BOK may 
not be concerned about the sterilisation costs in the short run.  The results here are based on 
daily data, so we may not conclude that BOK does not pay attention to sterilisation costs in 
the medium to long run. Chapter 6 discusses whether BOK cares about sterilisation costs and 
whether current MSB-dependent sterilisations are sustainable in the long run. 
Table 4.7 Intervention motives in Japan: Probit model   
 
Whole period 
(8/4/1991-31/32004) 
Pre-Sakakibara 
(8/4/1991-30/6/1995) 
Post- Sakakibara 
CDS excluded 
(1/7/1995-31/3/2004) 
CDS included 
(2/1/2003-31/3/2004) 
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value. Coeff. P-value. Coeff. P-value. 
P
ur
ch
as
in
g 
U
S
 d
ol
la
r 
 Constant (
1a )  -1.9008
*** 0.0000  -2.0289*** 0.0000  -1.9207*** 0.0000  -1.4429*** 0.0000  
 Deviation from trend (
2a ) - -0.0554
*** 0.0000  -0.0926*** 0.0000  -0.0452*** 0.0000  -0.0811*** 0.0041  
 FX rate volatility(
3a ) + 0.0505  0.7461  0.1022  0.7594  0.0196  0.9032  0.3239  0.4679  
 Interest differential(
4a ) + -0.1717  0.2768  -0.2712
* 0.0984  -0.0259  0.9342  0.1953  0.8930  
 Change in CDS spread(
5a ) - - - - - - - -0.0151 0.8889 
 Previous intervention(
6a ) + 1.7657
*** 0.0000 1.3635*** 0.0000 2.0296*** 0.000 1.6271*** 0.0000 
 Log likelihood -715.58 -318.53 -386.58 -144.18 
 LR statistic 684.51*** 0.0000 238.29*** 0.0000 455.01*** 0.0000 132.60*** 0.0000 
 McFadden R-squared 0.3235 0.2722 0.3705 0.3150 
 Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistic 7.7676 0.4925 6.0147 0.6423 18.2201** 0.0196 10.6208 0.2241 
S
el
li
ng
 U
S
 d
ol
la
r 
 Constant  (
1b )  -2.1082
*** 0.0000  -1.7667*** 0.0001  -4.2880***  0.0010  n.a
1 n.a1 
 Deviation from trend(
2b ) + 0.0199 
** 0.0422  0.0729*** 0.0001  0.1982*** 0.0082  n.a
1 n.a1 
 FX rate volatility(
3b ) + -0.8686  0.3035  -0.4900  0.6614  -0.8648  0.6780  n.a
1 n.a1 
 Interest differential(
4b ) - 0.4484 
* 0.0872  0.3577  0.2080  0.9222  0.2239  n.a
1 n.a1 
 Previous intervention(
6a ) + 1.7107 
*** 0.0000  1.0523*** 0.0006  2.7436*** 0.0000  n.a
1 n.a1 
 Log likelihood -163.52 -116.19 -20.430   
 LR statistic 47.709*** 0.0000 28.9741*** 0.0000 42.6829*** 0.0000   
 McFadden R-squared 0.127 0.111 0.512  
 Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistic 8.6206 0.3753 6.4690 0.5948 12.4587 0.3421   
 No of observations 3564 1270 2294 310 
Notes: 1. USD-selling interventions did not occur during the period 2/1/2003– 31/3/2004. 
            2. Huber-White’s robust standard errors and covariances are used.  
   3. Hosmer-Lemeshow tests are goodness-of-fit evaluation for binary specification. A null hypothesis is that the fit is 
 sufficient to the data. 
            4.+ and – indicate a priori expectation about the signs of coefficients under leaning-against-the-wind. 
            5. ***, ** and * are significant at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.4.3 Degrees of asymmetric intervention motives: Friction model  
We first compare the degree of asymmetric intervention (which is our interest) and 
then describe the evidence which is peculiar to the friction model for each country. The results 
are reported in Tables 4.8 to 4.10. Most results obtained from the friction model are similar to 
those from the probit model. For example, coefficients of previous interventions ( 1 ) are 
significantly positive in all three countries through all periods, suggesting the persistence of 
the interventions. The deviations of the FX rate level from its trend, in general, prompts 
interventions in all countries, particularly when the deviations are large or persistent. This 
confirms the tendency to lean against the wind in three countries. FX rate volatility deviating 
from its trend causes both BOK and RBA, but not BOJ, to intervene in FX markets. Interest 
rate differentials do not significantly affect intervention decisions in any of the countries.   
 
4.4.3.1 Comparison of the degree of asymmetric interventions  
In absolute values, the estimated negative threshold ( I = -3.815) is significantly 
larger than positive threshold ( I =2.564) for the whole sample in Korea, while the two 
significant thresholds (1.881 vs. -1.816) are not much different in Japan. This suggests the 
asymmetric and symmetric intervention preferences in Korea and Japan, respectively. The 
evidence of asymmetric interventions in Korea is consistent with Gnabo et al.’s (2010) studies 
on small open emerging economies such as Brazil and the Czech Republic. The result of 
Japanese symmetric interventions corresponds to Ito (2003) that Japanese interventions were 
symmetric in 1991M4-2001M3 and exchange rate level of 125JPY/USD was the threshold 
applied to both USD-purchasing and selling interventions. All these findings support evidence 
obtained from the buffer stock model in the previous section. 
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The RBA is more prone to favour the AUD appreciation. The estimate I (-0.018) is 
significantly less than I  (0.128) in absolute values over the entire period, implying that 
RBA prefer supporting AUD to devaluing it. The RBA’s preference appears somewhat 
strengthened in the post-IT period: I stayed around -0.05 over time while I  increased 
from 0.108 to 0.129. 
BOK’s preference for the KRW-depreciation and RBA’s preference for the AUD-
appreciation look stable over time. In contrast, Japanese intervention appears to become 
asymmetric in the post-Sakakibara period. Table 4.10 reports that I (=1.828) > I (=0.047) 
in the pre-Sakakibara period and I (=3.097) < I (=6.522) in the post-Sakakibara period, 
indicating that BOJ became more concerned about the JPY appreciation than the depreciation 
after the late 1990s.  This may come from the motive for boosting trade competitiveness for 
the purpose of economic recovery, under quite limited policy options at that time.  Note that 
BOJ maintained a zero interest rate policy in 1999M2-2000M8 and  2001M3-2006M6(Ito and 
Yabu 2007), and that the policy was reintroduced in October 2010. 
 
4.4.3.2 Korea 
The coefficients for average deviation dummy ( dev ) are all insignificant while the 
size deviation dummy ( size ) is significantly negative during the whole period. This implies 
that BOK leans against the wind when the deviation from FX rate level is large. A large fall in 
FX rate level from its trend (i.e., KRW appreciation) leads to USD–purchasing interventions 
(INTt>0) while a large rise in the FX rate from its trend (i.e., KRW deprecation) incurs USD-
selling interventions (INTt<0). Insignificant dev  and suggests that BOK, on average, does 
not react to (every) deviation from the FX level and volatility trend in consideration of 
c
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intervention cost. This evidence of leaning against the wind is consistent with other previous 
studies (see Lee and Yoon 1997) and the probit estimation in the previous section. However,
size  became insignificant in the post-subprime periods, indicating that the motives for 
leaning against the wind became weaker. This reflects the fact that USD-selling interventions 
are limited during crisis periods owing to fear of depleting foreign reserves. 
 
Table 4.8 Asymmetric intervention in Korea: Friction model  
ttcdstmsbtdifftthsizetdshsizetdscttsizesizetcumcumtdevdevtt CDSMSBDIFFhIIIFXDEVIIIINTINT    )()( ,,,,,,11  
 sign I. Whole 
(12/9/2001-23/3/2010) 
II. Pre-subprime 
(12/9/2001-31/7/2007) 
III. Post-subprime 
(1/8/2007-23/3/2010) 
(i) Previous intervention( 1 ) + 0.1901
*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1904*** 
(0.0001) 
0.1866*** 
(0.0046) 
(ii)Deviation from FX level trend      
 Current (average) deviation( ) - 0.0550 
(0.5641) 
-0.0208 
(0.8202) 
0.1071 
(0.5327) 
 Persistent ( ) - -0.0909 
(0.3406) 
-0.0253 
(0.7846) 
-0.1504 
(0.3834) 
 Large ( size ) 
- -0.0280** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0342*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0355 
(0.1019) 
(iii)Deviation from FX volatility trend      
 Current (average) deviation ( ) - -9.1013 
(0.8648) 
24.6372 
(0.1105) 
-10.4436 
(0.8940) 
 Large ( hsize ) 
- -4.8181 
(0.9271) 
-57.2547** 
(0.0278) 
-10.8322 
(0.8891) 
(iii ) Interest  differential ( diff ) 
+ -1.1635 
(0.4955) 
-2.4214 
(0.4008) 
-0.8450 
(0.7424) 
(iv) Change in MSB ( ) - -0.0001 
(0.7471) 
-0.00002 
(0.6479) 
0.00001 
(0.8848) 
(v) CDS spread( ) - -0.0216
* 
(0.0718) 
-0.06420* 
(0.0597) 
-0.0165** 
(0.0470) 
(vi) σ  5.3652*** 
(0.0000) 
3.5994*** 
(0.0000) 
7.1357*** 
(0.0000) 
(vii)  positive threshold  2.5643
*** 
(0.0000) 
2.1230*** 
(0.0000) 
3.3182*** 
(0.0010) 
(vii)  I negative threshold  -3.8146
*** 
(0.0004) 
-2.1717*** 
(0.0008) 
-4.2112*** 
(0.0000) 
Log- likelihood  -2039.21 -1060.98 -896.77 
Notes: 1. HAC robust standard error covariance matrix is used. 
            2. The numbers in (  ) are p-values. 
            3. ***, ** and * are significant at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
            4. The signs are prior expectations in case of leaning-against-the-wind. If CBs lean with the wind, it may be 
  expected that  and . 
            5. |δI-|>| δI+| is interpreted as the evidence of asymmetric interventions which favour weak KRW. 
 
dev
cum
c
msb
cds
I
0dev 0size
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The estimated hsize (= -57.255) is significantly negative with p-value of 0.028 only for 
the pre-subprime period, suggesting that, on days of above average volatility, BOK conducts 
USD-purchasing (selling) interventions to address the further increase in volatility associated 
with KRW appreciation (depreciation). The insignificance of hsize  for the post subprime 
period may also be due to “fear of losing foreign reserves” which has kept BOK from 
responding to high FX volatility actively during the crisis period.  diff   and msb  are 
insignificant in all periods, implying that interest rate differentials and changes in MSB do not 
influence intervention decisions in the short run. This result is exactly what we obtain from 
the probit model.  
 
4.4.3.3 Australia 
 
The average effect of current FX rate deviation from the level trend ( dev ) is 
significantly negative for all periods, suggesting that RBA mostly leans against the wind. cum   
is significantly negative in all periods, indicating that RBA reacts to correct persistent  
deviations from trend.  However, estimated size  is significantly positive in the post-IT period, 
which is not expected from leaning-against-the-wind. Nevertheless, the overall effects of FX 
level deviation on the intervention decision are still negative in all periods (i.e., dev + cum +
size < 0). The overall impact of volatility deviation is negative (i.e. c <0 in the post-IT 
period and hsize <0 in the pre-IT period), so the RBA appears to conduct the intervention 
when FX rate volatility increases. 
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Table 4.9 Asymmetric intervention in Australia: Friction model 
ttdifftthsizetdshsizetdscttsizesizetcumcumtdevdevtt DIFFhIIIFXDEVIIIINTINT    )()( ,,,,,,11
 
 sign I. Whole 
(2/1/1989-31/12/2008) 
II. Pre-IT 
(2/1/1989-31/7/1992) 
III. Post-IT 
(1/8/1992-31/12/2008) 
(i) Previous intervention( 1 ) + 
0.3032*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1168** 
(0.0179) 
0.3483*** 
(0.0016) 
(ii)Deviation from FX level trend      
 Current deviation( dev ) - 
-0.1594*** 
(0.0057) 
-0.2644*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.3111* 
(0.0574) 
 Persistent ( cum ) - 
-0.3389*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.6171*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.5323*** 
(0.0000) 
 Large (
size ) - 
0.3419*** 
(0.0003) 
0.2094 
(0.2391) 
0.6789*** 
(0.0000) 
(iii)Deviation from FX volatility trend      
 Current deviation(
c ) - 
-0.0098 
(0.3967) 
-0.0007 
(0.8916) 
-0.0448* 
(0.0750) 
 Larger ( hsize ) - 
-0.0218 
(0.1383) 
-0.0199** 
(0.0166) 
0.0103 
(0.1631) 
(iii ) Interest  differential (
diff ) + 
0.0046 
(0.1465) 
0.0009 
(0.6373) 
0.0098 
(0.5249) 
(vii) σ  
0.1346*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0540*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2324*** 
(0.0000) 
(viii) I  positive threshold  
0.1282*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1079*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1286*** 
(0.0002) 
(viv) I negative threshold  
-0.0176* 
(0.0524) 
-0.0485*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0500*** 
(0.0000) 
Log- likelihood  225.04 407.55 4.50 
Notes:  1. HAC robust standard error covariance matrix is used. 
             2. The numbers in (  ) are p-values. 
             3. ***, ** and * are significant at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
             4. The signs are prior expectations in case of leaning-against-the-wind. If CBs lean with the wind, it   
                 may be expected that 0dev  and 0size . 
             5. |δI-|>| δI+| is interpreted as the evidence of asymmetric interventions which favour weak AUD. 
 
4.4.3.4. Japan 
The estimated dev  is significantly positive – wrongly signed or insignificant for all 
periods. size  is significantly negative in the post-Sakakibara period, indicating that BOJ 
responded only to the larger deviation from FX rate level trend in the post-Sakakibara period.  
This is consistent with Ito and Yabu (2007) that Japanese intervention patterns shifted with the 
inauguration of Dr. Sakakibara in June 1995 – from frequent and small interventions to 
infrequent and large-scale ones.  
The persistent deviations from level trend lead to a negative effect on intervention 
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( cum <0), but insignificant in all periods. According to Kim and Sheen (2002, pp. 643-646), 
the insignificance of cum  may imply that if the deviation is sustained, the BOJ consider the 
persistent deviation to be a permanent change in the equilibrium rate, and restrain intervention 
to some degree. The estimated diff is either insignificant or wrongly signed for all periods. 
This confirms the insignificant effects of interest rate differentials on intervention decision on 
a daily basis, which is consistent with the result of the probit model.  
 
Table 4.10 Asymmetric intervention in Japan: Friction model  
ttdifftthsizetdshsizetdscttsizesizetcumcumtdevdevtt DIFFhIIIFXDEVIIIINTINT    )()( ,,,,,,11
 
 sign I. Whole 
(8/4/1991-31/3/2004) 
II. Pre-Sakakibara 
(8/4/1991-30/6/1995) 
III. Post- Sakakibara 
(1/7/1995-31/3/2004) 
(i) Previous intervention( 1 ) + 
0.3418*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0819 
(0.6416) 
0.1529** 
(0.0293) 
(ii)Deviation from FX level trend      
 Current deviation( dev ) - 
0.0811 
(0.8201) 
0.4291*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.1106 
(0.6524) 
 Persistent ( cum ) - 
-0.07122 
(0.8374) 
-0.0903 
(0.5173) 
0.1788 
(0.8279) 
 Massive ( size ) - 
0.0419 
(0.6849) 
-0.05263 
(0.9436) 
-0.2142*** 
(0.0000) 
(iii)Deviation from FX volatility trend      
 Current deviation( c ) - 
42.7068 
(0.4235) 
-33.7380 
(0.2912) 
10.6849 
(0.9034) 
 Massive( hsize ) - 
-37.3781 
(0.6024) 
-40.1418 
(0.2864) 
-51.3617 
(0.7133) 
(iii ) Interest  differential ( diff ) + 
-0.6598 
(0.2451) 
0.1562 
(0.4662) 
-7.0104** 
(0.0152) 
(vi) σ  
2.9143*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9974*** 
(0.0000) 
3.5205*** 
(0.0000) 
(vii) I  positive threshold  
1.8806*** 
(0.0000) 
1.8282*** 
(0.0000) 
3.0974* 
(0.0966) 
(viii) I negative threshold  
-1.8157*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0474* 
(0.0680) 
-6.5220* 
(0.0639) 
Log- likelihood  -664.45 -195.46 -345.40 
Notes:  1. HAC robust standard error covariance matrix is used. 
            2. The numbers in (  ) are p-values. 
            3. ***, ** and * are significant at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
            4. The signs are prior expectations in case of leaning-against-the-wind. If CBs lean with the wind, it                  
 may be expected that 0dev  and 0size . 
            5. |δI-|>| δI+| is interpreted as the evidence of asymmetric interventions which favour weak JPY. 
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4.5   Conclusion 
 
4.5.1 Summary of main findings 
 
The main objectives of this chapter are to examine various motives for sterilised FX 
interventions and to compare the degrees of asymmetric intervention preference in the 
selected countries. Using a buffer stock model with monthly foreign reserves data from 11 
countries, we first examine a cointegration relationship between foreign reserves and FX rate 
movements. In this model, CBs’ demand for foreign reserves is assumed to be determined by 
the appreciation or depreciation pressure of FX rates, opportunity costs of holding reserves, 
volatility of reserves increments and the need for payment for imports, etc.  
Our main finding from the buffer stock model is that BOK tends to be more worried 
about appreciation than depreciation of domestic currency compared to other countries.  In 
particular, the preference for asymmetric intervention (aiming at domestic currency 
depreciation) is more prominent in small open economies such as Korea than in relatively 
large or closed economies such as Japan and India.  The buffer stock model suggests that 
reserve holding in these countries is not significantly associated with the precautionary needs 
for increasing import payments. Foreign reserve holdings are affected by the domestic-foreign 
interest rate differential, which is a proxy for opportunity costs. Although the buffer stock 
model enables us to conduct cross-country analysis with foreign reserve data which are easily 
available, it has limitations, in that foreign reserves are not perfect proxies for interventions. 
Considering this, we examine the determinants of intervention decisions by using the probit 
and friction model with daily data on Korea, Japan and Australia.   
Probit estimation suggest that interventions are mainly affected by several common 
factors in three countries: the degree of current FX rate deviation from trend, the level of FX 
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rate volatility, country risk and previous interventions. Unlike the evidence from the buffer 
stock model with monthly data, interest rate differentials do not have a significant effect on 
intervention decisions in the three countries in probit and friction model using daily data. 
The appreciation (depreciation) of domestic currency deviated from its FX rate level 
trend leads to the increase in probability of USD-purchasing (USD-selling) interventions in 
the three countries, which implies that CBs lean against the wind. Korea’s leaning-against-
the-wind policy is somewhat different from Australia’s. BOK appears not to sell USD 
significantly against the rapid depreciation of Korean won, particularly in the recent crisis 
periods. This may be associated with “fear of losing foreign reserves”, which is frequently 
found in the studies on small open emerging countries. In contrast, RBA is willing to sells 
USD but reluctant to purchases USD when AUD/USD rate is deviated from its trend. RBA 
appears to be more worried about the depreciation of AUD than the appreciation, which may 
reflects the RBA’s relatively stronger anti-inflation commitment than BOK and BOJ. 
We have found that there is a significant difference in intervention responses to the 
deviation from a volatility trend between small open economies (Korea and Australia) and 
large economies (Japan). The higher probability of USD-selling or purchasing intervention is 
related to more volatile movement of FX rates in Korea and Australia, but not in Japan. This 
may be mainly because of the differences in the natures of their economy. Since Korea and 
Australia are small open economies (which are more susceptible to external shocks) and Japan 
is relatively larger economy, JPY movements are more stable than the KRW and AUD. This 
leads BOK and RBA to be more concerned about exchange rate volatility.   
Interest rate differentials appear not to significantly influence the probability of either 
USD-purchasing or selling interventions in all periods in the three countries. One possible 
interpretation is that the three authorities may not seriously consider the possibility of 
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overshooting of the FX rate caused by changes in interest rate differentials (e.g., a sudden rise 
in the US policy rate) on a daily basis. Another interpretation may be that the intervention 
policy may support current monetary policy, not by immediately responding to the change in 
interest rate differential. Interventions are significantly influenced by changes in country risk 
(proxied by CDS spread) in Korean and Australia but not in Japan. In Korea, foreigners’ 
purchases (sales) of Korean stock significantly increase the probability of USD-purchasing 
(USD-selling) interventions. The intervention costs (represented by increases in MSBs) are 
not considered in the BOK’s intervention decision in the short-run.  
The aforementioned results of probit estimation are, in general, confirmed by the 
friction estimation. For example, friction estimations appear to support the BOK’s claim that 
it intervenes in the market to smooth out severe FX volatility and to slow down (or reverse) 
rapid changes in FX rate levels. BOK tends to selectively intervene when FX rates are too 
volatile or are changing too fast.  The three CBs appear not to respond to average deviations 
of FX level and volatility from trends. These behaviours may contribute to reducing 
intervention costs with allowing for more flexible movement of exchange rates.   
Importantly, the friction model provides direct information on the degrees of 
asymmetric intervention in the three countries. The results suggest the existence of 
asymmetric intervention preferences in Korea and symmetric ones in Japan, implying that 
BOK favours interventions for inducing KRW depreciation while BOJ responds 
symmetrically to the appreciation and depreciation of JPY.  RBA prefers interventions to 
support AUD.  Both BOK’s preference for KRW depreciation and RBA’s preference for AUD 
appreciation remain stable over time. In contrast, Japanese intervention appears to become 
more asymmetric, favouring the depreciation of JPY after the mid-1990s, which may be due 
to the increasing motives for boosting trade competitiveness.  
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Considering the empirical findings in Ch. 3 and Ch. 4 together, we may come to 
conclusion on why small open emerging economies like Korea have adhered to sterilised FX 
market interventions despite little effects on exchange rates and sterilisation costs as a result 
of the intervention activities. First, some small open emerging countries prefer to build up 
foreign reserves irrespective of intervention effects in order to insure against possible sudden 
stop and reversal of capital flows. Indeed, some studies have noted that many emerging or 
developing countries were relatively more resilient to financial crises in 2008-2009 than they 
would have, owing to more sufficient foreign reserves and better macroeconomic and 
prudential polies as compared to past decades (IMF 2009).   Second, intervention authorities 
in emerging countries need to create uncertainty in the FX market via secret interventions to 
prevent one-way bets or to warn speculators in FX markets (Rhee and Lee 2005). The FX 
markets in emerging countries tend to be more vulnerable to speculative attacks and one-way 
bets because of their thin market structure. Third, USD-purchasing interventions can lower 
local residents’ financing cost from abroad because reserves accumulation contributes to 
lowering spreads on the service costs of the stock of sovereign debt – that is, CDS spread 
(Levy-Yeyati 2008). 
 
4.5.2 Limitations of study and future research 
 
The analyses in Chapter 3 and this chapter have several limitations. First, we assume 
that a CB or a government’s horizon is a few days and that intervention effects are short-lived. 
Although most concurrent studies support the very short-term effects of interventions, it may 
be possible that the CB’s horizon may be beyond the day or week.  For example, CBs may 
undertake interventions in response to persistent interest rate differentials which last for a few 
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months, although they do not respond to short-term differentials. Thus, it is necessary to 
investigate the medium to long-term effects of interventions. For example, Kim (2003) 
provides evidence of significant interrelations between interventions and monetary policy 
rate(i.e. interest rate differentials) by using the SVAR model with monthly data. 
Second, we use different sample periods for each country. This is inevitable, because 
data availability is different for the countries considered and because it is difficult to obtain 
enough daily data. Thus, comparative interpretations in this chapter may have some 
limitations, although most of the sample periods for the three countries overlap.  On account 
of the limited data availability, we may omit pertinent factors influencing intervention effects 
or motivations. For example, the daily data on foreigners’ purchases of domestic equity are 
only available for Korea in our analyses.  
Third, we do not sort out the impacts of oral interventions in the analyses. While 
actual interventions are generally undertaken when FX markets are open, oral interventions 
often occur after the FX markets are closed.  Thus, it is possible that even a very small-scale 
intervention, if it is supported by oral interventions, could be much more effective than large-
scale ones. In this case, the coefficient on the small-scale (actual) interventions is likely to be 
overestimated.  
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CHAPTER 5 STERILISATION AND CAPITAL 
MOBILITY UNDER INFLATION TARGETING: 
Evidence from sterilisation and offset coefficients 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
It has been generally accepted that international capital mobility weakens the effects 
of monetary policy. As capital mobility accelerates, domestic interest rates will be more 
affected by external shocks.  That is, an independent monetary policy will be less effective 
due to increasing sensitivity of domestic interest rates to foreign shocks. A sterilised FXI is 
believed to mitigate the impact of foreign shocks on domestic interest rates and inflation, and 
thus to contribute to maintaining monetary autonomy.  Accordingly, the sterilised intervention 
can be taken as a tool to cope over the constraint imposed by the trilemma hypothesis. In 
general, the more effective the sterilisations, the more controllable the domestic interest rates 
and the less controllable the foreign reserves (Herring and Marston 1977, p 343).  Effective 
sterilisations of sustained capital inflows enable recipient countries to limit money growth and 
inflation expectations, and to reduce the appreciation pressure on domestic currency at the 
same time.  
Most countries appear to automatically sterilise FXIs in a manner that is consistent 
with the day-to-day maintenance of their interest rate target, and thus attempt to maintain 
monetary autonomy while allowing for FX rate movements (Craig and Humpage 2001). The 
effects of sterilisations heavily depend on the degree of capital mobility. If domestic markets 
are fully integrated with international markets, any attempt to completely sterilise capital 
flows is fruitless (particularly in the long run), and it is impossible to avoid the trilemma 
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constraint via sterilisations, regardless of FX rate regimes (Mundell 1963, p 475). Imperfect 
capital mobility is a precondition for sterilisations to be effective. Given limited capital 
mobility, the sterilised intervention can be used as a tool to control both domestic interest 
rates and FX rates, regardless of the FX regimes (Obstfeld 1982, p 45).  
Many studies have pointed out that since the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, most 
emerging countries in Asia, facing capital inflows and current account surpluses, have used 
sterilisations to secure monetary independence while allowing for more flexible exchange 
rates and freer capital accounts. The countries appear successful in controlling domestic 
interest rates and stabilising exchange rates through sterilisations despite more open capital 
accounts (Reisen 1993, Ouyang and Rajan 2005). In particular, a larger amount of foreign 
reserves accumulated during the last decade appear related with greater and more persistent 
sterilisations than before (Aizenman and Glick 2009, p 777).   
If the sterilisations are persistently successful, this may imply that either the degree 
of de facto capital mobility or the de facto exchange regime has evolved differently from what 
has been conjectured under the trilemma hypothesis.  That is, there is a possibility that (i) 
emerging countries have maintained de facto intermediate exchange regimes (like implicit 
soft pegs) via sterilisations after introducing a de jure free float; or (ii) that de facto 
intermediate exchange regimes after the crisis. Thus, sterilisations may have functioned as a 
substitute for capital control.  
However, it is likely that, even in a state of imperfect capital mobility, a complete 
sterilisation will be limited owing to its side-effects. According to Calvo (1991), a high degree 
of sterilisation in emerging countries might lead to excessively high domestic interest rates, 
thereby encourage capital inflows which, in turn, force CBs to take on high sterilisation costs 
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stemming from additional sterilisations. This vicious circle of sterilisations may eventually 
hamper the credibility of the monetary policy.  
With regard to sterilisations in Asian countries, another plausible possibility is that 
CBs occasionally conduct intentional, partial sterilisations in line with developments in 
macro-economic variables such as inflation.  In particular, CBs with low inflation pressure 
and sluggish output may attempt to promote economic growth by intentionally reducing the 
degree of sterilisation or by non-sterilisation.54  Therefore, the degree of sterilisation (i.e., the 
extent to which international capital flows can be sterilised by OMOs) and the degree of 
capital mobility (i.e., the extent to which OMOs are neutralised by offsetting international 
capital flows) are critical issues in examining not only intervention effects but also monetary 
policy independence. In this context, sterilisation and offset coefficients may provide 
straightforward but flexible methods to investigate the extent of sterilisation, de facto capital 
mobility, trilemma constraints and their interactions. Despite many previous studies 
estimating the coefficients, no studies on a wide range of countries have yet been carried out.  
In an effort to fill this gap, we estimate the coefficients for 30 countries, mainly focusing on 
IT countries. 
The main interest of this chapter is to examine the interaction between sterilisations 
and de facto capital mobility in major inflation targeting (hereafter IT) countries during the 
last two decades. Our main method is to estimate sterilisation and offset coefficients. We 
particularly examine (i) whether there are differences in sterilisation activities and de facto 
54 Svensson (2001) shows that FXIs for inducing domestic currency depreciation may stimulate the economy, as 
do monetary expansion operations. Romer (2004, p 531) considers an unsterilised intervention as one of the 
specific types of unconventional OMO. Particularly where the nominal interest rate is close to zero and thus 
conventional OMOs are no more effective, FXIs can replace OMOs for adjusting economic fluctuations.  For 
example, Japan – known for being the most frequent to intervene in the FX markets among advanced countries – 
might have intentionally reduced the extent of sterilisation during the zero-interest-rate period. 
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capital mobility among major countries with different institutional arrangements and (ii) 
whether sterilisations keep domestic interest rates from falling.   
Previous studies have mostly applied individual time series models with different 
control variables that are chosen by the authors without explicit theoretical backgrounds. Thus, 
the estimated coefficients seem significantly different depending on the methodologies and 
regressors included in the specifications (even for the same countries with similar sample 
periods). This may be because the estimation of sterilisation and offset coefficients is 
vulnerable to problems of omitted variables and endogeneity. In order to lessen such problems, 
we examine panel data from 30 countries while exploiting new instrument variables as well as 
time-series data of individual countries.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the 
current literature on theoretical aspects and empirical evidence. The main issue here is the 
interactions between net domestic assets (or monetary base) and net foreign assets (or foreign 
reserves), which show how CBs respond to capital flows through sterilisations.  Section 3 
presents the models for estimating the sterilisation and offset coefficients, based on Brissimis 
et al.’s (2002) theoretical foundation. We modify several constraints imposed on the CB’s 
reaction function. Then, we specify an empirical model that estimates the effect of 
sterilisations on domestic interest rates, based on Edwards and Khan (1985)’s interest rate 
determination model. This chapter is novel in that it is based on comprehensive panel analyses 
for 30 countries, which have not been conducted in previous studies so far.  We provide time-
series analyses for selected countries for the purpose of comparing the two coefficients.  The 
data are also described here. Section 4 discusses the main findings and section 5 concludes. 
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5.2. Literature review 
5.2.1. Theoretical framework 
The change in money supply through the foreign sector is unavoidable in open 
economies. CBs in small open economies (without perfect capital control) have depended on 
sterilisations to attain both exchange rate stability and monetary independence. Regardless of 
FX rate regimes, policy makers appear to view sterilisations as policy tools to control both 
exchange rates and monetary targets in the short run, although they doubt the long-term 
feasibility of sterilisations.   
In general, under a fixed exchange regime and perfect asset substitutability, monetary 
control is totally infeasible in the short run as well as in the long run due to the complete 
offsetting of capital flows responding to domestic interest rate movements (Mundell 1963). In 
a more realistic world with imperfect substitutability, monetary independence through 
sterilisations may be feasible particularly in the short run, as domestic monetary policy cannot 
be immediately offset by capital flows (Obstfeld 1982, p 45).  In the long run, the feasibility 
of sterilisations will disappear through the gradual adjustment procedure of offsetting capital 
flows. CBs under flexible FX regimes are expected to sterilise capital inflows more easily 
than those with fixed regimes, because the appreciation of domestic currency could absorb the 
impact of capital inflow. 
In consideration of recent highly-integrated financial markets, the controllability of 
both the monetary base and exchange rate depends on the degree of capital control or 
sterilisations in a small open economy. As the benefits of capital mobility appear widely 
appreciated, the controllability of money tends to depend more on the effectiveness of 
sterilisations than capital control. Optimal sterilisation policy is determined by driving forces 
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to affect the economy and the CBs’ preference – particularly exchange rate regime (Haque et 
al. 1997).  If CBs care about more stability of interest rates than of exchange rates, there will 
be a negative correlation between domestic credit and foreign reserves. In contrast, positive 
correlation indicates that the CBs aim to stabilise foreign reserves. 
 
5.2.1.1 Measurement of sterilisation and offset coefficient 
In this section, sterilisation is narrowly defined as a CB’s attempt to neutralise 
changes in net foreign assets (NFA) by changing net domestic assets (NDA)55 for the purpose 
of keeping the monetary base (MB) unaffected by capital flows. Given frequent FXIs under 
free capital mobility, sterilisations mitigate the impact of capital flows on domestic bank 
reserves, interest rates and inflation. However, the benefits of sterilisation (i.e., greater control 
over the monetary base and domestic interest rates) are gained at the expense of lessened 
control over foreign reserves (i.e. foreign exchange rates). This trade-off between monetary 
independence and FX stability is the gist of conventional trilemma arguments.  
The following simultaneous equations, suggested by Argy and Kouri (1974) and 
Kouri and Porter (1974), are useful for understanding the sterilisation mechanism. (5.2.1) 
shows a monetary reaction function while (5.2.2) describes a BOP function. 
(5.2.1) tttt uXaNFAaaNDA  321  
(5.2.2) tttt vYbNDAbbNFA  321  
where ia and ib are the coefficients to be estimated; tu and tv  are i.i.d disturbances; X and Y 
denote control variables affecting NDA  and NFA , respectively. To illustrate the offset and 
55 Accounting identity drawn from a CB’s B/S indicates that ∆BM = ∆NDA + ∆NFA. Since BM consists of 
controllable bank reserves and not-perfectly-controllable CIC, the sterilisation boils down to changing bank 
reserves. Alternatively, domestic credit and foreign reserves can replace NDA and NFA, respectively. 
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sterilisation coefficients with the above simple equations, assume a CB facing considerable 
capital inflows.  Because uncontrolled capital inflows may fuel inflation and drive a high level 
of REER, CBs wish to neutralise the increase in domestic bank reserves and simultaneously 
to lessen the pressure of local currency appreciation. To resist the appreciation pressure, CBs 
would sell domestic assets for foreign assets – this procedure is reflected in (5.2.2). In this 
context, equation (5.2.2) may be indirectly interpreted as the CBs’ FX intervention function.  
However, FX interventions may increase foreign components of the monetary base 
and eventually cause domestic interest rates to fall to a level significantly deviating from the 
target, which indicates the loss of monetary independence. This situation may eventually 
result in increasing inflation. To prevent this, CBs have to sterilise the impacts of the FXIs by 
absorbing the increased NDA – this is reflected in (5.2.1).  Note that this sterilisation will 
leave domestic interests rates higher than they would be without sterilisation, regardless of the 
nature of capital inflows (see Ch. 2, Section 2.1.2). From a theoretical and practical 
perspective, effective sterilisations enable the CBs to gain high monetary independence, at 
least in the short or medium run, by insulating domestic money from changes in foreign 
reserves. However, complete sterilisation is impossible in the long run, because the CB cannot 
sustain money supply that is different from the equilibrium level of money demand. The 
money supply is determined endogenously by money demand (Frankel 1997, p 268).   
The estimated coefficients 2a and 2b are respectively labelled as the “sterilisation 
coefficient” and “offset coefficient. The  indicates the CB’s monetary response to capital 
flows, while the  represents the sensitivity of capital flows to domestic monetary operations.  
To put it differently, estimates how much monetary operations offset the changes in 
foreign reserves to control money supply and measures the effectiveness of capital control 
2a
2b
2a
2b
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or de facto capital mobility (Kim 1995, p 16).  If 2a = −1, CBs completely sterilise the impact 
of capital flows on the monetary base. In contrast, 2a = 0 means no sterilisation. In a general 
case, a negative sign of a  indicates systematic sterilisations. In particular, 12 a  indicates an 
over-sterilisation, indicating that the CBs reduce the monetary base by more than one unit 
against a unit of foreign reserves increased. This happens when CBs conduct strong money 
tightening for fear of imminent inflation pressure. 02 a  indicates monetary expansion 
aiming at reducing a credit crunch or adjusting an external imbalance.  
On the other hand, 02 b  implies perfect capital control in which the change in the 
monetary base does not affect capital flows, while 12 b  indicates perfect capital mobility in 
which the change in monetary operation induces instant capital movements.  The offset effect 
of capital flows on monetary operations empirically leads to a negative relationship between 
ΔNFA and ΔNDA. As the degree of capital mobility increases, sterilisations become less 
effective. Hence, a large 
2a  and a small  in absolute value generally indicate a high degree 
of monetary independence. Because 0 ttt NFANDAMB  under complete sterilisation, 
positive (negative) tMB can be interpreted as unsterilised capital inflows (outflows).   
 
5.2.1.2 Nature of capital inflows and policy responses  
The impacts of capital inflows on domestic interest rates and appropriate policy 
responses are determined by FX regimes and the nature of capital inflows — for instance, 
whether capital inflows are caused by pull factors or push factors.56 Under highly flexible FX 
56  Among the factors inducing capital inflows, pull (or internal, country-specific) factors pull international 
capital into domestic markets. Examples are autonomous increases in demand for domestic money or increases 
in the productivity of domestic capital (and resultant increases in exports). Push (or external) factors push 
international capital from foreign markets to domestic markets (e.g., exogenous fall in foreign interest rates). 
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regimes, most sterilised interventions responding to capital inflows are likely to aim at 
resisting domestic currency appreciation rather than preventing inflation, because the 
appreciation of domestic currency tends to alleviate inflationary pressure from capital inflows.   
However, under a managed float or a fixed exchange rate regime, the impacts of capital 
inflows on inflation pressure differ depending on the nature of those capital inflows. 
The general conclusion is: (i) As to capital inflows from push factors, sterilisations 
may be effective in controlling inflation without incurring high sterilisation costs; (ii) As to 
capital inflows from pull factors, monetary expansion is more appropriate than sterilisation in 
addressing the negative effects of capital inflows (Calvo 1991, Frankel 1997).  
For example, when capital inflows are pushed by a fall in foreign interest rates, 
which is mostly a temporary shock, the accumulation of foreign reserves will lead to increases 
in the monetary base, heightened inflationary pressures, and deterioration of the external 
position (Haque et al. 1997, p 4).  In this case, the sterilisation of selling MSBs may not 
significantly push up interest rates, and thus sterilisation may be the more necessary and 
appropriate response (see section 2.1.2.2).  
On the other hand, if capital inflows are pulled by sustained increases in domestic 
money demand, they tend to push up domestic interest rates (which repress inflation 
expectations). Hence, an appropriate response may be not to sterilise inflows, but to increase 
domestic money supply. Monetary expansion will lessen the pressures of both domestic 
currency appreciation and interest rate increases (see section 2.1.2.1).   
However, it is, in practice, not easy for CBs to differentiate the causes of capital 
inflows because the inflows mostly reflect a combination of various factors that affect risk 
and return trade-offs (IMF 2011).  Although some financial indicators may help CBs to 
identify the cause of capital inflows – see Haque et al. (1997, pp. 4-5), many CBs tend to 
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depend on sterilisation rather than policy rate changes to adjust the impacts of capital inflows 
in the short run.  CBs respond to capital inflows and resultant price increases by changing 
interest rates from a relatively long-term perspective. Kumhof (2004) shows that an interest 
rate cut is more appropriate policy than an interest rate increase to lessen inflation pressure 
stemming from sustained capital inflows. 
Particular policy responses to capital inflows influence the volume or composition of 
capital inflows. Sterilisations tend to increase the volume of total capital inflows by inducing 
short-term portfolio funds, while capital controls encourage long-term FDI and discourage 
short-term portfolio inflows (Montiel and Reinhart 1999). 
5.2.1.3 Sterilisation peril 
As mentioned previously, it is not easy for CBs to differentiate the causes of capital 
inflows.  What happens if the CBs sterilise the capital inflows caused by increases in money 
demand (which could be responses to an exchange rate orientated stabilisation programme) by 
issuing nominal MSBs?  There exists a sterilisation peril that sterilisation itself will 
destabilise the economy rather than stabilise it, owing to the sterilisation cost (Calvo 1991).  
CBs should maintain the nominal domestic interest rate high in order to keep the monetary 
base from increasing owing to capital inflows. Consequently, the sterilisation leaves the 
domestic interest rate unnecessarily high, perpetuates domestic-foreign interest rate 
differentials, and thereby induces further capital inflows which would bring about additional 
sterilisations. Subsequent stabilisation for curbing the incessant capital inflows may, in turn, 
lead to further increases in domestic money demand, persistent domestic-foreign interest 
differentials and consequent increases in sterilisation costs (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
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2001). The increasing sterilisations cost frequently incurs quasi-fiscal deficits (Rocha and 
Saldanha 1992), which in turn limits the CB’s ability to sterilise capital inflows.   
This “vicious cycle of sterilisation” results in the persistent accumulation of MSBs 
and foreign reserves. As the outstanding stock of MSBs becomes increasingly large relative to 
GDP, the CB will have an incentive to liquidate part of its debt through surprise inflation – or 
to monetise these MSBs – in the future.  If the public rationally expects such future 
monetisation and inflation, they will require higher interest rates. As a result, persistent 
sterilisation could face serious credibility problems in the long run and thus jeopardize the 
sustainability of the CB’s anti-inflation policies (Calvo 1991, p 3).  As a result, the vicious 
cycle may lead to the undesired situation in which sterilisation may have an expansionary 
effect. For example, when financial markets are illiquid or underdeveloped, sterilisations may 
have a “backfiring” effect, where the sterilisations stimulate short-term capital inflows and 
result in an expansion rather than a desired contraction in aggregate demand (Cagallero and 
Krishnamurthy 2001).  
Persistent sterilisations cause the CBs (with financial distraught) to experience 
fiscal losses and occasionally to rely on financial support from their governments to 
recapitalise them. However, CB recapitalisation by government taxation will weaken central 
bank independence from the government (Stella 2005, Cukierman2006),which will eventually 
also pose a threat to price stability (Alesina and Summers 1993, Brumm 2006).57 
A CB’s ability to sterilise capital inflows is more limited as capital mobility is freer 
or the exchange rate is more fixed. Despite financial market integrations and increases in 
57  There are several consensus views of the role of the CB in major countries during the last two decades 
(Cukierman 2006): (i) The main objective of CBs should be price stability, even at the cost of substantial neglect 
of other objectives. (ii) CBs should have monetary policy instruments independently of the government. Alesina 
and Summers (1993) and Brumm (2006) provide evidence that stronger central bank independence is 
significantly related with lower and more stable inflation. However, some studies doubt that there is a 
significantly negative correlation between CB independence and inflation (Ismiham and Ozkan 2004, Dreher et 
al. 2008). 
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flexible regimes, many CBs in small open IT countries still seem to regard sterilised FXIs as 
an independent policy tool to contribute to both stabilising FX rates and targeting interest 
rates simultaneously.  Thus, the CBs intervene in FX markets to adjust FX rates as they desire, 
and then automatically and routinely sterilise the effects of FXIs on the monetary base to 
maintain the target interest rate (Craig and Humpage 2001, pp. 1-3).  
However, as the conventional trilemma emphasizes, either of the two objectives 
should be compromised in all cases except for the case where the driving forces of capital 
inflows come from the domestic monetary sector (Craig and Humpage 2001, pp. 6-9).  When 
the shocks come from external sectors, exchange rate stability may be achieved at the cost of 
losing monetary autonomy. In addition, one country’s greater use of sterilisation, which may 
be regarded as a “beggar-thy-neighbour” policy, tends to induce both subsequent greater 
sterilisation of its own and other countries’ sterilisations – which may eventually destabilise 
output and inflation in both countries. Thus, even if the sterilised interventions affect FX rates, 
practices of automatic and complete sterilisation may be problematic (Daniels 1997).58 
 
5.2.2 Empirical evidence 
5.2.2.1 Estimation issues 
Most previous studies estimated the sterilisation and offset coefficients by using 
reduced form equations like (5.2.1) and (5.2.2) respectively, without considering the 
optimisation procedure of the CBs. Hence, they have been criticized for depending on 
specifications that are too discretionary or ad-hoc, and for being subject to endogeneity 
58 Daniels (1997) derives the optimal sterilisation coefficient, suggesting that, in general, incomplete sterilisation 
is optimal under imperfect capital mobility while complete sterilisation is optimal under perfect capital mobility, 
although the optimal extent of sterilisation depends on the natures of the shocks and also on the CB reaction 
function.  
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problems. The endogeneity comes from systematic contemporaneous feedbacks between 
∆NDA and ∆NFA.  The specific directions of the feedbacks are likely to depend on which 
policy objective is more dominant between interest rate stability and foreign exchange rate 
management. The endogeneity causes OLS estimates to be biased and inconsistent. 
A systematic sterilisation policy indicates 02 a  in (5.2.1). If 02 a , tNDA  would 
be correlated with tv  in (5.2.2), and thus OLS estimates of the offset coefficient ( 2b ) in (5.2.2) 
is likely to be downward-biased towards −1 (algebraically) (Obstfeld 1982, Pasula 1994).  In 
other words, a CB’s attempt to sterilise the capital flows introduces an additional source of 
negative correlation between ∆NFA and ∆NDA. Thus, OLS estimates of 2b  tend to be larger 
(in absolute value), as sterilisations are stronger. If sterilisations respond to not only imminent 
capital flows but also lagged inflation or output, the extent of overestimating will be bigger. 
Therefore, the reduced-form evidence of high 2b (i.e., high capital mobility and no monetary 
independence) is frequently regarded as a result of improperly taking “sterilisation bias” into 
account (Pasula 1994, p 684).  In contrast, if CBs use a domestic credit policy to target 
foreign reserves rather than to sterilise capital flows, the OLS estimate of 2b  will be upward-
biased (see Frankel 1983). When the CBs’ true reaction function is not known, the direction 
of bias in estimating the 2b  may not be predicted a priori, although the bias is sure to exist.  
The endogeneity problem also exists in estimating the sterilisation coefficient from (5.2.1). 
To avoid the endogeneity problem, one could estimate two reduced forms (5.2.1) and 
(5.2.2) simultaneously using instrument variables such as 2SLS, 3SLS or GMM.  Instead, one 
can set up a structural model of the asset demand function, and then obtain the implied offset 
coefficient from the total derivative of ∆NFA with regard to ∆NDA or the estimated domestic 
interest sensitivity of capital flows.  The choice between reduced-form and structural estimate 
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is associated with the issues on the conventional trade-off between the two approaches. 
Reduced-form estimates, though subject to the endogeneity problem, may be more robust 
with respect to specification errors and be implemented under unlimited substitutability 
(Obstfeld 1982 p 46). Structural approaches allow for the interpretation of estimated 
coefficients based on structural parameters, but they are sensitive to specification errors. 
Several studies examine the discrepancy between the reduced form and structural 
estimates of the coefficients.59  Thus, it may be desirable for one to estimate the coefficient 
derived from the structural model and then compare the result with the reduced-form estimate 
(Frankel 1983) or use semi-reduced form equations which are derived from more explicit 
optimisation problems solved by monetary authorities (e.g., Roubini 1988, Brissimis et al. 
2002). Another approach is to examine the transmission of an impulse from NFA   to 
NDA   by applying VAR approach (Moreno 1996, Takagi and Esaka 2001, He et al. 2005).  
5.2.2.2 Main findings of previous studies 
Previous studies separately estimate monetary reaction functions like (5.2.1) (Kwack 
2001, Takagi and Esaka 2001, Cavoli and Rajan 2006, Aizenman and Glick 2009) or BOP 
equations like (5.2.2) (Pasula 1994).  A typical estimation form includes some lagged 
variables like:  
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59 Obstfeld (1982) and Pasula (1994) provide evidence of a significant difference between estimates of the offset 
coefficient obtained from the two approaches. Structural estimates are generally lower than reduced form 
estimates, particularly when OLS is used in a single equation like (5.2.2). Obstfeld (1982) argues that structural 
estimates are more appropriate because reduced form estimates of offset coefficients are biased towards -1, even 
for the Bretton Woods period, if CBs systemically sterilise capital flows. The overestimate of the reduced-form 
offset coefficients is caused by sterilisation bias and the inclusion of a speculative period in data sample. It can 
be shown that reduced-form OLS estimates of sterilisation coefficients have the same bias towards -1 (see 
Roubini 1988). In contrast, Pasula (1994) argues that reduced-form estimates are more appropriate, because 
structural estimates of the offset coefficient are biased towards 0 if the public has internalised government 
budget constraints.  
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where Xi denotes control variables such as current account, inflation, interest rate and 
exchange rate.  0 = −1 indicates a contemporaneous perfect sterilisation while 0 =0 
indicates no contemporaneous sterilisation. )1( mii  implies a relatively long-run 
sterilisation coefficient. Most studies measure either contemporaneous or one-period lagged 
coefficients because the CBs are known to conduct sterilisation operations (Craig and 
Humpage 2001, Taylor 1995) immediately or with a very short lag. 
Aizenman and Glick (2009) provide evidence that sterilisations have been 
strengthened in the 2000s in twelve Asian and Latin American countries, implying that there 
have been increasing potential inflationary pressures and significant sterilisation cost 
problems. They find a structural break in the sterilisation behaviours in both regions around 
crisis periods: the 1997-1998 financial crises and the 1994 peso crisis. Cavoli and Rajan 
(2006) focus on the relation between the uncovered exchange rate adjusted interest 
differential and the degree of sterilisation in five Asian countries (Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines) in 1990-1997.  They find that nearly complete sterilisations in 
Korea, Malaysia and Philippines leave interest differentials unchanged, and in turn induce 
further capital inflows. In spite of its simplicity, this approach has limits in assuming that 
international capital flows would not respond to changes in domestic monetary conditions.   
If all of the variables in (5.2.3) are cointegrated, the simultaneity problem could be 
avoided by using the multivariate cointegration technique. Bernstein (2000) measures 
cointegration-based long-run sterilisation coefficients in the G7 countries in 1973-1992, when 
managed exchange regimes were dominant. While the sterilisations are almost complete in 
Japan, UK and US (where sterilisation coefficients range from -0.95 to -1), they are relatively 
low in other countries like Germany, France and Canada (where sterilisation coefficients 
range from -0.42 to -0.80). They do not provide particular reasons for the differences between 
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the sterilisation coefficients. Takagi and Esaka (2001) do not find a significant cointegration 
relation between M1 (or M2) and foreign assets in five Asian countries in 1987-1997. 
Using VAR often enables one to circumvent the endogeneity problem (Moreno 1996, 
Christensen 2004, He et al. 2005). Impulse-response functions allow one to trace out the time 
path of the various shocks on the variable in the system. The typical VAR is: 
(5.2.4) 
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Moreno (1996) runs four variable VARs (consisting of NDA, NFA, CPI and real 
GDP) for Korea and Taiwan in 1981M1-1994M12. He suggests complete sterilisations but 
not perfect capital mobility in both countries. In particular, Korea has stronger monetary 
independence due to stricter capital controls and a higher degree of sterilisation. Christensen 
(2004) uses four variable VARs (domestic credit, foreign reserves, domestic and foreign 
interest rates) to examine the relationship between capital inflows and sterilisation in the 
Czech Republic for 1993–1996. He supports Calvo (1991). As a sterilisation stimulates more 
capital inflows, the initial successful sterilisation turns to increasing fiscal burden, and the 
sterilisation policy eventually become unsustainable.  However, VAR only identifies 
coefficients of lagged variables, making it impossible to estimate the contemporaneous effects. 
In addition, VAR are often based on an assumption that NFAs are exogenous to NDAs, or all 
variables are treated as symmetrically endogenous, which is often empirically rejected.  
The third approach obtains coefficients from a CB’s optimisation problem (Herring 
and Marston 1977, Roubini 1988, Kim 1995, Brissimis et al. 2002, Ouyang et al. 2007, 2010). 
Two functional forms are derived from the small open economic model:  
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where itA  and  itB  are the sets of control variables.  If all variables are I(0), the simultaneous 
equation can be estimated by 2SLS, 3LS or GMM.  If the variables are I(1) and cointegrated, 
cointegrated VAR is used to estimate the long-term coefficient.  The cointegrated VAR 
provides both lagged and contemporaneous relationships among NDA  and NFA .  
Many previous studies suggest that nearly-complete sterilisations have been carried 
out in several countries, which contributes to build-up of a large amount of foreign reserves 
and to maintenance of monetary independence.  In particular, two countries under fixed 
exchange regimes became “foreign reserve sinks” owing to their high degree of sterilisation: 
West Germany during the Bretton Woods regime (Brissimis et al. 2002), and China and Asian 
countries during the 2000s (Ouyang et al. 2007, 2010).   
Brissimis et al. (2002) suggest that the Bundesbank had considerable monetary 
independence during 1980-1992 in that the offset coefficient is significantly lower (in 
absolute value)during the period than during the Bretton Woods period, while the sterilisation 
coefficient is not significantly different from -1 in both periods. Ouyang et al. (2007, 2010) 
suggest that both China (that controls capital mobility) and other emerging Asian countries 
(that allow relatively free capital flows) are able to completely sterilise foreign reserves in the 
1990s and 2000s, although their sterilisations may have problems in terms of costs. They 
interestingly find that offset coefficients in eight Asian countries decrease from around -0.8 
(pre-crisis) to -0.6 (post-crisis) in absolute value, which implies that de facto capital mobility 
has been more restricted since the 1997 crisis.  
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However, Wu (2009) finds that the cointegration-based sterilisation coefficient of 
China was only −0.35 in 1995-2005, which is significantly lower than Ouyang et al. (2010)’s. 
This indicates that China did not have monetary autonomy to a great extent. Kim (1995) 
examines the evolution of the two coefficients during the period 1980-1995, when Korean 
governments undertook capital control and actively managed exchange rates. He finds that 
Korea more completely sterilised current account surpluses in the late 1980s than capital 
inflows in the early 1990s.  BOK pursued over-sterilisation during 1980-1985, when BOP 
showed deficit, and thus foreign reserves were dropping, which indicates that monetary 
policies might worsen BOP deficit rather than improve it.     
As summarized in Appendix 5.1, previous evidence shows that the offset and 
sterilisation coefficients vary across countries and times. Nevertheless, several implications 
may be drawn from previous studies.  First, estimated sterilisation coefficients in the 2000s 
are generally larger than those in the previous periods.   Ouyang et al. (2007) report that, in 
five East-Asian countries, estimated sterilisation coefficients range from -1.04 to -1.27 (under 
the assumption of perfect foresight) in the 1990s and 2000s.  The sterilisation coefficients for 
China range from -1.02 to -1.23 in the 2000s (Ouyang et. al 2010). These are larger than the 
estimated sterilisation coefficients including the 1980s and 1990s: e.g., -0.79 for 1986Q1-
2007Q2 (Aizenman and Glick 2009) and -0.96 for 1999M6-2009M3 (Wang 2010). Another 
example is the case of Korea: the sterilisation coefficient was -0.56 in 1980Q1-1994Q4 (Kim 
1995) but -0.77 in 1985Q1 - 2007Q2 (Aizenman and Glick 2009).  Despite the increases in de 
jure flexible FX regimes in East Asian countries during the last decade, lower FX volatility in 
the 2000s than in the 1990s may be, in part, ascribed to sterilisations.  
Next, emerging countries appear to retain considerable monetary independence in the 
2000s. Many studies have found that sterilisation coefficients are relatively closer to −1 while 
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offset coefficients are closer to 0 than to -1(e.g. China, Czech Republic, Mexico, etc.). It is 
commonly accepted that capital mobility in emerging countries has been accelerated since the 
early 1990s, when many developing countries began to open capital accounts. Furthermore, a 
series of financial crises between 1997 and 2000 are believed to contribute to the wide spread 
of free float and capital market openness. However, empirical evidence of low offset 
coefficients for the 1990s and 2000s cast a doubt on the common knowledge. For example, 
Ouyang et al. (2007) provide evidence that the offsetting effect of capital flows in East Asian 
countries is not significantly different between the pre-Asian crisis and post-Asian crisis 
period. Therefore, we may conjecture that de facto capital mobility in emerging countries was 
not so high in the 2000s as has been conventionally thought. 
Lastly, BOK appears to increase the degree of sterilisation over time. Before the 
introduction of IT with a free float regime in 1997-1998, the estimated sterilisation 
coefficients were significantly less than 1 in absolute value: e.g. -0.56 (Kim 1995) or -0.12 
(Lee and Yoon 1997). However, the studies including the period of IT with a flexible regime 
(i.e., after 2000) show estimated sterilisation coefficients close to or over 1 in absolute value: 
−0.77 (Aizenman and Glick 2009) and −1.11 (Cavoli and Rajan 2006). Most studies indicate 
that FXIs are completely sterilised in the short run but not in the long run, indicating that FXIs 
eventually lead to increases in the monetary base in the long run (Choi 1995, Lee and Yoon 
1997).  
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5.3 Methodologies and data 
 
5.3.1 Estimation of sterilisation and offset coefficient  
 
5.3.1.1 Derivation of monetary reaction and capital flow function 
 
 
Assuming imperfect capital mobility and following Brissimis et al.’s (2002) 
constraints, we construct a CB’s loss function with which the CB attempts to achieve multiple 
policy objectives: stabilising price and output, managing exchange rates, and minimizing 
volatility of interest rate and exchange rate. As is typical of an intermediate exchange regime, 
we assume that the CB attempts to adjust the domestic monetary base (and thereby to manage 
domestic interest rate) and intervenes in the FX market not only to stabilise exchange rate 
volatility but also to affect the exchange rate level toward desired direction.60  The CB is 
assumed to minimize the following loss function.  
 
 (5.3.1) Loss function: 2,
22
,
22 )()()()()( tstttrttttt SSYYppL    
where tL  is the loss at time t; tp and tp are actual and target inflation, respectively; 
tY  and tY are actual and potential output; tS  and tS  are current and target exchange rates; 
tr ,  and ts ,  are measures of volatility of interest rates and exchange rates.  The parameters 
),,,,(   are the weights assigned by the CB and are assumed to all be positive. (5.3.1) is 
60 Herring and Marston (1977) include the change in foreign reserves, inflation and output in their loss function. 
Recently Ouyang et al. (2010) include only (
tt pp  ) and ( tt YY  ) in the loss function. It seems more 
appropriate to use Brissimis et al.’s (2002) original specification, which includes exchange rate target (level) 
instead of foreign reserves target, because (i) the original form may be more appropriate to explain the CB 
behaviours that pursue the control of exchange rates even under floating regimes (i.e. de facto intermediate 
regimes); (ii) several studies have recently provided significant evidence of intervention effects on exchange rate 
level as well as volatility (see Chapter 3 for the detailed evidence on the intervention effects). 
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rewritten in a slightly different form (5.3.2) by replacing tt YY   with cyclical output ( tcY , ) 
and by assuming tp =0 for simplicity.    
(5.3.2) 2,
22
,
2
,
2 )()()()()( tstttrtctt SSYpL    
The CB conducts FXIs (by altering NFA ) and OMOs (by changing NDA ) to 
minimize the loss function, subject to the following constraints. 
(5.3.3) Inflation: ttttt SpNDANFAp   3121 )(  , 1 >0, 0< 2 <1, 3 >0 
 Unlike Brissimis et al. (2002), we assume that tS would affect tp  owing to the 
direct effects of exchange rates on import price.61 
 (5.3.4) Cyclical output: ttctttc GYNDANFAY   31,21, )(  , 01  , 10 2   , 03   
where tG is a government budget balance ( 0 tG indicates fiscal surplus).  
Cyclical output is affected by monetary and fiscal policy, and its past value. 
(5.3.5) Balance of payment: ttt NKCANFA   
where tCA  is the current account surplus and tNK  is the net capital inflows. Thus, 
ΔNFA is the sum of the capital, financial and current account surplus. We assumed that tCA is 
exogenous, for simplicity, and tNK  depends on the uncovered interest parity (UIP). 
(5.3.5.a) Net capital inflow: )()/1( ,,1 tftdtttt rrSEScNK    
61  Unlike Brissimis et al. (2002), we assume that (i) exchange rates directly influence price (i.e.
ttttt SpNDANFAp   3121 )(  ); and (ii) domestic interests are related to foreign components of the 
monetary base as well as domestic ones ( )(, tttd NFANDAr   .We additionally consider the effect of 
government expenditures on the cyclical output.  
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where 1ttSE  = expectation for future FX rate; tdr , = domestic interest rate; tfr ,  = 
foreign interest rate; and c = degree of relative risk aversion between domestic and foreign 
assets, which represents the degree of capital mobility. It is assumed that 0 < c < ∞.  In 
particular, c close to zero indicates that any deviation from UIP will lead to an infinite capital 
flow (Brissimis et al. 2002, p 66), representing a perfect substitutability between domestic and 
foreign assets.  
 (5.3.5.b) interest rate: )()(, ttttd NFANDAMBr   ,  >0 
Under the assumption of the existence of liquidity effect, tdr ,  is negatively related 
with tMB .  indicates the sensitivity of local interest rates to money supply. Using (5.3.5.a) 
and (5.3.5.b) in (5.3.5) and solving for tS  produces: 
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Equation (5.3.6) has several implications which are consistent with intuitive knowledge:  
(i) Increases in the monetary base depreciate domestic currency: tNFA ↑ or tNDA ↑ →
tS ↑ ( )0, c . Foreign currency purchasing intervention ( tNFA ↑) or liquidity-
providing OMO ( tNDA ↑) are expected to depreciate domestic currency. 
(ii) Increases in the current account surplus (owing to the decrease in cyclical income or 
REER) lead to domestic currency appreciation: tCA ↑ → tS ↓. 
(iii) A rise in foreign interest rate encourages capital outflows and eventually leads to 
domestic currency depreciation (overshooting): tfr , ↑ → tS ↑. 
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(iv) Although FXIs and subsequent OMOs may affect exchange rates, the FXIs usually 
have more significant impacts on exchange rates than OMOs, because  c , all 
other things being equal. 
 
Following Brissimis et al. (2002), we assume that tr ,  and ts ,  are related positively 
with past values and negatively with the amount of OMOs and FXIs:  Assuming the effect of 
OMOs and FXIs on reducing FX and interest rate volatility, 0,, 1111,1,    ttrtr NDA  
and 0,, 2221,2,    ttsts NFA . Then, we transform the above two volatility equations 
into the following testable forms which do not include absolute terms: 
(5.3.7)  0,)( 11111,1,    tttrtr NDAdNDA  
(5.3.8) 0,)( 22221,2,    tttsts NFAdNFA
 
where 01 d  ( 21 d ) if the money market is in liquidity shortage (surplus); 02 d  
( 22 d ) if the FX market is in excess supply of (demand for) foreign exchanges. Solving for 
0 tt NDAL  and 0 tt NFAL , and then substituting the constraints into a CB loss 
function, yields two semi-reduced forms, (5.3.9) and (5.3.10), which provide optimal rules 
that the CB should follow (see Appendix 5.2 for the detailed derivative procedure). 
 
(5.3.9)
1,12111,131
1311,121112111
131131
2
1
2
1
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]/[]/[]/[))(/(
]/)([}/)])(({[


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
trtttf
ttcttt
ttt
dSEr
GYpSS
CAcNFAcNDA



 
where 0])1()([ 21
2
131
2
1
2
11  d  
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(5.3.10)
1,22221,231
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where 0})1()]([{ 22
2
231
2
1
2
12  dc   
 
5.3.1.2 Implications  
Our main interests are the coefficients for ΔNFA (sterilisation coefficient) in (5.3.9) 
and for ΔNDA (offset coefficient) in (5.3.10).  Both are, in general, expected to be negative, 
but could be less than or greater than −1. A sterilisation coefficient less than −1 indicates a 
contemporaneous oversterilisation. A priori expected signs of other regressors are as follows. 
First, signs of the coefficients in (5.3.9) are expected to be negative except 1, tcY , 
tG  and tCA . For example, CBs should tighten money( tNDA ↓) when a domestic currency 
depreciates relative to their trend or target, inflation increases or foreign interest rate rises: in 
abbreviation notation, )( 1 tt SS  ↑, 1 tp ↑ or )( 1,  tttf SEr ↑→ tNDA ↓. The coefficient of
)1( 11,  dtr  is expected to be negative, because CBs have to withdraw (provide) monetary 
base in case of liquidity surplus (shortage) and because the magnitude of OMOs should be 
greater as domestic interest rates are more volatile: 1, tr ↑ and 21 d → ↓. However, 
the coefficient of tCA  is, in general, expected to be positive, as the deterioration of current 
account causes the CBs to reduce the monetary base to attract capital inflows: 
tCA ↓→ tNDA ↓.  
However, when the CBs attempt to induce domestic currency depreciation for boosting export 
via monetary expansion, CA and ∆NDA may be negatively correlated.  The CBs should, in 
general, respond to increases in government expenditures or cyclical outputs by tight 
tNDA
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monetary operations: tG ↑ → tcY , ↑ → tNDA ↓. In this case, the coefficients of tG  and 1, tcY  
are expected to have negative signs. However, they could be positive when monetary 
loosening and fiscal expansion are concurrently carried out to stimulate the economy during a 
recession or when monetary tightening and fiscal contraction are conducted during a boom.  
For example, while cyclical outputs increase but the economy is still sluggish, expansionary 
monetary policy can be possibly continued (Ouyang et al. 2010, pp. 9-10). 
In the BOP function (5.3.10), the expected signs of the coefficients are almost the 
same as in (5.3.9).  If the domestic currency appreciates relative to the target or CBs aim for 
the domestic-currency depreciation, the CB should buy foreign reserves: 1tS ↓ or tS ↑ →
)( 1 tt SS  ↓→ tNFA ↑. Higher inflation may lead to domestic currency depreciation, increases 
in domestic interest rates, capital losses thereof and capital outflows: 1 tp ↑ → tNFA ↓.An 
improvement in current accounts leads to an increase in foreign reserves: 1tCA ↑ → tNFA ↑.  
A fall in foreign interest rates or an expectation for domestic currency appreciation 
leads to capital inflows: 1, tfr  ↓ or 1ttSE ↓→ )( 11   tt
f
t SEr ↓ → tNFA ↑. The coefficient of
)1( 2, dts  may be negative, because CBs should buy (sell) foreign currencies in case of 
excess supply of (demand for) foreign exchanges and because more volatile exchange rates 
lead to larger FXIs as seen in Chapter 3: ts , ↑ and 22 d (excess demand for foreign 
exchanges)→ tNFA ↓(sales of foreign exchanges).  
However, the prior expected sign of the coefficient of cyclical output increase ( 1, tcY ) 
is ambiguous, because the increase in may worsen the current account (owing to the 
income effect) and thus reduce foreign reserves ( ↑→ tNFA ↓), while an output increase 
1, tcY
1, tcY
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may reflect a strong economy, which encourages capital inflows ( ↑→ tNFA ↑). The 
expected sign for the coefficient of government spending is also unclear, because government 
spending increases cyclical outputs. 
This model enables one to see CB interventions in both domestic money markets and 
foreign exchange markets. If CBs aim only at managing exchange rates (i.e., 0   ), 
(5.3.9) and (5.3.10) are simplified as (5.3.11) and (5.3.12) respectively, in which CB 
interventions in both the money and FX markets do not rely on changes in inflation, cyclical 
output or domestic interest rate volatility.  
(5.3.11) )()/1())(/1()/(]1)/[( 1,1   tttfttttt SErSSCAcNFAcNDA   
(5.3.12) 
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where 0])1()]({[ 22
2
22  dc  . In (5.3.11), the optimal sterilisation 
amount (= 1/ c ) depends on c (degree of risk aversion) and  (sensitivity of interest rates 
to money supply). As c  is larger (i.e. the substitutability between foreign and local assets is 
low) or   is smaller (i.e. local interest rates are sensitive to money supply), the degree of 
sterilisation becomes larger. This is consistent with the well-known fact that sterilisations are 
more feasible with limited capital mobility. Because c>0 and 0 , 11/ c , which 
indicates that over-sterilisation may be optimal.  
On the other hand, if the CB cares only about inflation and income (i.e.,
0  ), a sterilisation coefficient is a unit (complete sterilisation) in Brissimis et al. 
(2002), while it is bigger than a unit in this model, as in the previous case of 0  .  
Hence, in most cases, the sterilisation coefficients obtained from this model would be larger 
(in absolute value) than those of Brissimis et al. (2002).    
1, tcY
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Under perfect capital mobility and a completely fixed exchange regime (i.e., ,0c
r =0, s =0,  =0
62), the two equations are simplified as: 
 (5.3.13) ttcttt GYpNFANDA   ]/[]/[]/[ 1311,1211121   
(5.3.14) ttcttt GYpNDANFA   ]/[]/[]/[ 2311,2211221   
where 2
2
1
2
11   . Here, both the sterilisation and offset coefficient are −1, which 
implies that under perfect capital mobility, CBs must conduct complete sterilisation to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate target. In this case, domestic market interventions (expressed 
by 5.3.13) and FX market interventions (expressed by 5.3.14) are identical in terms of policy 
response to inflation and cyclical output. As in Brissimis et al. (2002, p 69), the equivalent 
intervention functions (5.3.13) and (5.3.14) show the well-known trilemma that, given perfect 
capital mobility and a completely fixed exchange regime, CBs cannot conduct FXIs 
independently of OMOs.  
 
5.3.2 Estimation of impacts of sterilisation on domestic interest rate  
As seen in Chapter 2, sterilisations will leave a domestic interest rate higher than it 
would be without sterilisation, and thereby tend to perpetuate the domestic-foreign interest 
rate differential, regardless of the nature of capital inflows (Frankel 1997).  In equations (5.3.9) 
and (5.3.10), the sterilisation and offset coefficients do not deliver direct information on the 
relation between sterilisation and interest rates. To see how sterilisations affect domestic 
62 Under a perfect capital mobility and completely fixed exchange regime, the UIP condition ][ 1,, ttttftd SSErr    
boils down to 0,  tdr since 01  tt SS and tfr , is given. Then, 0,  tdr  means 0  from equation 
(5.3.5.b).  In addition, 0r  and 0s mean that the CB does not weigh interest rate and exchange rate 
volatility ( 0 ). 
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interest rates, we need to explicitly associate two variables. In this context, Edwards and 
Khan’s (1985) model has been most frequently used as a starting point to examine the effect 
of capital flows (or sterilisation) on domestic interest rates (see Haque and Montiel 1991, 
Willet et al. 2002, Cavoli and Rajan 2006). Edwards and Khan’s (1985) original model 
explains interest rate determination (particularly) in developing countries whose economy is 
neither fully open nor completely closed. 
In this section, we follow Willet et al. (2002) and Cavoli and Rajan (2006), both of 
which are based on Edwards and Khan (1985), in deriving the testable form. The model 
makes use of the UIP condition: 
ttttftd SSErr   )( 1,,  . Let 
*
,tfr  be the foreign interest rate 
adjusted by the uncovered exchange rate; *,tfr = ttttf SSEr   )( 1, .  Under imperfect capital 
mobility, tdr ,  can be described as the linear combination of the interest rates under a 
completely open economy, i.e., *,tfr  (foreign interest rates adjusted by UIP, i.e. interest rate 
under fully-opened economy), and those under a completely closed economy, *,tdr (domestic 
market clearing interest rate under a completely closed capital account):  Note that  *,tdr  is 
labelled as a closed economy interest rate, shadow rate or autarky rate, because it would exist 
if completely determined by domestic monetary conditions without any capital mobility. 
(5.3.15) *,
*
,, )1( tdtftd rrr   ,  10   
where  is a weight parameter showing the degree of capital mobility. 1  denotes 
perfect capital mobility where *,, tftd rr   while 0  indicates the complete capital control 
where *,, tdtd rr  . Majority of empirical works suggest 
*
,, tdtd rr  for most emerging 
economies (Willet et al. 2002, p 425).  Edwards and Khan (1985) assume:   
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(5.3.16) )(1,
*
,
s
t
d
t
e
tndtd mmprr     
where ndr , is a constant and represents a long-run equilibrium real interest rate (i.e. a 
natural interest rate); etp 1  is an expected rate of inflation; 
d
tm and 
s
tm  are money demand and 
supply, respectively, and thus )( st
d
t mm  reflects monetary disequilibrium; and   is a 
coefficient of adjustment speed of *,tdr to monetary disequilibrium. If a liquidity effect exists,
 is expected to be positive because  should rise when st
d
t mm  .  Higher   indicates a 
more sensitive and instant response of domestic interest rates to monetary disequilibrium.    
A real money demand ( dtm ) is assumed to be the function of a real income ( ty ), a 
long-term real interest rate ( ndr , ) adjusted by an expected inflation (
e
tp 1 ) and a real money 
supply in the previous period (Edwards and Khan 1985, p 8). 
(5.3.17) 131,21 )(   t
e
tndt
d
t mprym  0, 21   
Assume that CBs conduct sterilisations; tt nfaanda   where )0(a denotes a 
sterilisation coefficient. Because ttt
s
t nfaanfandam  )1(  and
s
t
s
t
s
t mmm  1 , 
money supply can be expressed as: 
(5.3.18)     )0()11( 1   amndaa
m stt
s
t
 
1a  indicates a complete sterilisation( 0 stm ).  Substituting (5.3.17) and (5.3.18) into 
(5.3.16) and again substituting (5.3.16) into (5.3.15) yields: 
(5.3.19)       
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 *,tdr
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Equation (5.3.19) shows a set of components which may affect domestic interest 
rates ( tdr , ): ndr , , 
*
,tfr , tnda , 
s
tm 1 , 
e
tp 1  and ty .  The coefficient of tnda , )/11()1( a  , 
shows the effect of the sterilisation on domestic interest rates and is our area of interest.  The 
effect depends on three factors: degree of sterilisation ( a ), degree of capital mobility ( ) and 
adjustment speed of domestic interest rate to monetary disequilibrium ( ).   
Note that general implications of this model are consistent with the model in the 
previous section. First, a complete sterilisation ( 1a ) keeps capital inflows from affecting
, implying that monetary autonomy can be maintained temporarily. Second,  is 
determined mainly by foreign factors as   increases. As a result, the impact of further capital 
inflows on  will diminish, given a constant degree of sterilisation. In the extreme case of 
perfect capital mobility ( 1 ), capital inflows do not influence , irrespective of the degree 
of sterilisation, and *,, tftd rr   always holds.  Third, a higher   indicates that tdr ,  responds 
more sensitively to monetary disequilibrium, so that tdr ,  is more likely to react to sterilisations.  
(5.3.19) can be simplified:  
 
(5.3.20) ),0(~, 2514132
*
,10,  ttt
e
ttttftd ypmndarr    
where ndr ,20 )1)(1(   ;  1 ; )/11()1(2 a  ; 
  )1(3 ; )1)(1( 34   ; ))(1( 15    
 
The testable form (5.3.20) indicates that under perfect capital mobility (where 1 ), 
all estimated coefficients are expected to be 0 except (=1), and thus )()( *,, tftd rErE  .  It is 
expected that 10 1   , 03   and 05  .  In most cases where money grows in line with 
tdr , tdr ,
tdr ,
tdr ,
1
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the expansion of an economy (i.e., 3 >0), 4  is expected to be positive.  The signs of  is 
our area of interest. In general, it is expected that 02   when 1a  (over-sterilisation) 
whereas 02  when 01  a  (incomplete or complete sterilisation), because 10   
and 0 . In other words, the domestic interest rate is likely to rise when the CB over-
sterilises capital inflows, while it may fall in the case of incomplete sterilisation. A complete 
sterilisation leaves the interest rate unchanged. 
 
5.3.3 Estimation strategies and preliminary considerations  
 
Simplifying (5.3.9), (5.3.10) and (5.3.20) leads to the following testable forms.  
 
(5.3.21) 
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(5.3.23) itit
e
ititititfitd uycpcmcNDAcrccr 3514132
*
,10,    
 
where i = 1,…, N (number of countries), t = 0,…,T (number of quarters). (5.3.21) and 
(5.3.22) suggest that using simple OLS may yield biased estimators, because two-way 
simultaneity interactions between NFA  and NDA  give rise to a model that violates the 
zero-conditional-mean assumption (Baum 2006, p 186). This may be the case where we 
estimate the effects of sterilisations on domestic interest rates ( dr ) by using (5.3.23), because 
ΔNDA and  interact with each other, so that ΔNDA may be correlated with t . In 
estimating (5.3.21) and (5.3.22), our interest is to estimate the contemporaneous coefficients 
2
dr
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of and , because the previous literature suggest that most CBs automatically and 
instantly sterilise FXIs (Craig and Humpage 2001), and because the theory does not provide 
any guidance. In particular, we assume that when capital flows cause domestic liquidity to 
deviate from equilibrium level at which market interest rate (typically O/N interest rate) is 
maintained around policy rate, the CBs should instantly change the supply of the monetary 
base to steer the interest rate. In practice, assuming lagged sterilisation implies that CBs allow 
for interest rate deviation from their target beyond a quarter. This is not plausible in 
consideration of actual operation practices that most CBs in IT regime conduct market 
operations mostly on a daily basis or on the very short-term horizon (see Borio 1997). Except 
for VAR-based studies like Moreno (1996), most previous studies include no lag (Ouyang et 
al 2010, 2007, Aizenman and Glick 2009, Cavoli and Rajan 2006, Pasula 1994, Herring and 
Marston 1977). Brissimis et al. (2002) include up to two lags but lagged regressors are not 
significant.   
As for the system consisting of (5.3.21) and (5.3.22), the two equations can be 
estimated either separately by 2SLS (or GMM), or simultaneously by 3SLS (or GMM).  2SLS 
estimators may be less efficient than 3SLS when nonspherical errors exist, but they are known 
to be consistent and have better small sample properties. 2SLS usually have an advantage 
over 3SLS in the case of possible misspecifications, because 2SLS may not spill over 
erroneous estimation results to other equations.  In addition, it is likely that 3SLS and 2SLS 
are identical when two equations are exactly identified, and the error terms are spherical. This 
may be the case for our model, because 1,1 )1(  trd  and 1,2 )1(  tsd   in (5.3.21) and (5.3.22) 
enable one to exactly identify both equations.63 
63According to the order condition, the two equations are just identified because the number of excluded 
exogenous variables is equal to the number of endogenous variables in the system equation minus one: i.e. 1=2-
1. 
NFA NDA
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In using 2SLS, 3SLS or GMM estimation, the main challenge is to find appropriate 
instrument variables (IV). For obtaining more consistent and efficient estimates from IV than 
OLS, it is necessary to find a sufficiently large number of good instruments (Baum and 
Schaffer 2003 p2). The ideal instrument variables should be correlated with corresponding 
endogenous variables (relevant condition) and uncorrelated with (orthogonal to) the 
disturbances (validity or orthogonality condition). Ouyang et al. (2007) uses government 
expenditure and a REER as instruments for ΔNDA and ΔNFA, respectively.64 
For this, we use FDI and currency in circulation (CIC) as instruments for NFA and 
NDA, respectively, in addition to up to 2 lags of other control variables in the equations. 
According to Wooldridge (2001, p91), the lagged variables have been naturally considered 
instruments that should be predetermined by construction. Hence, adding moment conditions 
in this way have been conventionally accepted under the assumption that the past explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated with the error term. The choice of FDI as the instrument for ΔNFA 
in (5.3.21) is based on the fact that FDI is highly correlated with ΔNFA, while CBs appear to 
respond less to long-term capital inflows like FDI. Thus, it is likely that ΔFDI and ΔNFA are 
highly correlated but ΔFDI and itu1  are not. ΔCIC is selected as an instrument for ΔNDA in 
(5.2.22) and (5.2.23). ΔCIC is closely linked with the volume of monetary operations(ΔNDA) 
but is not significantly related with itu2 itu3 ΔCIC is affected by the institutional features 
of payment and settlement system.  
Panel analysis, regardless of whether we use fixed effect (FE) or random effect (RE) 
estimation, assumes that the slopes, ii ba ,  and ic (i >0) in three equations are equal for all 
64 They argue that government expenditure has little effect on capital inflows. However this may not be the case, 
because fiscal expansion normally leads to a low interest rate, which sometimes triggers capital outflows. Zhang 
(2011) uses the past 12 months’ FX rate volatility and dummy for the 4th quarter as an instrument for ΔNFA and 
ΔNDA respectively. But he does not test the validity of the instruments.  
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countries within a country group, while the intercepts,  and (i=0) are different.  FE 
treats the different intercepts as parameters to be estimated, while RE interprets the intercepts 
as random (and part of the errors).  Hence, we first use time-series analyses for selected 
countries to see the different slope coefficients, and then apply panel analysis. 
 
5.3.4 Data Descriptions 
 
Our quarterly (unbalanced) panel data consist of 30 countries from 1981Q1 to 
2010Q4. Country selection is primarily governed by the availability of balance sheets of 
individual CBs. Among the countries, 22 countries employ inflation targeting (IT) regimes 
and 8 countries are non-inflation targeting (Non-IT) countries as of the end of 2010, as seen in 
Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1 Monetary policy and de facto exchange rate regime of sample countries 
Exchange rates 
Monetary policy 
Free float Managing float pegs 
Inflation 
Targeting 
(IT)[22] 
 
IT-advanced 
[7] 
 
Australia(1993Q1), UK(1992Q4), 
Canada(1991Q1), New Zealand(1990Q1), 
Norway(2001Q1), Sweden(1993Q1), 
Switzerland(2000Q1), 
  
IT-Asia 
[4] 
Korea(1999Q1),  
Philippine(2002Q1) 
Indonesia(2005Q2), 
Thailand(2000Q2) 
 
IT-Emerging 
Europe 
[6] 
Czech Rep.(1998Q1),Hungary(2001Q3), 
Poland(1999Q1),Turkey(2006Q1), 
Israel(1997Q2), South Africa(2000Q1)   
  
IT-Latin 
[5] 
Chile(1999Q3), Mexico(2001Q1), 
Brazil(1999Q2) 
Peru(2002Q1), 
Colombia(1999Q3) 
 
Non-Inflation Targeting 
(Non-IT) [8] 
Euro Area, Japan India, Malaysia,  
Singapore 
China, Argentina  
Hong Kong 
Notes: 1. The classifications of exchange rate and monetary policy regimes follow IMF (2008) and are updated according to 
each CB’s announcement in its homepage. 
2. The figures in [ ] and (  ) denote the number of countries included and the time of introducing IT, respectively. 
3              3. Israel and South Africa are classified as IT-Emerging Europe in consideration of their economic connection to 
  European countries. 
Sources: Author’s classification based on IMF De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy 
 Frameworks (2008) as of 31 April 2008 and each CB’s homepage. 
 
ii ba , ic
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Considering regional or economic connections among countries, the 22 IT countries 
are divided into 4 country groups: IT-advanced (7 countries), IT-Asia (4), IT-emerging 
Europe (6) and IT-Latin (5). Most data are collected from the IMF IFS and homepages of CBs. 
The definition and sources of the data are summarized in Tables 5.2(a) and 5.2(b). 
The cyclical output is measured as real GDP minus the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered trend of 
real GDP. The volatility of FX rates and domestic interest rates is measured as the standard 
deviation of the within-quarter change of the daily average exchange rate and short-term 
interbank rate, respectively.   We assume that the CBs have an implicit target FX rate level. 
Here, the 200 business day moving average is used as a proxy for the target FX rate. 
Assuming perfect foresight, we use actual FX rates in the next period as proxies for expected 
FX rates in the next period ( 11   ttt SSE ), because credible forward FX rates do not exist for 
most sample countries. 
Notice that the values of the NFA in balance sheets of CBs are denominated by 
domestic currencies, so that NFA can be changed by FX rate movements even if there were 
no changes in sterilisation policy. Following Ouyang et al. (2010), we adjust NFA by 
excluding revaluation effects. First of all, NFA is obtained by subtracting foreign liabilities 
from foreign assets. Considering that most CBs revalue their assets and liabilities at the end of 
each quarter or year, the revaluation effect ( tre ) at time t will be )1/(* 11   etettt SSNFAre , 
where etS is the end of period nominal spot rate. Thus, adjusted net foreign assets (
a
tNFA ) is 
measured by: )1/( 11   etettttt
a
t SSNFANFAreNFANFA . Since the monetary base is not 
influenced by the revaluation, the adjusted ΔNDA is easily measured by
t
aa
t NFAMBNDA  . We will use Δ
aNFA  and Δ atNDA as variables in all regression 
equations. Δ aNFA ,Δ atNDA , CAt, and ΔGt  are scaled by GDP. 
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Table 5.2 Definition and source of variables used in regressions 
(a) Dependent variables: ΔNFAa, ΔNDAa 
Variable Definition   Measurement and sources 
NFA Net foreign assets  IFS: line 11- line 16c 
 Adjusted net foreign assets IFS: )1/( 11   etettt SSNFANFA where etS  is end of quarter spot FX rate 
a
tNDA  Adjusted net domestic assets IFS: Δ MB(line 14) -  
 
Current account surplus 
IFS: line78, BOK(http://ecos.bok.or.kr/) 
When CA is unavailable, export-import gap is used 
 
Cyclical output 
IFS: [ln(real GDP)–HP filtered trend] ÷ HP filtered trend where HP 
denotes Hodrick-Prescott method with smoothing parameter=1600 
 
Inflation rate  IFS line 64: ln(CPIt)-ln(CPIt-1) 
 
Government fiscal surplus IFS and Datastream 
 
Average FX rate  IFS, Quarterly average of daily FX rate against USD 
 
 
FX rate target  
Bloomberg, FRB and each CBs: measured as a quarterly average in the 
200-day moving average: if daily data is not available, 10 month moving 
average is used 
 
 
Volatility of domestic short-
term interest rate change (   ) 
 
Datastream, IFS and each CB:  
(i) measured as standard deviation of the within-quarter change in daily 
domestic O/N money market rate (or bank rate) except for Hong Kong 
and Singapore where 3 month rates are used 
(ii) when daily data are not available, 
 where  
:domestic money market rates (quarterly average) 
 
 
 
Change in FX rate-adjusted 
foreign interest rate  
IFS; measured as  under the assumption of perfect 
foresight ( ) where = US federal fund rate 
 
 
 
 
Volatility of  exchange rate 
change against USD(    ) 
 
 
 
DataStream, Bloomberg, IFS and each CBs:  
(i) measured as the standard deviation of the within-quarter change in 
daily bilateral USD FX rate 
(ii) when daily data are not available,  
where  
 
Dummy for liquidity shortage  
in money markets 
 if <0   0, otherwise 
 
Dummy for excess demands 
in FX markets 
 if <0  0, otherwise 
FDI Foreign direct investment IFS 78: Direct investment abroad – direct investment in  
CIC Currency in circulation IFS 34 
(b) Dependent variable: domestic interest rate ( itdr , ) 
Variable Definition   Measurement and sources 
tdr ,  Domestic money market rate  IFS line 60b: nominal rate - inflation rate 
*
,tfr  
 
Uncovered FX rate adjusted 
foreign interest rate  IFS line 60b; ttttftf SSErr ln)(ln 1,
*
,    where tfr ,  is the US fed 
fund rate; Under the assumption of perfect foresight 
tttftf SSrr lnln 1,
*
,  
 
e
tp 1  Expected inflation rate 
 
IFS line 64; ∆pt+1 = ln(CPIt+2) – ln(CPIt+1) under the assumption of 
rational expectation 
tNFA  Adjusted net foreign assets IFS: )1/( 11   etettt SSNFANFA  
1tm  Real base money (in log) IFS line 14 
ty  Real output (in log) IFS line 66 
a
tNFA
a
tNFA
tCA
tcY ,
tp
tG
tS
tS
tr ,
2
2
2
, )ˆ(5
1
t
i
itts rr  

 
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2
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1
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
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Several descriptive statistics of the main variables used in regressions are reported in 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4. First, Table 5.3 shows that NFA increased in all country groups and that 
NDA decreased in the IT-Advanced, IT-Asia and Non-IT groups but increased in the IT-
Europe and IT-Latin groups. This may partly reflect relatively successful sterilisations and 
consequent lower inflation in the former groups, and less successful sterilisations and 
resultant high money growth in the latter groups some of which experience hyper-inflation 
(see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2).65  NFA increase was prominent in the IT-Asia and Non-IT 
groups, which are mostly large reserve builders.  However, the increases in ∆NFA (capital 
inflows) appear to be offset by the decrease in ∆NDA. Emerging-IT countries appear to run 
fiscal loosening (∆G/GDP < 0), on average, with capital inflows during the sample period.  
In Table 5.3, the ratios of NFA to currency in circulation (CIC) represent the extent 
of liquidity surplus in the domestic money markets. The larger the NFA/CIC, the stronger 
sterilisation is needed, because liquidity surplus leads CBs to be in a debtor position where 
monetary policies become more difficult (Gray 2006). Emerging IT countries (excluding IT-
Asia), in general, show larger liquidity surplus, more volatile domestic interest rate and FX 
rate, and higher growth in foreign reserves than the IT-advanced group. This suggests that the 
controllability of the domestic interest rate and exchange rate appears lower in the emerging 
IT group than in the IT-Advanced group. This may be related to unsuccessful sterilisation 
activities in these countries.  Note that IT-Asia retains more stable domestic interest rates and 
FX rates than any other emerging IT countries, which indicates that there have been relatively 
successful sterilisations in the IT-Asia.  Hence, we may expect a higher degree of sterilisation 
and incomplete capital mobility in the IT-Asia.  
65 Among the sample countries, Argentina (1989-90), Brazil (1989-90), Peru (1990) and Poland (1990) 
experienced hyper-inflation, according to Cagan’s (1956) definition of hyperinflation that a monthly inflation 
rate is over at least 50%. Mexico’s inflation was close to hyperinflation in the late 1980s (see Reinhart and 
Savastano 2003). 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of main variables used in regression (1981Q1-2010Q4) 
  
GDP
NDA
(%)
 
GDP
NFA
(%)
 
dr
  S  FR  ∆FR CIC
NFA  
GDP
G  
IT- Advanced -0.46 0.72 0.003 0.016 0.132 0.022 1.972 0.003 
IT-Asia -1.29 2.10 0.008 0.014 0.166 0.031 3.571 -0.006 
IT-Europe 1.09 1.65 0.024 0.033 0.179 0.035 4.032 -0.040 
IT-Latin 0.67 1.32 0.012 0.026 0.156 0.025 3.337 -0.039 
Non-IT -3.12 5.17 0.003 0.010 0.080 0.029 3.708 0.022 
Notes: 1. ∆FR=changes in foreign reserves(in log): FR = standard deviation of growth of foreign reserves, ∆G= fiscal surplus 
               S
= standard deviation of FX rate change(in log),
dr
 = standard deviation of local interest rate changes  
         2. In calculating standard deviation of interest rate change, we exclude the data on Brazil(1989M2-1990M3) and 
Argentina(1989M5-1990M3) during   hyperinflation period. See Appendix 5.3 for details. 
         3. The statistics for country groups are calculated as arithmetic average of all countries included (quarterly average).  
Source: Author’s calculation based on IMF IFS and Datastream. 
 
Table 5.4 reports the main components of the balance of payments. IT-Asia 
experienced both current and capital account surplus. Accordingly, sterilizing capital inflows 
may be a more challenging task in the IT-Asia group than in any other country group. Capital 
outflows occur mostly in the IT-Advanced group and Non-IT group, and capital account 
deficits appear to be made up for by the current account surplus. Capital outflows from the 
Non-IT group mostly come from Japan. China and India experienced large amounts of capital 
inflows during the last two decades. Note that capital account surpluses in the IT-Asia mostly 
came from short-term portfolio investment and foreign borrowings rather than FDI.  In 
contrast, most capital account surpluses in IT-Europe and IT-Latin were due to long-term FDI.   
 
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics of main components of BOP (1980Q1-2010Q3) 
  CA/GDP KA/GDP FDI/GDP PF/GDP OINT/GDP 
IT-Advanced 0.013 -0.007 -0.017 -0.019 0.025 
IT-Asia 0.003 0.015 0.005 0.029 0.136 
IT-Europe -0.022 0.035 0.051 0.011 0.038 
IT-Latin -0.015 0.019 0.030 0.002 -0.002 
Non-IT 0.061 -0.028 -0.059 -0.041 -0.018 
Notes 1.CA=current account surplus: KA= capital account surplus: FDI=foreign direct investment (net):     
              PF=portfolio investment (net): OINT=other investment (net) 
           2. See Appendix 5.3(b) for the detailed statistics of individual countries. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IMF IFS and Datastream. 
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5.4 Estimation results   
 
5.4.1 Time-series analysis for selected countries 
 
5.4.1.1 Degree of sterilisation and de facto capital mobility 
 
In this section, we first compare the sterilisation and offset coefficients of 12 selected 
countries and trace the evolution of the coefficients over time by using recursive estimations. 
In particular, the case of Korea is of our main interest because of its peculiar sterilisations 
depending on the MSBs. We choose 12 countries which have the longest historical data 
among 30countries. Samples cover the period 1981-2010 for Korea, the UK, Australia, 
Switzerland and Canada, the period 1990-2010 for New Zealand and Peru, and the late 1990s-
2010 for Thailand, Indonesia, India, Japan and China 
ADF unit root results for all relevant variables are presented in Appendix 5.4. Most 
variables are I(0) except domestic interest rates(rd)  and ∆G (fiscal surplus) whose order of 
integration is different depending on the countries.   If rd ~I(1), we use first difference of rd  as 
dependent variable in the regression (5.3.23). Based on the results of previous literature 
(Ouyang et al. 2007, Aizenman and Glick 2008) and institutional changes, we divide the 
sample period mainly into two subsamples. For example, the simultaneous equations for 
Korea are separately estimated for the pre-IT period (1981Q1-1998Q4) and the post-IT period 
(1999Q1-2010Q3). The analyses for each subsample may show how the degree of sterilisation 
and de facto capital mobility has evolved and to what extent sterilisation influences local 
interest rates in line with the changes in the exchange rate or monetary policy regimes.   
Table 5.5 summarizes the GMM estimation of the sterilisation and offset coefficients 
for inflation targeting countries. The detailed estimation results are presented in Appendix 5.5   
where most coefficients for other control variables (e.g., current account, inflation, cyclical 
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output, etc.) are significant and of the rightly signed. Hansen’s J statistics show that the null 
hypothesis (that a model specification has a valid overidentifying restriction) cannot be 
rejected. Thus, most specifications are considered as correct, except for those for Canada and 
Indonesia, where the null can be rejected at a 10% significant level.  
Table 5.5 Sterilisation and offset coefficients in selected IT countries: GMM estimation 
Country group Country 
Sterilisation coefficient Offset coefficient 
Pre-IT Post-IT Pre-IT Post-IT 
Emerging IT 
Korea (1999Q1) -0.193* -1.019*** -0.203** -0.879*** 
Peru (2002Q1) -0.228*** -0.935*** -0.108 -0.932*** 
Indonesia (2000Q3) n.a. -1.171*** n.a -0.516*** 
Thailand (2000Q2) n.a -0.988*** n.a -0.726*** 
Advanced IT 
UK (1992Q4) -0.811*** -0.424 -0.654*** -0.240*** 
Australia (1993Q1) -0.674*** -0.774*** -0.891*** -0.384*** 
Switzerland (2000Q1) n.a -0.227*** n.a -0.460*** 
Canada (1991Q1) n.a 0.171 n.a -0.213** 
New Zealand (1990Q1) n.a -0.862*** n.a -0.818*** 
Notes: 1. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
            2. Detailed results of system GMM estimation are presented in Appendix 5.5. 
            3. The figures in (  ) indicated the time when inflation targeting was employed.   
            4. n.a: data are not available. 
 
Overall, the sterilisation coefficients of emerging IT countries are higher than those 
of advanced IT countries66. In emerging IT countries, the sterilisation coefficients are around 
1 while the offset coefficients are less than 1 (in absolute value) during the post-IT period, 
indicating that the CBs conduct complete sterilisations (or over sterilisations) and de facto 
capital mobility is not perfect. This implies that sterilisations help to retain monetary 
independence.  In contrast, both sterilisation and offset coefficients are much lower than 1 (in 
absolute value) in advanced IT countries.  The difference between emerging and advanced IT 
66Note that the results in Table 5.5 may not be inferred as direct evidence of higher offset coefficients for 
Emerging market than Advanced Economies. (i) The periods covering post-IT are different between Emerging 
and Advanced Economies. Post-IT periods for Advanced Economies mostly include the 1990s while post-IT 
periods for Emerging Economies include the 2000s.Hence, the offset coefficients for two country groups should 
be compared with caution. In some cases, for example, de facto capital mobility of Emerging Economies in the 
2000s is possibly higher than that of Advanced Economies in the 1990s. (ii) The estimation results in Table 5.5 
are based on time-series analysis for 9 individual countries selected from 30 countries.  In this case, the estimates 
may have the problems of unobserved heterogeneity. Panel analyses in next section will make clear the 
comparison of Advanced-IT and Emerging-IT
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countries may reflect the fact that emerging IT countries face more volatile capital flows and 
thus have to depend on sterilised interventions more. 
In emerging IT countries, both sterilisation and offset coefficients significantly 
increase (in absolute value) from pre-IT to post-IT period (e.g. Korea, Peru). For example, the 
sterilisation and offset coefficients in Korea increase from 0.19 to 1.02 and 0.20 to 0.88 (in 
absolute values), respectively. The offset coefficient of less than 1 and the sterilisation 
coefficient more than 1 imply that the BOK appears successful in maintaining monetary 
independence to some extent by increasing the degree of sterilisation during post-IT period. 
This result about emerging IT seems to correspond to conventional arguments (Aizenman and 
Glick 2009): as capital mobility has become freer, a higher degree of sterilisations helps to 
maintain monetary independence in East Asian emerging economies, particularly in the 2000s. 
The estimated coefficients for Korea contrast somewhat with other countries which 
have a longer history of inflation targeting such as the UK and Australia. The coefficients for 
IT-Advanced countries show relatively low degree of sterilisation and de facto capital flows. 
For example, in Australia, the sterilisation coefficient increases slightly from 0.67 to 0.77 
while the offset coefficient decreases significantly from 0.89 to 0.38 (in absolute value). In the 
UK, both the sterilisation and offset coefficients decrease from 0.81 and 0.65 to 0.42 and 0.24, 
respectively. Decrease in the sterilisation coefficient in IT-Advanced countries may be 
explained by less frequent sterilised interventions.  On the other hand, the decrease in offset 
coefficient seems not consistent with the recent increased integration of international capital 
markets.  
We run recursive estimations to investigate the dynamic change of the estimated 
offset and sterilisation coefficients over time and to investigate the stability of estimated 
coefficients. Figure 5.2 shows the results for several countries.  
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Figure 5.1 Recursive estimations of sterilisation and offset coefficients  
Korea 
 
UK 
 
Australia 
 
Japan 
 
China 
 
                            Note: The recursive coefficients are estimated by OLS. 
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The recursive offset coefficient of Korea illustrates that de facto capital mobility has 
significantly increased with institutional shifts in monetary and FX policy regime – e.g. 
joining The IMF Article VIII countries in 1988, and abolishing daily limits of FX rate 
movements and completely opening the domestic stock and bond markets in the 1997-98 
financial crisis. Meanwhile, the sterilisation coefficient increases steadily notwithstanding 
some institutional changes such as the introduction of IT with a free float regime.  
The recursive coefficients for other countries provide several implications. First, in 
the UK and Australia, sudden changes in the degree of sterilisations and de facto capital 
mobility are associated with occurrences of institutional changes – mainly deregulation, or 
financial crisis: Big Bang in the UK(1986), Wallis Inquiry into the financial system in 
Australia (1996) and subprime crisis (2007), etc.  In both the UK and Australia, the degree of 
sterilisations appear to become somewhat higher while de facto capital mobility became lower 
in the recent subprime crisis period.  Overall, deregulation of financial markets appears to 
incur both increases in capital mobility and high degree of sterilisation.  Financial crisis 
causes to lower the de facto capital mobility and strengthen sterilisations. In Japan, de facto 
capital mobility has remained remarkably high despite the persistent nearly-complete 
sterilisations. In China, it is likely that the de facto capital mobility is extraordinarily limited 
owing to the high degree of sterilisations and capital control. 
Table 5.6 reports the sterilisation and offset coefficients in three Non-IT countries: 
Japan, China and India. The sterilisation coefficients of Japan and China are above 1 (in 
absolute value), indicating over-sterilisation.  This result implies that BOJ and PBOC sterilise 
more than capital flows or FX interventions during the sample periods, as does the BOK. 
There are significant differences in the offset coefficients among the countries. The low offset 
coefficient of China may reflect the existence of strict capital controls. 
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Table 5.6 Sterilisation and offset coefficients in selected Non-IT countries: GMM 
 Sterilisation coefficient Offset coefficient 
 Japan(2002Q3-2010Q4) -1.010*** -0.990*** 
China(1995Q4-2010Q3) -1.106*** -0.138* 
India(1997Q3-2010Q1) -0.377*** -0.100 
Notes: 1. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
           2. Detailed results of system GMM estimation are presented in Appendix 5.5. 
 
5.4.1.2 Impacts of sterilisation on domestic interest rates 
Table 5.7 summarizes the impacts of sterilisation (∆NDA) on domestic (real) interest 
rates (rd) in twelve sample countries.  See Appendix 5.6 for the detailed estimation results.  In 
general, there is no significantly negative relationship between ∆NDA and rd in the 2000s 
except for Korea and China where the sterilisation impact on rd is marginally significant. 
∆NDA and rd are negatively correlated in most countries but insignificant, or positively 
correlated (e.g. UK, Japan, Switzerland and New Zealand).  Hence, the estimation results 
indicate that most sterilisations (except for oversterilisations) appear not to raise domestic 
interest rates significantly.  
 
Table 5.7 Impacts of sterilisation on domestic interest rates: GMM 
 Korea Indonesia Thailand Peru UK Australia Swiss Canada 
New 
Zealand 
Japan China India 
Post-IT -0.012* 0.020 0.034 -0.014 -0.015 -0.070 -0.047 -1.902 0.114* 0.002** -0.133* -0.128 
Pre-IT 0.083 n.a n.a n.a 0.706** -0.603* 0.470** -3.662 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Notes: 1. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
            2. Detailed estimation results are presented in Appendix 5.6. 
            3. Sample periods for Non-IT countries: Japan(2002Q4-2010Q3), China(2000Q1-2010Q3), India(1997Q4-2010Q3) 
            4. n.a: data are not available. 
 
Based on aforementioned inferences, most of capital flows into emerging markets in 
the 2000s appear not to be pulled by the increase domestic money demand. This is because 
sterilisations in most countries may not lead to a significant rise in domestic interest rates 
notwithstanding the high degree of sterilisation in the 2000s. Rather, the capital inflows may 
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stem from a drop in the US interest rate or increase in the expected rate of return on domestic 
assets (such as equity).  
It is noteworthy that oversterilisations in Korea and China may cause domestic 
interest rates to rise and thereby interest rate differentials not to converge, which encourages 
further capital inflows. Coincidently, these two countries heavily depend on the issuance of 
MSBs.  In particular, oversterilisations with MSBs could contribute to significant sterilisation 
cost in Korea where the domestic interest rate is higher than the foreign interest rate.67 
 
5.4.1.3 Coefficients of other control variables  
 
Appendix 5.5 and 5.6 show the estimation results of the system consisting of two 
equations (5.3.21) and (5.3.22), and equation (5.3.23), respectively.  Many coefficients of 
control variables are significant and rightly signed in most countries. J-statistics suggest that 
GMM estimations have valid over-identifying restriction.  
First, in Appendix 5.5, the coefficients for rd )1( 1   are highly significantly 
negative, indicating that most CBs conduct OMOs to stabilise domestic interest rates when 
they are volatile. The coefficients of sd )1( 2  are significantly negative in most countries 
(except Canada, New Zealand, Indonesia and Thailand with insignificantly negative signs). 
The current account surplus has significantly positive effects on both ∆NDA and ∆NFA in 
Korea and Thailand, but significantly negative effects in Japan, Switzerland and New Zealand. 
67 Although PBOC heavily issues MSBs for sterilizing capital inflows as BOK does, it is not likely that PBOC 
makes losses, because the local interest rate is lower than the US rate owing to interest rate control. China has 
been earning a premium from its foreign reserve accumulation due to domestic financial repression (Prasad and 
Wei 2005). Sterilisation costs will be reduced as CBs use market distorting instruments such as raising reserves 
requirement and setting loan quotas, etc. (Ljungwall et al. 2009, pp 3-4). Zhang (2011) provides evidence that 
PBOC’s income from foreign reserves has exceeded its sterilisation costs consistently in 2003-2010.  However, 
he expects that if local interest rates are determined by pure market forces, the increasing issuance of PBOC bills 
will soon impose too high a burden on the PBOC.  
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The coefficients of inflation (∆pt-1) are not significant in most countries except Korea, 
the UK, and Switzerland. This result implies that CBs appear not to instantly respond to 
inflation by changing money supply, and inflation appears not to instantly influence foreign 
investment in domestic markets.  Both CBs and investors need time to react to changes in 
inflation. Given that our samples are mostly obtained from the period of the late 1990s – 
2000s, it seems that globally low inflation and the narrowing domestic-foreign interest rate 
differential yield statistical difficulties in detecting the true relationship between ∆pt-1 and 
∆NDA (or ∆NFA) on a quarterly basis. Note that inflation remains at a very low level in most 
of the countries (see Table 2-1 in Chapter 2), while ∆NFA and ∆NDA are very volatile during 
the 2000s (see Appendix 5.3(c)). Interestingly, the coefficient of ∆pt-1 has a significantly 
positive relation with ∆NDA in Japan, implying that BOJ increases the domestic money 
supply even when inflation increases, probably reflecting their quantitative easing policy in 
the early 2000s. 
The coefficients of exchange rate-adjusted foreign interest rates ∆(rf+ES) are mostly 
insignificant or significant with the wrong signs in both equations, indicating that foreign 
interest rate changes do not have a significant and consistent effect on domestic monetary 
supply and capital movements. This result is not consistent with the prior expectations 
explained in the previous section.  There may be some plausible explanations for the weak 
relationship between ∆(rf+ES) and ∆NDA (or ∆NFA).  First, capital flows (∆NFA) may be 
influenced more by the expected rate of return on risky assets (e.g. stock) than by interest rate 
differentials in the 2000s (Choi and Park 2008, Verma and Prakash 2011).  Second, most CBs 
tend to adjust their policy interest rate in line with the changes in the policy rate in the US.  If 
we allow for the announcement effect, CBs do not always need to change the money supply 
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when adjusting policy interest rates (Guthrie and Wright 2000).68  Hence, ∆(rf+ES) is unlikely 
to be significantly related with ∆NDA. 
)( 1 tt SS   tends to have a significantly negative effect on ∆NFA but not on ∆NDA in 
most countries. This implies that the deviation of the FX rate from its trend incurs FX 
interventions and resultant changes in NFA, while FX rate deviation may not directly 
influence domestic operations (∆NDA). The cyclical output (yc) and fiscal surplus (∆G) have 
significant effects on both ∆NDA and ∆NFA, but not in consistent ways, as we discussed in 
the previous section.     
Appendix 5.6 reports the estimation results of equation (5.3.23).  In many countries 
(except Japan, China,  Indonesia and New Zealand), the coefficients of US fed fund rates (r*f) 
are significantly positive as expected, implying that domestic policy interest rates tend to 
synchronize to the US fed fund rate. In contrast, Japan and China are relatively large 
economies, so their policy interest rates may be less sensitive to changes in the US fed fund 
rate. Local rates in New Zealand and Indonesia are known to be affected by interest rate 
changes in Australia and Japan, respectively, as well as changes in the US fed fund rate. 
The coefficients of ∆mt-1are not significantly negative in most countries except the 
UK, Canada, Korea and Switzerland, implying that changes in the money supply mostly have 
an insignificant effect on local interest rates in the short run. The weak relation between 
money supply and interest rates may be ascribed to the announcement effect and the lagged 
effect of money supply on interest rate. The coefficients of expected inflation (pet+1) are not 
significant in most countries, implying that expected inflation does not significantly affect real 
interest rates.   
  
68 Guthrie and Wright (2000) suggest that interest rates can be changed by the CB’s announcement of policy 
interest rate changes without actual market operations to change money supply.   
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5.4.2 Panel analyses 
The results of time-series analyses discussed in the previous section suggest that 
there are some differences in the significance of the control variables (which account for 
∆NDA, ∆NFA and rd), and the magnitude of sterilisation and offset coefficients.  Panel data 
analyses have advantages over the time-series approach (Baltagi 2008, pp. 6-11). First, panel 
analysis can control for unobserved country-specific variables (i.e., country heterogeneity) 
and thereby provide estimates which are more robust against the omitted variable bias. 
Consequently, we may expect more consistent signs for the coefficients, which may 
somewhat differ from those in the previous time-series analyses. Second, panel analyses may 
better measure the effect of sterilisation on local interest rates, which is not significantly 
detected by time-series data. Lastly, panel data are less plagued with multicollinearity than 
time-series data. 
 
5.4.2.1 Preliminary considerations and post estimations of panel model 
Several considerations are needed before and after panel estimations. Since our data 
is macro-panel with relatively small N (30 countries) and large T (120 quarters), stationarity, 
cross-sectional dependence and serial correlation may be significant issues to be addressed 
before or after the estimations. 
 
5.4.2.1(a) Panel unit root test 
A spurious regression may be problematic, particularly in an FE panel model with 
long time-series, because the time series components frequently follow non-stationary 
processes. In this case, inferences based on t-values can be highly misleading, despite 
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seemingly significant t-values and high R2(Entorf 1997). However, according to Phillips and 
Moon (1999),69 the pooled OLS estimator can be consistent and thus asymptotic normal 
inferences are possible even in the spurious regression case under the conventional 
assumption of independent cross-sections. This is because pooling across a large cross-section 
of independent units can smooth out unit root dependency for each unit. Strong noise in time 
series regression is attenuated by pooling cross-sections and time-series. Panel methods allow 
for an estimation of a long-run relation among variables in cases where consideration of the 
time dimension alone would lead to a spurious regression (Banerjee 1999).  
However, cross-sectional independence is not usually guaranteed when 
macroeconomic data (with strong intra-economic associations) are considered (Banerjee et al. 
2004). Recent studies suggest that panel models are likely to exhibit substantial cross-
sectional dependence in their errors (Pesaran 2004). This may be because of the existence of 
common shocks originating from an ever-increasing economic and financial integration over 
the last decade. In addition, when inferences are made from non-stationary panels where N= 
4~8, like our sample, cross-sectional independence may not hold due to the possible “beggar 
thy neighbour”sterilisation policy. In this case, it is necessary to run panel unit root tests, 
which are generally known to have higher power than those based on time series.  
Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (2003) and Fisher-type ADF or PP panel unit root tests 
(Maddala and Wu 1999, Choi 2001) allow for individual unit root processes while Levin, Lin 
and Chu (LLC) (2002), Breitung (2000) and Hadri (2000) assume common unit root 
processes. All of these tests use a null of a unit root except the Hadri test, where the null is 
stationarity. We use a Fisher-type ADF test because (i) the LLC, Hadri and Breitung tests 
69Entorf (1997) shows that for T→∞ and N<∞, nonsense regression holds for the spurious fixed effects model. 
However, Phillips and Moon (1999) show that even in case of spurious FE panel regression 
TtNiXaY titiiti ,,1;,....,1ˆˆˆ ,,,  
 where Yt and Xt, are all I(1) without a cointegration, the pooled 
OLS estimator ˆ is n -consistent for β  and has a limiting normal distribution.  
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have more restrictive assumptions about cross-sectional independence than the Fisher-type 
test; (ii) the Fisher-type tests outperform the IPS test with regard to size-adjusted power; (iii) 
unlike the IPS test, the Fisher-type test does not require a balanced panel (Baltagi 2008, pp 
281-282). SIC determines an appropriate lag number.  The Fisher-ADF test combines the p-
value from individual unit root tests for each cross-section. Let us illustrate Fisher-ADF test 
with the following equation (Baltagi 2008, pp. 280-281).  
 (5.4.1) 
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with Xmt denoting deterministic variables and mi  the corresponding coefficients for model 
m=1,2,3. The lag order qi is allowed to vary across individuals. The Fisher-ADF test 
0:0 iH   for all Ni ,,1   against 0:1 iH   for 1,,1 Ni   and 0i  for NNi ,,11   
with NN  10 . Now, let iiT  denote a unit root test statistics for the i
th country where Ti 
indicates time-series observations. It is assumed that as iT , .iiTi    
Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) suggest two test statistics by combining the 
p-values from the unit root tests for each country in order to test the panel unit root. 
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1 where   is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function and ip  is the p-value from unit root tests for each cross-section i. The 
null is that each series in the panel contain a unit root while the alternative is that at least one 
of the individual series is stationary.70 
70  Consider following the AR(1)-type process for panel data: TtNiXyy titiitiiti ,....,1;,1,,1,,     
where Xit are exogenous variables; ti,  are mutually i.i.d.  yit is weakly stationary if 1i  but non-stationary if 
1i .  LLC, Breitung and Hadri test assume that i  are common (i.e.,  i  for all i) while the IPS and 
Fisher-ADF/PP test assume that 
i  varies across cross-sections. 
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When using the Fisher-ADF test for the panel unit root, we remove the cross-
sectional means from the series to mitigate the effects of cross-sectional dependency. In 
particular, the “demean” function of STATA 12 is used to deal with cross-sectional 
dependency.71  The results of the panel unit root test suggest that most series are I(0) except 
for domestic interest rates(rd) in the IT-advanced group, which is I(1) during the 1980s (See 
Appendix 5.7).   
 
5.4.2.1(b) Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
 
In the previous literature (based on time series), estimated sterilisation and offset 
coefficients and the significance of other control variables are different depending on the 
specifications and institutional features of each countries.  This indicates that time series 
analyses may not consider unobserved heterogeneity. Figure 5.2 illustrates the best practice 
regarding the choice of models with panel data. Intuitively, it is likely that panel analysis is 
more appropriate than pooled OLS for our data, because the panel allows for control for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity.  
The choice between FE and RE depends on whether the countries in each group 
could be regarded as representative of a population (Snijders 2005). If the countries are 
randomly selected from a given population, RE is modelled.  In contrast, if the country group 
contains most countries of interest (i.e. the countries included in a specific group represent the 
population), FE is appropriate. When the researcher wishes to draw a conclusion primarily 
about the population (from which the selected countries were drawn) rather than about 
particular countries, FE should be used (Snijders 2005). 
71 The 2nd generations of the panel unit root test directly deal with the existence of cross-sectional dependence. 
For example, Pesaran (2004) proposes a t-test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels with cross-section 
dependence(see Baltagi 2008, pp 273-277). 
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Figure 5.2 Best practice of model selection for panel data 
 
 
In this regard, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (hereafter DWH) test provides a formal way 
of choosing an appropriate model between two different models: e.g.  FE vs. RE, pooled OLS 
vs. RE. To describe the DWH test, consider following regression equation:     
 (5.4.2) itiitit euxy    
where Ni ,2,1 (cross-section, i.e., country) and Tt ,,2,1  (time period, i.e., 
quarter); yit=dependent variables; xit=exogenous variables;  =intercept; iu =i
th country 
specific effect; ite = idiosyncratic error term with 0),( isit eeE for all s≠t; and 0),( iti euE . Note 
that when estimating (5.4.2) with panel data, we restrict the slope coefficient (  ) to be 
constant and allow for the intercept coefficient ( iu ) to vary over units. iu is a fixed 
parameter to be estimated under FE but assumed to be randomly distributed across units under 
No Yes 
No Yes 
Can the observations be described as being a 
random sample from a given population? 
Run both FE and RE regression 
Does a Hausman test indicate 
significant differences in the 
coefficient? 
Use FE 
Use FE  
Provisionally choose RE and run a 
Breusch-Pagan test. Does the test 
indicate the presence of RE? 
Use RE Use pooled OLS 
No 
Yes 
Source: Dougherty (2006, p 421) 
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RE.72  The DWH test provides flexible tools for choosing a specific estimation among two 
options.  
First of all, DWH tests H0: 0),( iti uxE (i.e., orthogonality of ui and tix ).RE is 
appropriate if  , while FE is preferred if 0),( iti uxE .  We run both RE and FE 
regressions for (5.3.21), (5.3.22) and (5.3.23), and then compare the RE and FE estimates. 
Under the null of orthogonality, both FE and RE are consistent, so the two estimates should 
not significantly differ from each other. Under the alternative hypothesis, RE is not consistent. 
Hence, if the null is rejected, FE is preferred. The statistics are computed as: 
)ˆˆ()]ˆvar()ˆ[var()ˆˆ( 1 REFEREFEREFEH    . These test statistics follow 2x
distribution with M degree of freedom where M is the number of time-varying regressors.73 
Second, after choosing model between RE and FE, we test H0: 0),( 2 itit exE (where x2it 
is assumed endogenous) to examine the existence of endogeneity. We compare the estimates 
of the instrument variable method (e.g. 2SLS) and FE (or RE) estimates without using IV. 
Under the null of no endogeneity, both estimators of the same equation provide consistent 
estimates. Therefore, a rejection of the null requires one to use IV techniques.   
Table 5.8 summarize the result of DWH tests for selecting the model by post-
estimation function of STATA 12. The selected model is different depending on country 
groups.  
  
72 We can also assume that the intercept coefficient varies over both time and units: in this case (5.3.25) can be 
expressed as 
ittiitit euxy    where )(0,~
2
 t  is the unobservable time-specific residual that accounts 
for period effects. 
73  We apply the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test (STAT command: xttest0) for testing H0: 
iu ui  ,0)var(
2 , against H1: iu ui  ,0)var(
2 .  Note that there are no country-specific effects (ui) under the 
null, while the effects assume the random variable under the alternative hypothesis. Hence, if Ho cannot be 
rejected, a pooled OLS is more appropriate than an RE estimation. The test results are different depending on 
country groups and sample period, although panel models are recommended in most cases. 
 
0),( iti uxE
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First, in the estimation of (5.3.21) and (5.3.22), the DWH tests suggest that FE is 
appropriate for Asia-IT, Europe-IT, Latin-IT and Non-IT while RE is recommended for 
Advanced-IT. The DWH test statistics ( 2x =19.08, p-value 0.000) of (5.3.21) for Asia-IT 
suggests that the null can be rejected, so FE estimation is considered as appropriate. Second, 
the test statistics for endogeneity mostly support the use of instrument variables. For example, 
when estimating (5.3.21) for the Asia-IT, we can reject the null of 0),cov(:0 itit exH , 
because  DWH test statistics is 41.62 with p-value 0.000. Combining the two results leads us 
to choose the 2SLS with FE in estimating equation (5.3.21) for the Asia-IT.  
In consideration of the results of the DWH tests and best practices for model 
selection in the panel, it is somewhat difficult to select one specification (to be applied for all 
Table 5.8 Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for country-specific fixed effects and endogeneity 
Objective Choice between FE and RE 
Test for endogeneity  
(FE vs. 2SLS FE / RE vs. G2 SLS) 
Null  
0),cov(:0 iit uxH  
If Ho is rejected, FE may be appropriate. 
0),cov(:0 itit exH  
If Ho is rejected, IV estimate like 2SLS FE(or 
G2SLS) may be appropriate. 
STATA 
Command  
hausman fe re hausman xtivreg xtreg 
Equation (5.3.21)
 
(5.3.22)
 
(5.3.23)
 
Model1 (5.3.21)
 
(5.3.22)
 
(5.3.23)
 
Model1 
Advanced-IT 11.11 
(0.196) 
9.39 
(0.310) 
4.32 
(0.687) 
RE 
RE 
20.66*** 
 (0.008) 
17.65** 
 (0.014) 
2.45 
(0.784) 
IV 
Non-IV 
Asia-IT 19.08
*** 
(0.000) 
18.91*** 
(0.00) 
24.32*** 
(0.000) 
FE 
FE 
41.62*** 
(0.000) 
43.63*** 
 (0.000) 
74.02*** 
(0.000) 
IV 
IV 
Europe-IT  6.08 
(0.638) 
4.20 
(0.839) 
27.32*** 
(0.000) 
RE 
FE 
21.59*** 
 (0.006) 
16.82** 
(0.019) 
5.11 
(0.402) 
IV 
Non-IV 
Latin-IT 26.35
*** 
(0.000) 
32.25*** 
(0.000) 
29.36*** 
(0.000) 
FE 
FE 
47.21*** 
(0.000) 
42.54*** 
(0.000) 
90.51*** 
(0.000) 
IV 
IV 
Non-IT 
16.35** 
(0.038) 
17.83** 
(0.023) 
130.36*** 
(0.000) 
FE 
FE 
13.39* 
(0.099) 
20.66*** 
(0.001) 
9.76* 
(0.082) 
IV 
IV 
Notes: 1. In each column the 1st row indicates the model selected for (5.3.21) and (5.3.22). The 2nd row shows the 
  model recommended for (5.3.23).  
   2. FE= fixed effect; RE= random effect; 2SLS FE= two stage least square with cross-sectional fixed effect; G2  
  SLS=Generalised 2 stage least square with random effects; IV=instrument variable(e.g. 2SLS FE, G2 SLS 
  or GMM); Non-IV= FE or RE without considering endogeneity.      
3. When estimating (5.3.21) and (5.3.22) with IV, we use ∆FDI and ∆CIC as an instrument for ∆NFA and 
   ∆NDA, respectively, with a constant and up to 2 lags of other regressors. As for the (5.3.23), ∆CIC, a     
constant and up to 3 lags of other regressors are used as instruments. 
    4. The figures in (  ) indicate p-values. 
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samples) over another. We primarily model with cross-sectional FE and endogeneity.74  The 
reason that FE seems more appropriate is twofold.  First, our sample countries are more likely 
to represent the population of each group rather than a random sample, so that FE may be 
more appropriate (Dougherty 2006 p 421). The number of sample IT countries (= 22) may 
represent the population (= 26 IT countries in the world as of the end of 2009). Second, the 
properties of the RE estimator are largely unknown for macro-panels with small N and large T 
(Judson and Owen 1999, p 11). 
 
5.4.2.1(c) Test for nonspherical residual in fixed effect model 
 
It is likely that residuals are correlated across cross-sections or over time in macro 
panels. As Baltagi (2008) points out, a serial correlation within a country or a 
contemporaneous correlation between countries (i.e., cross-sectional dependence) may be 
more of a problem in macro-panels than in micro-panels.  For example, a serial correlation 
biases standard errors of the coefficients to be smaller than they actually are, and thus causes 
estimation results to be less efficient. The existence of a cross-sectional dependence leads to 
either inconsistent or biased estimators.  After estimating FE panel model with IV, we 
conduct post-estimation tests for check the nonspherical properties of the residuals: 
Wooldridge serial correlation test, Pesaran cross-sectional dependence test and modified Wald 
test for country-level heteroskedasticity.  
74 Other econometric software like Eviews requires that, when RE is modelled, the number of cross-sections 
must be larger than that of the coefficients for between estimators to estimate RE innovation variance. Our 
sample does not meet this condition. In addition, to see if time-fixed effects are needed when running a FE, we 
conduct a joint test in which the null is that the dummies for all quarters are equal to zero. The restricted F-test 
result for Advanced-IT countries during the entire period (F = 2.17, p-value=0.000) suggests that the null is 
rejected, so that time-fixed effects are not needed. Other samples show similar results. 
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The Wooldridge test (2002) has the null of no first-order serial correlation. In 
particular, 0:0 H  in ititit vee  1 is used to identify a serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic error term ( ite ) in (5.4.2). The Pesaran test (2004) has a null of a cross-sectional 
independence − 0),cov(:0 jtit eeH . A modified Wald test has the null of no heteroskedasticity 
− Ho: ieit  ,)var(
2 .  The results of the nonspherical residual test are reported in Table 5.9.   
 
Table 5.9 Result of post-estimation test of nonspherical residual 
 
1st order autocorrelation 
within a country level 
 Contemporaneous 
correlation across countries 
Country-level heteroskedasticity 
Test  
method 
Wooldridge’s LM test of serial 
independence 
Pesaran cross-dependence 
test3) 
modified Wald test 
Null  
hypothesis 
steeH isit  0),cov(:0  
0:0 H  in ititit vee  1  
(no 1st order serial correlation) 
 
(no cross-sectional 
dependence)
 
ieH it  ,)var(:
2
0   
(no heteroskedasticity) 
STATA 
command 
xtserial xtcsd , pesaran abs xttest3 
Equation (5.3.21)
 
(5.3.22)
 
(5.3.23)
 
(5.3.21)
 
(5.3.22)
 
(5.3.23)
 
(5.3.21)
 
(5.3.22)
 
(5.3.23)
 
Advanced-
IT 
0.273 
(0.617) 
11.102*** 
(0.000) 
68.424*** 
(0.000) 
5.454*** 
(0.000) 
1.932* 
(0.053) 
20.166*** 
(0.000) 
6271.71*** 
(0.000) 
2151.03*** 
(0.000) 
100.05*** 
(0.000) 
Asia-IT 
5.637* 
(0.098) 
0.461 
(0.545) 
1075.52*** 
 (0.000) 
4.049*** 
 (0.000) 
2.990*** 
 (0.003) 
8.432*** 
 (0.000) 
140.00*** 
 (0.000) 
41.99*** 
 (0.000) 
461.68*** 
 (0.000) 
Europe-IT 
17.814*** 
(0.008) 
66.121*** 
(0.001) 
95.619*** 
(0.000) 
0.398 
(0.690) 
0.577 
(0.563) 
7.205*** 
(0.000) 
41363.70*** 
(0.000) 
4107.87*** 
(0.000) 
1498.39*** 
0.0000 
Latin_IT 
0.348 
(0.586) 
1.605 
(0.274) 
8.645** 
(0.042) 
1.435 
(0.151) 
2.416** 
(0.015) 
4.260*** 
(0.000) 
1878.02*** 
(0.000) 
94.96*** 
(0.000) 
200.59*** 
(0.000) 
Non-IT 
1.112 
(0.326) 
0.970 
(0.357) 
34.672*** 
(0.001) 
0.952 
(0.341) 
0.869 
(0.384) 
2.789*** 
(0.005) 
17934.31*** 
(0.000) 
10992.33*** 
(0.000) 
16956.83*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: 1. The figures in (  ) indicates p-value 
            2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10, respectively. 
            3. All results are obtained by STATA post-estimation commands after FE estimations with IV.  
 
In many cases, residuals are heteroskedastic and serially-correlated within country 
level, and contemporaneously correlated across countries. These results require one to use the 
HAC-robust standard errors in inferring the estimated coefficients and the HAC-robust weak 
identification test in applying IV. For example, Kleibergen-Paap F statistics are recommended 
rather than Cragg-Donald statistics and the Anderson canonical correlation test in examining 
the weakness of IV (Baum et al. 2007, p 21). See Appendix 5.9 for the details.  
 
0),cov(:0 jtit eeH
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5.4.2.2 Degree of sterilisation and de facto capital mobility 
In this section, we present the estimated sterilisation and offset coefficients for five 
country groups. It has been argued that capital mobility has been accelerated since the 
liberalisations of financial markets in the 1990s and the widespread introduction of flexible 
exchange regimes with IT in the 2000s (IMF 2011). To examine the degree of sterilisation 
and de facto capital mobility, we divide the sample into two (or three) subsamples and then 
carry out separate estimations. The data before the 2000s is available only for the IT-
Advanced and the IT-Asia. The estimation results of the monetary reaction and BOP function 
are reported in Table 5.10.   
Most estimated sterilisation and offset coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 
or 5% level except the offset coefficient for the IT-Advanced in the 1990s and the IT-Latin in 
the 2000s. For the IT-Advanced and IT-Asia, the sterilisation coefficient increases while the 
offset coefficient decreases over time. In the IT-Advanced, the sterilisation coefficient 
increases from 0.75 to 1.00 while the offset coefficient decreases from 0.93 to 0.73 (in 
absolute value) between the 1980s and the 2000s. In the IT-Asia, the sterilisation coefficient 
increases from 0.90 to 1.08 whereas the offset coefficient decreases from 0.90 to 0.42 from 
the 1990s to the 2000s.   
During the 2000s, the sterilisation coefficients are close to or above 1, and the offset 
coefficients is significantly less than 1 (in absolute value) in the IT-Asia and the IT-Advanced 
group.  The offset coefficients are notably lower than sterilisation coefficients in both groups. 
These results suggest that sterilisations are effective in neutralizing unwanted changes in the 
monetary base caused by capital flows, and that de facto capital mobility is not complete. The 
changes in NDA incurred by sterilisations are never completely offset by international capital 
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flows. Increases in sterilisation coefficients over time indicate that the CBs in both groups 
attempt to intensify sterilisations in order to retain their monetary independence.  
During the 2000s, the sterilisation coefficient of the IT-Advanced was much lower 
than that of the IT-Asia while the offset coefficient of the IT-Advanced are greater than that 
of the IT-Asia group, implying that the sterilisation is relatively more successful in the IT-
Asia than in the IT-Advanced group. The decreases in the offset coefficients in the IT-
Advanced and IT-Asia groups over time imply that both groups as a whole have experienced 
lower de facto capital mobility in the 2000s than in the 1990s. This result appears to conflict 
with recent discussions about the integration of international capital markets. However, the 
results for IT-Asia are consistent with some studies which suggest that de facto capital 
mobility has not significantly increased since the 1997-98 crises (Ouyang et al. 2007).  
The reduced de facto capital mobility in advanced countries in the 2000s appears 
somewhat difficult to interpret. Two plausible interpretations have been proposed.  First, more 
open financial market does not necessarily represent de facto high capital mobility in 
advanced countries, as Feldstein-Horioka puzzle hints at. Capital is not freely mobile in most 
financially-open advanced countries (Younas 2011). Second, IT-Advanced countries rarely 
intervened in FX markets in the 2000s, so that the ∆NFAs did not change considerably in line 
with ∆NDA.  
Several implications can be drawn from the estimation results in the 2000s. First, the 
sterilisation coefficients are close to or above 1 in most groups (except for IT-Europe), which 
indicates that CBs conduct almost complete sterilisation or slight over-sterilisation of capital 
flows in the 2000s. This result from the panel data is mostly consistent with recent time-series 
based studies that report high degree of sterilisations in most countries: e.g. Siklos(2000a), 
Bernstein (2000), Cavoli and Rajan(2006), Ouyang et al(2010) and Wang(2010) (see 
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Appendix 5.1 for the summary of previous studies). Second, de facto capital mobility appears 
lower in IT emerging countries than in IT-Advanced countries, as expected. The offset 
coefficients range from -0.42 to -0.64 in IT emerging countries and -0.73 in IT-Advanced 
during the 2000s.75 
Among the control variables, the volatility terms (σr, σs) interacted with the dummy 
variables (d1, d2) are, in general, significantly negative in both equations, regardless of 
country groups. This implies that most CBs attempt to stabilise the money and FX markets by 
providing monetary base when the money market is in a deficit position and by selling foreign 
exchange when the FX market is in excess demand for foreign currency, respectively.  
The estimated coefficients for other control variables are different depending on 
country groups or sample periods. For example, the coefficients for current accounts are 
significant in IT-Asia group during the 2000s. This may reflect a relatively large amount of 
current account surplus in this group after 1997-98 financial crises. )( 1 itit SS  , Yc and 
 are mostly insignificant and do not have consistent signs in both regressions. The 
coefficients for  are not significant in IT-Advanced, IT-Asia and IT-Europe but 
significant in IT-Latin and the Non-IT group. Considering that Non-IT and Latin-IT include 
relatively more fixed exchange regime countries during the sample periods, these results are 
understandable. The insignificance of and significance of (d2-1)σs in IT-Advanced,  
IT-Asia and IT-Europe may suggest that CB interventions mostly aim at reducing FX rate 
volatility rather than changing FX rate level. 
75The high offset coefficient (-0.98) in the Non-IT group may be because the Non-IT group includes regional 
financial centres such as Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong, where capital moves more freely than any other 
countries. China and India experienced a large amount of capital inflows despite the institutional constraints on 
capital flows. According to Montiel and Reinhart (1999), capital control appears to change the composition of 
capital flows without reducing the total volume of capital inflows. 
 
)( 1,  tttf SEr
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Table 5.10 Estimated sterilisation and offset coefficients for 5 country groups: panel model 
 
 IT-Advanced    IT-Asia  IT-Latin IT-Europe Non-IT 
 1981Q1-1990Q4 1991Q-2000Q 2001Q1-2010Q4 1991Q-2000Q4  2001Q1-2010Q4 2001Q1-2010Q4 2001Q1-2010Q4 2001Q1-2010Q4 
∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA 
Intercept 
0.002 
(0.202) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.862) 
0.002*** 
(0.004) 
0.015* 
(0.094) 
0.010** 
(0.041) 
0.002 
(0.647) 
0.007 
(0.419) 
0.010 
(0.183) 
0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.008* 
(0.087) 
0.010** 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.843) 
0.005** 
(0.028) 
0.019*** 
(0.000) 
0.012 
(0.385) 
∆NFA 
-0.754*** 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.599** 
(0.019) 
- 
-1.002*** 
(0.004) 
- 
-0.902*** 
(0.000) 
- 
-1.081*** 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.988*** 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.836** 
(0.042) 
- 
-1.022*** 
(0.000) 
- 
∆NDA - 
-0.933*** 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.236 
(0.508) 
- 
-0.728*** 
(0.010) 
- 
-0.895*** 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.417*** 
(0.002) 
- 
-0.639* 
(0.099) 
- 
-0.426*** 
(0.004) 
- 
-0.977*** 
(0.000) 
CA 
0.014 
(0.739) 
0.016 
(0.667) 
-0.195* 
(0.096) 
0.016 
(0.715) 
0.038 
(0.835) 
-0.024 
(0.865) 
-0.025 
(0.783) 
0.027 
(0.719) 
0.211* 
(0.063) 
0.217*** 
(0.007) 
0.029 
(0.809) 
-0.022 
(0.852) 
0.056 
(0.589) 
-0.090 
(0.201) 
-0.041 
(0.438) 
0.114 
(0.529) 
∆(rf+ES) 
-0.006 
(0.756) 
-0.008 
(0.630) 
0.008 
(0.684) 
-0.028* 
(0.079) 
0.005** 
(0.035) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.439) 
0.001 
(0.287) 
-0.001 
(0.831) 
0.0002* 
(0.071) 
-0.0004 
(0.862) 
-0.0001 
(0.672) 
0.0001 
(0.973) 
-0.001 
(0.161) 
-0.002 
(0.608) 
0.001 
(0.799) 
 
-0.019 
(0.400) 
0.006 
(0.778) 
0.056 
(0.353) 
0.002 
(0.950) 
0.072 
(0.666) 
0.041 
(0.671) 
-0.081 
(0.439) 
-0.040 
(0.721) 
0.034 
(0.598) 
0.085 
(0.473) 
-0.090** 
(0.012) 
-0.131* 
(0.068) 
-0.036 
(0.423) 
-0.035 
(0.467) 
-0.174** 
(0.022) 
-0.395** 
(0.012) 
∆pt-1 
-0.106* 
(0.100) 
-0.106 
(0.164) 
-0.113 
(0.434) 
0.050 
(0.431) 
-1.468** 
(0.045) 
-0.902*** 
(0.007) 
0.045 
(0.232) 
0.310 
(0.486) 
0.002 
(0.600) 
0.027 
(0.903) 
-0.124 
(0.483) 
-0.241 
(0.310) 
-0.011 
(0.936) 
-0.002 
(0.989) 
0.244 
(0.204) 
0.110 
(0.716) 
Yc 
0.053 
(0.162) 
0.003 
(0.933) 
-0.104 
(0.363) 
-0.043 
(0.231) 
0.203 
(0.502) 
0.151 
(0.597) 
-0.053 
(0.632) 
-0.006 
(0.942) 
-0.138 
(0.425) 
-0.055 
(0.798) 
0.002 
(0.960) 
0.193* 
(0.058) 
0.253*** 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.918) 
-0.054 
(0.242) 
-0.028 
(0.617) 
Fiscal  
deficit 
-0.037 
(0.119) 
-0.012 
(0.565) 
0.086*** 
(0.009) 
0.017 
(0.532) 
-0.047 
(0.194) 
-0.017 
(0.647) 
-0.237** 
(0.019) 
-0.211** 
(0.035) 
0.033 
(0.550) 
-0.148*** 
(0.009) 
-0.359*** 
(0.000) 
-0.152 
(0.279) 
-0.148** 
(0.012) 
-0.051 
(0.244) 
0.064* 
(0.087) 
-0.001 
(0.977) 
(d1-1)σr 
-0.424*** 
(0.009) 
- 
-2.889*** 
(0.007) 
- 
-4.960** 
(0.025) 
- 
-0.309 
(0.553) 
- 
-2.577** 
(0.032) 
- 
-1.382*** 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.676 
(0.396) 
- 
-0.106 
(0.434) 
- 
(d2-1)σs - 
-0.097 
(0.335) 
- 
-0.470*** 
(0.003) 
- 
-0.660*** 
(0.002) 
- 
-0.336** 
(0.035) 
- 
-1.563*** 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.264 
(0.238) 
- 
-0.493*** 
(0.001) 
- 
-0.345** 
(0.066) 
Observation 105 105 200 200 296 296 75 75 150 150 174 174 202 202 245 277 
Wald χ2-stat 
126.30 
(0.000) 
145.32 
(0.000) 
123.41 
(0.000) 
119.95 
(0.000) 
409.48 
(0.000) 
114.16 
(0.000) 
270.90 
(0.000) 
80.90 
(0.000) 
257.68 
(0.000) 
196.37 
(0.000) 
93.76 
(0.000) 
123.00 
(0.000) 
79.02 
(0.000) 
191.71 
(0.000) 
304.81 
(0.000) 
371.35 
(0.000) 
J-statistics 
0.526 
(0.768) 
1.587 
(0.452) 
0.688 
(0.672) 
4.231 
(0.112) 
1.989 
(0.369) 
4.002 
(0.145) 
0.465 
(0.793) 
1.469 
(0.480) 
5.687 
(0.058) 
0.596 
(0.742) 
2.465 
(0.321) 
1.234 
(0.531) 
4.731 
(0.094) 
0.935 
(0.6266) 
0.932 
(0.628) 
1.031 
(0.597) 
Kleibergen-Paap 
F statistics 
13.23 22.33 15.03 8.65 19.68 11.22 19.10 8.22 10.76 15.63 10.65 12.97 11.39 21.64 23.65 12.35 
Notes: 1. Panel 2 Stage Least Squares with cross-sectional fixed effect are used.  
            2. To obtain Newey-West type HAC estimator, we use STATA command xtivreg, fe with robust bw(6) option.  
            3. ∆FDI and ∆CIC are used as an instrument for ∆NFA and ∆NDA, respectively, with a constant and up to 2 lags of other explanatory variables. Instruments used are same for all country groups. 
            4. Hansen’s J-statistics is the diagnostic test for the validity of over-identifying restriction. If the null of a valid over-identifying restriction is not rejected, the model is considered as correct. 
            5. Kleibergen-Paap F statistics is to test weakness of a set of instruments. If the F-statistics is at least 10, the model is assumed not to have significant problem of weak instrument. 
            6. ***, ** and* denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
7             7. P-values are in in parenthesis. 
)( 1 itit SS 
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The insignificance of )( 1,  tttf SEr may be due mainly to the lower interest rate 
sensitivity of capital flows in the 2000s (Forbes and Warnock 2011).  A series of financial 
crises since 1997 and globally low interest rates in the late 2000s appear to render market 
participants to recognize non-interest rate risk more seriously than interest rate risk. 
Consequently capital flows may become less sensitive to interest rate changes. For example, 
Verma and Prakash (2011) provide evidence that net capital inflows to India during the period 
2000-2009 were not sensitive to interest rate differentials. Lagged inflation terms are 
significant and have the expected sign only in IT-Advanced countries that have a longer 
history of IT and relatively stronger commitments on inflation. In addition, from the statistical 
point of view, the insignificance of Yc, and )( 1,  tttf SEr  may be explained by the fact that 
the dependent variables (∆NDA and ∆NFA) are quite volatile, whereas the independent 
variables (GDP, interest rates, etc.) are relatively stable (Ouyang 2007). 
 
5.4.2.3 Impact of sterilisations on domestic interest rates 
In the previous section, we saw that the degree of sterilisation is greater and de facto 
capital mobility is lower in IT-Asia than in IT-Advanced. The countries in IT-Asia, in 
particular, conducted over-sterilisations during the 2000s. Consequently, it is expected that 
sterilisations influence domestic interest rates more significantly in the IT-Asia than any other 
country group. In general, the sterilisations in emerging IT-Asian countries facing capital 
inflows are most likely to keep domestic interest rates from falling and cause the interest rate 
differential not to converge, because sterilisations are mostly money-tightening in these 
countries.  In contrast, the sterilisations in IT-Advanced countries mostly address capital 
outflows, so that sterilisations are likely to be monetary expansion in many cases − See the 
Appendix 5.3(b) for the detailed statistics about the BOP. Hence, the sterilisation impacts on 
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interest rates in IT-Asia may be significantly different from those in IT-Advanced. Over-
sterilisations in IT-Asia are most likely to raise domestic interest rates.  
The results presented in Table 5.11 appear consistent with prior expectations.  In the 
2000s, the sterilisation (∆NDA) is negatively related with domestic interest rates (rd) in all 
country groups except the IT-Advanced (where ∆NDA and rd are positively correlated but 
insignificant).  However, the estimated coefficient is significant only in the IT-Asia.  The 
estimated coefficients of ∆NDA are -0.15 at a 5% significance level in IT-Asia, implying that 
1 % decrease in ∆NDA/GDP leads to a rise in domestic interest rate by 0.15%.   
This may be somewhat expected from some statistics and the analyses of sterilisation 
coefficient. As already seen in Chapter 2 and Appendix 5.3(b), the increases in short-term 
capital inflows and the consequent foreign reserve accumulation are most prominent in the IT-
Asia. This indicates that strong sterilisations may have been more imperative in the IT-Asia 
than in any other regions. Analyses in the previous section report that the sterilisation 
coefficient in IT-Asia is 1.08, highest among all country groups.  In addition, time-series 
analyses (in the section 5.4.1.2) report that significant negative relations between ∆NDA and 
rd are found in Korea and China in the 2000s.  Accordingly, it could be interpreted that recent 
oversterilisations in the IT-Asia may lead the interest rate differential not to converge and 
thereby help to encourage further capital inflows. This result supports previous studies such as 
McKinnon and Pill (1999) that the interest differential between the domestic and base 
countries tends to widen under free float regime in emerging economies. 
As seen in the previous sections, the degree of sterilisation appears to become higher 
in the IT-Asia since the introduction of IT, which concurrently accompanies more flexible 
exchange regimes. Fear of float or fear of appreciation appears to encourage the countries in 
IT-Asia group to intensify sterilisations against capital flows.   
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Table 5.11 Effect of sterilisation on domestic interest rate: panel model 
Dependent variable: real domestic interest rate  
 
IT-Advanced                  IT-Asia  IT-Latin IT-Europe Non-IT 
(1981-1990) (1991-2000) (2001-2010) (1991-2000) (2001-2010) (2001-2010) (2001-2010) (2001-2010) 
Intercept 0.053
*** 
(0.000) 
0.034*** 
(0.000) 
0.025*** 
(0.000) 
0.111*** 
(0.000) 
0.056*** 
(0.000) 
0.080*** 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.118) 
0.037*** 
(0.000) 
r*f 
(adjusted foreign rate) 
-0.109 
(0.176) 
-0.112** 
(0.041) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
-0.828*** 
(0.000) 
0.203*** 
(0.001) 
0.122** 
(0.017) 
0.068 
(0.385) 
0.103 
(0.333) 
∆NDA/GDP 
(sterilisation) 
0.186 
(0.586) 
0.026 
(0.603) 
0.032 
(0.101) 
-0.814 
 (0.149) 
-0.151** 
(0.039) 
-0.529 
(0.247) 
-0.645 
(0.192) 
-0.002 
(0.464) 
∆mt-1 /GDP  
(change in base money) 
-0.070 
(0.314) 
-0.023 
(0.275) 
-0.001 
(0.604) 
-0.089 
(0.281) 
-0.033 
(0.117) 
0.069 
(0.267) 
-0.359* 
(0.057) 
-0.460** 
(0.012) 
πet+1 (expected inflation)  
5.124*** 
(0.000) 
6.785*** 
(0.000) 
2.696*** 
(0.001) 
5.203*** 
(0.000) 
-1.111** 
(0.049) 
-1.465* 
(0.080) 
3.808** 
(0.012) 
1.888** 
(0.011) 
∆y(growth rate) -0.248
* 
(0.078) 
-0.167 
(0.238) 
0.065* 
(0.092) 
0.095 
(0.464) 
0.104** 
(0.036) 
0.091 
(0.560) 
0.062 
(0.514) 
-0.098 
(0.456) 
Observations 149 200 284 84 149 166 196 244 
Wald χ2-statistics 
1230.12*** 
(0.000) 
1071.34*** 
(0.000) 
1794.97*** 
(0.000) 
364.56*** 
(0.000) 
907.04*** 
(0.000) 
952.31*** 
(0.000) 
512.20*** 
(0.000) 
287.60*** 
(0.000) 
J-statistics 
8.106 
(0.423) 
7.189 
(0.410) 
13.977 
(0.174) 
9.278 
(0.055) 
5.764 
(0.330) 
9.898 
(0.129) 
11.471 
(0.243) 
16.335 
(0.130) 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistics 14.65 12.33 18.56 26.22 36.20 15.62 12.35 8.28 
Instrument rank 14 13 16 10 11 12 15 17 
Notes: 1. Panel 2 stage GMM estimations (with cross-sectional fixed-effects) are used 
             2. To obtain Newey-West type HAC estimator, we use STATA command xtivreg, fe with gmm2s robust bw(6) option.  
             3. A constant, ∆CIC,and up to three lags of regressors and ∆CIC are used as instruments differently depending on country group until over-identifying restrictions become valid and the 
 problem of weak instrument sufficiently is lessened.  Thus, instruments used in each country group are mostly different as instrument rank indicates. 
             4. Hansen’s J-statistics is the diagnostic test for the validity of over-identifying restriction. If null of a valid over-identifying restriction is not rejected, the model is considered as correct. 
             5. Kleibergen-Paap F statistics is to test weak identification. If the F-statistics is at least 10, the model is assumed not to have significant problem of weak instrument. 
             6. ***, ** and* denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
                7. P-values are in in parenthesis 
236 
5.5. Conclusion 
5.5.1 Summary of main findings 
In this chapter, we investigate the degree of sterilisation and de facto capital mobility 
in 30 main countries by estimating sterilisation and offset coefficients. For this, we modify 
Brissimis et al. (2002)’s unified framework which provides fully identified semi-reduced-
form sterilisation and offset equation.  Following previous studies and institutional features, 
we concern only contemporaneous sterilisation and offset coefficients. We also estimate the 
effects of sterilisation on domestic interest rate by applying Edwards and Khan’s (1985) 
interest rate determination model under imperfect capital mobility.  
Our analysis is differentiated from previous studies in that our sample covers 30 
countries, and we apply panel analyses as well as time-series analyses. The derived models 
appear to explain CB interventions in both money and FX markets well. In the model, the 
degree of sterilisation becomes greater as capital is less mobile or local interest rate is more 
sensitive to money supply.  
From the results of time-series analyses for 11 countries, we find that the sterilisation 
coefficients are significantly more than 1 or close to 1 while offset coefficient are 
significantly less than 1 (in absolute value) in most emerging IT countries during inflation 
targeting period. From pre-IT to post-IT period, both sterilisation and offset coefficient 
increase in emerging-IT countries (e.g. Korea, Peru). This indicates that the emerging-IT 
countries retained considerable monetary independence via complete-or-over sterilisations 
despite the increasing capital mobility. The countries increase sterilisation as de facto capital 
mobility increases.  
Meanwhile, the sterilisation and offset coefficients in advanced IT countries (e.g. UK, 
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Australia, Canada) are significantly less than 1 (in absolute value), implying that the countries 
does not completely sterilise capital flows. We find evidence of over-sterilisations in non-IT 
countries with higher reserve holdings such as Japan and China. We also find marginally 
significant negative correlation between sterilisation and domestic interest rates in Korea and 
China, implying that oversterilisations (using MSBs) may cause domestic interest rates to rise 
and thereby encourage further capital inflows and resultant additional sterilisations. This 
result suggests that oversterilisations of foreign reserves may incur considerable sterilisation 
costs by leaving domestic-foreign interest rate differentials as they are. Our result appears to 
substantiate Calvo (1991)’s argument that sterilisation peril is higher in the countries (like 
Korea and China) that issue nominal MSBs for sterilisation.  
Considering the unobservable heterogeneity, we apply the 2 stage least square panel 
estimation with cross-sectional fixed effect for 5 country groups (consisting of 30 countries).  
During the 2000s, the sterilisation coefficients are close to or above 1 and the offset 
coefficients significantly less than 1 (in absolute values) in most country groups. This result 
implies that most countries retain monetary independence by sterilizing capital flows nearly 
fully, and that de facto capital mobility is not perfect.  During the 2000s, the sterilisation 
coefficient of the IT-Advanced was lower than that of the IT-Asia while the offset coefficient 
of the IT-Advanced was greater than that of the IT-Asia. This indicates that the sterilisations 
in IT-Asia appear to be more successful than those in the IT-Advanced.  The degree of 
sterilisation increases while de facto capital mobility decreases in the IT-Asia and IT-
advanced over time. This appears to supports the conventional belief that sterilisations 
function as substitute for capital control (Aizenman and Glick 2009, Steiner 2011).   
The degree of sterilisation in IT-Asia appears to have become higher since the 
introduction of IT, which concurrently accompanies more flexible exchange regimes. 
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Considering the estimation result for Non-IT group where oversterilisation is found, the 
increasing degree of sterilisation may be directly related to prevalence of flexible exchange 
regimes rather than inflation targeting. That is, with more flexible exchange regime prevailing 
in the 2000s, the fear of float or fear of appreciation appear to encourage emerging countries 
to intensify sterilisations against capital flows.   
Sterilisation amount (∆NDA) has a negative correlation with domestic interest rates 
with marginal significance in IT-Asia during the last decade, implying that oversterilisation 
may cause domestic interest rates to rise.  The sterilisation peril appears prominent in the 
countries where CB issues nominal MSBs for sterilizing capital inflows (e.g Korea, China, 
Indonesia). We have found the negative correlations in other country groups, but they are not 
significant. The persistent interest rate differential in IT-Asia countries may be partly 
attributed to the practice of oversterilisation, which encourages further capital inflows and 
causes CBs to suffer sterilisation costs. 
5.5.2 Limitations of study and future research 
 
We do not consider a number of issues owing to data availability and some restricted 
assumptions which are worth being pursued in future research. First, we apply overnight US 
fed fund rate and the exchange rate against USD to the analyses of all countries. Considering 
the different economic structures of sample countries, weighted interest rates and FX rates 
may be more appropriated. For example, interbank interest rates in Euro Area and exchange 
rates against EURO will be more appropriate for the study on emerging European countries.  
Second, the analyses in this chapter consider only contemporaneous sterilisations. 
This follows the results and methodologies of most previous studies (e.g. Aizenman and Glick 
2009, Craig and Humpage 2001) and considers current sterilisation practices. Nevertheless, 
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lagged sterilisations are possible in advanced countries. For example, the CBs do not need to 
change the supply of the bank reserves instantly in response to every change in monetary base 
caused by FXIs. This is because the same interest rate can coexist with different amounts of 
bank reserves and vice versa owing to announcement effect (Borio & Disyatat 2009 p3). Once 
the demand for monetary base is met, the CBs can control the O/N rate at the level they wish 
by announcing the level of the interest rate they want to see. This means that the CBs do not 
necessarily change monetary base (∆NDA) for sterilizing every change in capital flows to 
keep policy interest rate. In this case, lagged sterilisation may be more realistic. Cointegrated 
VAR model may provide long-term and lagged coefficients and lessen simultaneity problems.  
Third, we do not consider the possible change in the CB’s reaction function over 
time. Over the entire period, the CB is assumed to have constant reaction function with same 
multiple objectives irrespective of the changes in monetary and exchange rate regime. 
However, more realistic reaction function may be time-varying in line with the policy regime 
changes.  Forth, the efficiency and consistency of estimates in this chapter depends on the 
choice of good instrument variables for ∆NFA and ∆NDA. The tests of overidentifying 
restriction and weak instrument mostly support the appropriateness of the model used here.  
However, the test statistics are marginally significant in some subsamples. For example, in 
panel estimation, Kleibergen-Paap F statistics are mostly slightly over 10 or less than 10 (e.g. 
Non-IT in Table 5.11), indicating that the instrument variables used here are mostly 
acceptable but not strong.  
Lastly, we estimate the monetary reaction function (5.3.21) and the BOP function 
(5.3.22) separately in fixed effect 2SLS panel estimation. It is necessary to estimate the panel 
system consisting of (5.3.21) and (5.3.22), which has never been carried out so far in the 
estimation of sterilisation and offset coefficient. 
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CHAPTER 6 SUSTAINABILTY OF CENTRAL BANK 
BOND-DEPENDENT STERILISATIONS: 
Can the current path of sterilisations in Korea be sustained without exploding the 
stock of monetary stabilisation bonds? 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
An increasing number of central banks are issuing central bank bonds (hereafter 
MSB: Monetary Stabilisation Bond) to sterilise the impact of capital inflows. An MSB-
dependent sterilisation policy may be preferable when (i) there are not enough government 
bonds on issue; (ii) central banks (hereafter CBs) want to find efficient operational tools to 
resist domestic currency appreciation; and (iii) the issuance of the MSB may be helpful to 
develop local financial markets by providing benchmark interest rates, particularly when 
government bond markets are thin. MSBs are considered as an effective sterilisation tool to 
manage capital inflows and to maintain monetary autonomy in East Asian countries. 
However, despite the usefulness of MSBs, several concerns have been raised about 
MSB-dependent sterilisations.  First of all, MSBs may split the liquidity of public securities 
markets, as they are normally issued independently from treasury bonds.  The excessive 
issuance of MSBs may complicate the procedures of monetary policy implementation by 
pressing long-term interest rates upward or by strengthening the expectation of future 
inflation.  For example, CBs often have to provide the holders of MSBs with above-market 
interest rates or issue long-term bonds to encourage the public to purchase more MSBs.  
Another concern is the sterilisation peril which stems from nominal MSBs (Calvo 
1991). CBs in emerging economies may not earn enough returns from their foreign assets 
(financed by issuing the MSBs) to cover the interest paid on the MSBs, and thus experience 
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fiscal losses (Hawkins 2005), because local interest rates are normally higher than 
international interest rates. A large amount of the MSBs and consequential CB’s fiscal loss 
may lead people to doubt the CB’s capability of reimbursement, meaning that they would not 
purchase the MSBs in the future. In this case, the CB fails to manage the level of liquidity 
needed for controlling their target interest rate, and cannot eventually control inflation. 
Consequently, excessive issuances of MSBs may weaken the soundness of a CB’s balance 
sheet, which is crucial for the monetary policy independence and price stability (see Klüh and 
Stella 2008 for the relation between the economic performance and fiscal soundness of CBs).  
There has been growing concern about the future course of the stock of MSBs in 
Korea owing to the huge amount of MSBs outstanding and several episodes of fiscal losses on 
the part of the BOK over the last decade. The main question arises as to whether the current 
MSB-dependent sterilisation will be sustainable permanently or in the long run.  It seems 
intuitively evident that, because MSBs, unlike high-powered money, should be redeemed 
when they are matured, the CB could not continue issuing the bond without any 
constraints.  However, despite numerous studies on the sustainability of government debt 
policies and the existence of many CBs issuing MSBs, surprisingly, there are few attempts to 
take account of the sustainability of MSBs. This is mainly because most of the relevant CBs 
are not in developed countries in which MSBs are not main sterilisation tools and because the 
accounts of a CB and a central government are not considered separately in most studies.  
This chapter studies whether the sustainability of MSB-dependent sterilisation in 
Korea would provide significant policy implications for other countries that use MSBs as a 
main sterilisation tool. The main interests in this chapter are to answer following questions: (i) 
Whether current MSB-financed sterilisations are sustainable in the long run without 
exploding the MSB and incurring inflation; (ii) Under what conditions can CBs continue their 
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MSB-dependent sterilisation policy without losing its monetary independence over time; and 
(iii) What constraints, if any, does MSB-dependent sterilisation place on a monetary policy 
implementation. This chapter seeks to contribute to the theoretical and empirical 
understanding of MSB-dependent sterilisations by applying existing theories of fiscal debt.  
For this, we first briefly describe the relationships among MSBs, the monetary base and 
foreign reserves. Then, we derive an intertemporal budget constraint (hereafter IBC) of a CB 
and seek long-term sustainability conditions for the MSB-dependent sterilisation. Based on 
cointegration analysis and Bohn’s (1998, 2004) methodology, we empirically evaluate the 
long-run sustainability of the MSB-dependent sterilisation policies in Korea.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes several 
noteworthy, stylised facts about the balance sheet of a CB and MSBs. Section 3 outlines the 
theoretical aspects of the sustainability of government debt, which is the theoretical 
foundation of this chapter. Section 4 reviews previous empirical studies on the sustainability 
of government debts. Section 5 derives the optimal conditions for a sustainable MSB issuing 
policy and sets up empirical models for the sustainability test. Using quarterly Korean data for 
1987Q1-2009Q4, we assess the sustainability of MSBs in Korea via three tests: (i) Whether 
the univariate debt series is stationary with a positive mean; (ii) Whether there is a 
cointegration relation in the CB’s asset purchases and seigniorage; and (iii) Whether the CB 
systemically responds to changes in the MSB outstanding by adjusting its asset purchases or 
seigniorage. To analyse these issues, we first consider a CB’s budget constraint separately 
from a government’s, and then extend our analysis into the budget constraint of consolidated 
government, including both a CB and a central government. Section 6 concludes the chapter 
and provides several policy implications around MSB-dependent sterilisation policy. 
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6.2 Monetary stabilisation bond 
6.2.1 Stylised balance sheet of a central bank 
The links between FXIs and subsequent sterilisation operations are understood by 
examining the balance sheet (B/S) of a CB. Table 6.1(a) shows the initial B/S of a CB 
expressed in terms of net values. The asset side mainly consists of domestic treasury bonds, 
loans to the government or commercial banks, and net foreign assets (NFA). The liability side 
is composed of bank reserves (TR: total reserves) and currency. A net worth (or capital) 
appears in the liability side.  
Now, suppose that CB intervenes in the FX markets by purchasing foreign assets 
(+ΔNFA) with base money (+ΔTR) in order to sterilise capital inflows. The intervention leads 
to an increase in both assets (+ΔNFA) and liabilities (+ΔTR) as shown in Table 6.1(b). 
Should demand for bank reserves be the same as before, the increase in bank reserve (+ΔTR) 
may cause short-term interest rates to deviate from a target interest rate. In order to maintain 
short-term interest rates close to target, the CB should sterilise the increases in bank reserves 
either by reducing its domestic assets (e.g., selling treasury bonds, -ΔTB), as shown in Table 
6.1(c) or by increasing its liabilities (+ΔMSB), as depicted in Table 6.1(d). Note that the 
increase in bank reserves (+ΔTR) is withdrawn by the decrease in treasury bonds in Table 
6.1(c) or the increase in MSB in Table 6.1(d).   
In general, the reduction of domestic assets is chosen as a main sterilisation tool by 
CBs which have enough holdings of treasury bonds and other assets. This is the case for most 
CBs in developed countries (e.g. the USA, the Euro area, the UK, Japan, etc.).  However, as 
their holdings of treasury bonds start to run out or if there are few assets to be sold, the CBs 
will depend on issuing their own bonds (e.g. Korea, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Chile, etc.). 
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Table 6.1 Stylised balance sheet of a central bank  
 
(a) Initial situation 
Assets Liabilities 
□ Net Domestic Asset (NDA) 
- Domestic treasury  bonds (TB) 
- Loans to a government or commercial banks 
- Other domestic securities 
□ Net Foreign  Asset(NFA) 
 - Foreign securities, Foreign deposits, etc. 
 □ Total Reserves (TR) 
   - Required Reserves(RR) 
 - Excess Reserves (ER) 
 □ Currency in Circulation 
 □ Net worth (or Capital ) 
 
(b) Foreign asset buying interventions without sterilisations 
Assets Liabilities 
□ Net Domestic Asset (NDA)  
- Domestic treasury  bonds (TB) 
- Loans to a government or commercial banks 
- Other domestic securities 
□ Net Foreign Asset(NFA) + ΔNFA 
 -  Foreign securities, Foreign deposits, etc. 
 □ Total Reserves(TR) + ΔTR 
   -  Required Reserves(RR) 
 -  Excess Reserves (ER) 
 □ Currency in Circulation 
 □ Net worth (or Capital ) 
 
 
 (c)  Foreign asset buying intervention with sterilisation by reducing domestic assets 
Assets Liabilities 
□ Net Domestic Asset(NDA) - ΔNDA 
- Domestic treasury  bonds (TB)- ΔTB 
- Loans to a government or commercial banks 
- Other domestic securities 
□ Net Foreign Asset (NFA) + ΔNFA 
  -  Foreign securities, Foreign deposits, etc. 
 □ Total Reserves(TR) +  ΔTR - ΔTR 
  - Required Reserves(RR) 
- Excess Reserves (ER) 
 □ Currency in Circulation 
 □  Net worth (or Capital ) 
 
 (d) Foreign asset buying interventions with sterilisations by increasing liabilities 
Assets Liabilities 
□ Net Domestic Asset (NDA) - ΔNDA 
- Domestic treasury  bonds (TB) 
- Loans to a government or commercial banks 
- Other domestic securities 
□ Net Foreign Asset + ΔNFA 
 -  Foreign securities, Foreign deposits, etc. 
 □ Total Reserves(TR) +  ΔTR -  ΔTR 
  - Required Reserves(RR) 
- Excess Reserves (ER) 
 □ Currency in Circulation 
 □ ΔMSBs 
 □ Net worth (or Capital ) 
        Notes: 1. Changes in each term have equivalent values; i.e. ΔNFA = ΔNDA = ΔTB = ΔTR 
                   2. When the amount of necessary sterilisation is small, reverse repos replaces the MSBs 
 
It is worth noting that CBs depending on the MSBs are likely to face a larger risk 
of B/S problems than those selling treasury bonds outright or with repurchase agreement. 
Sims (2004) dichotomises the types of CB as type-F (Federal Reserve type) and type-E 
(ECB type), according to the composition of their B/S. As shown in Table 6.2(a), the B/S 
of type-F is always perfectly hedged, since it consists of short-term interest-bearing 
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nominal assets and base money liabilities with the same currency denominated, so there is 
almost no risk of B/S problems. However, in the case of type-E (see Table 6.2(b)), the 
assets consist of a larger portion of foreign assets that are subject to fluctuations of 
exchange rates and international interest rates, while the liabilities consist of base money 
denominated by the local currency. A type-E is always under risk of B/S problems that 
originate from the change in exchange rates and the domestic-foreign interest differential.  
 
Table 6.2 Balance sheets of US Fed and ECB (end of year 2009) 
 
(a) Fed 
 (billion USD) 
 (b) ECB 
(billion euro) 
Assets 2235.0 Liabilities   2235.0  Assets                      138.0 Liabilities 138.0 
Treasury 1  
Securities 
973.4 Banknote  
issued 
887.8  Foreign asset 
(non-euro area)   
35.5 Banknote 
issued 
64.5 
  MBS2 918.9     RP sold   77.7    Gold    12.4   Domestic 
liability 
10.6 
Loan to   
Financial  
companies 
166.0     Bank  
    Reserve 
977.0  Foreign asset 
(euro area) 
3.3   Foreign 
liability 
0.2 
Foreign   
  Assets 
25.3  Treasury       
  Deposits  
191.6    Intra-Eurosystem3  70.9   Intra- 
  Eurosystem4 
40.2 
  Gold  11.0     others 49.2     Securities held for 
operations 
2.2   Others 16.2  
  Others      140.4 Net worth   51.2    Others          13.8 Net worth 6.3 
 Notes: 1. including government-sponsored enterprise debt securities (167 bill. USD) 
             2. Federal agency and government-sponsored enterprise mortgage-backed securities 
             3. ECB’s claims against member national central banks 
               4. ECB’ liabilities to member national central banks 
  Sources: Annual report 2009 (US Fed and ECB) 
 
Table 6.3 shows that the B/S of the BOK has become a typical E-type, as foreign 
assets and MSBs have occupied the majority of assets and liabilities, respectively, since the 
late 1990s.  The proportion of foreign assets to total assets increased from 25.3% in 1980 to 
88.6% in 2009 while that of domestic liabilities (exclusive of monetary base) increased from 
37.3% to 76.8% during the same period. In particular, the proportion of MSB to total 
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liabilities soared up to 58.0% in 2005 from 8.5% in 1980.  It is argued that this change may 
stem from the BOK’s sustained sterilisation for preventing the appreciation of local currency.  
Table 6.3 Percentage changes in the BOK’s main accounts 
                                                                                                                                     (%, end-of-year)   
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Assets  
 Domestic assets 74.7 81.7 74.3 62.8 20.3 14.5 11.4 
 Foreign asset s 25.3 18.3 25.7 37.2 79.7 85.5 88.6 
 Total assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
liabilities  
 Monetary base1 51.9 27.0 32.4 42.6 18.8 16.2 18.9 
 Domestic liabilities2 37.3 62.5 66.2 56.5 75.1 76.9 76.8 
  (MSB)  (8.5) (11.9) (36.6) (37.5) (44.3) (58.0) (41.7) 
 Foreign liabilities 10.8 10.6 1.4 0.9 6.1 6.9 4.3 
 Total liabilities 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: 1. Monetary base consists of currencies in circulation(CIC) and bank reserves. 
            2. Domestic liabilities include reverse repos, swap agreement and net worth.   
Data: BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
 
6.2.2 Monetary Stabilisation Bond (MSB)  
Many CBs have sold debt certificates (i.e., MSB) issued by their own names in order 
to absorb liquidity surplus caused by sterilised interventions.  According to Hawkins (2003), 
approximately 31 economies have MSBs in their law or regulation regarding CBs. Sweden, 
Switzerland, Euro area, UK, Iceland and Denmark are developed countries and the rest are 
mostly emerging or developing countries. The outstanding volume of MSBs in terms of 
percentage of CB liabilities are mostly 10-20%, but Chile (78%), Slovenia (58%), Korea 
(47%) and Demark (39%) are much higher than other countries.76 MSBs are overwhelmingly 
denominated in local currencies and issued at fixed interest rates.  
Figure 6.1 depicts the ratios of the outstanding stock of MSBs to monetary base in 
76MSB-dependent policies are particularly prominent in emerging countries which face massive capital inflows 
like Korea, China, Taiwan and Hungary. For example, Geiger (2008 p. 4) reports that the issuance of MSBs in 
China increased dramatically owing to the increasing need for sterilisation of foreign exchange interventions 
between 2003 and 2006. The portion of the issuance of MSBs to all market operations occupies 70.8% in terms 
of frequency of operations in 2006. The PBOC can absorb excess reserves in banking sector by issuing MSBs, 
and thus manage a desired expansionary policy without incurring high inflation.
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four countries.  The ratio has consistently increased since the late 1990s in Korea, China and 
Taiwan and sharply increased in Switzerland since the late 2000s. The increases may be due 
to the sustained sterilisations of capital inflows in the three Asian countries and the absorption 
of massive liquidity provided in Switzerland during the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008. In 
particular, the sustainability of MSBs may be a problem in Korea and Taiwan, which have 
long histories of issuing MSBs and whose stocks appear to increase consistently over time. 
 
Figure 6.1 Ratio of MSB to monetary base in selected countries 
                                            Korea                                                                               China 
 
                                           Taiwan                                                                          Switzerland 
 
       Data: Each central bank homepage 
 
In most cases, MSBs are not included in national debts, because MSBs are mostly 
issued for financing foreign reserve buying interventions. Accordingly, the amount of MSBs 
is mostly backed by corresponding foreign reserves or other financial assets. This means that 
CBs can sell foreign reserves for the redemption of principals and interests of MSBs. In 
contrast, government bonds are issued mainly for financing a government’s current and 
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capital expenditures, so there are no backing assets corresponding to the government bonds. 
Thus, the governments have to issue new bonds or increase tax to make up for their fiscal 
deficits. In Korea, MSBs are issued by weekly competitive auction to drain structural liquidity 
surplus or through irregular, direct sales for fine-tuning unexpected liquidity surplus.  The 
eleven MSB maturities range from 14 days to 2 years. In practice, the leading issue is two 
year MSBs, the proportion of which was about over 75% as of the end of 2009.77 
Figure 6.2 shows that the stock of MSBs and foreign reserves has steadily increased 
since the late 1990s. The increases were particularly prominent after the 1997 financial crisis 
and foreign exchange rate (KRW per USD, hereafter KRW/USD) tended to be under 
consistent appreciation pressure.  
 
Figure 6.2 Foreign reserves, MSB and nominal exchange rate in Korea 
 
        Note: The stock of MSB outstanding (originally denominated KRW) is measured in terms of USD  
                   by being multiplied by monthly average exchange rates.  
        Data:  BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
 
77  There are 11 maturities: 14, 28, 63, 91, 140, 182, 364, 371, 392 and 546 days, and 2 years.  The proportions of 
maturities in term of outstanding amount as of end of 2009 are as follows(Data: BOK): 
     Maturity  63days 91days 182days 364days 546days 2years Total 
     Amount (trill. KRW) 1.5 9.9 4.8 10.6 12.5 118.8 158.1 
     Proportion (%) (0.9) (6.3) (3.0) (6.7) (7.9) (75.1) (100.0) 
 
500
1000
1500
2000
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
19
80
/0
1
19
81
/0
4
19
82
/0
7
19
83
/1
0
19
85
/0
1
19
86
/0
4
19
87
/0
7
19
88
/1
0
19
90
/0
1
19
91
/0
4
19
92
/0
7
19
93
/1
0
19
95
/0
1
19
96
/0
4
19
97
/0
7
19
98
/1
0
20
00
/0
1
20
01
/0
4
20
02
/0
7
20
03
/1
0
20
05
/0
1
20
06
/0
4
20
07
/0
7
20
08
/1
0
20
10
/0
1
Foreing reserves(lhs) MSB(lhs) FX rate(rhs)
(Billion USD)         (KRW/USD) 
249 
The outstanding volume of MSBs increased from 29 trillion KRW as of February 
1998 to around 150 trillion KRW (equivalent of 132 billion USD) as of end 2009, in line with 
the increase in foreign reserves from 26 billion to 270 billion USD and the appreciation of the 
exchange rate from 1,640 to 1,167 (KRW/USD) during the same period. Thus, the major 
cause of the increase in MSBs after the mid-1990 seems to be associated with the increase in 
foreign reserves possibly incurred by foreign currency purchasing interventions. If the 
interests paid on MSBs are greater than the revenues on the corresponding foreign assets, the 
BOK may make losses, other things being equal.  
As can be seen in Table 6.4, local interest rates have, in general, been higher than 
foreign interest rates. The interest differential is regarded as a main factor undermining the 
BOK’s profitability, together with the appreciation of KRW.  Note that the demand for base 
money frequently decreases and that, even if it increases, the growth rate of base money has 
normally been less than that of interest payments to the MSB.  Consequently, interest payment 
growth has consistently exceeded base money growth after the 2000s. 
 
 Table 6.4 Interest rate differential and interest payment on MSBs in Korea  
                                                  (End of period, bill. KRW) 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 1998 2000 2005 2009 
MSB outstanding 523 1,900 15,612 25,825 23,471 45,673 66,378 155,235 149,170 
Interest paid on MSBs (A)   5 375 1,898 2,522 2,725 4,841 4,666 6,114 6,228 
Base money (B)1 -224 71 993 4,101  -3,203 -1,816 -249 4,457 2,933 
A/B ―  3.38  0.82  0.88 ― ― ― 1.37 2.12 
Rate of return of MSBs2 (C)  28.75 12.70 15.58 13.47  12.77  12.38  7.81 3.97 2.98 
Foreign interest rate 3 (D) 13.67 7.61 6.94 5.12 5.50 4.49 5.50 4.24 0.60 
Interest rate differential(C-D) 15.08 5.09 8.54 8.35 7.27 7.89 2.31 -0.73 2.38 
Notes: 1. Growth (annual) from the previous period 
           2. Monthly average rate of 1 year MSBs (except the year 1980 when average rate of return on1-year 
KTB and government agent bond is used. 
           3. Average rate of 90 day US Treasury Bill and 2 year US Treasury Bond  
 Data: BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
 
 
This indicates a possible future scenario where, with the low growth rate of the 
monetary base and higher local interest rates than international interests, the interest payments 
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to MSBs might explode to a level in which market participants doubt the BOK’s capability of 
reimbursement of the MSBs or worry about future inflation. A current large amount of 
outstanding MSBs could possibly create ‘a vicious circle’: the more MSBs are issued, the 
more interest would have to be paid, and in turn the more MSBs issued to make these 
payments. As the MSB outstanding accumulates, as a result of the on-going sterilisation 
policy, the question of whether the BOK is running a Ponzi scheme is raised. It follows that 
the current MSB-dependent sterilisation policy may not be sustainable in the future.  
6.2.3 Advantages and disadvantages of MSB-dependent sterilisations 
Principally, discussions of CB debt policy are the same as those of government debt 
policy, since uncontrollable increases in outstanding stock of MSBs may lead to serious 
credibility problems in implementing monetary policy. MSB is a simple, flexible and efficient 
market-based operation tool for draining liquidity surplus. The MSB-dependent policy in 
Korea has been a good example of a sterilisation tool to several East Asian countries facing 
liquidity surplus due to capital inflows.  MSBs have been useful in absorbing excess reserves 
in money markets, maintaining a target interest rate and thus controlling inflation. It is 
broadly accepted that MSBs have contributed to the development of the Korean bond markets, 
since MSBs provided market participants with risk-free investments and good benchmark 
interest rates when the KTB market was at the fledgling stage.78 
According to Hawkins (2004, pp. 6-7), even if there is already a considerably sized 
government bond market, CBs have several reasons to continue issuing MSBs. (i) CBs may 
evade the pressure for (indirectly) lending to governments, thereby maintaining their policy 
independence by using their own bonds for monetary operations. (ii) By issuing MSBs, CBs 
78Barro (1989, p 44) points out that the issuance of government bonds can amount to a useful form of financial 
intermediation. Thus, the yield on government bonds is a typical benchmark rate in most countries. MSBs and 
KTBs actually have the same credit rating, so that both are regarded as credit-risk free bonds. 
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can engage in crisis management operations such as a bank restructuring which requires quick 
methods of funding. (iii) Government bonds are sometimes not appropriate for a CB’s 
monetary operations in terms of maturity. (iv) CBs normally prefer to separate monetary and 
debt management.79 
However, there may be specific limitations on MSBs being continuously used as a 
liquidity draining device. A large amount of MSBs has frequently invoked controversies 
about a CB’s fiscal soundness and monetary policy independence from the government.  The 
BOK experienced large fiscal losses in 2003-2007 while the Korea won continuously 
appreciated, and the domestic-foreign interest differential widened. CBs cannot perform 
active and pre-emptive monetary policies while their fiscal losses persist. For example, when 
liquidity-providing policies are necessary in the short run, CBs may have limits in performing 
such policies by purchasing treasury bonds or by expanding loans to commercial banks if 
CB’s balance sheet losses are likely to worsen.   
In addition, continuing deficits may damage the public’s credibility of the monetary 
policy. In case that a CB has to depend on financial support from a government in order to 
recapitalise itself,80 there may be more room for government or political parties to interfere in 
the monetary policy of the CB.  An excessive outstanding amount of MSBs also contributes to 
complicating monetary operations, crowding out treasury and corporate bonds and splitting a 
public bond market (see Geiger 2008).  
  
79Although there are now significant government bonds on issue, the BOK still issues its own bonds.  In contrast, 
several CBs ceased the issuance of MSBs as (i) the Treasury issued its own securities or reversed its previous 
objection to the use of treasury bonds for market operations (e.g. the Philippines, Poland and Saudi Arabia); and 
(ii) its operations moved from money quantities to interest rate targets. 
80 According to the BOK Act, the Korean government provides the necessary funds for the BOK when the BOK 
exhausts its Special Reserve Fund due to consecutive deficits. “Any loss incurred by the BOK during any fiscal 
year shall be offset from the reserves and, should these be insufficient, the deficiency shall be made up by the 
government in accordance with the Budget and Accounts Act.”(Bank of Korea Act, January 1998).   
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6.3 Literature review 
 
6.3.1 Theoretical aspects of fiscal sustainability 
 
Although the issues around the sustainability of a government debt have been 
extensively explored, those of a CB debt policy have been rarely analysed so far, in my 
understanding.81  This is mainly because there have been few CBs actively using MSBs as 
their policy tools in developed countries. In addition, there are no specific theories on this 
topic.  However, a significant number of CBs have issued MSBs in emerging economies (see 
BIS (2007b) and Ho (2008) for details on the market operations of key countries).  Theories 
on the sustainability of government debts can be easily applied to studying MSB-dependent 
sterilisation. Considering this, we will review major literature on the sustainability of 
government debt policy.  
Owing to the lack of a general agreement on the definition of what precisely 
constitutes a sustainable fiscal debt policy, the literature has suggested several methods to 
define and to evaluate the sustainability of government debts (which increase through 
accumulated fiscal deficits). The sustainability of government debt can be assessed differently 
in terms of the length of the period (short-term vs. medium or long-term sustainability), 
required condition (weak vs. strong form), and the definition of fiscal debt (gross vs. net debt) 
(Neck and Sturm 2008).Generally, two problems are raised when a government consistently 
runs budget deficits (Luporini 1999, p 9). First, as deficits increase to (or beyond) the level of 
the government’s collateral or future taxing capacity, the interest rate tends to rise, and 
81 Garcia (1999) documents that many Latin countries are switching to debt financing as a means of sterilising 
capital inflows. He argues that the trend may, in turn, affect the sustainability of their debt through its impact on 
the real interest rate and reduce income growth, because high interest rates usually depress economic activities. 
But his study has a limitation in mainly depending on narrative methods.  
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investment and consumption are discouraged.  Second, as the debt accumulates, agents 
wonder whether the government will borrow more to meet interest payments on its debts, and 
simply roll over its debts indefinitely. Intuitively, government debt policy is constrained by 
the need to finance the deficit, so that the government should balance the present value of its 
expenditures (including interest payments on current debts) and the present value of its 
revenues over the entire period. Otherwise, agents become suspicious as to whether the 
government is playing a Ponzi game, which ultimately leads to high inflation or debt crisis, 
and thus will not keep buying government bonds. However, a sustainable debt policy does not 
mean that a government cannot run deficit occasionally, but indicates that the government 
cannot continue permanent interest-exclusive deficits.  
Since the concrete concept of fiscal sustainability was suggested by Domar (1944), 
substantial theoretical advancements have been made by Barro (1974, 1979), McCallum 
(1984) and Bohn (1991, 1995, 2007).  Domar (1944) shows that the faster the GDP grows, the 
lighter will be the burden of government debt. Consequently, if GDP growth rate exceeds the 
after-tax interest rate on government debts and thus the government can levy enough taxes to 
pay for interest on the debts and other expenditures, the debt will be sustainable. According to 
Domar, the sustainability of public debt should be tackled by increasing GDP (which can be 
achieved by expanding government spending occasionally) rather than by merely reducing the 
public debt. However, Domar’s arguments are not applicable to a dynamically efficient 
stochastic economy, as shown in latter studies like Bohn (1995, 1998).  
Barro (1974, 1979), re-examining the Ricardian equivalence theorem,82 provides a 
theoretical explanation for the determinants of government deficits. Barro suggests that a 
government can temporarily increase deficits in the short-and-medium term so as to smooth 
82 Barro (1979, p 940) describes public debt neutrality as follows: “Shifts between debt and tax finance for a 
given amount of public expenditure would have no first-order effect on the real interest rate, volume of private 
investment, etc.” 
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the tax rate over time and thus to minimize the distortionary effects of taxation.  It follows 
that the level of taxes has to be determined by the government’s IBC, which states that the 
present value of all government expenditures should be equal to the present value of all tax 
revenue over the entire period. Equivalently expressed, a government under a dynamically 
efficient economy should balance its budgets inter-temporally by arranging the present value 
of debts and the discounted sum of expected future surpluses to be equal over entire periods. 
As long as the government satisfies the IBC, the debt policy is sustainable, regardless of the 
existence of short-term deficit.  
McCallum (1984) examines the theoretical validity of the ‘monetarist hypothesis’ 
that a constant, positive per capita budget deficit can be maintained permanently and without 
inflation if it is financed by the issue of bonds rather than money.  McCallum shows that the 
validity of the hypothesis depends on the way the deficit is defined. If the deficit is defined 
exclusive of interest payments, the monetarist hypothesis is invalid — i.e., the permanent 
deficit cannot be financed solely with bonds. However, a constant positive deficit inclusive of 
interest payments can be permanently financed by bond sales. It is noteworthy that, owing to 
McCallum, most empirical studies have focused on the relation between government revenues 
and expenditure inclusive of interest payments, rather than expenditure exclusive of interest 
payments.    
Bohn (1990) analyses the optimal structure of a government debt in a stochastic, 
dynamically efficient economy where individuals are risk averse. Bohn suggests that a 
government should issue state-contingent bonds to smooth tax rates over states of nature as 
well as over time to minimize tax distortion. Bohn (1995) also proves that in dynamically 
efficient economies such as the infinitely-lived agent model, government debt policy always 
has to satisfy an IBC, regardless of the level of the interest rate, since the IBC cannot be 
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written in terms of expected fiscal variables discounted at a fixed interest rate. Thus, even if 
the interest rate on the government bonds is below the growth rate of the economy, the fiscal 
policy is sustainable only when the government satisfies the IBC, which depends on the 
probability distribution of fiscal variables across states of nature.  
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned theoretical aspects of fiscal sustainability are 
all based on the government’s IBC, which is equivalent to the satisfaction of the no-Ponzi 
condition in government behaviours. A violation of the no-Ponzi condition would imply that 
the fiscal debt would explode over time and cannot be sustained permanently; therefore fiscal 
policy must be changed in the future. Specifically, the fiscal debt is regarded as sustainable 
when the debt can be offset by expected future primary surpluses of equal present value; i.e., 
the discounted value of the debt should go to zero at the limit (no-Ponzi condition). Unless the 
no-Ponzi condition was assumed, any pattern of deficits would be sustainable by financing 
interest on debts through the additional issuance of debts.  In a real and growing economy, a 
fiscal policy is assumed to be ultimately sustainable if it does not lead to an ever-increasing 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus, stationarity tests of the fiscal ratios to GDP are generally used for 
assessing fiscal sustainability.  Now, we will begin from a single-period deterministic model 
in order to explain the aforementioned theoretical aspects and set up empirical specifications. 
 
6.3.1.1 Single period budget constraint of a government 
The single period budget constraint is described as the following equation (6.3.1) 
which may be naturally derived from the accounting identity: 
(6.3.1) ttttt TDDiGE  1)1(  
where GEt is a (nominal) non-interest government expenditure in period t; Dt is a gross stock 
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of government debts at the end of period t; it is the one-period nominal rate of interest payable 
on the government debts issued in a previous period; Tt is the nominal tax revenue.  The left-
hand side of the equation indicates the total spending of the government while the right-hand 
side expresses the source of the funds. Since (6.3.1) can be rewritten as ttttt DDiTGE  1 , the 
equation states that total budget deficit inclusive of interest payments must be financed by 
new debt creation.  (6.3.1) can be rewritten as (6.3.2):   
(6.3.2) tttttttt PDDiTGEDiD   11 )1()1(  
where )( tttt PSTGEPD   is defined as a primary (or non-interest) deficit.  It is assumed 
that the deficit is not money-financed by the CB since money-financing to reduce the deficit 
will ultimately induce high inflation, which is not tolerable to economic agents.  Note that, in 
practice, CB’s lending to government is strictly prohibited in most advanced countries. Hence 
the stock of public debts at time t (Dt) is the sum of pre-existing public debt )( 1tD  with its 
interest payment )( 1tt Di  and primary budget deficits ( tPD ).  It is more advisable to rearrange 
the relevant variables in (6.3.2) as their ratios to GDP.83  Dividing (6.3.2) by nominal tGDP and 
rearranging it yield:   
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where nominal GDP is calculated by PtYt   with Pt and Yt being the GDP deflator and real GDP, 
respectively; 
1
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g  is a real GDP growth rate; 
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

t
tt
t P
PP
  is an inflation rate.  A 
simplified version of (6.3.3) is  
83 In this context, the countries under EMU are urged to comply with budgetary requirements which require all 
members to keep their debts and deficits below 60% and 3% of their nominal GDP, respectively. 
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pd   . (Hereafter a lowercase letter denotes the value scaled by 
GDP). When deriving (6.3.4), we use )1)(1()1( ttt ri  . Subtracting 1td  from both 
sides of (6.3.4), we obtain:  
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Equation (6.3.5) shows that debt-to-GDP ratio increases when (i) primary deficit to 
GDP ratio ( tpd ) is larger; (ii) real interest rate ( tr ) is higher; and (iii) real GDP growth rate 
(gt) is lower.  Note that if the economy grows fast with a low real interest rate, i.e., tt gr  , 
then a government could run a primary deficit ( 0tpd ) without increasing the debt-to-GDP 
ratio (i.e. 0 td ). In this case, a permanent primary deficit may be possible and hence, 
frequent or considerable primary deficits may not indicate an unsustainable fiscal policy 
(Bohn 1998, p 960).  In the opposite situation, where tt gr  , even the primary surplus 
( 0tpd ) may not be enough for reversing the increasing debt-to-GDP ratio, so it may be 
crucial to maintain a sufficient level of primary surplus that keeps the debt-to-GDP ratio 
constant. Note that a stable debt-to-GDP ratio does not always guarantee fiscal sustainability, 
because unsustainable polices do not necessarily display an explosive debt-to-GDP ratio 
(Bohn 1998, p961)  
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6.3.1.2 Inter-temporal budget constraint (IBC) of a government in real terms 
Suppose that a real interest rate is constant and positive; )0( rr it where i=1,…, n. 
Rewrite the single period budget constraint (6.3.2) in real terms and take a conditional 
expectation of it.  Then, solving forward for t+1, t+2,t+3, ---,∞  leads to the following IBC.  
(6.3.6) ntt
n
n
ntt
n
t DEPSED 


  
1
 
where tE =expectation operator at time t,  ttt GETPS   and   r)1/(1  is a discount factor.  
Equation (6.3.6) proposes that initial public debt (Dt) should be equal to the sum of the 
present values (hereafter PV) of expected future primary surpluses (PS) and the future debts. 
However, the PV of expected future debts ( ntt
n DE  ) should be zero when n . That is, 
following no-Ponzi (or transversality) condition (hereafter NPC) should be satisfied:  
(6.3.7) 0lim 

ntt
n
n
DE  : (NPC) 
If 0lim 

ntt
n
n
DE , then the government refinances its debts by continuously issuing 
new bonds without eventually retiring them. The term, nt
n
n
D 

lim  is frequently named 
“bubble term” in many literatures. 0lim 

nt
n
n
D  means that there will be a part of public debt 
not to be paid by governments but to be paid by debt holders. This situation renders the 
investors to doubt the government’s payment and eventually not to buy bonds anymore. The 
NPC (6.3.7) eliminates the possibility of the government’s financing by endlessly rolling over 
its debts. To put it differently, (6.3.7) implies that the sustainable fiscal policy requires the real 
supply of government bonds to grow no faster (on average) than the real interest rate 
(Hamilton and Flavin 1986, p 811). If the NPC is satisfied, (6.3.6) becomes: 
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Equation (6.3.8) indicates the government IBC that current debt should be equal to 
the present value of the expected future primary surpluses. 
6.3.1.3 IBC of a government under a growing economy 
 
It is more useful to express the variables in the IBC in terms of their ratio to GDP.  
Under a constant interest rate and GDP growth rate (i.e., rr it   and gg it   where i=1,…,n), 
the IBC condition in terms of the ratio to GDP can be expressed as:  
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  . Equation (6.3.9) leads to 
the IBC (6.3.11) if and only if the NPC (6.3.10) is satisfied:   
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The NPC (6.3.10) indicates that the present value of expected future debt-GDP ratios 
should converge to zero at the limit, while the IBC (6.3.11) demonstrates that a sustainable 
fiscal policy requires that the present value of expected future primary surpluses relative to 
GDP should be equal to the current debt-to-GDP ratio ( td ).  In the two equations, if td
(initial debt)>0, the sustainability condition requires gr  so ntd  (future debt) as to stabilise 
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(or converge to zero at the limit). Thus, satisfying 0ntps  (which ensures the ultimate 
liquidation of ntd  ) on the average − not in every period, will be enough for sustainability. In 
contrast, in a growing economy with low interest rate where gr  , the Ponzi scheme 
generally corresponds to the constant debt-to-GDP ratio over time. 84 In this case, the 
government does not need to run primary surplus, which implies that the government debt 
policy may not be restricted by the IBC. Hence, theoretical models justifying (6.3.10) do not 
provide an appropriate framework for empirical study (Bohn 1991 p 3).   
 
6.3.2 Empirical studies on the sustainability of government debts 
 6.3.2.1 Standard stationarity test 
As shown in the previous section, IBC imposes a NPC which should be held under 
dynamically efficient economies. While early empirical studies were mostly conducted by 
directly checking the NPC (6.3.10) (Hamilton and Flavin 1986, Wilcox 1989), most of the 
later studies have focused on testing the IBC (6.3.11), either by examining the univariate 
properties of debts (dt) or by testing the presence of a cointegration relationship between 
expenditures (GEt) and tax revenues (Tt) (Trehan and Walsh 1988, 1991; Haug 1991, Smith 
and Zin 1991, Martin 2000, Bohn 1990, 1995, 2004, 2007; see Appendix 6.1 for a summary 
of the key studies). Note that the satisfaction of the NPC is equivalent to the fulfilment of the 
sustainability condition. Econometrically, an unbound increase in fiscal debts ( ntd  ) 
84 Note that, as Domar (1944) suggested, in a dynamically inefficient economy with gr  , the government might 
run Ponzi-game permanently. Imposing 
ntt dd  (i.e., debt-to-GDP ratio is constant), we can rearrange (6.3.9) as


 

1
)()1(
n nt
nn
t psd  . The left-hand side is negative, since 0td  and 0)1( 
n . Thus, the right-hand-
side (i.e. primary surplus) should be negative for the equality to hold. This implies that a government could run a 
permanent primary deficit with the debt-to-GDP ratio holding constant or continuously falling (Romer 2004, pp. 
563-564). Therefore, the NPC (6.3.10) is not an absolute sustainability condition applicable to all economies.  
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corresponds to either a non-stationary primary deficit ( ntPD  ) or absence of a cointegration 
relationship between tax revenues ( ntT  ) and (interest-inclusive) expenditures (GEt+itDt-1 ). 
(Tanner and Liu 1994, p.516) 
Later, structural breaks in the cointegrating relationship were examined by Hakkio 
and Rush (1991a), who assumed the break point as exogenously given; and by Haug (1995), 
Quintos (1995) and Martin (2000), who assumed the breaks as endogenously determined.   
Bohn (1995, 1998 and 2007) and Martin (2000) focus on the stochastic properties of 
debt-relevant series and point out the limitations in the sustainability test based on the 
stationarity test. Sarno (2001) and Bajo-Rubio et al. (2006) are interested in the nonlinear 
process of the debt-to-GDP ratio rather than in testing the fiscal sustainability itself.  In 
addition, panel data analyses have been frequently used to test the fiscal sustainability of the 
countries within similar economic environment (see Afonso and Rault 2007). Overall, the 
empirical evidence on the US fiscal debt is mixed, depending on the definition of fiscal 
sustainability and the selection of sample periods. 
In their seminal study, Hamilton and Flavin (1986) firstly test the null hypothesis of 
the NPC (i.e. 0lim 

ntt
n
n
DE ) against the alternative of the existence of a speculative term 
( 0lim 

ntt
n
n
DE ). To do this, they check the significance of the exponential terms in the 
equation, tntt
n
n
n
t PSEAD   



10 where r 1
1 and t = white noise errors. If the 
coefficient 0A is insignificant (i.e., 00 A ), equivalently if )0(~ IDt  and )0(~1 IPSE ntt
n
n 

  , the 
debt policy will be sustainable (i.e., 0lim 

ntt
n
n
DE ) (Hamilton and Flavin 1986, p815). 
Intuitively, this sustainability condition requires that primary surpluses fluctuate with a certain 
positive mean for the entire life of the economy. Using annual US data in 1962-84, they 
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conclude that the fiscal deficit was sustainable. However, their study has several limitations. 
First, they assume nonstochastic fluctuations in real interest rates. The real interest rates are 
assumed ex post constant and positive (i.e. rt+n=r >0). Second, Hamilton and Flavin argue that 
the undiscounted debt (
tD ) should be I(0) for the present value of expected future primary 
surpluses to be stationary. Thus, their test method cannot be used when )1(~ IDt . Third, they do 
not consider the existence of structural breaks in debt policy.  
Wilcox (1989) extends Hamilton and Flavin (1986) by allowing for stochastic real 
interest rates(i.e. ),(~ 2rr it where 0,,,1  rni  ) and possible nonstationarity of the 
undiscounted debt series(
tD ).  He argues that even if undiscounted tD follows I(1), the IBC 
could be satisfied, because the nonstationarity of tD might just reflect the fact that deviations 
of the debts from the future primary surpluses persist over a longer period, not permanently. 
Wilcox suggests a different test method: the IBC holds if and only if the discounted
tD are I(0) 
with a zero unconditional mean.  Wilcox calculates the realised values of discounted debts, 
)1(/ 10 jt
n
jnt rD 

   for fixed t=1960 and j=0…24, with r being ex post real returns on the 
debts.  Using Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) data, he finds a significant structural change in 
US fiscal policy in 1974, and concludes that the IBC was satisfied before 1974 but not 
afterwards.  
Later studies have used alternative tests based on a cointegration relationship 
between expenditures and revenues (Trehan and Walsh 1988, 1991; Haug 1991, 1995; Hakkio 
and Rush 1991a, Payne 1997, Baharumshah and Lau 2007). When total expenditures (TS) and 
tax revenues (T) follow (1), respectively, but their linear combination is I(0) and thus revenues 
do not drift too far away from expenditures, IBC would be satisfied. Trehan and Walsh (1988, 
1991) suggest two stationarity tests on total deficit and primary deficit. Technically, the 
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fulfilment of the IBC can be proved by verifying either of the following two conditions: (i) 
total deficit (TDt) series are stationary while debt (Dt) series are integrated of the order one, i.e.
)0(~))(( 1 ITGErDTTSTDD ttttttt   and )1(~ IDt , (ii) )1(~)( 1 IGErDTS ttt    and 
)1(~ ITt but the two series are cointegrated with a cointegration vector of (1,-1). This 
condition implies that, although fiscal debts consistently increase, fiscal policy could be 
sustainable if government expenditures and revenues follow a certain long-term pattern. This 
is because the government can ensure sustainability by reacting to the increase in debts 
through the adjustment of its expenditures or revenues within a specific range. Using US 
annual data for 1890-1986 and also Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) data, Trehan and Walsh 
(1998, 1991) conclude that the IBC has not been violated.  
Hakkio and Rush (1991a) extend Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991)’s approach. Their 
model is basically similar to Trehan and Walsh (1991) in that if Tt ~I(1) and TSt ~I(1), and the 
two series are cointegrated with the vector of (1, -1),85 the fiscal policy may be sustainable. 
But their study is different in three points: (i) they allow for stochastic and stationary real 
interest rates (i.e., rt+n ~(r, σ
2), r>0); (ii) they consider the growing economy by normalizing 
revenues and expenditures by GDP and population; and (iii) they impose an exogenous 
structural break.  Hakkio and Rush, using quarterly data for 1950-1988, find that no 
cointegration between T and TS existed from the mid-1970s, particularly in the 1980s. It is 
interpreted that the US fiscal deficit became a serious problem after the advent of the Reagan 
administration. 
Quintos (1995) firstly introduces a weak sustainability condition. While a strong 
85 Consider the specific empirical form: all variables are scaled by GDP, 
ttt TST   . If )1(~ ITSt , )1(~ ITt , 
and )0(~ ITST ttt   , then TSt, and Tt are cointegrated with a cointegration vector ),1(  . Although Hakkio 
and Rush (1991) demonstrate that 0<β≤1 is a sufficient condition for sustainability, they consider only β=1 as a 
sustainability condition, because β <1 indicates that, at the limit, the undiscounted debts will reach infinity and 
make the debt unbounded, which gives an incentive for the government to default on its debts. However, later 
studies such as Quintos (1995) prove that the debt can be sustainable under the condition of 0<β <1. 
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condition corresponds to the sustainability condition of Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan 
and Walsh (1988) and Hakkio and Rush (1991), the weak condition allows a bubble term to 
go to zero at a rate slower than the stronger version. Technically, the weak condition is 
satisfied when )2(~ IDt  and ΔDt (=TSt–Tt=TDt=rDt-1+GEt –Tt) ~ I(1) (Quintos 1995, pp. 409-
410). Thus, the weak condition requires that T and TS are I(1) and cointegrated with a 
cointegrating vector of (1, -β) where 0<β<1. In other words, when the total deficit process 
can be integrated or even mildly explosive, the deficit will still be sustainable, as long as the 
growth rate of the debt does not exceed the growth rate of the economy. He finds that US 
fiscal debt was sustainable despite the non-existence of cointegration between expenditures 
and tax revenues in the 1980s - i.e., the failure of the ‘strong 'condition - since the debt 
process satisfied the ‘weak’ sustainability condition. Bergman (2001) agrees with Quintos 
(1995) on the point that he distinguishes the weak and strong forms of sustainability.   
 
6.3.2.2 Estimation of fiscal reaction function (Bohn test) 
Bohn (1995, 1998) questions the validity of the traditional stationary tests that 
involve unit root test of debts and cointegration tests between expenditures and revenues, 
since they are all based on strong assumptions about discount rates and stochastic process of 
future fiscal variables, which are difficult to obtain from a single set of observed time series.  
Bohn (1998, pp. 949-962) particularly notices several limitations of the stationarity-based 
tests: (i) The tests are highly sensitive to the choice of discount rates; (ii) The tests frequently 
cannot reject a unit root in debt-GDP ratio even if debt-GDP ratio is declining; (iii) The tests 
are not connected with the government’s corrective actions to the debt-GDP ratio, because the 
debt-GDP ratio is bounced around by various shocks such as temporary business cycle.  
In particular, traditional tests explicitly or implicitly assume a real interest rate on 
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government debt above average growth rate, i.e. r>g in the equation (6.3.10).  However, as 
Bohn (1991, p3) comments, dynamic efficiency and r<g are both key characteristics of 
historical US data. In this case, we do not use (6.3.10) as empirical framework for empirical 
analysis.86 In addition, cointegration-based tests do not distinguish the source of sustainability. 
When cointegration exists, the cointegration may stem either from policy responses or just 
luck, i.e., the temporary business cycle (which affects the value of fiscal variables but is not 
controlled by the government).  In this regard, Bohn (2007, pp. 1840-1845) derives the 
following three propositions associated with the properties of fiscal variables and 
sustainability conditions:  
(i) If )(~ D t mI  for any finite m≥0, then 0lim 

nt
n
n
D  and Dt , Tt and TSt  satisfy the IBC. In 
words, low order of integration of debt series, for example, Dt~I(0), I(1) or I(2) is not 
necessary for the IBC to be satisfied. 
(ii) If )(~ TSt TSmI  and )(~ Tt TmI , possibly with TTS mm   and not necessarily cointegrated, 
)(~ D t mI  with 1)m ,max(mm TTS  , so NPC and IBC hold. In words, a cointegration 
between TSt and Tt is not a necessary condition for the fulfilment of the IBC.  
(iii) If  Dt and  PSt follow the error-correction specification,  I(m)~DPS ttt   for some 
 ]1,0( r where r is a constant interest rate, then  Dt satisfies the IBC. In words, if a 
government responds positively to the debt ( 0 ), the IBC holds, and this is not 
affected if we allowed for the unit root property of the debts.   
Bohn argues that the standard stationarity or cointegration tests tend to prefer the 
conclusion of non-sustainability because the cyclical or temporary variations in fiscal 
variables are not captured by the standard cointegration test. He suggests a different test based 
86 Bohn’s definition of the IBC is more general than the conventional concept explained in the section 6.3.1, 
because Bohn considers risk-averse individuals. Technically, Bohn’s IBC and NPC may be expressed as: 
   ∑                
 
    : IBC,          (           )    : NPC, where nttu , is marginal rate of 
substitution between t and t+n. Note that the discount rate is not just real interest rate. The discount rate 
“depends on the probability distribution of debt across state of nature and on the correlation of debt with the 
marginal rate of substitution”(Bohn 1991 p4). In case of risk neutral, Bohn’s IBC reduce to the IBC (6.3.11). 
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on a government’s corrective reaction of adjusting primary surplus in response to changes in 
debt. If the government responds to debts, such responses would implement an error-
correction-type mechanism that stabilises debts or at least produces cointegration between 
debts and primary surplus (Bohn 2004 pp. 9-10). Bohn argues that the government response 
to an increase in debt-to-GDP ratio (by raising the primary surplus) can be obscured by 
wartime spending or by cyclical fluctuations. If the fluctuations in spending and in aggregate 
income are corrected, fiscal sustainability will be found more than the previous stationarity 
tests suggested (Bohn 1998, p 962).  The simplest testable form based on Bohn is: 
(6.3.12) ttitittttt xAddps   , ),(~,
2 NxA ttititt   
where ttt getps  ,tt=Tt/GDPt, get=GEt/GDPt, dt=Dt/GDPt, xit is a control vector of 
non-debt determinants that cyclically influence the variations in the primary surplus. He 
shows that the coefficient  can be interpreted as an alternative test for fiscal sustainability. 
0  means that the government takes action to counteract the changes in debts, so that the 
fiscal policy may be sustainable. The regression (6.3.12) indicates that, for example, if 
)1(~ Idt  and )1(~ Ipst  while )0(~ It , a cointegration regression is valid without 
additionally modelling the t . If )0(~ Id t  and )0(~ Ipst , simple OLS can be applied.   
In the Bohn test, it is crucial to find the appropriate non-debt control vector (
itx ), 
because of omitted variable problem. To find the appropriate itx , Bohn utilises Barro’s tax 
smoothing model (Bohn 1998, pp. 951-952).  The tax smoothing model considers a 
government optimisation that minimises the cost of taxation by smoothing marginal tax rates 
over time. The key feature of this theory is that the tax rate should be dependent on 
noncyclical (permanent) fiscal expenditures and debt levels. Bohn (1998, 2004) uses two 
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control variables extracted from Barro (1986): the level of temporary government spending 
(GVAR) and a business cycle indicator (YVAR).87  As seen from (6.3.12), Bohn test does not 
require any assumption about interest rates, so that it does not matter whether discount rate is 
above the growth rate or not.  
 It is noteworthy that Bohn (2007) does not deny the validity of the stationarity-based 
sustainability test. Rather, he argues that stationarity (or cointegration) are not necessary but 
sufficient conditions, because stationarity-based tests do not consider the possibility of higher 
order integration in the debt-related series. Correspondingly, Bohn argues that reaction 
function-based tests are more appropriate for testing sustainability. Bohn test has particular 
explanatory power for large deficits and debt accumulation during war time. 
As Bohn (1995, 1998) points out significant limits in the standard tests based on the 
assumption of the linearity in debt-related series, several studies address the non-linear 
property of debt dynamics (Sarno 2001, Bajo-Rubio et al. 2006). They argue that the linearity 
assumption is not plausible because the adjustments toward the long-run equilibrium of debt-
to-GDP ratio appear to occur in discontinuous or nonconstant ways. For example, fiscal 
policies may have nonlinear effects in the sense that both the size and the sign of the response 
of macro variables to fiscal policy could be different depending on the type of policy actions 
and the magnitude of primary deficits at the time when the policies are enacted. 
Bohn test, however, has limits in explaining why fiscal debts in developed countries 
continuously accumulated from the 1970s to the early 1990s and how changes in relevant 
fiscal variables influence each other in the relatively short term perspective(Persson and 
Tabellini 2000). The latter point implies that Bohn does not reflect the fact that fiscal deficits 
are likely to be affected by changes in the political system and decision making process.  
87 GVAR and YVAR are measured as
tttt yGEGEGAVR /)(
*  and     *** // ttttt yGEyyyYAVR t  , 
respectively, where GEt =government expenditure, y = GDP and * indicates the trend of the series.  
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6.4 Methodologies and data 
As discussed in the literature review, the standard stationarity tests and Bohn test 
could complement each other, because the choice of test depends in most cases on the 
availability of data and properties of the relevant time series.  In this section, both methods 
will be used to obtain more robust estimation results. After deriving the IBC for a CB, we first 
adapt the standard stationarity tests for the sustainability of MSB-dependent sterilisation 
policies. Then, we use modified Bohn’s methodology.  
 
6.4.1 Derivation of intertemporal budget constraints of a central bank 
The single-period budget constraint of the CB can be expressed as (6.4.1), which is 
derived from its accounting identity. All variables are real terms. We assume that the CB does 
not money-finance its budget deficits, because printing money induces instant inflation, and 
thus the monetary base is provided only to adjust money demand for controlling interest rates. 
(6.4.1) ttttttt NAMSBrNArHMSB   11
*  
where MSBt is the stock of MSB at the end of period t; NAt is the amount of net assets 
held by the CB at the end of period t, and thus ΔNAt is the expenditure on purchasing net 
assets in period t; Ht is the monetary base at the end of period t, and thus ΔHt is the CB’s 
seigniorage revenue in period t; *tr is the rate of return on net assets (mostly foreign reserves) 
in period t; tr is the rate of return paid to the MSB in period t. The right-hand side of the 
equation indicates the CB’s total expenditures while the left-hand side implies the funding 
source for the expenditures.  (6.4.1) simply indicates that the CB purchases foreign assets and 
pays the interests and principal of the MSBs through financing from newly issued MSBs, 
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newly printed money or interest received from its assets. Rewriting (6.4.1) shows the one-
period dynamics of the MSBs in discrete time: 1
*
1   ttttttt NArHNAMSBrMSB . The 
increase in the stock of MSBs in time t stems from the interest payments on the MSB issued 
in the previous period, the increase in asset purchases, the decrease in the monetary base or 
decrease in interest income from net assets.  
To transform the above budget identity into budget constraint, we assume a constant 
interest rate and GDP growth rate (i.e., rt+i=r, r
*
t+i=r
* and gt+i=g where i=1,…,n). Then, 
rearranging (6.4.1) and solving forward leads to the following IBC: 
 (6.4.2) itt
n
n
i
ititt
n
t MSBENATREMSB 

  
1
)(  
where
r

1
1
  , 1
*
t  tt NArHTR = total revenue (TR) which consists of 
seigniorage and interest income from net assets and 
tE = expectation operator. Ruling out 
Ponzi schemes, ( 0lim 

n
n
n
MSB ), we can simplify (6.4.2) as: 
(6.4.3) 



1
)(
n
ntt
n
t PSEMSB 
 
where ttt NANArHPS  1
*
t is the primary budget surplus. Equation (6.4.3) 
indicates that the current MSB-dependent sterilisation policy would be sustainable when the 
current stock of the MSB outstanding is equal to the present value of the expected future 
primary surpluses.  Correspondingly, the CB will have to ensure future primary surpluses 
whose present value adds up to the current value of the MSBs by increasing future 
seigniorage ( ntH ), by increasing future interest income from assets ( ntNAr 1
* ) or by 
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reducing future purchases of assets ( ntNA ) so that its sterilisation can be permanently 
sustainable. Note that (6.4.3) can be easily transformed into the equation in terms of the ratio 
to GDP. In this case, the discount factor will be 
r
g



1
1
   rather than
r

1
1
 . 
Equation (6.4.3) provides several implications concerning MSB-dependent 
sterilisation policy.  The CB cannot continue a policy that does not satisfy the IBC, because it 
will eventually lead to the explosion of the MSBs. The current stock of MSBs must eventually 
be financed by future seigniorage or interest incomes from net assets with the current 
sterilisation policy unchanged. In other words, current sterilisation policies should eventually 
be replaced in the future by the policy of increasing money supply or by raising the rate of 
returns on assets. However, increasing future money supply in accordance with the 
developments of the MSB may not be feasible, owing to inflation risk without the money 
demand increasing.   
Allowing somewhat higher inflation than now (equivalently allowing policy interest 
rate deviation from target) will reduce the necessity of sterilisation and thus contribute to 
decreasing the stock of MSB.  The option of raising the rate of returns on foreign reserves 
appears not practical either, because most CBs in small open economies give priority to the 
precautionary demands, i.e., safety or liquidity – not profitability – of foreign reserve 
(Aizenman et al. 2007). Hence, the most feasible option is to reduce the purchase of foreign 
reserves, to reduce the degree of sterilisation or to find alternative sterilisation tools to 
decrease the sterilisation cost.  
It is noteworthy that MSB-dependent sterilisations would not get rid of inflation 
permanently but allow the CB to postpone imminent inflation into the future.  Under the 
assumption of a constant increase in net assets, the substitution of a MSB for a current money 
increase does not influence permanent money that is the weighted average of current money 
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and expected future money.  For a given path of the CB’s purchase of assets, a current MSB-
financed decrease in monetary base leads to higher future money increases that have the same 
present value as the initial decrease.  If the policy does not affect permanent money, it does 
not influence inflation, interest and income.  Therefore, unbounded sterilised interventions by 
issuing MSBs eventually lead to an increase in future money supply and higher inflation. This 
argument is built on Barro’s (1989) Ricardian equivalence of government debt applied to the 
CB’s debt 
 
6.4.2 Test for the long-term sustainability of MSB-dependent policy 
In line with stationary tests for fiscal debts, the crucial question about the 
sustainability of the MSB-dependent policy is whether 0lim 

nn
n
MSB  or whether the CB’s 
total revenues ( 1
*
t  tNArH ), non-interest expenditures ( tNA ) or their linear combination 
follows the stationary process. The alternative is associated with the CB’s reaction function, 
which can be set up by modifying Bohn (1998, 2007). With regard to Bohn test, the key 
question is whether the CB responds to increases in the MSB by increasing its primary budget 
surplus. These two alternative methodologies complement each other, so we can use both 
approaches to obtain more robust results. 
 
6.4.2.1 Standard stationarity test 
To obtain a testable form, first rearranging the budget identity (6.4.1) yields: 
 
(6.4.4) ttttttttt TRTSNArHMSBrNAMSB   )()( 1
*
1  
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where 1t  ttt MSBrNATS is the total spending (inclusive of interest payments on the 
MSB) and 1
*
t  ttt NArHTR  is the total revenue.  Here, we need some assumptions on tr  
to transform (6.4.4) into a budget constraint. Assuming that 
tr  and *tr are any stochastic 
stationary process with unconditional mean equal to r(>0) and
*r (>0) respectively,88 we can 
rewrite (6.4.4) as:   
(6.4.5) tttt TRASMSBrMSB  1)1(  
where 1)(  tttt MSBrrNAAS is the CB’s adjusted total spending with interest 
rates taken around a zero mean.  Solving (6.4.5) forward leads to:  
 
(6.4.6) itt
i
i
i
itt
i
t MSBEASTREMSB 






  1
1
it
1
1 lim)(    where  r 11  
 
Applying the difference operator in (6.4.6) and using (6.4.4), we can rewrite (6.4.6) as:  
 
(6.4.7)  itt
i
i
i
itit
i
tt MSBEASTRETRTS 





   1
0
t
1 lim)(   
 
Note that the left-hand side of the equation (6.4.7) includes the CB’s total spending 
that includes not only purchases of assets but also interest payments on the MSBs issued 
previously. So the left-hand side ( tt TRTS  ) can be named as a total budget deficit (TD) which 
contrasts with a primary budget deficit (PD) that excludes interest payments. Again, the NPC 
indicates that: 
88That is, the interest rate is a stationary stochastic process with a positive mean: i.e. rt ~(r, σr
2) r*t ~(r
*, σr*
2), and 
r>0, r*>0. This assumption is required for interest payments 
1)(  tt MSBrr  to have similar properties of tNA
in (6.4.5) and broadly accepted by many studies such as Hakkio and Rush (1991a), Quintos (1995), Payne 
(1997), Afonso and Rault (2007), and Baharumshah and Lau (2007), etc. 
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(6.4.8) 0lim 1  


itt
i
i
MSBE  
(6.4.9) 



 
0
t
1 )(
i
itit
i
tt ASTRETRTS   
To test the sustainability of the MSB-dependent sterilisation policy, we can use either 
(6.4.8) for testing the stationarity of itMSB or (6.4.9) for testing the cointegration between 
two series tTS  and tTR . For instance, assuming that both tTR  and ASt are following a 
random walk with drift: ttt TRTR 111    and ttt ASAS 212    , then equation (6.4.9) 
can be rewritten as: 
 (6.4.10)  titt
i
i
tt MSBETRTS   


1lim  
where )(
1
)( 21
0
21
1  

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
i
i
r
r
 and )(
1
)( 21t
0
21t
1
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i
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r
 




 . 
Assume a NPC (i.e, 0lim 1  


itt
i
i
MSBE ). Then, if the variables in the right-hand side of 
(6.4.10) are stationary, for (6.4.10) to hold, the left-hand side variable must be also stationary. 
Since TSt and TRt are I(1), these two variables must be cointegrated. Consequently, the 
sustainability tests include following cointegration regression: 
 (6.4.11)   ttt TSTR    
where 1 ttt rMSBNATS  and 1-t
*NArHTR tt  . Equation (6.4.11) implies that a 
sustainable policy requires the existence of a stable long-run relationship between total 
spending (=the sum of the asset purchase and interest payments on the MSBs) and total 
revenue (= the sum of seigniorage and interest incomes from net assets).  
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6.4.2.2 Modification of Bohn’s methodology 
Modifying Bohn (1998, 2007), we set up a simple reaction function to describe the 
CB’s sterilisation policy and investigate whether the CB responds to increases in the MSB-to-
GDP ratio.  
(6.4.12) titittttt xAmsbmsbps    11  
where tttttt GDPNANArHps /)( 1
*   is the ratio of primary surplus to GDP; 
ttt GDPMSBmab / ;  itx  is a vector of determinants other than MSBs that influence the 
variations in tps such as cyclical components of the CB’s budget; all variables are real; 
tititt xA   ; and t is an i.i.d error. Equation (6.4.12) indicates that if MSB increases, a 
sustainable policy should be characterized by the increase in the primary surplus, 
accomplished by increasing money demand ( H ↑), reducing purchases of net assets ( NA ↓) 
or raising the rate of return on foreign reserves ( *tr ↑).  Finding a positive and sufficiently large 
ˆ  could be interpreted as evidence of the long-run sustainability of the sterilisation policy.  
Note that the decrease in the purchase of foreign assets can be accomplished mainly by fewer 
FX interventions, because most of the increases in NA have been incurred by the increase in 
NFAs (see Figure 6.6 in the next section). 
The detailed specifications of regression (6.4.12) are as follows. We use 1 tmsb
instead of tmsb , tmsb  or 1tmsb ,because the BOK’s MSB issuance quota is  normally made 
one quarter in advance by Monetary Policy Committee, because policy makers are likely to be 
forced to care more about the amount of the MSB increase during the previous quarter than 
about its level itself and because not using a contemporaneous variable enables us to simplify 
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our analysis by avoiding a simultaneity problem between tps  and tmsb .  Regression 
(6.4.12) indicates that if 1 tmsb and tps  are both non-stationary while )0(~ It , we can use 
cointegration analysis between two variables for the stationarity test without additionally 
modelling the t . However, if )0(~ Imsbt  and )0(~ Ipst , we use simple OLS with additional 
control variables ( itx ).   
 
6.4.2.3 Sequence of sustainability test for MSB-dependent policy 
Figure 6.3 illustrates the sequential procedures for testing MSB-dependent 
sterilisation policy. First, we perform unit root tests for the levels, differences and their ratios 
to GDP of the following series: discounted and undiscounted stock of MSBs, total revenues, 
changes in net asset purchases, total spending,89 primary surplus and total deficit. Calculating 
the total spending of the BOK (i.e. TSt =rtMSBt-1+ΔNAt), we use a one-year rate of return on 
MSBs since the average maturities of the MSBs outstanding in the 2000-2009 was 
approximately 11 months. Note that when tTS and tTR are not integrated to the same order, we 
first have to depend on the results of the unit root tests for MSBs. That is, the CB’s 
sterilisation policy is assumed to be sustainable: (i) if )0(~ IMSBt  and )0(~
1
IPS
n
nt
n 








  ; or 
alternatively (ii) if  I(0)~
0




n
nt
n MSB with a zero unconditional mean.  
Second, if tTR  and tTS or alternately ( ttt GDPTRtr / ) and ( ttt GDPTSts / ) are 
integrated of order 1 at most, we run the cointegration regression given by (6.4.11). When 
tTS  and tTR are cointegrated with the cointegration vector ),1(  , the CB’s current 
89 Note that we apply a zero interest rate in calculating the interest income from the negative value of NDAs. 
Negative NDA indicates that the BOK has more domestic liabilities (most of which are bank reserves) than 
domestic assets. Since the BOK does not pay interest on bank reserves, the assumption of a zero interest rate on 
negative NDAs is acceptable. 
276 
sterilisation is: (i) “strongly” sustainable if 1 ; (ii) “weakly” sustainable if 10   and (iii) 
unsustainable if 0 (Martin 2000, Quintos 1995).  The case of 1 does not need to be 
considered because it implies that the CB’s revenue is growing at the rate faster than total 
expenditures – the CB runs a budget surplus.  
A strong sustainability means that the IBC holds and, at the time, both the 
undiscounted MSB series and the primary surplus of the CB follow the I(0) process. It also 
leads to stationarity both in total budget deficits )( ttt TRTSTD   and in tMSB owing to 
(6.4.4): ttt TRTSMSB  . A weak sustainability indicates that the IBC holds, but with MSBs 
increasing at a rate which is less than the GDP growth rate. The sterilisations are 
unsustainable when MSBs are exploding at a rate which is equal to or faster than the GDP 
growth rate. According to Bohn, however, even if MSBs are growing faster than GDP, MSB 
could be sustainable when CBs adjust their primary surplus in response to ∆MSB. 
Figure 6.3 Sequential procedures of sustainability tests  
 
Notes: 1. All variables are real in volume or their ratio to GDP. 
            2. CI indicates cointegration. 
Trehan and Walsh (1988, 91)  
Hakkio and Rush (1991) 
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277 
6.4.3 Consolidated budget constraints of government and central bank 
If a CB cannot repay the principal and interest on the MBS, the government should 
provide financial support to the CB by increasing taxation. Thus, we need to extend the 
analysis of the sustainability by combining the B/S of the two authorities.  Rewriting the 
single period budget constraints (6.3.1) and (6.4.1) leads to (6.4.13) and (6.4.14): 
(6.4.13) ttttt GEDrTD  1  : Government 
(6.4.14) ttttttt NAMSBrNArHMSB   11
*  : CB  
For simplicity, we assume that interest rates applied to government bonds and MSBs 
are same. Combining (6.4.13) and (6.4.14) leads to a single-period budget constraint of 
consolidated government: 
(6.4.15)  )( 111
*
  ttttttttttt MSBDrNAGENArMSBDHT  
Following the same procedure as in the previous sections, the IBC of the 
consolidated government is as follows: 
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  (g: growth rate, r: real interest rate) 
   tttttttt GDPNAGENArHTRcps /)( 1
*   : Consolidated primary surplus  
   ttt GDPDd /  : Government debt scaled by GDP 
   ttt GDPMSBmsb /  : MSB scaled by GDP 
The NPC requires that 0)(lim  

ntntt
n
n
msbdE . Hence, equation (6.4.16) indicates 
that a sustainable policy requires that the government’s and the CB’s current stock of debt 
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outstanding should be equal to the present value of the future primary surplus of two 
authorities, which is defined as the sum of tax and seigniorage less the sum of the 
government’s expenditures and the CB’s net asset purchases.  Given the path of consolidated 
expenditures, the increase in MSBs and treasury bonds lead to increases in tax and monetary 
base in the future. Note that even if the CB cannot afford the financing for its sterilisation 
policy for itself and thus violates its IBC, but if the government maintains a sound budget 
stance, the sterilisation is considered sustainable in the perspective of the whole country. In 
this case, however, it is unlikely that the CB could conduct its monetary policy independently 
from government and political parties.   
6.4.4 Data descriptions 
Quarterly data for outstanding amounts of MSBs, assets and liabilities of the BOK 
and other macro variables are obtained from the “main accounts of the BOK” and “main 
indicators” in the BOK’s economic statistics system (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). All relevant data 
are available for the period 1987Q1-2009Q4 for the BOK and 1994Q1-2009Q4 for the 
Korean government. Figure 6.4 demonstrates that the MSB-to-GDP ratio increases from 
approximately 10% to over 50% despite the short-term fluctuations, while the MB-to-GDP 
ratio has been stable with a range between 20% and 30% in 1980-2009. In particular, the 
MSB-to-GDP ratio began to increase rapidly after the 1997 financial crisis and soared up to 
over 80% in the third quarter in 2005. The MSB-to-MB ratio increased from approximately 
20% to over 200% during the same period.  These statistics show that increasing seigniorage 
may not be a feasible option for the sustainability of MSB-dependent sterilisation in Korea. 
Note that Figure 6.4 suggests that there might be possible structural breaks in the 
time series of the MSB-to-GDP ratios. The possible structural breaks have two implications 
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for the analysis of the sustainability of MSB issuing policy. First, if the breaks are brought 
about by exogenous shocks (e.g. financial crises), they might be responsible for not rejecting 
the null hypothesis of unit root in relevant fiscal series, even though the series is stationary 
within a certain sub-period.  Second, the existence of breaks may indicate that the BOK may 
respond more to its primary deficit when the outstanding MSB is particularly large – the 
possibility of a non-linear response to variations of the MBS.  
                   Figure 6.4 Ratio of monetary base and MSBs to nominal GDP 
 
                        Data: BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
 
At the times close to 1989Q3 and 2006Q4, the increasing trend of the MSB seemed 
to be temporarily reversed, so the MSB-to-GDP ratios declined. Nonetheless, the MSB-to-
GDP ratio, overall, looks non-stationary.  In this regard, the interesting question is whether the 
temporal declines of the MSB-to-GDP ratios are due to high economic growth or policy 
responses. The MSB-dependent sterilisation policy will be more sustainable if the declines 
stem from changes in the BOK’s adjustments (by reducing the purchase of assets, increasing 
the demand for MB or introducing alternative liquidity-absorbing tools).90  If the declines are 
90 In reality, BOK introduced a marginal reserve requirement system in 1989, which aimed at withdrawing the 
excess reserve incurred by pegging FX rates. The marginal requirement system was abolished right before the 
introduction of the managed float in March 1990. In December 2006, BOK raised the required reserve ratio from 
5 to 7 %. In November 2007, BOK strengthened the control for the issuance of MSB by letting the Monetary 
Policy Committee set the limit of issue amount quarterly. In April 2008, BOK changed its monetary operational 
scheme from Fed-style to ECB style, which enabled it to less stick to controlling short-term market interest rates.  
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just due to luck (i.e., economic growth), however, the policy may be less sustainable. 
Figure 6.5 illustrates that nominal MSBs sharply increased from 1998Q1 to 2006Q4 
and appears to show a somewhat stable path since 2006Q4.  Unlike figure 6.4 where the MSB 
scaled by the GDP, the nominal MSB consistently increased until 2005. It seems obvious that 
the growth of both NFA and MSB began to accelerate after the 1997 financial crisis due to the 
increasing sterilised interventions.  
                 Figure 6.5 Net foreign assets and MSBs 
 
                        Data: BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
 
Table 6.5 shows the dilemma that the BOK faces. In the 2000s, the NDA shows 
continuously increasing negative values while the NFA had increasingly positive values. This 
implies that as foreign reserves flood in, domestic liquidity conditions could be too loose to 
stabilise inflation or too tight to resist the appreciation pressure of domestic currency. The 
increase in NFA mostly comes from the accumulation of foreign reserves. The NDA has 
turned to a negative value since 2000 owing to the increasing domestic liabilities such as bank 
reserves or deposits received from financial institutions through sterilisation.   
Consequently, the increases in MSBs appear approximately to correspond to those in 
the NFA, as can be also seen from Figure 6.5. The difference in values between MSB and 
NFA reflects the facts that (i) the BOK used alternative sterilisation tools other than MSB (e.g., 
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raising required reserve ratio, reverse repos, etc.); and (ii) the value of NFA is subject to FX 
rate movements, while that of MSB is not.   
Table 6.5 Main accounts in the balance sheet of the BOK 
(End of period, bill. KRW) 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 1998 2000 2005 2009 
Monetary base(A) 3,244 4,319 13,811 29,305 22,519 20,703 28,238 43,249 67,779 
MSB(B) 530 1,900 15,612 25,825 23,471 45,673 66,378 155,235 149,170 
A+B=C+D=Net Asses 3,774 6,219 29,423 55,130 45,990 66,376 94,616 195,484 216,949 
NDA(C=e-f)  1 ) 2,656 4,930 18,818 29,711 30,749 23,249 -20,602 -18,049 -90,468 
   Domestic assets(e) 5,294 13,277 32,454 44,002 82,587 61,364 31,721 39,189 41,360 
   Securities2) 12 - 2,154 2,069 7,859 13,556 6,496 5,397 12,670 
   Loan to government 1,376 2,636 865 968 788 1,218 779 829 1,116 
Other liabilities(f) 3) 2,638 8,347 13636 14,291 51,838 38,115 52,323 57,238 131,828 
NFA (D=g-h) 1,118 1,289 10,605 25,419 15,241 43,128 115,218 213,533 307,417 
    Foreign Assets(g) 1,790 2,983 11,212 26,068 29,833 66,501 124,323 232,071 322,673 
          Securities           1,013 1,085 6,874 16,364 6,168 48,061 113,748 204,964 291,110 
          Due from banks 507 1,332 3,681 8,330 21,721 16,493 6,978 23,433 19,575 
    Foreign Liabilities(h) 672 1,694 607 649 14,592 23,374 9,095 18,538 15,257 
Notes: 1) For simplicity, net wealth is included in NDA by treating it as domestic liabilities because most of positive net 
 worth is not reserved in the BOK account and should be transferred to government account. 
           2) Most are bonds issued by government and government agencies  
           3) Other liabilities = domestic liabilities - MSB – MB: e.g., reverse repos with banks, excess reserve, etc. 
  Data: BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
 
Figure 6.6 confirms that the increase in net assets has mostly come from the increase 
in NFA during last two decades, and that NFA has rapidly increased since the 1997 financial 
crisis when Korea introduced the free float regime and inflation targeting, and considerably 
reformed the financial markets. 
             Figure 6.6 Components of the BOK’s net assets  
                                                                                                       (Nominal, trill. KRW, 1987Q1-2009Q4)  
 
                  Data: IFS and BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
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Table 6.6 reports that both the mean and variance of MSB-to-GDP ratio have sharply 
increased since the 1997 financial crisis, together with the NFA-to-GDP ratio. All these 
statistics appear to indicate that the sustainability of the MSB-dependent sterilisation policy is 
getting weaker over time. 
 
       Table 6.6 Average and volatility of main accounts in BOK’s balance sheet 
                                                                                                                                                                   (%) 
Average NDA(a) NFA(b) MB+MSB MB(c) MSB(d) 
1980-1997 31.3 14.2 45.5 22.7 22.8 
1998-2009 -8.3 81.5 73.2 20.0 53.3 
1980-2009 15.6 41.2 56.7 21.7 35.1 
Variance 
 
    
1980-1997 0.7 0.7 1.6 0.2 1.3 
1998-2009 1.6 5.5 2.0 0.2 1.7 
1980-2009 4.9 13.5 3.6 0.1 3.6 
           Note: All numbers are relative to nominal GDP  
           Data: BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
 
As all fiscal variables in the BOK’s balance sheet are denominated by local currency, 
the effects of exchange rates on the NFA are already reflected in the data.  For example, the 
value of foreign assets and liabilities are revalued and booked in local currency every six 
months. The exchange rate plays a decisive role in the developments of the stock of MSBs (i) 
because of its effects on the BOK’s motivation for FX market interventions (as seen in Ch. 4); 
and (ii) due to the valuation effects of foreign reserves. The more appreciated the local 
currency, the larger the stock of MSB is likely to be, because the BOK tends to intervene to 
resist local currency appreciation and subsequently needs to issue MSBs for sterilisation.  
Note that the value of foreign reserves denominated by local currency decreases when local 
currency is appreciated. Thus, the values of the NFA can be changed by exchange rate 
movements even when there are no changes in sterilisation policy.  
Figure 6.7 illustrates the developments and trends of the NFA, its ratio to GDP and 
nominal exchange rate (KRW/USD). The real values of the NFA and the NFA-to-GDP ratio 
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have continued to increase since the 1997 financial crisis, when international capital flowed in, 
and exchange rate overall appreciated, with exception for the period of the recent subprime 
mortgage crisis. These plots suggest that increases in NFA mainly come from increases in 
purchases of foreign reserves rather than the increase in valuation caused by KRW-
depreciation. 
 
Figure 6.7 NFA and exchange rate rates  
 
         (a) Real value of NFA                       (b) NFA scaled by GDP                    (c) Nominal exchange rate 
 
Data: BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
 
Table 6.7 demonstrates that the BOK experiences primary surplus but the total 
balance (inclusive interest payment) records deficits on average, which may be attributable to 
the increasing stock of MSBs and the resulting increase in interest payments. The total 
spending is much more volatile than total revenue.  
 
Table 6.7 Statistical summary of BOK’s main fiscal variables used in regressions 
 
Total 
Revenue(A) 
Total 
spending(B) 
Total 
surplus(A-B) 
Primary 
surplus 
Interests 
on MSB 
Real 
(bill. KRW) 
Mean 2,101 4,254 -2,154 136 1,798 
Std. Dev. 3,256 6,367 5,588 6,817 1,206 
Scaled by GDP 
 (%) 
Mean 1.40 2.86 -1.45 0.11 1.03 
Std. Dev. 2.34 4.24 3.31 4.05 0.40 
     Notes: 1987Q1-2009Q4, quarterly average 
     Data: Author’s calculation based on BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
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6.5 Estimation results 
6.5.1 Sustainability tests for the budget of the BOK 
6.5.1.1 Plotting fiscal variables of the BOK 
 
Before conducting unit root tests, we plot relevant fiscal variables to get a feel for the 
data. All plots of the seasonally-adjusted fiscal variables of the BOK are presented in Figure 
6.8(a). Most variables fluctuate a great deal with large variances, except undiscounted MSB 
and the monetary base, which are trending upwards over time.  The upward trend of the MSB 
series is consistent with that of government debts observed particularly after the 1980s in the 
US, Japan, many European countries (see Bohn 2004) and Korea. As seen in Figure 6.8(b), a 
government’s expenditures and revenues tend to increase over time (and thus mostly show a 
non-stationary property) as the economy grows, while the government’s budget surpluses 
shows fluctuations within a certain range (and thus appear stationary). However, most of the 
BOK’s fiscal data (excluding MSB series) in Figure 6.8(a) appear to show significantly less 
increasing trend than government’s with more fluctuations over time. For example, the 
seigniorage, total spending and total revenues mostly fluctuate around a certain positive level.  
The total budget balance shows deficits over considerable periods. Note that MB-to-
GDP ratios in the 2000s are much lower than those in the 1990s, while MSB-to-GDP ratios 
show a steady increase with several significant fluctuations – which implied that seigniorage, 
became a less important factor in the BOK’s budget balance. This phenomenon may be partly 
related with the monetary regime changes (from monetary targeting to inflation targeting) and 
decreases in money demand.  
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Figure 6.8 Plots of main fiscal variables of the BOK and Korean government 
 (a) BOK (1987Q1 – 2009Q4) 
    Real values (trill. KRW)     Ratio to GDP (%) 
 MSB       MSB/GDP 
  
Base money (BM) BM/GDP 
 
 
         Seigniorage Seigniorage /GDP 
  
            Total return (TR) TR/GDP 
 
 
             Total spending(TS) TS/GDP 
  
           Total deficit(TD) TD / GDP 
 
 
Data: BOK database (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 
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(b) Korean government (1994Q1 – 2009Q4) 
                             Real values (trill. KRW)                                               Ratio to GDP (%) 
 
                 Data: BOK database (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 
 
6.5.1.2 Unit root tests  
In a standard test for fiscal sustainability, the results of the unit root test are crucial, 
so we use the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) 
and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests in which an intercepts are mostly allowed in test forms.  The 
number of lags in the test form is determined by the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) with a 
maximum lag of 12. The null hypothesis is I(1) in the ADF and PP tests and I(0) in the KPSS 
test. We also apply the Zivot-Andrews (1992) test for the I(1) series in order to see whether 
the I(1) series actually trend stationary once the break is considered. Zivot-Andrews (1992) 
tests the null of I(1) against the alternative of I(0) with one endogenously determined break.     
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Table 6.8 shows the results of unit root tests for the BOK’s fiscal variables in level 
and their ratios to GDP.   First, undiscounted MSBs (at both level and their ratio to GDP) 
follow I(1). Although the ADF test suggests the I(2) property of MSB-to-GDP ratio, the test 
result may be affected by the broken trend around 2004, as shown in Figure 6.8(a).91  The 
Zivot-Andrews test suggests that MSB series are I(1).  It is worth recalling that allowing the 
I(2) property of the MSB-to-GDP ratios may not indicate non-sustainability but rather weak 
sustainability, according to Quintos (1995, pp 409-410).  
Second, non-interest spending (∆NA) and primary surplus (PS) are I (0) in both 
levels and their ratios to GDP. Third, with regard to total revenue (TR) and total spending 
(TS), three tests provide different results: TR and TS are (1) according to ADF and KPSS test 
but I(0) according to PP test. As seen from the plots in Figure 6.8, the ambiguous integration 
property of the BOK’s TS and TR series contrasts with clear nonstationarity of government 
revenue and expenditures. For example, both government revenues and expenditures in all G-
7 and major emerging countries are I(I) in levels, per-GDP and per-capita (Payne 1997, 
Kalyoncu 2005), because they tend to increase with economic growth or over time as in 
Figure 8.6(b).  A few exceptions are that both revenue-to-GDP and expenditure-to-GDP ratios 
are I(0) for the US and revenue level is I(2) for Japan (Payne 1997).On the other hand, CBs’ 
seigniorage (revenue) and growth in net asset purchases (spending)appear not to significantly 
increase with economic growth or over time as in Figure 8.6(a). Rather, they are related to 
changes in monetary policy or FXIs.  Note that although TR and TS may be possibly 
integrated at different orders, we can use Johansen’s cointegration test, because they are at 
most I(1).  
91 As seen in Figure 6.8(a), the MSB-to-GDP ratio appear to be more smoothly and more slowly changing than 
the real value of MSB which is I(1). This is one of the characteristics observed in the I(2) series. The properties 
of I(2) are found in some time-series like prices, wages, money balances and stock variables(Haldrup 1998). 
Other unit root tests also provide conflicting results: Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock test statistic suggests I(1) while 
Ng-Peron modified unit root test and Dickey-Fuller test with GLS de-trending test support I(2).   
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Table 6.8 Unit root test results of BOK’s fiscal variables  
                               Test statistics 
Variables 
Levels 1st  difference 2nd 
difference 
Zivot-
Andrews 
verdict 
ADF KPSS PP ADF KPSS PP 
MSB
 
          
Real c,t -0.843(4) 1.084*** -0.796 -3.253** 0.128 -8.308*** n.a -3.622 I(1): All  
Ratio to GDP c,t -1.227(8) 0.815*** -1.125 -2.168 0.198 -10.378*** 
-5.621*** 
(ADF) 
-4.427 
I(1): PP, KPSS 
I(2): ADF 
Total Revenue  (TR)           
Real  c -2.198  0.568** -9.096*** -4.620*** 0.226 -52.599*** n.a -3.921 
I(0): PP 
I(1): ADF, KPSS 
Ratio to GDP c -2.767* 0.472** -9.642*** -5.176*** 0.204 -41.985*** n.a -4.123 
I(0): PP  
I(1): ADF, KPSS 
Non-interest spending (ΔNA)           
Real  c -3.590*** 0.121 -9.718*** -11.687*** 0.105 -46.662*** n.a n.a I(0): All 
Ratio to GDP c -3.398** 0.116 -9.887*** -12.876*** 0.106 -48.259*** n.a n.a I(0): All 
Total Spending (TS)           
Real  c -2.617* 0.984*** -5.381*** -5.429*** 0.020 -15.250*** n.a -3.741 
I(0): PP 
I(1): ADF, KPSS 
Ratio to GDP c -3.271** 0.112 -5.782*** -6.064*** 0.018 -14.308*** n.a n.a I(0): All 
Primary surplus (PS)           
Real  c -3.284** 0.130 -8.649*** -11.358*** 0.091 -41.395*** n.a n.a I(0): All 
Ratio to GDP c -3.154** 0.139 -8.984*** -11.851*** 0.110 -44.309*** n.a n.a I(0): All 
Total  deficit  (TD)           
Real  c -8.333 *** 1.135 -8.333*** -9.792*** 0.164 -57.430*** n.a n.a I(0): All 
Ratio to GDP c -8.577 ** 0.114 -8.636*** -10.112*** 0.166 -46.079*** n.a n.a I(0): All 
Notes: 1. The series are measured as follows:
1
*
 ttt NArHTR ; 1 ttt rMSBNATS , ttt NATRPS  , ttt TRTSTD 
 where r=rate of return on 1 year MSB and r* =rate of return on 1 year US 
Treasury bond measured as an average rate of return on 90-day US Treasury bill & 2 year US Treasury bond 
2.  ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
            3. Null hypothesis is I (1) in ADF and PP test and I(0) in KPSS test. In Zivot-Andrews test (maximum lag=12), null is I(1) and alternative is I(0) with one structural break.  
            4. c and t indicate that unit root test form includes an intercept and deterministic trend term, respectively. 
            5. When we include both time trend and intercept in the test form for TR, TS and PS (or exclude time trend in the test for MSB), the test results are same.  
6. In KPSS and PP test, the spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel, and bandwidth is selected by Newey-West’s method. 
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6.5.1.3 Stationarity of discounted MSB series: Wilcox test 
 
We cannot use the Hamilton & Flavin test, because the stationarity of the 
undiscounted MSB series (i.e., )0(~ Imsbt ) is a necessary condition for the test. Thus, we use 
the Wilcox test, which allows the nonstationarity of undiscounted MBS series. According to 
Wilcox, we can simply generate the series, i.e., the realised values of discounted MSBs in real 
levels and in their ratio to GDP, using the following measurements: 
(6.5.1) discounted MSBt (dMSBt) =
11
0 )(



  kt
n
kntMSB  where  ktkt r  1  
(6.5.2) discounted msbt(=dmsbt)= kt
n
kntGDPMSB 

  
1
0)/(  where )1/()1( ktktkt rg    
where t is fixed at 1987Q2 and n = 0…91; r is the ex-post real return on the MSBs that is 
assumed to reflect the future stochastic movements of interest rates; g is the growth rate of the 
economy. The BOK’s policy is assumed to be sustainable if the generated series follow the I(0) 
process with a zero unconditional mean.92 
Figure 6.9 plots the two series generated by the Wilcox methodology. In real terms, 
the discounted values of real MSBs appear different from their undiscounted values. The 
undiscounted value of MSB has, in particular, shown apparently upward trend since 1997, 
while the discounted value looks relatively stable. The relatively similar movements between 
undiscounted (MSB/GDP) and discounted (MSB/GDP) stem from the fact that there was no 
significant difference between ktr   and ktg   during the sample period – the averages of 
92 That is, a zero-mean stationarity is required. More specifically, suppose that MSBt follows a general ARIMA 
process:  
tt
d eLamsbLL ))(1())1))(((1(   where )(L  and )(L are polynomials with an order of p and q, 
respectively; a is the unconditional mean of the stationary series 
t
d msbL)1(  ; and tmsb is the discounted value of 
MSBs scaled by GDP. Assume that )(L  and )(L  satisfy the conditions for stationarity and invertibility, then 
the equation provides a convenient framework for investigating the properties of tmsb ; under a sustainable 
policy, 
tmsb should be stationary(d=0) and the unconditional mean of the tmsb should be zero(a=0) (Seo 2000). 
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rand g (quarter to quarter) were 1.42% and 1.34%, respectively. Note that the discount factor, 
)}1/()1{(10 ktkt
n
k rg 

   becomes close to 1 when g = r.   
 
Figure 6.9 Market value of MSB (real) and MSB-to-GDP ratio 
 
A. Discounted MSB and undiscounted MSB(real)  
 
 
B. Discounted (MSB/GDP) and undiscounted (MSB/GDP) 
 
               Data: Author’s calculation based on BOK Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr)  
 
The two plots suggest that the sustainability appears more favourable in terms of real 
MSB than (MSB/GDP).  The results of ADF and KPSS unit root test report that both 
discounted real MSBs and MBS-to-GDP ratios are I(1), as seen in Table 6.9. The Zivot-
Andrews unit root test suggests that a break point of discounted MSB and (MSB/GDP) are 
2003Q1 and 2000Q1, respectively, but both are not significant. Thus, we may state that the 
stock of MSBs may not be unsustainable at this stage. 
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Table 6.9 Stationarity test for the discounted MSB and MSB-GDP ratio: Wilcox test 
              Test statistics 
Variables 
Levels First difference Break 
Verdict 
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS Zivot -Andrews 
Real  MSB 
c -1.378(4) 0.762***(7) -3.362** (3) 0.107(2) 
-3.920 I(1) 
c,t -2.877(4) 0.206**(7) -3.380
* (3) 0.113(2) 
MSB-GDP ratio 
c -1.361(8) 0.762***(7) -4.203*** (4) 0.129* (10) 
-3.858 I(1) 
c,t -3.051(8) 0.156**(7) -4.176*** (4) 0.092(10) 
Notes: 1. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
            2. c and t indicate that unit root test form includes an intercept and deterministic trend term, respectively. 
     3. Null hypothesis is I(1) in ADF and I(0) in KPSS test. The figures in parentheses indicate the number of 
lags selected by AIC in ADF test and Newey-West bandwidth estimated by Bartlett kernel in KPSS test. 
            4. Null hypothesis is I(1)  and the alternative is I(0) with a break in Zivot-Andrews test (maximum lag=12).  
The series are tested with an intercept. 
 
Considering the limited power of the unit root test for the stationary series with near-
unit root, we additionally examine whether the unconditional means of tmsb  is zero. We 
check whether the constant in the following autoregressive model (6.5.3) is statistically 
different from 0. In the Wald test for the stationary series, the hypothesis of zero-constant can 
be tested by the restriction: 0 . 
(6.5.3) ttdmsb    
where 
kt
n
kntt GDPMSBdmsb 

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it   


1
  and t = white noise errors.  As for 
both discounted MSB and discounted (MSB/GDP) series, the null hypothesis of the constant 
zero ( 0 ) is rejected at a 1% significance level in all autoregressive models with a lag of 1 
through 6.93  We check for a possible structural break in the coefficients by using the Quandt-
93  The estimation results for regression (6.5.3) are as follows. The number of lags is determined by SIC: the 
optimum number of lags is 1 for the level of discounted MSB and 6 for the discounted (MSB/GDP). Here, the 
numbers in parenthesis are p-value. 
(i) discounted real MSB(=dMSB): AR(1)  
          ttdMSB  265.40
 ,  
1972.0  tt   
                         (0.000)                  (0.000)  
           
2R  : 0.95, F-statistics: 1682.97(0.000), Breusch-Godfrey correlation LM test: 14.925 (0.245) 
(ii) discounted (MSB/GDP)(=dmsb): AR(6) 
          ttdmsb  43.0 654321 32.089.071.004.024.011.1   ttttttt 
 
                      (0.00)             (0.00)      (0.06)     (0.66)     (0.00)      (0.00)    (0.00)     
           
2R  : 0.93, F-statistics: 186.94(0.000), Breusch-Godfrey correlation LM test: 12.644 (0.262) 
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Andrews breakpoint test with 15% trimmed observations.  The test statistics (Wald F-statistics) 
suggest that 2003Q1 may be the mostly likely point of structural break, where three Wald F-
statistics are at a maximum at a 1% or 5% significance level.94  When we allow a structural 
break at 2003Q1, Wald test rejects the null of zero-constant at 1% significance level for any 
sub-periods.  That is, we can reject the null hypothesis of the zero unconditional mean, not 
only for the whole sample but also for the subsample periods suggested by the structural 
breakpoint tests.  As a consequence, we may firmly conclude that the current MSB issuing 
policy series is not sustainable according to Wilcox’s test.    
 
6.5.1.4 Cointegration between total revenue and total spending 
 
Since the ratios to GDP rather than real values provide more credible information 
about the fiscal series (Bohn 2005, pp. 11-15), we test for cointegration between tr(=TR/GDP) 
and ts(=TS/GDP).  If tr and ts are cointegrated with 1 , i.e., if the cointegration vector is 
(1, -1) in the equation ( ttt tstr   ), a strong form of sustainability is satisfied. The lack 
of cointegration (i.e., 10   ) implies the weaker sustainability condition. We employ 
Johansen’s methodology to test for cointegration between tr and ts. Before conducting the 
cointegration test, we need to specify the appropriate number of lags in the VAR system. To 
do this, considering the quarterly frequency of the data and the BOK’s budgetary planning 
process (which ends one or two quarters before the new fiscal year), we assume that the 
94 But likelihood ratio(LR) F-statistics suggest conflicting results: the null of no break points cannot be rejected. 
Statistic Suggested break point Value P-value 
Maximum LR F-statistic 
Exp LR F-statistic 
Ave LR F-statistic 
1998Q1 
3.410 
0.850 
1.541 
0.313 
0.850 
0.166 
Maximum Wald F-statistic 
Exp Wald F-statistic 
Ave Wald F-statistic 
2003Q1 
15.145** 
4.850*** 
5.148** 
0.011 
0.009 
0.034 
       Note: *** and ** denote the rejection of the null of no structural break at 1%and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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appropriate number of lags is no longer than 6. The information criteria suggest VAR (4) with 
a constant.95 
In the Johansen methodology, the trace test (
trace ) and maximum eigenvalue test 
(
max ) are used to determine the number of cointegration vectors (r).  In the trace  test, we test 
the null that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r against the 
alternative of more than r.  In the 
max test, we test the null that the number of cointegrating 
vectors is r against the alternative that of r+1. Table 6.10 shows that the trace test and 
maximum eigenvalue test reject the null of no cointegration (r=0) and suggest a rank of 1 at 5% 
and 10% significance level, respectively.   
Table 6.10 Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration test 
 null alternative statistics p-value 
Trace test(
trace ) 
r = 0 r ≥1 21.563** 0.0329 
r ≤ 1 r ≥2   7.363 0.1085 
Maximum eigenvalue test(
max ) 
r =0 r =1 15.892* 0.0905 
r ≤ 1 r =2   7.363 0.1085 
Notes: 1. ** and * indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 5% and 10%  
               significance level, respectively. 
            2.  r stands for the number of cointegration vectors. 
 
Hence, we may preliminarily assume that there is one cointegration vector between tr 
and ts and then construct the VECM. Because no trends appear in the two series as seen in 
Figure 6.8(a), no time trend terms are included both in the difference variable part and in the 
95  The results of the test for VAR lag structure are as follows. When extending the maximum number of lags up 
to 12, we obtain the same results. 
 Lag 
With constant No constant 
AIC SC HQ  AIC SC HQ 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
-8.575402 
-8.570775 
-8.499123 
-8.693360 
 -9.022556* 
-9.018941 
-8.936006 
-8.517928* 
-8.398353 
-8.211753 
-8.291041 
-8.505288 
-8.386725 
-8.188843 
-8.552285 
-8.501422 
-8.383535 
-8.531536 
 -8.814496* 
-8.764646 
-8.635476 
n.a. 
-8.020929 
-8.225210 
-8.651456 
 -8.979754* 
-8.938559 
-8.858242 
n.a. 
-7.905980 
-7.995313 
-8.306611 
 -8.519960* 
-8.363817 
-8.168552 
n.a. 
-7.974693 
-8.132739 
-8.512750 
 -8.794812* 
-8.707381 
-8.580830 
Notes : 1) * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
             2)  AIC: Akaike information criterion, SIC: Schwarz information criterion,   
                   HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
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cointegration part of the VECM. An intercept is included in the cointegration part but not in 
the difference variable part.  Thus, the two variables tr and ts have the following model with 4 
lags: 
 
 (6.5.4)    
ttsi i ititttTSt
ttri i ititttTRt
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tsitritstrtr
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where   = the coefficient of the cointegration vector given by ttt tstr   ; 
ttr , and tts , = white noise errors; i = number of lags. The coefficient TR ( TS ) is interpreted 
as the speed of adjustment toward long-run equilibrium.  The coefficients, )(ijk j,k=1,2 and 
i=1,2,3,4  indicate short-run responses.  We check the appropriateness of the estimated VECM by 
testing the properties of the residuals (e.g., serial correlation, normality and 
heteroskedasticity).   
The results are presented in Table 6.11. The normalised cointegration coefficient (  ) 
is -0.062 but is not significant. Furthermore, the magnitude of the cointegration vector is close 
to zero.  To see whether  is significantly different from 0, we impose a restriction on 
cointegration vector )0,1(),1(   and test the validity of the restriction. We cannot reject the 
null of (1, 0).  This indicates that there is no long-term relationship between TR and TS in 
terms of their ratios to GDP.  Now, we can conclude that the current MSB-dependent 
sterilisations may not be sustainable in the long run.  
A close look at the differential variable parts enables us to see the BOK’s short-term 
adjustment of its revenues (in the current period) to the expenditures in the previous period. 
The shaded area of the third column in Table 6.11 may suggest that the BOK seems to adjust 
its spending in line with its revenue in the short run, because the current changes in spending 
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(ΔTSt/ΔGDPt) depend on revenues in the previous periods (ΔTRt-i/ΔGDPt-i).  The expenditure 
increases in previous periods (ΔTSt-i/ΔGDPt-i) lead to the revenues decrease in the current 
period (ΔTRt/ΔGDPt), but insignificantly (see the shaded area of the second column).
96 
Table 6.11 VECM (4) estimates for the BOK’s revenue and expenditures 
   Cointegration term: (TR/GDP)t-1   − 0.117 
***  −  0.062 ×  (TS/GDP) t-1 
                                                         (0.00467)        (0.0615) 
                                                         [-3.7222]        [-1.0056] 
                     Dependent variables 
  Regressors   
Δ(TR/GDP)t Δ(TS/GDP)t 
cointegration term -0.773197*** 
 (0.23550) [-3.28327] 
-1.473358** 
 (0.62267) [-2.36619] 
Δ(TR/GDP)t-1 -0.508346** 
 (0.23065) [-2.20395] 
 1.080302* 
  (0.60986) [ 1.77138] 
Δ(TR/GDP)t-2 -0.373263 
 (0.22613) [-1.65066] 
 1.461459** 
  (0.59790) [ 2.44430] 
Δ(TR/GDP)t-3  0.097373 
 (0.19756) [ 0.49288] 
 2.028353*** 
  (0.52237) [ 3.88299] 
Δ(TR/GDP)t-4  0.101339 
 (0.13195) [ 0.76803] 
 0.679433 
  (0.34888) [ 1.94748] 
Δ(TS/GDP)t-1 -0.041205 
 (0.04686) [-0.87923] 
-0.930041*** 
  (0.12391) [-7.50555] 
Δ(TS/GDP)t-2 -0.042878 
 (0.05117) [-0.83793] 
-0.750474*** 
  (0.13530) [-5.54668] 
Δ(TS/GDP)t-3 -0.048485 
 (0.05029) [-0.96406] 
-0.662421*** 
  (0.13298) [-4.98149] 
Δ(TS/GDP)t-4 -0.026888 
 (0.04327) [-0.62134] 
-0.008632 
  (0.11442) [-0.07544] 
Adj. R-squared   0.679029  0.656545 
F-statistic 23.47770  21.31061 
Log likelihood 244.5049  160.8850 
Mean dependent -0.000394  -0.000314 
S.D. dependent 0.026291  0.067201 
Log likelihood 407.1461 
D
ia
gn
os
tic
 Adjusted Q 42.12110  < 0.1900> 
Serial correlation LM test 4.020257  <0.4033> 
Normality 1.795622 < 0.5570> 
White Heteroskedasticity test 70.77518*  <0.0624> 
Notes: 1.Standard errors in (    ) and t-value in [   ]. P-value in < >. 
            2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level,  
 respectively (critical value: 1.67, 1.99 and 2.64 at 10%, 5% and 1% significant level). 
            3. Multivariate LM test for serial correlation up to lag 12 : null is no residual autocorrelations. 
            4. Multivariate extensions of the Jarque-Bera residual normality test under the null of normality. 
  Inverse square root of residual correlation matrix (Doornik and Hansen 1994) is used. 
            5. Multivariate extensions of White’s heteroskedasticity test: null is no heteroskedasticity. 
96 Pairwise Granger causality test (1987Q1-2009Q4, lag=4) suggests that ∆TR granger causes ∆TS. 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
 ∆(TR/GDP) does not Granger Cause  ∆(TS/GDP)   78  2.08232 0.0343 
 ∆(TS/GDP) does not Granger Cause  ∆(TR/GDP)  1.48764 0.1583 
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Accordingly, it may be interpreted that the BOK’s expenditure on the purchase of 
foreign reserves appears to be subject to its revenues in previous periods in the short run, so 
that the BOK appears to make short-term efforts to some extent to adjust its expenditures 
within its budget constraints. 
 
6.5.1.5 Modified Bohn test based on general-to-specific methodology  
 
6.5.1.5 (a) General unrestricted model (GUM) 
 
Bohn test for the sustainability of MSB-dependent policy begins from (6.5.5).  Since 
pst and ∆msbt are I(0), as seen in Table 6.8, the ordinary least square can be used.   
 
(6.5.5) tititt xAmsbps   10  
 
 where iA =coefficients and itx = non-debt explanatory variables which reflect cyclical 
business and should be stationary.  In (6.5.5), it is crucial to find the control variables ( itx ) 
which should be non-debt related variables that affect tps .  
In this section, following Bohn’s (1998, 2004) argument, we first construct several 
variables to possibly cause cyclical changes in the net asset purchases and seigniorage of a CB.  
However, Bohn test, basically applying a specific-to-general strategy, may not be 
mechanically applicable to the analysis of a CB’s debt policy, because non-debt determinants 
of a CB’s primary surplus may be different from those of a government. For example, the tax 
rate should depend only on permanent government expenditures and on the debt level, and 
should be smoothed over time, according to Barro’s tax smoothing theory.  However, a CB’s 
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seigniorage is mostly determined by the private sector’s money demand that is not controlled 
by a CB but affected by the growth of the economy.   
 Hence, it is necessary to consider additional variables to avoid omitted variable 
problems when we apply Bohn test to the analysis of the CB debt policy. Because there are no 
firm theories on CB debt policies, our approach is to specify a general unrestricted model 
(GUM) which includes all possible non-debt variables (with lags) to influence a CB’s primary 
budget. The selection of candidate variables included in the GUM is based on the 
modification of theories of fiscal sustainability and evidence of CB sterilisation behaviours 
already discussed in Chapter 3 through Chapter 5. Then, we reduce the GUM to the most 
specific model without distorting data through Hendry’s general-to-specific (GETS) 
modelling principle (see Campos et al. 2005).  In particular, after checking the significance 
for coefficients of candidate variables and running diagnostic tests (e.g. autocorrelation, 
ARCH, normality, heteroskedasticity, RESET), we reduce the number of the variables and 
finally reach the most parsimonious regression forms (final model) with the relevant variables 
remaining. The process of model reduction is carried out by the function “Autometrics” 
offered by Oxmetrics 6.1.  
Using impulse-indicator saturation (IIS) at α(significant level)=0.001 in Autometrics, 
we also detect all possible outliers and structural breaks.  IIS is a recent and general method 
for detecting structural breaks and outliers,97 suggested by Hendry et al. (2009). IIS allows an 
impulse indicator for every observation among the candidate variables, so that potential 
explanatory variables can be more than the sample size. The IIS procedure can be summarized 
97 It is well known that unless outliers or breaks are not modelled, this can distort a model’s fitness, parameter 
estimates and constancy (Hendry et al. 2010, p 4). In particular, not modelling breaks can lead to estimated 
models showing unit roots when none exist. Outliers mostly result from sudden behaviour shifts or data 
measurement errors. IIS is the most general method for detecting breaks, encompassing other structural break 
tests like the Bai-Peron multiple structural test and Quant & Andrews’s single structural break test. See Hendry 
et al.(2009) and Hendry et al. (2010) for the application of the IIS. 
298 
as follows (Hendry and Mizon 2010):  
 
(i) Create impulse indicator for every observation, sst  }{1 , still including a constant. 
(ii) Divide the indicators into k blocks (that form a set of initial GUMs) and then estimate 
each them. 
(iii) Select the significant indicators from each block in terminal model and record them. 
(iv) Formulate the joint model which is the union of k terminal models, estimate the model 
and reselect the indicators. 
(v) Under the null of no outliers, αT indicators will be retained in a sample of T observations 
on average at significance level α. 
 
IIS enables one to check that the times of known shifts are correct when we use 
dummies for them and that all outlying events are included in the model. In addition, as IIS is 
a kind of robust estimation, it can jointly deal with data measurement errors and fat-tailed 
distribution by removing extreme values, as well as location shifts and innovation outliers 
(Hendry et al. 2010, p 5). 
Table 6.12 summarizes the candidate variables used to specify the GUM. All 
candidate variables reflect cyclical, domestic or external factors affecting the sterilisation 
operations and primary surplus of the CB. We first, based on Bohn (1998, 2004), choose 
cyclical non-debt variables that only temporarily affect the primary surplus: NVAR, SVAR, 
GVAR. NVAR and SVAR 98  reflect the cyclical variation of net asset purchases and 
seigniorage revenues. GVAR indicates a business cycle indicator.  
98NVAR and SVAR indicate the very short-term fluctuations of foreign reserves and monetary base caused by 
the CB’s sterilised interventions to address the sudden reversal of capital flows and the resultant instability in the 
financial markets. 
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Additional cyclical variables are selected to reflect the degree of temporary deviation 
from their trends. RVAR, FVAR and IVAR measure the temporal variation in the real interest 
rate differential between Korea and the US, exchange rate changes and inflation, respectively. 
The primary surplus is expected to be negatively related with NVAR and RVAR, but 
positively related with SVAR and FVAR.99 But the relation between primary surplus and 
GVAR or IVAR is theoretically unclear.100 
Before describing other candidate variables, it is worth commenting briefly on the 
problem of spurious cycles which may be caused by using filtered data. In Table 6.12, we 
obtain cyclical components by using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. The HP filter extracts a 
nonlinear trend component from an observed series by minimising a weighted average of the 
variability in the trend and its deviations from the actual data. The trend value is obtained by 
minimizing the following loss function:  
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tX are the logs of observed and trend respectively, n is the number of observations and  is a 
smoothing parameter: larger   indicates smoother estimates for trend and consequently a 
larger cyclical component. It is known that when integrated or nearly integrated series are 
filtered, mechanical use of HP filtering may create spurious cycle or unreal comovements 
which are not present in the original raw data (Cogley and Nason 1995).  In addition, when 
99 With other things being equal, temporary increases in net asset purchase (NVAR↑) is likely to exacerbate 
primary budget balance (ps↓); increases in temporal money supply (SVAR↑) lead to increases in seigniorage  
(ps↑); reduction in interest rate differential (RVAR↓) may increase interest incomes from foreign assets and 
reduce interest payments on the MSBs and thus improve primary budget balance(ps↑); depreciation of domestic 
currency (FVAR↑) improves primary budget (ps↑) by increasing the domestic-currency value of NFA when 
NFA>0.   
100 When the economic growth is temporarily higher than its trend (GVAR↑), growth rate of MSBs will be less 
than economic growth rate and thus PS-GDP ratio may be improved (ps↑). However, temporary economic 
growth may also lead net foreign assets to increase faster than their trend because of increasing sterilisation of 
(short-term) capital inflows, and thus PS-GDP could be worse where domestic interest rate is higher than foreign 
foreign interest rate. Given real interest rates, inflation leads to an increase in nominal interest rates which 
imposes an additional interest burden on the MSBs. However, the real value of the MSBs also reduces as 
inflation goes up, and thus the two effects may be offset. 
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filtered series are used in dynamic econometric models, the models are likely to suffer the 
omitted variable problem and the autocorrelation problem. 
To tackle these problems, we first HP-filter only the stationary variables except real 
GDP.  Second, we adjust the data using the same smoothing parameter (  =1600) for all 
variables, to get consistent estimators. Third, considering the possibility of inconsistent and 
inefficient estimates stemming from HP-filtering, we carefully examine the possible residual 
autocorrelation and also use HAC standard errors. 
The noncyclical factors included in the GUM are the determinants of monetary 
operations or sterilised FX interventions, which ultimately affect a CB’s primary budget. A 
CB’s  operations in domestic and FX markets are influenced by FX volatility (SDFX), interest 
rate volatility (SDRATE), deviation of FX rate from its trend (FXDEV), stock price change 
(STOCK),101 short-term capital flows measured by net portfolio investments and short-term 
borrowing from non-residents (PFOT), current accounts (CA), oil price changes (OIL), and 
government budget balance (FIS). DVAR represents the CB’s non-linear adjustments of its 
primary budget to changes in MSB. The coefficient of DVAR is expected to be positive if the 
CB responds more to the larger changes in MSBs. The ADF unit root test suggests that all 
candidate variables are stationary, as shown in Table 6.12, so that OLS can be applied. 
Considering the unit period of the BOK’s fiscal accounting (1 year) and the average 
maturity of the MSBs (11.2 months as of the end of 2009), we use the following ARDL 
specification with contemporaneous values and four lags of each variable: 
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101 The share of foreigners in Korean stock markets (in terms of market value) has maintained at approximately 
35-40% in the 2000s, which is the highest in Asia. Consequently, Korean stock price mostly rises when 
foreigners, rather than domestic investors, increase the purchase of Korean stock. So, a stock price rise leads to 
the BOK’s USD purchasing interventions, which increases sterilisation cost in most cases and ultimately 
exacerbates the primary budget of the BOK. 
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Table 6.12 Candidate variables used in the GUM 
Name Implication  Measurement ADF test 
(a) Cyclical variables: based on Bohn’s argument(1998, 2007) 
NVAR Level of temporary  net 
asset purchases  
ttt yNANA /)(
* where NA = net asset purchases;  
y = real GDP (Bohn 1998) 
-2.8653 
(0.0046) 
SVAR Level of temporary 
seigniorage   revenues 
ttt yHH /)(
* where H= real money base  
(Bohn 1998)  
-2.9015 
(0.0042) 
GVAR Business cycle indicator
 )/)(/(
**
tttt yGEyyy   
where GE = government expenditure (Bohn 1998) 
-5.1967 
(0.0000) 
RVAR Level of temporary 
variation in interest rate 
differential
 
** /)( ttt diffdiffdiff  where diff = difference 
between unsecured O/N call money rate and US fed 
fund rate 
-9.1519 
(0.0000) 
FVAR Level of temporary 
variation in FX rates
 
** /)( ttt SSS  where S = spot exchange rate 
(in log) 
-6.8911 
(0.0000) 
IVAR Cyclical variation in 
inflation
 
** /)( ttt ppp   where p=CPI (in log) -8.1071 
(0.0000) 
(b) Domestic factors related to OMOs: based on empirical results of Ch3 to 5 
FIS Government budget 
surplus(or deficit) 
Share to GDP; indicative of a CB’s concern about a 
government budget status 
-3.0789 
(0.0332) 
STOCK Growth rate of stock 
market price  
Log difference of Korean stock price index(KOSPI);
 Indicative of foreigners’ investment sentiment (or 
foreigners’ demand for domestic currency)  
-5.7534 
(0.0000) 
SRATE Volatility of O/N 
interest rate 
Standard deviation of unsecured O/N call money rate; 
indicative of uncertainty in money market 
-3.0507 
(0.0356) 
DVAR Non-linear behaviour of 
a CB  
2
1 )( msbmsbt    where msb = unconditional  
mean; non-linear reactions of the CB to ∆MSBs
 
ADF:-0.7234(0.0756) 
PP: -8.1640(0.0000) 
(c ) External factors related to sterilised FXIs: based on empirical results of Ch3 to 5 
FXDEV FX rate deviation from 
its trend 
matmatt FXFXFX 200,200, /)(  where matFX 200, = 200 day 
backward moving average of KRW-USD spot rate; 
indicative of the necessity of FXI
 
-5.0258 
(0.0001) 
SDFX Volatility of spot 
exchange rate 
Standard deviation of daily spot FX rate within a 
quarter; indicative of uncertainty in FX market and 
the necessity of sterilised FXI 
-3.7398 
(0.0056) 
CA Current account Share to GDP; indicative of the degree and direction 
of sterilised FXI 
-2.3004 
(0.0218) 
PFOT Short-term capital flows Share to GDP; sum of short-term borrowing and 
portfolio investments from non-residential(net);  
indicative of the degree and direction of sterilised FXI 
-6.0114 
(0.0000) 
OIL Oil price change Log difference of Dubai spot price index; 
Indicative of  the demand for foreign exchanges   
-6.8512 
(0.0000) 
Notes: 1. * indicate the HP-filtered trend of each series. 
            2. KPSS test for DVAR cannot reject the null of I(0) at 1% significance level. 
            3. The figures in (   ) indicate the p-values. 
Sources: IMF IFS, Datastream, BOK 
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6.5.1.5(b) Final model   
 
The final model selected by Autometrics has 11 regressors, which include different 
lags as presented in the Table 6.13(a).   
 
Table 6.13 Information on final model: Bohn test for MSBs 
(a) Regression model :dependent variable = PSt (primary surplus/GDP) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value  p-value 
constant     0.006 0.002 2.88 0.006 
PSt-4 0.642 0.044 14.70 0.000 
ΔMSBt-1 -0.849 0.034 -25.10 0.000 
ΔMSB t-3 -0.069 0.026 -2.67 0.010 
ΔMSBt-4 0.658 0.038 17.30 0.000 
NVARt-1 -8.102 1.724 -4.70 0.000 
SVARt-4 10.223 3.571 2.86 0.006 
FVARt-2 0.126 0.021 5.87 0.000 
FVARt-3 -0.061 0.022 -2.79 0.007 
IVARt 0.003 0.001 4.42 0.000 
STOCKt-2 -0.032 0.011 -3.06 0.003 
STOCKt-4 0.020 0.010 2.04 0.046 
ΔOILt 0.033 0.008 4.00 0.000 
OIL t-1 0.026 0.008 3.11 0.003 
OIL t-4 -0.018 0.008 -2.19 0.033 
SDRATE t 4.157 0.749 5.55 0.000 
SDRATE t-1 -4.006 0.744 -5.39 0.000 
SDFX t -0.256 0.099 -2.59 0.012 
FIS t-2 -0.105 0.027 -3.85 0.000 
          Note: Contemporaneous values and four lags of the series are used in the GUM. 
 
(b) Additional information 
Sigma )ˆ(  0.0089 RSS 0.0045 
R2 0.9634 F(18,57)= 63.97 (0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.9519 log-likelihood 262.206 
no.of observations 76 no.of parameters 19 
Mean (ps) 0.0031 se(ps) 0.0404 
         Note:  p-value in (     ) 
(c) Residual diagnostic test output 
Test(null) Distribution Statistics p-value 
No Autocorrelation F(5,52) 1.7290 0.1444 
No ARCH F(4,68) 0.3664 0.8317 
Normality χ2(2) 0.4180 0.8114 
No Heteroskedasticity F(36,39) 1.2947 0.2149 
Correct functional form(RESET) F(2,55) 0.3681 0.6937 
 
The signs of the coefficients are, in general, consistent with prior expectations and 
also significant. Particularly, primary surpluses are positively related with SVAR, FVAR and 
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O I L ,  and negatively related with NVAR, SDFX and FIS. For example, the estimated 
coefficient of NVARt-1 is significantly negative, indicating that current cyclical increases in 
foreign asset purchases worsen the BOK’s primary surplus in the next quarter. On the other 
hand, the coefficient of SVARt-4 is significantly positive, which indicates that a cyclical 
increase in monetary base will improve the primary budget with time lags.  Estimated 
coefficients for ΔMSBt-1, ΔMSBt-3 and ΔMSBt-4 of interest to us, are -0.85, -0.07 and 0.66 
respectively and all significant at 1% level.  This suggests that the increase in MSBs in 
previous periods does not induce the BOK’s budget adjustment in the current period. Since 
the sum of the coefficients is negative, the dynamic effects of ΔMSB on the primary surplus 
appear to be negative, implying that the current sterilisation is unsustainable.  
Table 6.13(b) provides some information on the degree of fitness of the final model.  
Because estimated standard deviation, sigma )ˆ( =0.0089, is much smaller than the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable, se(ps)=0.0404, the model explains some of the variation 
in primary surpluses well. Adjusted R2=0.95 and highly significant. F test statistics also 
support the excellent fitness of this model.  Table 6.13(c) shows that the final model passes all 
misspecification tests.  
Figure 6.10 shows a plot of the actual and fitted values of the final model, a plot of 
scaled residual over time, a residual histogram and an autocorrelation function (ACF) and 
partial autocorrelation function (PACF). These plots suggest that the final model fits primary 
surpluses very well, that residuals are homoscedastic and non-autocorrelated, and that the 
estimated density is close to the ideal normal distribution, as already confirmed by the 
residual diagnostic tests in Table 6.13(c).  
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Figure 6.10 Fitted value and residual from final model for BOK primary surplus  
 
 
However, the aforementioned final model is quite difficult to interpret due to the 
lagged dependent variables and the regressors with lags. Thus, we consider the long-run 
solution or equilibrium between the variables, which strips out all dynamics. The error 
correction type model (ECM) provides steady state impacts of the explanatory variables on 
the primary surplus.  The coefficient of each regressor can be considered as the sum of all 
partial derivatives to infinity, e.g. the full impact of a change in MSBs in the current quarter 
on primary surplus over an indefinite horizon (Reade 2011, p180).  The static long run 
solution produced via Oxmetrics is: 
 
ECM: PS = 0.0154  -  0.7300*ΔMSB - 22.6396*NVAR + 28.5690*SVAR 
                     (0.005)     (0.000)                (0.000)                  (0.006)   
                  + 0.1807*FVAR + 0.0085*IVAR - 0.0358*ΔSTOCK  
       (0.001)                 (0.000)               (0.387) 
                 + 0.1159*ΔOIL + 0.4207*SDRATE - 0.7162*SDFX - 0.2933*FIS 
                     (0.006)              (0.615)                     (0.009)                (0.001) 
 
   WALD test: χ2(2) = 106.81 (0.000)  
 
   Note:  p-values in (   ) 
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Most of the steady state coefficients are significant except those on ΔSTOCK and 
SDRATE. The coefficients for ΔMSB have a significantly negative value of -0.73, which 
implies that the BOK’s primary surplus-to-GDP ratio decreases by about 0.73% against a 1% 
point increase of the ∆MSB-to-GDP ratio. This indicates that the BOK does not attempt to 
increase its primary budget in response to the increase in MSBs. This result supports evidence 
of standard stationary tests that current MSB-dependent sterilisation is not sustainable.  
The negative coefficient on FIS indicates that as Korean government attempts to run 
fiscal surplus, the burden of the BOK’s involvement in FXIs will be larger and thereby the 
BOK’s primary budget will become worse.  That is, it is likely that the BOK would be asked 
to take a larger share of the financing for sterilised interventions if the government is in 
financial distress. A high volatility of the FX rate (SDFX) leads to a high degree of 
sterilisation and hence increases sterilisation cost.  A rise in oil prices is likely to induce 
increasing demand for USD and thereby depreciate domestic currency in an oil-importing 
country like Korea, because oil price is mostly denominated in USD. Accordingly, the 
resultant depreciation of KRW will lead to an increase in the BOK’s sales of foreign assets. 
The sales, in most cases, have positive effects on the BOK’s primary surplus due to the 
intervention profit that is realised (see Chapter 3). In addition, the depreciation of nominal 
exchange rates is positively related to the increase in primary surplus owing to valuation 
effect. The signs of the coefficients for ΔSTOCK and SDRATE are negative and positive as 
expected, but not significant.  
Figure 6.11 shows recursive estimates of all coefficients from the final model for the 
BOK’s primary surplus. This figure enables us to see whether the coefficients are constant 
over the entire period. There seem to be no apparent structural breaks because the coefficients 
all settle down to their final values quickly and remain there.  
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Figure 6.11 Recursive estimates of regression coefficients  
 
 
6.5.2 Test for consolidated debts of Korean government and the BOK 
 
6.5.2.1. Univariate stationary test for consolidated fiscal variables 
 
In the previous sections, considering only the budget constraints of the BOK, we see 
that three different tests all support the non-sustainability of the BOK’s MSB-dependent 
sterilisation. In this section, we consolidate the balance sheets of the Korean government and 
the BOK to evaluate the MSB-dependent sterilisations at a national-level perspective. We use 
quarterly fiscal data for the Korean government which is only available for the period 
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1994Q1-2009Q4.  The plots of the consolidated fiscal series are presented in Figure 6.12.   
 
Figure 6.12 Plots of consolidated fiscal variables of the Korean government and BOK 
 
 
 
 
 
                           Data: Ministry of Strategy and Finance of Korea, BOK 
 
 
Consolidated debts (CD), revenues (CTR) and expenditures (CTE) show increasing 
trends over time in real terms. However, the plots of the variables scaled by GDP show 
somewhat different patterns.  In particular, both CTR and CTE seem to grow less than GDP in 
the 2000s. Consolidated primary surplus (CPS) has fluctuated over the entire period. In 1998, 
2004 and 2008 when the Korean economy was depressed or under financial crisis, the 
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consolidated budget showed huge deficits.   
The procedures of sustainability test in this section are exactly the same as those in 
the previous sections. Table 6.14 presents the results of unit root tests for the level, first 
difference of real fiscal variables and their ratios to GDP.  Overall, the results of stationarity 
test for the consolidated fiscal series are similar to those for the BOK’s fiscal data, with a few 
exceptions. First, consolidated (undiscounted) debts (CD=Korean treasury bonds+MSBs) 
scaled by GDP and in real terms are tested as I(1) by both the KPSS and PP unit root test, and 
as I(2) by the ADF test. Note that the second difference stationarity of a debt series is a 
necessary condition for weak sustainability (Quintos 1995) and is often found in the series of 
government debt. Second, consolidated total revenues (CTR = tax revenue + seigniorage + 
interest income from net foreign assets) and consolidated total expenditures 
(CTE=government expenditure+foreign asset purchase of the BOK+interest payments on 
treasury bonds and MSB) are at most I(1) at both their level and their ratio to GDP.  Third, 
consolidated primary surplus (CPS=CTR – non-interest expenditures of government and BOK) 
and total budget surplus (CTS=CTR-CTE) are I(0).  Because both CTR and CTE are I(1) at 
most, we can use the Johansen cointegration test. 
We first use Wilcox tests for the discounted consolidated debt (CD) in real terms and 
its ratio to GDP. As presented in Table 6.15, both the discounted CD and CD-to-GDP ratio are 
non-stationary, so that we may, at this stage, conclude that the current sterilisation is 
unsustainable.  However, notice that the Wilcox condition is not a necessary condition for 
sustainability. Thus, we proceed to the next step for sustainability test – cointegration based 
test. 
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Table 6.14 Unit root tests for consolidated fiscal variables  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      (Sample: 1994Q1 – 2009Q4) 
                                    Test statistics 
Variables 
Levels First difference verdict 
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS  
Consolidated Debt(CD)
         
Real1 c,t -0.392 0.292 0.972*** -2.419 -5.833*** 0.290 I(1): PP, KPSS; I(2): ADF 
Real per GDP c,t -1.117 -0.634 0.951*** -2.130 -10.660*** 0.153 I(1): PP, KPSS; I(2): ADF 
Consolidated total revenue (CTR)         
Real  c,t -0.729 -1.031 0.983*** -12.549*** -12.559*** 0.077 I(1): all 
Real per GDP c,t -1.630 -2.912** 0.789** -3.779*** -18.727*** 0.220 I(1): ADF, KPSS;  I(0) :PP 
Consolidated total expenditures (CTE)         
Real  c,t -1.700 -1.382*** 0.987 -7.821*** -22.467*** 0.252 I(1): ADF;  I(0): PP, KPSS  
Real per GDP c,t -3.634*** -3.525** 0.721** -4.284*** -20.485*** 0.403* I(0): ADF, PP;  I(1):KPSS 
Consolidate primary surplus (CPS)         
Real  c -3.853*** -3.913*** 0.142 -7.018*** -11.478*** 0.195 I(0): all 
Real per GDP c -4.080*** -4.069*** 0.068 -9.800*** -12.106*** 0.027 I(0): all 
Consolidated total  surplus(CTS)          
Real  c -3.633*** -3.670*** 0.254 -6.922*** -9.487*** 0.130 I(0): all 
Real per GDP  c -3.822*** -3.688*** 0.256 -9.493*** -9.877*** 0.197 I(0): all 
Notes: 1. The series are measured as follows: 
ttt DMSBCD  ; tttt TNArHCTR  1 ; tttttt GEDMSBrNACTE   )( 1 ; tttt GENACTRCPS  ;   ttt CTSCTRCTS   
           2. Although ADF test suggests that CD is I(2), we assume that CD is I(1) because KPSS and PP test suggest that CD is I(1).  
           3. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
           4. c and t indicate that unit root test form includes an intercept and deterministic trend term, respectively 
5. When we include both time trend and intercept in the test form for CPS and CTS (or exclude time trend in the test for CD,CTR and CTE), the test results are same. 
           6. In KPSS and PP test, the spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel, and bandwidth is selected by Newey-West’s method. 
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Table 6.15 Wilcox test for the discounted consolidated debt and its ratio to GDP 
           Test statistics 
Variables 
Levels First difference Breaks 
verdict 
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS Zivot-Andrews 
Consolidated 
debt(CD) 
c 0.111 (0) 0.939*** (6) -5.832*** (0) 0.266 (2) 
-4.012 
I(1) 
c,t -1.996 (0) 0.149**(6) -5.777*** (0) 0.214* (1) I(1) 
CD-GDP ratio 
c -1.059 (5) 0.942*** (6) -3.773*** (4) 0.169 (12) 
-3.925 
I(1) 
c,t -1.285 (5) 0.134*(5) -3.766*** (4) 0.162 (12) I(1) 
Notes: 1. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
           2. c and t indicate that unit root test form includes an intercept and deterministic trend term, respectively. 
   3. Null hypothesis is I(1) in ADF and I(0) in KPSS test. The figures in parentheses indicate the number of lags
 selected by AIC in ADF test and Newey-West  bandwidth estimated by Bartlett kernel in KPSS test. 
           4. Null hypothesis is I(1)  and the alternative is I(0) with a break in Zivot-Andrews test (maximum lag=12). The 
series are tested with an intercept.. 
 
 
6.5.2.2 Cointegration between consolidated revenues and expenditures 
 
 
We employ Johansen’s methodology to test for cointegration between consolidated 
total revenue (ctr=CTR/GDP) and consolidated total expenditure (cte=CTE/GDP).  
Considering the budget planning process explained in the previous section, the maximum 
number of lags is assumed to be 6. The information criteria suggest 4 lagged VAR with 
constant.102  Table 6.16 shows that both the trace test and maximum eigenvalue test reject the 
null of no-cointegration (r=0) and suggest a cointegration rank of 1 – at a 1% significance 
level. 
 
  
102 The results of the test for VAR lag structure are as follows. When extending the maximum number of lags up 
to 12, we obtain the same results. 
 With constant Without constant 
 FPE AIC SC HQ FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 1.74e-05 
 1.20e-05 
 1.25e-05 
  9.87e-06* 
 1.02e-05 
 1.16e-05 
-5.284311 
-5.658575 
-5.619071 
 -5.853943* 
-5.825716 
-5.697590 
-5.142211 
 -5.374376* 
-5.192772 
-5.285545 
-5.115219 
-4.844993 
-5.228960 
-5.547874 
-5.453019 
 -5.632540* 
-5.548963 
-5.365487 
 4.39e-05 
 1.54e-05 
 1.19e-05 
 1.26e-05 
  1.02e-05* 
 1.05e-05 
 1.19e-05 
-4.358744 
-5.404964 
-5.663027 
-5.605269 
 -5.820080* 
-5.802408 
-5.676722 
-4.287694 
-5.191814 
 -5.307778* 
-5.107921 
-5.180633 
-5.020860 
-4.753075 
-4.331069 
-5.321938 
-5.524650 
-5.411542 
 -5.571003* 
-5.497979 
-5.316943 
   Notes : 1. * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
                2. FPE: Final prediction error,  AIC: Akaike information criterion, 
                    SC: Schwarz information criterion,  HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
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Table 6.16 Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration test 
 Null Alternative Statistics p-value 
Trace test(
trace ) r = 0 r ≥1 19.107*** 0.003 
r ≤ 1 r ≥2 1.759 0.217 
Maximum eigenvalue test(
max ) r =0 r =1 17.348*** 0.004 
r ≤ 1 r =2 1.759 0.217 
Notes: 1. Asterisks (***) indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1%  
   significance level, respectively. 
           2.  r stands for the number of cointegration vectors. 
 
 
Now, we preliminarily assume that there is one cointegration vector between ctr and 
cte and then construct the VECM. No time trend terms are included either in the differential 
variable part and or the cointegration part of the VECM.  An intercept is included in the 
cointegration part but not in the difference variable part.  Thus, the two variables ctr and cte 
have the following model with four lags: 
 
 (6.5.7)  tctri i ititttTRt cteictrictectrctr ,
4
1
4
1 121111
)()()(        
              tctei i ititttTSt
cteictrictectrcte ,
4
1
4
1 221211
)()()(        
 
where  = the coefficient of the cointegration vector given by ttt ctectr   , 
tctr , and tcte, = white-noise errors. We check the appropriateness of the estimated VECM by 
testing the properties of the residuals.  The results are presented in Table 6.17.  The 
normalised cointegration coefficient (  ) is -0.96 at 1% significant level. At first glance, the 
coefficient indicates that the sterilisation policy is sustainable in the context of the weak form.  
To see whether the coefficient (-0.96) is statistically different from -1, we impose the 
restriction of the cointegration vector (1,  ) = (1, -1) and test the validity of the restriction. The 
likelihood ratio (LR) test (Chi-square 0.0287, p-value 0.87) suggests that the estimated 
correlation vector is not significantly different from (1, -1). 
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Table 6.17 VECM (4) estimates for the consolidated revenue and expenditure 
 
Cointegration term: (CTR/GDP)t-1   −  0.05     −   0. 96
***×  (CTE/GDP) t-1 
                                                           (0.092)      (0.169) 
                                                           [-0.524]    [-5.699] 
                         Dependent variables 
Regressors   
Δ(CTR/GDP)t  Δ(CTE/GDP)t 
cointegration term -0.239580*** 
(0.08790) [-2.72550] 
 
 
0.315889* 
(0.17214) [ 1.83508] 
Δ(CTR/GDP)t-1 -0.579019*** 
(0.13635) [-4.24666] 
 
 
-0.610011** 
(0.26701) [-2.28463] 
Δ(CTR/GDP)t-2 -0.073099 
(0.15637) [-0.46749] 
 
 
0.007156 
(0.30621) [ 0.02337] 
Δ(CTR/GDP)t-3 -0.045991 
(0.15288) [-0.30082] 
 
 
0.062345 
(0.29939) [ 0.20824] 
Δ(CTR/GDP)t-4 0.176856 
(0.13845) [ 1.27742] 
 
 
0.281379 
(0.27112)[ 1.03784] 
Δ(CTE/GDP)t-1 -0.213191** 
(0.09589) [-2.22336] 
 
 
0.023111 
(0.18777) [ 0.12308] 
Δ(CTE/GDP)t-2 -0.352178*** 
(0.09417) [-3.73964] 
-0.174666 
(0.18442) [-0.94711] 
Δ(CTE/GDP)t-3 -0.306156*** 
(0.09807) [-3.12181] 
0.011496 
(0.19205) [ 0.05986] 
Δ(CTE/GDP)t-4 -0.069447 
(0.09681) [-0.71738] 
0.257234 
(0.18957)[ 1.35690] 
Adj. R-squared 
 F-statistic 
 Log likelihood 
 Mean dependent 
 S.D. dependent 
0.551326 
9.908741 
113.4813 
0.001942 
0.057334  
0.305077 
4.182807 
73.82935 
0.004435 
0.090216 
  Log likelihood 192.1273 
  Diagnostic    
Adjusted Q 21.01067< 0.9703 > 
Serial correlation LM test 5.662224< 0.2258> 
Normality 1.931491< 0.3807 > 
White Heteroskedasticity test 163.9952< 0.4414> 
Notes: 1. Standard errors in (    ) and t-value in [   ]. P-value in < >. 
            2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level,  
 Respectively (critical value: 1.67, 1.99 and 2.64 at 10%, 5% and 1% significant level).   
            3. Multivariate LM test for serial correlation up to lag 12: null is no residual autocorrelations. 
            4. Multivariate extensions of the Jarque-Bera residual normality test under the null of normality.        
                Inverse square root of residual correlation matrix (Doornik and Hansen 1994) is used. 
       5. Multivariate extensions of White’s heteroskedasticity test: null is no heteroskedasticity.  
 
The existence of cointegration vector close to (1-1) indicates that the source of fiscal 
adjustments in Korea is evident in the long run, so that we may now conclude that the 
sterilisation policy is strongly sustainable. This result contrasts with the case where there is no 
cointegration relation between the total revenues and total expenditures of the BOK.  Hence, 
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based on the cointegration analysis, we conclude that the current MSB-dependent sterilisation 
appears sustainable, but that the source of sustainability comes from the Korean government’s 
taxation capacity or budget surplus, not from the BOK’s adjustment activities. 
To see the short-run dynamics of CTE and CTR, we consider the signs and 
significance of the coefficients for the difference part of the VECM (see the shaded area of  
the second column in Table 6.17).  The coefficient of cointegration (or error-correction) term 
is significant with −0.2396, indicating that if disequilibrium occurs owing to a percentage 
point increase in CTE-to-GDP in one period, CTR-to-GDP will increase 0.2396 percentage 
points during the next quarter to restore equilibrium, and vice versa. In the second column of 
Table 6.17, the coefficients of Δ(CTR/GDP)t-1 are significantly negative, indicating on average 
a negative autocorrelation in CTR. The coefficients for Δ(CTE/GDP)t-i  are, in general negative 
and highly significant (up to lag 3), indicating that increases in CTE in previous periods lead 
to decreases in current CTR. It may be interpreted that the authorities appear not to react to 
changes in spending by increasing revenues in the short term.   
To sum up, although the Korean government and the BOK appear not to respond to 
the increasing MSBs in the short run, they have adjusted their consolidated budgets in order to 
maintain long-term equilibrium between total revenues and total expenses. This finding 
provides evidence that the current MSB-dependent sterilisation policy may be sustainable in 
the long run. However, the source of the sustainability is not the BOK’s budget strength but 
that of the Korean government.  
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6.5.2.3 Modified Bohn test based on general-to-specific methodology 
 
In this section, we estimate whether the BOK and the Korean government adjust 
their (consolidated) budget together to changes in their consolidated debt.  We use same 
general-to-specific methods as we did in the Bohn test for the BOK’s budget constraint in the 
previous section.  We use cyclical variables to influence not only the CB’s budget but also the 
government’s fiscal status. Based on Bohn (1998), we use the same candidate variables 
(shown in Table 6.12) in the GUM, except that SVAR and NVAR are replaced by EVAR and 
REVAR. EVAR and REVAR indicate the level of temporary expenditure and revenues of 
consolidated government, respectively. They are measured as )/( * tt yCTECTEEVAR 
)/( * tt yCTRCTRREVAR  . With other things being equal, temporary increases in 
consolidated expenditure (EVAR↑) are likely to worsen primary budget balance (cps↓). 
Increases in temporary consolidated revenue (REVAR↑) improve the consolidated primary 
budget (cps↑).  Hence the coefficients on EVAR and REVAR are expected to have negative 
and positive sign respectively. We include all candidate variables in the GUM with 4 lags and 
IIP (impulse indicator saturation) at α=0.001. The specification of the GUM is: 
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where 
tttttttt GDPNAGENArHTRcps /)( 1
*    and ttttttt GDPMSBGDPDmsbdcd //  .  
The final model is presented in Table 6.18.  Most of the coefficients have expected signs and 
are significant. For example, the coefficients on EVARt and RVARt-2 are negative, indicating 
that temporary increases in consolidated expenditures and domestic-foreign interest rate 
difference lead to a worsening of the consolidated primary budget.  The coefficients on 
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cyclical revenue increase (i.e., REVARt and REVARt-4) are all positive. In particular, the 
coefficient on 1 tcd , of interest to us, is 0.21 with a p-value 0.016, indicating that the increase 
of 1% point in consolidated debt-to-GDP ratio in the current quarter leads to a 0.21 % point 
increase in consolidated primary surplus-to-GDP ratio in the next quarter. Although the 
coefficient on 2 tcd  has a negative value with -0.08, the coefficient is much less than the 
coefficient on 1 tcd  in absolute value, and insignificant. This indicates that current MSB-
dependent sterilisations may be sustainable, which is consistent with the results of the 
cointegration analysis in the previous section.  
 
Table 6.18 Information on final model: Bohn test for consolidated debt 
    (a) Final regression model: dependent variable consolidated primary surplus (CPSt) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error   t-value P-value 
Constant 0.041  0.010  4.20  0.000  
cps t-1 0.466  0.072  6.51  0.000  
 cdt-1 0.208  0.082  2.54  0.016  
 cd t-2 -0.080  0.077  -1.04  0.306  
REVAR t 1.208  0.225  5.37  0.000  
REVARt-4 0.022 0.003  7.83  0.000  
EVAR t -1.269  0.232  -5.46  0.000  
RVAR t-2 -0.015  0.003  -4.33  0.000  
IVARt-2 -0.008  0.003  -2.92  0.006  
GVAR t-2 -0.018  0.004  -4.63  0.000  
SDRATE t-2 7.531  2.333  3.23  0.003  
SDRATE t-3 -8.981  2.114  -4.25  0.000  
I1997Q2 -0.091  0.029  -3.14  0.003  
I2004Q1 -0.218  0.030  -7.25  0.000  
I2005Q1 -0.291  0.031  -9.25  0.000  
                Note: The final model is selected from a GUM with 4 lags and IIS at α=0.001 
   (b) Additional information 
Sigma )ˆ(  0.0275235 RSS 0.0265139933 
R2 0.9254 F(18,57)= 31.01 (0.000)** 
Adj. R2 0.89556 log-likelihood 117.606 
no. of observations 50 no. of parameters 15 
mean(cps) 0.041984 se(cps) 0.0851669 
            Note: p-value in (    ) 
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 (c) Residual diagnostic test output 
Test(null) Distribution Statistics p-value 
No Autocorrelation F(4,31) 2.5140 0.0616 
No ARCH F(4,42) 0.99252 0.4222 
Normality χ2(2) 3.1779 0.2041 
No Heteroskedasticity F(22,24) 0.60048 0.8833 
Correct functional form(RESET) F(2,33) 0.19862 0.8208 
 
The impulse-indicator saturation suggests three dummy variables: 1997Q2, 2004Q1 
and 2005Q1.  That is, the main impulses in the final model are large drops in consolidated 
primary surplus in 2004Q1 and 2005Q1 and relatively smaller impacts in 1997Q2. These 
outliers are due mainly to the fiscal deficit during the 1997 financial crisis and rapid increases 
in government bonds due to institutional changes in 2004-2005.  That is, after the 1997 
financial crisis, the Korean government raised public funds for financial sector restructuring 
by issuing Deposit Insurance Fund Bonds and Non-performing Asset Resolution Fund Bonds 
(which were not included in government bonds at the time when they were issued).  The 
public bonds were redeemed by newly issued government bonds for 2003-2005.  This result 
support previous studies that the debt of the Korean government began to enter the 
unsustainable region in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis (see Croce & Juan-Ramon 2003). 
Figure 6.13 (together with above Tables 6.18(b) and 6.18(c)) suggests that the final 
model fits the consolidated primary surpluses very well. Thus, we can proceed to the next step 
to estimate the long-run coefficients. The long-run solution yields following steady-state 
coefficients:  
 
  ECM: cps = 0.0766 + 0.2403* cd + 2.3053*REVAR – 2.3774*EVAR 
 (0.0000)   (0.0291)          (0.0002)                (0.0002) 
- 0.0277*RVAR – 0.0150*IVAR – 0.0334*GVAR – 0.7158*SDRATE 
                      (0.0008)               (0.0096)             (0.0005)              (0.1246) 
 
  WALD test: χ2(10) = 67.5094 (0.000)  
  Note: p-value in (     ) 
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The coefficient on cd indicates the steady-state impact of the increase in 
consolidated debt(CD) on the consolidated primary surplus (CPS). A percentage point 
increase in the CD-to-GDP ratio will lead to a 0.24 % point long-term increase in CPS-to-
GDP. This indicates that the BOK and Korean government jointly increase their primary 
surplus in response to the increasing MSBs or government bonds. Consequently, we conclude 
that when government budgets are considered, the BOK’s MSB-dependent sterilisation may 
be sustainable. This finding is consistent with the result from the cointegration tests in the 
previous section.  
 
Figure 6.13 Fitted value and residual from final model for consolidated primary surplus 
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6.6 Conclusion  
 
6.6.1 Summary of main findings 
 
This chapter examines the sustainability of the CB’s sterilisation policy depending on 
the CB’s interest bearing bonds (i.e., MSBs). The main purpose is to answer the question 
about whether the current amount of the MSB outstanding is too large for the CB to continue 
its sterilisation policy. For this, we decompose the “consolidated” government intertemporal 
budget constraints into the separate budget constraints of a CB and a government. The 
separate consideration of the budget constraints of these two authorities (which are considered 
as a single entity in most studies) provides an analytical tool to assess the sustainability of the 
CB’s sterilisations using MSBs.  
Based on the theories on fiscal sustainability, we first derive the intertemporal budget 
constraint (IBC) of a CB, and then view the sustainability conditions. The IBC postulates that 
the current MSB-dependent sterilisation policy will be sustainable if the current stock of the 
MSB outstanding is equal to the present value of the CB’s future primary surplus 
(=seigniorage+interest incomes from foreign reserves−purchases of net foreign assets). The 
IBC requires that the CB ensure the future primary surplus whose present value adds up to the 
current value of the MSBs by increasing seigniorage, by increasing interest income from 
foreign assets or by decreasing purchases of foreign assets in the future, so that its current 
sterilisations are permanently sustainable. Then, we set up several empirical models and 
provide the sequential test procedure for evaluating the sustainability of the MSB-dependent 
sterilisation policy.  
Three test methods modified from fiscal sustainability theory are investigated: (i) 
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univariate stationary tests for discounted MSBs; (ii)cointegration test for the CB’s revenues 
and expenditures; (iii) Bohn’s reaction function-based test. Unlike the first two stationarity-
based tests, Bohn test emphasizes the CB’s intentional response of adjusting the primary 
surplus to the change in MSBs irrespective of the effects of cyclical business factors on fiscal 
variables. Since neither the stationarity-based tests nor the Bohn test provide the necessary 
condition but sufficient condition, we need to use the sustainability tests together or 
selectively depending on data availability.   
Three sustainability tests using quarterly Korean data for 1987-2009 suggest that, 
overall, MSB-dependent sterilisation policy in Korea may not be sustainable when only the 
BOK budget is considered, but sustainable when the government budget is analysed together 
with that of the BOK.  In particular, when limiting the estimation only to the BOK’s 
intertemporal budget constraints, all three tests present evidence against the sustainability of 
the MSB-dependent policy in Korea. The BOK’s current sterilisation policy may not be 
sustainable, because the BOK has neither increased seigniorage nor reduced the build-up of 
foreign reserves significantly. This may be related with the shift of monetary policy regime in 
1999 and strong necessity of sterilisation for the increasing domestic liquidity caused by a 
huge amount of capital inflows and current account surplus during the 2000s.   
However, the tests for the consolidated budget of the BOK and the Korean 
government show that current sterilisation policy is sustainable. Consequently, the 
sustainability of the current MSB-dependent sterilisation policy may not come from the 
BOK’s adjustments of its budget constraint but the Korean government’s taxation capacity or 
budget surplus. This may ultimately impair the BOK’s monetary policy independence from 
the Korean government.   
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6.6.2 Limitations of study and future research 
 
As explained so far, fiscal sustainability theories can be, in principle, applied to the 
investigation on the sustainability of CBs’ MSB-dependent sterilisation policies.  However, it 
is noteworthy that there are two limitations in such an application in practice. First, CBs 
would not be able to easily increase their revenues in response to weakening sustainability of 
their current policy as governments do. This is because increases in seigniorage or interest 
income from foreign reserves are beyond most CBs’ control particularly in small open 
emerging economies. For example, raising seigniorage may conflict with CBs’ main 
objectives – price stability. Return on foreign reserves is determined mainly by international 
interest rates rather than by CBs investment.  Meanwhile, governments can increase tax 
revenues when they suffer severe fiscal debts. Second, most CBs in emerging counties are 
subject to government directives in interventions in FX markets. Hence, even if CBs face with 
serious sustainability problems, they cannot make their own decisions to change intervention 
behaviours. That is, they cannot reduce or stop foreign-currency buying interventions for their 
own accord owing to political pressure. For example, even the Fed has still at times 
unwillingly participated in interventions initiated by US Treasury because “appearing not to 
cooperate in a legitimate policy action of the administration would raise market uncertainty 
and could sabotage the operation’s chances for success”(Bordo et al. 2011). Congress has 
frequently cautioned that the FRB should conform to the Treasury’s intervention policies. 
Several assumptions used in this chapter are worth being loosened for further 
research. First of all, we assume that all foreign reserves consist of USD-denominated assets 
when testing the sustainability of BOK’s MSB-dependent policy. This is somewhat inevitable 
because Korea like other nations does not reveal the currency composition of its foreign 
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reserves. However, this is truly unrealistic. For example, according to IMF statistics on 
Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, USD-denominated assets 
occupy 61.0 per cent of world foreign exchange reserve holding as of the end of 2011Q1: 
Euro (26.5%), British pound (4.1%), Japanese yen (3.6%), etc. The changes in composition of 
foreign assets would have significant effects on the result of sustainability test. Hence, it is, 
for example, worthwhile to compare the results of sustainability test in line with the change in 
currency composition of foreign reserves. In addition, the choice of interest rates affect the 
result of the cointegration-based sustainability test, as Bohn (2007) points out. We use US 
Treasury Bill rate with 1 year maturity as a foreign interest rate. It is more appropriate to use 
weighted average interest rate than single foreign interest rate in order to reflect the actual 
currency composition of foreign reserves.  
The empirical test in this chapter focuses on Korea’s case owing to the lack of data. 
Time-series analysis is known as vulnerable to omitted variable bias owing to unobserved 
heterogeneity. Hence, it would be interesting to extend the sustainability test methodologies 
(by using panel analyses) to other countries such as China and Taiwan in which MSBs are 
main sterilisation tool. Lastly, when disaggregating main accounts in balance sheets of the 
central bank and government, we can measure the revenue and expenditures more accurately. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION AND  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
7.1 Summary of main findings  
During the last two decades when capital mobility has accelerated in emerging 
countries, many CBs have used sterilisation as a main tool to maintain monetary 
independence while stabilising the FX rate fluctuations simultaneously. Despite the 
considerable benefits of the sterilisation, it has limitations in being continuously used as a 
policy tool to address capital inflows due to sterilisation cost. In this thesis, we have examined 
the impacts and sustainability of sterilised intervention policy – in particular, sterilisations 
depending on the issuance of monetary sterilisation (or sterilisation) bonds (MSBs).  
We first overview some theoretical aspects and statistical facts regarding 
sterilisations and capital flows in key countries. Conventional trilemma theory proposes that 
sterilisation may be possible in the short run under limited capital mobility.  With regard to 
the feasibility of sterilisation, there have been two opposite arguments. Calvo (1991) 
emphasizes the difficulty in sterilisation owing to sterilisation peril from a theoretical 
perspective while Reisen (1993) considers the sterilisation as a more feasible policy tool from 
a practical perspective. Theoretically, the impacts of sterilisation are different depending on 
the natures of capital flows (Frankel 1997). Sterilisation is more feasible when the capital 
inflows stem from push factors (e.g. a fall in foreign interest rates) rather than pull factors (e.g. 
an increase in domestic money demand).  
Statistics in the chapter 2 appear to support Reisen (1993), because both FX rate and 
interest rate became less volatile after CBs employed inflation targeting (IT) with more 
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flexible FX rates and freer capital markets, in most emerging economies from around 2000. 
Inflation rate remained lower in the 2000s than in the 1990s. This is somewhat contradictory 
to theoretical expectation that FX rates would be more volatile after the introduction of IT 
with more flexible FX regime than before. It is noteworthy that both exchange and short-term 
interest rates are more stable in countries holding larger amounts of foreign reserves, implying 
that most emerging countries may fear domestic-currency appreciation more. Overall, 
sterilisations mostly backed by asymmetric interventions appear feasible and effective in 
stabilising both FX and interest rate (and thereby inflation) in most emerging IT countries.  
However, the sterilisations may lead to considerable sterilisation peril owing to 
foreign-domestic interest rate differentials in most emerging countries. In particular, Korea 
has been confronted with the quandary that as foreign reserves rushed in, domestic liquidity 
could have become too “loose” to stabilise inflation or too “tight” to resist the pressures for 
the domestic currency appreciation. The BOK has issued MSBs to solve the dilemma. 
However, a large stock of MSB outstanding imposes a substantial burden to the BOK with 
regard to inflation control and sterilisation costs. In particular, significant financial losses of 
the BOK in recent times have raised the question about the sustainability of MSB-dependent 
policy. The statistical intuitions obtained from chapter 2 are examined in the following 
chapters with recent econometric techniques.  
Chapter 3 investigates the impacts of sterilised FX interventions on FX rate level and 
volatility by applying ACT-GARCH model with daily data on Korea, Japan and Australia. 
We find that one-off interventions appear ineffective, but that large interventions affect FX 
rate levels and volatility in the three countries. Notably, in Korea and Japan interventions 
appear more effective in reversing the current trend than in Australia. The differences in 
intervention effects on the FX rate level in three countries may be explained by different 
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features of their FX market structures and intervention patterns. Interventions appear not to 
affect long-term FX rate volatility significantly but increase short-term volatility. Transitory 
leverage effects on conditional volatility exist in both Korea and Japan – but not in Australia, 
indicating that concerns about the domestic-currency appreciation are larger than those about 
depreciation in Korea and Japan. Simple estimations of the intervention profits show that the 
BOJ and RBA did make profits, whereas the BOK experienced intervention losses mainly 
because of the interest rate differential.  Different signs of the coefficients for size (or 
intervention persistency) dummies and one-off interventions in Korea and Japan imply that, 
large or persistent interventions possibly produce unexpected side effects opposite to what the 
initial (one-off) intervention aims for.  This is partly due to secret intervention practices in 
these countries.  
Chapter 4 explores the intervention motives in major countries focusing on their 
asymmetric intervention preferences for inducing domestic-currency depreciation. Based on 
Pesaran et al.’s cointegration analysis between foreign reserves and FX rate changes in 11 
countries, we find a preference for asymmetric interventions inducing domestic-currency 
depreciation in small open economies like Korea rather than relatively large or closed 
economies such as Japan and India. Considering the limitations of using foreign reserves as a 
proxy for interventions, we apply probit and friction model with daily intervention data. 
Probit estimation suggests that various common factors affect interventions in the three 
countries: the degrees of current FX rate deviation from trend, levels of FX rate volatility, 
country risks, and previous interventions. We find a significant difference in intervention 
response to deviation from volatility trend between the small open economies (Korea and 
Australia) and the large economy (Japan). Importantly, the friction model provides direct 
information on the degrees of asymmetric interventions. The Korean authorities tend to react 
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more to the appreciation than to the depreciation of Korean won, while their Japanese 
counterparts seem to respond symmetrically. The RBA prefers interventions for supporting 
Australian dollar. Interest rate differentials and changes in MSBs appear not to be considered 
in the FXI decision-making process in the very short-run.  
Chapter 5 examines the degrees of sterilisation and de facto capital mobility by 
estimating sterilisation and offset coefficients with quarterly panel data on 30 countries. 
Estimation results provide evidence that most emerging countries – in particular, emerging 
IT-Asia countries – significantly increased their sterilisations from the late 1990s (when most 
of the sample countries introduced IT regime with flexible FX rate regimes), and practiced 
nearly-complete or over-sterilisations in the 2000s. Time-series analyses for individual 
countries provide evidence that oversterilisations were prevalent in East Asian countries 
during the 2000 − Korea, China, Japan, Indonesia, etc. The evidence of increasing 
sterilisations leads us to expect that de facto capital mobility may not have changed 
significantly in Asian IT countries between the 1990s and the 2000s, despite the considerable 
institutional changes (e.g. capital market opening and more flexible FX regime) that took 
place. The estimated offset coefficients seem to support this. The evidence of nearly-complete 
or excessive sterilisations hints at possible sterilisation peril in emerging countries. Our 
finding appears to weakly support the possibility of sterilisation peril in emerging countries, 
because high degrees of sterilisation tend to raise local interest rates in emerging IT-Asia 
countries. In Korea, we find over-sterilisation and an increase in the degree of sterilisation 
over time since the introduction of IT, which may contribute to the huge accumulation of 
MSBs and consequent high sterilisation costs.  
Chapter 6 attempts to provide analytical methodologies to assess the sustainability of 
MSB-dependent sterilisation policies. Based on such fiscal sustainability theories, we first 
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derive the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) of the CB that uses MSBs as its main 
sterilisation tool. The IBC postulates that the current MSB-dependent sterilisation policy will 
be sustainable if the current stock of MSBs is equal to the present value of the CB’s future 
primary surplus (= seigniorage + interest income from foreign reserves - purchases of net 
assets). Empirical study on the case of BOK suggests that, considering only the CB’s budget 
constraint and behaviour, the BOK’s current sterilisation policy may be unsustainable. 
However, the test for the consolidated budget of the BOK and the Korean government 
suggests that current sterilisation policy may be sustainable. Thus, we may conclude that the 
sustainability of the current BOK’s MSB-dependent sterilisations may not come from the 
BOK’s adjustments of its budget but the government’s taxation capacity or budget surplus. 
This may ultimately impair the BOK’s anti-inflation efforts and monetary policy 
independence from the Korean government.  
 
7.2 Policy implications for sterilised FX intervention and its 
sustainability 
 
The main findings of this thesis, in general, imply that the sterilised FX interventions 
cannot generate permanent changes in FX rates, as many other previous studies have 
indicated. FX interventions may be able to address unwarranted FX rate changes stemming 
from temporary shocks and thereby help to slow down the pace of FX rate movement.  As a 
substitute for capital control, the sterilised intervention in emerging countries may be possibly 
effective in adjusting both FX and interest rates to some extent only in the short run.  
However, if sterilized interventions are persisted for a long time, there is a 
sterilisation peril, which may eventually lead to the failure of the sterilisation policy for 
controlling inflation in the long run. In this respect, persistent asymmetric FX interventions 
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widely spread in emerging countries should be reconsidered, because they could occasionally 
conflict with monetary policies for price stability, incur considerable sterilization costs and 
impair CB independence in the long run. In particular, over-sterilisations for capital inflow 
(which heavily rely on MSBs) possibly cause sterilisations peril.  
As noted in section 3.2, the body responsible for implementing monetary policy and 
that responsible for FX interventions are separated in many countries. In addition to trilemma 
issues between monetary independence and exchange rate stability given high capital mobility, 
such an institutional arrangement presents additional challenges pertaining to the FX 
intervention effects, CB balance sheet issues, potential conflicts of interest between two 
institutions and sustainability of sterilisation policies. In general, mutual consistency of FX 
interventions and domestic monetary policies should be maintained for the efficacy of 
sterilised interventions (Willet 2002). Accordingly, strengthening the coordination between 
two institutions would be crucial.  
 With regard to intervention patterns to intensify FX intervention effects and to 
reduce sterilisation cost, chapter 3 suggests that sterilised intervention should be selective in 
terms of its frequency and magnitude. Infrequent and large-scale interventions would be more 
effective than frequent and small ones. However, under secret interventions, large-scale or 
persistent interventions possibly have an effect that is not initially intended. For example, 
although initial one-off interventions contribute to reducing FX rate volatility, large-scale 
ones would possibly increase volatility. Large-scale or persistent interventions do not always 
intensify the effect of initial one-off intervention under secret intervention practices. To 
prevent possible wrong signalling of interventions, appropriate communication strategy need 
to be considered with regard to FX intervention policies as in monetary policies.  
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Chapter 4 provides evidence on significant asymmetric intervention preferences in 
small open emerging countries like Korea. Theoretically, asymmetric interventions can be 
sustained under inflation targeting when the rate of return on domestic assets (i.e. MSBs) 
should be higher than that on foreign assets, so that there is an excess supply of foreign 
exchanges at the CB’s desired exchange rate target (Bofinger 2001).  However, given high 
capital mobility and inflation targeting, targeting the level of exchange rate may be not 
feasible even in the short run.  Furthermore, higher domestic interest rate than international 
one may cause the sterilisations to be unsustainable in the long run.  When the CB is involved 
in asymmetric interventions initiated by the government, there should be transparent cost-
sharing scheme between two institutions to avoid CB’s operational losses and need for 
recapitalisation. In addition, short-run political pressure for boosting export should be 
insulated to lessen the extent of asymmetric interventions.  
In Chapter 5, we found the prevalence of oversterilisations in East-Asian countries 
such as Korea, Indonesia and China, etc. Despite the benefits of the sterilisations, the over-
sterilisations of capital inflows possibly lead to sterilisation peril by leaving domestic interest 
rate unnecessarily high and thereby encouraging further capital inflows. This may be true for 
the countries in which long-term MSBs are used as a main sterilisation tool and domestic-
foreign interest rate differential is persistent. To choose a suitable sterilisation tool with little 
peril, it is imperative to monitor the natures of capital flows. There should be also limits to the 
degree of sterilised interventions over medium or long run to suppress the increasing 
sterilisation cost by allowing for more fluctuations of the target interest rate or FX rate.  As 
seen in section 2.1.6, excessive uses of MSBs in sterilisation operations are, in general, 
undesirable in that they possibly fragment public bond markets and contaminate the short-
term interest rate targeted by the CB. From an integrated perspective of the public sector, the 
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use of government bonds would be more desirable in the long-run (Nyawata 2012) in that it 
insulates all sterilisation operations (initiated by governments) from normal day-to-day 
liquidity management (conducted by CBs), makes the governments to recognise the cost of 
sterilisation operations explicitly in their budget constraint and reduces the need for CB’s 
recapitalisation. 
Chapter 6 emphasises that CB’s operational independence depends on the degree of 
CB’s fiscal soundness, which is often impaired by MSB-dependent sterilisation policy. In this 
regard, where the FX interventions are primarily determined by the government, the CB 
should be particularly mindful of its net worth so as to maintain its operational independence. 
Hence, there should be clear guidelines pertaining to accounting practices, transfer of profit 
from CB to government, coverage of fiscal loss and recapitalisation (see Nyawata 2012).103 
Once a CB is involved in the FX interventions with using MSBs as a main 
sterilisation tool, the IBC of the central bank suggests that, for the current MSB-dependent 
sterilisation to be sustainable without lessening the present degree of sterilisation, the CB 
should (i) find a way to increase seigniorage without inflation; (ii) raise the rate of returns on 
its foreign reserves by rebalancing its portfolio composition or by placing more weight on the 
profitability of foreign reserves management; (iii) introduce less expensive sterilisation 
instruments than MSBs. Among the three options, increasing seigniorage may not be effective 
under the inflation and short-term interest rate targeting regime, because money demand may 
not increase with economic growth as it did under the monetary targeting regimes. Increasing 
seigniorage is possible when the CB stimulates money demand and thereby increases money 
103 Although the use of MSBs stems partly from the motive for ensuring CB independence, the use of treasury 
bill could be more helpful for CB’s operational independence in the long run.  This is because the latter enable 
the government to recognise the sterilisation costs directly within its budget.  According to Nyawata(2012 p 21), 
the choice of sterilisation tool between government securities and MSBs should be “guided by the extent to 
which they: (i) facilitate the transmission of monetary impulse; (ii) assist in the development of liquid markets; 
and (iii) ensure operational independence for the central bank.” 
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supply proportionally with money demand. However, money demand is mainly determined 
by the evolution of payments and settlements of the private sector. Raising investment returns 
from foreign reserves has limits in improving the central bank’s primary balance in small 
open economy like Korea. Because the central bank should always be prepared for incidents 
of a sudden stop and reversal of international capital, the liquidity and security of foreign 
reserves may have priority over profitability.   
Introducing new cost-efficient sterilisation tools may be the most practical and 
feasible option. This is because the past exacerbation of the BOK’s primary budget balance 
mainly came from the higher growth rate of the interest payment on the MSBs rather than the 
reduction in growth rate of the sum of seigniorage and interest income from foreign reserves.  
Candidate tools may include ECB’s term deposit, BOE’s voluntary reserve ratio system, or 
Fed’s reserve requirement with remunerations. The interest rates applied to these tools are 
generally lower than the interest rates on MSBs, which helps to reduce the sterilisation cost, 
because they are mostly overnight interest rates.  
If the aforementioned options are unavailable, the sustainability condition implies 
that the central bank changes its current involvement in sterilised FX interventions in the near 
future to prevent its recapitalisations financed by government taxation, which would 
eventually impair the CB’s operational independence. In other words, the CB should limit its 
sterilisations of capital inflows by allowing the appreciation of domestic currency or by less 
sticking to the stability of policy interest rate.  
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Appendix 3.1 Recent studies on interventions in Japan and Australia, and  
  profitability 
 
(a) Japan 
Authors Samples and methods Evidence on impacts and motives of interventions 
Hillebrand & 
Schnabl  
(2003) 
1991-2002, 
GARCH 
 FXIs affect FX rate level and volatility on intervention day  
 Results are highly dependent on sample period 
- 1991-1998: JPY purchases were unsuccessful in changing 
FX rate level and increased FX rate volatility  
- 1999-2002: JPY purchases had short-term effects on FX 
rate level and reduced FX rate volatility 
Dominguez 
(2003a) 
1991M1–2002M6, 
event-study and time 
series 
 FXIs have short-term effects in the desired direction 
 Mostly effective within 2 days;  
- in one case, effective within 3 months 
Ito (2003) 1991M4–2001M3, 
OLS, GARCH(1,1) 
 Most USD-selling(USD-buying) FXIs were conducted 
when the JPY/USD rate was above (below) 125 
 Interventions in 1991M4–1995M6 were more frequent and  
more predictable than those in 1995M7-2001M3 
 -  ineffective:1991M4–1995M6; effective:1995M7–2001M3 
 More effective when the FXIs are coordinated 
Ito (2004) 2003M1–
2004M3,GARCH(1,1) 
 Effective in 2003–2004 
 Initial FXIs are more effective than subsequent ones 
 Magnitude of impacts is smaller in 2003-2004 than in 1995–
2002 
Fatum & 
Hutchison 
(2004) 
1999M1–2004M3, 
Matching methods 
 Effective in 1999-2002 when interventions are infrequent 
(3% of business days) 
 Ineffective in 2003 when interventions are frequent (35% of 
business days)  and in 2004Q1(85% of business days) 
Galati et al. 
(2005) 
1993M9-2000M4 
 
 Interventions in support of USD do not have statistically 
significant effect on FX rate level.  
 Neither contemporaneous nor deferred impact of 
intervention on the forward rate 
 Different intervention motives over time 
- 1993M9-1996M4: to target some JPY/USD spot rate level 
and to reduce uncertainty 
- 1997M11-2000M4: to respond only to  excessively 
increasing market uncertainty 
Fatum & 
Hutchison 
(2006) 
1991M4-2000M12, 
Non-parametric  
sign test and  
matched-sample test 
 Effective irrespective of whether or not supported by  
interest rate changes and whether or not secret 
 Effective when coordinated with other CBs 
 Effective within 30 days 
Ito & Yabu 
(2007) 
1991M4-2002M12 
Ordered probit  
 A regime change in 1995M6: small-scale frequent  
→ large-scale infrequent interventions 
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(b) Australia 
Authors Samples and methods Evidence on impacts and motives of interventions 
Kim & Sheen 
(2002) 
1983M12-1997M12,  
EGARCH, Friction 
 Determinants: FX rate deviation from its 150 day moving 
average,  interest rate differentials, profitability  
 Short horizon aim of leaning against the wind 
Edison et al. 
(2003) 
1984M1-2001M12, 
Event study 
  Reduce depreciation tendency of AUD in 1997-2001 
  Interventions increase volatility but the effects on FX rate 
level are quite weak   
Rogers & Siklos 
 (2003) 
1989-1998, 
Implied volatility 
 RBA responds to excessive FX rate volatility (measured as  
implied volatility of foreign currency futures options)  
 Interventions, in general, do not affect FX volatility 
McKenzie 
(2004) 
1983M12-1997M12, 
Probit, GARCH 
 Whether FXIs reduce or augment volatility is not clear  
Kearns & 
Rigobon (2005) 
1986-1993, GMM  Measure contemporaneous effect: AUD purchase equivalent 
to 100 mill.USD → 1.8 % appreciation of AUD 
 Most effects occur during intervention day 
 RBA leans against the wind 
Reitz et al.(2010) 1984M1-2008M12, 
smooth transition 
autoregressive target 
zone GARCH 
 Mean reversion increases with the degree of FX rate 
misalignment 
 Strengthen FX traders' confidence in fundamental analysis 
→ coordination channel 
Newman et 
al.(2011) 
1989M1-2010M12, 
GARCH  
 Effects on FX rate level exist only on intervention day 
 Effect of a one-off FXIs is different from consecutive one 
 
(c) Intervention profitability 
 Assumption and methodology Result and limitation 
Taylor 
(1982) 
  9 countries; 1973-1979, monthly 
  Consider realised trading profit 
  FXIs are evenly distributed across the month 
 Loss over the entire period  
 Interest rate and risk adjustment are not 
considered  
Jacobson 
(1983) 
 US, 1973-1981, daily  
 USD amount of foreign currency purchase 
valued by end-of-period FX rates minus 
trading cost 
 Profit over the entire period, but loss for 
1973-79 
 No interest rate adjustment is assumed 
Andrew & 
Broadbent 
(1994) 
 Australia, 1983M12-1994M6, daily 
 Three profits: realised trading profits + 
unrealised trading profits + net interest earning 
 Profitable for 3 profit components 
Leahy 
(1995) 
 US, 1973-1992, daily 
 FXIs do not affect interest rates and FX rates 
 CBs lean against the wind 
 Profit over the entire period 
 Profits are not merely the outcome of 
chance 
Sweeny 
(2000) 
 US, 1985-1991, daily 
 Risk-adjusted intervention profit 
 US Fed earned significant profits 
 Time-constant risk premium is assumed 
Pilbeam 
(2001) 
 UK, 1973-1995, daily 
 CBs lean against wind 
 Consider interest rate differential 
 Profitability is heavily biased depending 
on the amount of cumulative 
interventions  
Ito(2003)  Japan, 1991M4-2001M3, daily  Profitable in 3 profit components 
Fischer 
(2003) 
 Switzerland, 1986–1995, daily, weekly, 
monthly, quarterly 
 Compare profit measured by 3 methods 
(Taylor 1982, Leahy 1995, Sweeny 1997)  
 Profitable independently of different 
measurement and frequency 
 Profit estimates with daily data may be 
deviated further from true profit  
Becker & 
Sinclair(2004) 
 Australia, 1983-2004, daily 
 Similar method to Andrew & Broadbent(1994) 
 Profitable in 3 profit components 
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Appendix 3.2 Statistical summary of FX markets and interventions 
(a) Main indicators of foreign exchange markets in major economies 
  2007 2010 
Daily average turnover(bill. USD) Korea 35.2 48.3 
21 Developed1 169.3 201.3 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Luxemburg 155.6 179.0 
28 Emerging2 7.7 8.9 
Average 79.3 95.4 
Daily turnover/nominal GDP (%) 
 
Korea 3.4 5.3 
21 Developed 13.6 15.9 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Luxemburg 104.6 109.2 
28 Emerging 3.1 3.4 
Average 12.8 14.4 
Daily turnover/trade volume (%) Korea 9.6 13.2 
21 Developed 23.8 32.4 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Luxemburg 45.2 53.7 
28 Emerging 3.0 4.1 
Average 13.6 18.3 
Notes: 1. OECD member countries less Korea, Luxemburg, Czech Rep., Hungary, Iceland, Poland, Slovakia,  
 Turkey, Mexico, Chile, Israel 
            2. Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, Mexico, Chile, Israel, etc., 
            3. Nominal GDP and trade volume are those as of year 2009 
Source: BOK (2010), BIS (2010), World Economic Outlook  (IMF 2010), International Trade Data (WTO 2010) 
 
(b)  Main statistics on interventions and FX rates movements in three countries  
 Japan Korea Australia 
I. Interventions                       unit: 100 mill.JPY          100 mill. KRW           mill. AUSD 
(i)Amount1    
    Average2 
USD-buying 2,037 3,395 55 
USD-selling 1,483 4,445 160 
   Maximum 
USD-buying  16,664  31,000 461 
  USD-selling 26,201 80,200 1,305 
     Total 
  USD-buying 635,402 1,687,500 16,016 
  USD-selling 48,933 955,700 28,699 
    Net USD-buying  586,469  731,800 -12,683 
    Std. Dev. 1,114 3,825 53 
    Skewness 2.70 -4.49 -13.10 
    Kurtosis 152.32 113.99 257.94 
  Jarque-Bera 
  (probability)  
3,318,532 
(0.00) 
1,098,434 
(0.00) 
14,279,553 
(0.00) 
 (ii) Frequency (interventions/total obs)  345/3,567 772/2126 473/5218 
    USD-buying 313 497 293 
    USD-selling 32 215 180 
II.  FX rate change(log difference of daily rate) unit:  100JPY/USD KRW/USD AUD/USD 
    Mean -7.93E-05 -5.60E-05 4.04E-05 
    Maximum  0.0426  0.071 0.077 
    Minimum -0.0465 -0.091 -0.071 
    Std. Dev.  0.005  0.007 0.007 
    Skewness -0.38 -0.93          0.38    
    Kurtosis  7.21  42.17 14.53 
    Observations 3,566  2,125 5,217 
Notes : 1. Actual intervention(Japan, Australia), daily change in foreign reserves (Korea) 
            2. Average amount per an intervention = total intervention amount ÷ frequency. 
Data: BOK, Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance, BOJ, Japanese Ministry of Finance, RBA  
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Appendix 3.3 Detailed procedure for calculating intervention profits   
 
Here, we present a simple example of calculating the three components of 
intervention profits. First, suppose that the BOK initially buys USD at the FX rate 1000 
KRW/USD and builds up a long position of USD100. When the BOK additionally buys 
USD100 at the FX rate of 2000 KRW/USD, the average FX rate at which its long position has 
been acquired is 1500 KRW/USD. The average FX rate applied to USD long position, i.e., 
average purchase price of the USD, is recalculated as the BOK continues to buy USD. When 
the BOK sells USD, average selling prices are calculated in the same way.  
Realised trading gains are measured whenever the USD long position (short position) 
is reversed by selling (purchasing) USD. For example, if the BOK sells USD100 at the FX 
rate of 1200 KRW/USD, this trade incurs the loss of KRW300 to the BOK, because the 
selling price is less than average USD-purchasing price (1500 KRW): (1200-1500) 
KRW/USD*100USD = − 30000 KRW (realised loss). Thus, trading profits are realised when 
the FX rate at the sales of USD is higher than the average USD-purchasing price. If the BOK 
continuously sells USD, the sales result in the creation of realised profits (or losses) at each 
time of the sales until the USD long position is fully closed out. In case of USD short position, 
trading gains (losses) will be realised whenever USDs are purchased until the short position is 
completely closed out. In particular, trading profits will be realised when USD buying price is 
lower than average USD-selling price in the previous periods. Note that we estimate 
economic profit rather than accounting profit.  
Net interest earning is calculated by multiplying the amount of USD long (short) 
position and interest rate differential between US fed fund rate and domestic interbank rate. 
Interest earning is converted into domestic currency by using end-of-day exchange rate at 
every day.  
Unrealised profits are calculated on the outstanding USD position at the end of the 
sample period by comparing average USD-buying (or selling) price and the end-of-period 
exchange rate (Ito 2003). In most cases, unrealised profits (losses) are assumed to be made on 
the last day of sample period. If the USD position is valued every day, unrealised profits or 
losses are made every day (Becker and Sinclair 2004; Fisher 2003; Pilbeam 2001). 
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Example: Calculation of intervention profits without daily marking-to-mark  
 
Korea(2001M9-2010M3) Australia(1989M1-2008M12) Japan(1991M4-2004M3) 
Calculation methods  
USD Purchase  USD Sales  USD purchase  USD Sales  USD Purchase  USD Sales  
D
en
om
in
at
io
n Domestic 
currency(a) 
168750  
bill. KRW 
95570  
bill. KRW 
16016 
mill. AUD 
28699 
mill. AUD 
63540 
bill. JPY 
4893 
bill. JPY 
 Intervention data released  
 Cumulative amount during sample period 
USD  
Equivalent(b) 
151.2  
bill. USD 
83.5  
bill. USD 
12615 
mill. USD 
19177 
mill. USD 
578.5 
bill. USD 
37.6 
bill. USD 
 Intervention amount(USD) = (a)*daily average FX rate 
 Intervention amounts(USD) at each day are cumulated 
separately for selling USD and for buying USD 
Inventory 67.7 (=151.2-83.5) -6562.0 (=12615-19177) 540.9 (=578.5-37.6)  Cumulative USD long position at the end-day  
Period average FX rate 
(c=a/b) 
1116.01 
(KRW/USD) 
1144.28 
(KRW/USD) 
1.2696 
(AUD/USD) 
1.4965 
(AUD/USD) 
109.83 
(JPY/USD) 
130.13 
(JPY/USD) 
 Average USD purchasing(selling) price  
 =  cumulative purchasing(selling) amounts denominated 
by domestic currency ÷ USD equivalents   
 
End-of-period FX rate(d) 1136.5 (31 Mar. 2010) 1.4434(30 Dec. 2008) 103.95(31 Mar. 2004)   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Realised trading  
gains (e) 
2360.8 bill. KRW 
=83.5*(1144.28-1116.01) 
2862.3 mill. AUD 
= 12615*(1.4965-1.2696) 
763.3 bill. JPY 
=37.6*(130.13-109.83) 
USD long position : Realised profits = USD amount sold 
*(average selling price – average buying price)  
USD short position:  Realised profits = USD amount 
bought*(average selling  price – average buying price) 
Net interest earning(f) -5131.8 bill. KRW 1277.2 mill. AUD 4485.4 bill. JPY 
Net interest earning = interest income–interest payment  
(i) USD long position*O/N fed fund rate – domestic     
     currency short position*O/N domestic rate  
(ii) USD short position*O/N fed fund rate – domestic- 
     currency long position*O/N domestic interest rate 
Cumulated interest earning = sum of daily net interest 
earning during the sample period 
Unrealised trading  
gains (g) 
1387.2 bill. KRW 
=67.7*(1136.5-1116.01) 
-1140.4 mill. AUD 
= -6562.0*(1.4434-1.2696) 
-3180.5 bill. JPY 
=540.9*(103.95-109.83) 
 Difference between  mark-to-market at the end of period
 and average inventory cost  or sales price 
(i) USD long position*{(d)–average purchasing price)} 
(ii) USD short position*{(average selling price – (d)) 
Total profit (=e+f+g) -1383.8 bill. KRW 3035.1 mill. AUD 2068.2 bill. JPY  
Notes: 1. FX rate is the price of local currency per a unit USD. 
           2. RBA’s initial USD long position was reversed to short position in May 1998. That is, cumulative USD sales are exactly same as USD purchases at the time. Since then, RBA 
 have never bought USD during the rest of sample period.  
Sources: Korea Ministry of Strategy and Finance, BOK, Japanese Ministry of Finance, RBA. 
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Appendix 4.1 F-statistics for testing the existence of cointegration  
 
Symmetric lags 
 No. of variables 
1 2 4 6 8 
Singapore 
(1999M1-
2010M4) 
5a 1.29 1.67 1.29 1.98 1.69 
6a 1.08 1.33 1.09 1.57 1.31 
7a 2.14 1.94 2.14 2.66 2.67 
4s 1.15 1.78 0.83 1.30 1.02 
5s 0.91 1.39 0.85 1.31 1.04 
6s 2.19 2.25 2.58 2.86 2.97 
Australia 
(1999M1-
2010M4) 
5a 0.58 0.96 0.64 0.85 0.54 
4s 0.68 0.69 1.17 0.81 0.80 
Philippine 
(1999M1-
2010M4) 
5a 3.69 4.97 2.43 2.18 1.58 
6a 3.00 4.05 2.16 1.75 1.41 
4s 4.61** 6.47*** 3.33 2.53 2.39 
5s 3.61* 5.07*** 2.77 1.88 1.84 
Brazil 
(1999M1-
2010M4) 
5a 2.33 0.71 0.15 0.29 0.45 
6a 2.02 0.56 0.48 0.39 0.43 
4s 3.00 0.64 0.16 0.39 0.37 
5s 2.51 0.52 0.64 0.56 0.32 
Turkey 
(2002M1-
2010M4) 
5a 2.15 2.71 1.64 2.02 1.34 
6a 2.10 2.59 0.99 1.56 1.05 
4s 2.03 3.02 1.89 1.98 1.63 
5s 1.53 2.52 1.30 1.20 1.44 
Indonesia 
(1999M1-
2010M4) 
5a 0.30 0.27 0.13 0.49 0.52 
6a 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.66 1.09 
4s 0.25 0.27 0.13 0.41 0.55 
5s 0.27 0.32 0.12 0.56 0.93 
 Notes: 1. 
tttt SdifFRs ,,,:4
2 dt
a
tttt SSdifFRa ,,,,:5
2 ttttt IMPSdifFRs ,,,,:5
2  
                 t
b
t
a
tttt IMPSSdifFRa ,,,,,:6
2 tttttt MIMPSdifFRs 2,,,,,:6
2 tt
d
t
a
tttt MIMPSSdifFRa 2,,,,,,:7
2  
            2. The critical value bounds are given in Pesaran et al.(2001, p300-301), table CI (iii) (unrestricted intercept 
and no time trend). The lower bound (FL) and upper bound (FU) are as follows: 
Significance  10%  5%  1% 
No. of variables  FL FU  FL FU  FL FU 
3  2.72 3.77  3.69 4.89  4.29 5.61 
4  2.45 3.52  3.25 4.49  3.74 5.06 
5  2.26 3.35  2.62 3.79  3.41 4.68 
6  2.12 3.23  2.75 3.99  3.15 4.43 
7  2.03 3.13  2.60 3.84  2.96 4.26 
               If F > FU, the null of no cointegration can be rejected;  
               If F < FL, the null cannot be rejected, and thus there is no long-run relationship.  
               If FL< F < FU, the inference is inconclusive. 
           3.  ***, ** and* denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance  level, 
 respectively. 
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Appendix 4.2 Exchange rates, interest rate differential, intervention  
    profitability and asymmetric intervention motives  
 
The FXIs do not affect a CB’s profit under the assumption that interest rate parity 
holds and FXIs do not have effects on the FX rates with the free float regime. To see this, 
assume that FX rate follows a random walk process and thus the FX rate is not affected by the 
FXIs. This assumption may be consistent with the results of many previous studies, in that the 
FXIs may not affect the FX rate level, at least in the long run. The CB purchases foreign 
reserves (FR) funded by issuing its debts (MSBs) in period t-1. The FXIs will be shown on 
the balance sheet of the CB as (A.4.1): 
 
(A.4.1) 111   ttt MSBFRS  
 
where St-1 is the spot FX rate in period t-1 (domestic per unit of foreign currency). The right 
hand side indicates the MSBs issued for funding the FXIs and the left hand side denotes FR 
purchased by issuing MSBs.  Then, the economic profit ( ) of the intervention in period t can 
be expressed by: 
 
(A.4.2) 111
*
1 )1()1(   ttttt MSBrFRrS  
 
where *r is foreign interest rate and r is local interest rate. Under uncovered interest rate 
parity (UIP) i.e. )1/()1(/ *111   tttt rrSS , (A.4.2) can be rewritten in (A.4.3) in which the 
economic profit of interventions ( ) is zero ex ante; 
 
(A.4.3)  111
*
11*
1
1 )1()1(
1
1


 


 ttttt
t
t MSBrFRrS
r
r
  
11111 )1()1(   ttttt MSBrFRSr  ( ))1.4.( 111   ttt MSBFRSA  
       = 0)1()1( 1111   tttt MSBrMSBr  
 
From (A.4.3), we can discuss several implications about the FXIs and their impacts 
on sterilisation policy. First, when UIP holds, (A.4.3) holds and thus 0  regardless of 
domestic-foreign interest rate differential. If *11   tt rr , tS  falls (i.e., local currency depreciates) 
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to offset the interest rate differential. Consequently, the loss from the interest rate differential 
would be offset by the increase in the domestic value of foreign reserves incurred by local 
currency depreciation. However, when *11   tt rr , the more CB intervenes, the bigger 
accounting loss it makes. The accounting profit ( a ) shown in the profit/loss statement of the 
CB can be expressed as:  
 
(A.4.4)  111
*
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Substituting (A.4.1) and the UIP condition into (A.4.4) yields: 
 
(A.4.5) 1*
1
1
*
1
111
*
11*
1
1
11
1





 





 t
t
tt
ttttt
t
ta MSB
r
rr
MSBrFRrS
r
r
  
Equation (A.4.5) indicates that the FXIs always incur an accounting loss when *11   tt rr .  
 
Second, if the intervention amount is positively related to the effect of the FXIs, as 
several studies suggest, (see Ito 2003, Lecourt and Raymond 2006), the FXIs may have a self-
fulfilling property that intervention profits (or losses) depend on the intervention amount. To 
see this, assume that UIP does not hold, i.e., ttttt rrSS   )1/()1()/(
*
111  where t  is a 
random variable to reflect risk premium. Then, CB may make an economic loss or profit ex 
post as shown in (A.4.6). 
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If t < 0, i.e., the local currency is not depreciated by an amount equal to the 
interest differential, the CB may make a loss ex post ( <0). It follows that if the intervention 
is successful in depreciating local currency, and thus the negative value of t  deceases or t > 
0, then the CB could reduce losses or earn profits. Therefore, the CB, once it initiates FXIs for 
inducing domestic currency depreciation, is likely to intervene as strongly as possible in order 
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to maximize the effects of the intervention and thus prevent losses from the intervention.  This 
assertion may partly explain why foreign reserves have been rapidly built up with frequent 
episodes of interventions in East Asian countries where considerable interest rate differentials 
exist. If the CB intervenes in a moderate way with a small amount, it is likely that the 
intervention may fail to depreciate the local currency and eventually incur losses. 
Consequently, under the circumstance in which 1tr >
*
1tr , asymmetric interventions for 
inducing the depreciation of a local currency may be helpful for protecting the soundness of 
the CB’s balance sheet, all other things being equal.  
Third, revenues from interventions are generally influenced not only by interest 
rates but also by FX rate changes. In particular, the revenue growth of foreign reserves has a 
linear relationship with the current level of the spot FX rate. The higher the FX rate is at the 
valuation time, the larger the revenue growth.  Foreign reserves are divided into two types: 
hold-to-maturity reserves (FAH), which will not be sold, and tradable reserves (FAT), which 
will be sold before their maturities. The total returns from FR consist of interest income (It) 
and capital gain (Ct):  
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(A.4.7) indicates that realised interest incomes from two different types of foreign reserves.  
(A.4.8) suggests that capital gains are sum of realised profits from FRT (i.e.
T
tt
T
tt FRSFRS 11   ) and unrealised profits from FA
H (i.e. Httt FRSS 11)(   ). Unrealised 
profits are calculated by regular valuation procedures which are somewhat different 
depending on the accounting principles employed. For simplicity, we consider only realised 
capital gains.   
Net interest earnings ( a ) from FXIs can be expressed as (A.4.9) by subtracting 
interest payment (equation A.4.5) from interest income (equation A.4.7) 
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The realised capital gain is expressed in (A.4.10): 
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Assume that a book value of foreign reserves has a linear relation with a market value, (i.e.
T
t
T
t FRFR 1  ) and the UIP does not hold.   represents the rate of return on foreign reserve 
investments which depend on the ability to forecast the interest rates and FX rates.  Then 
(A.4.10) can be rewritten as: 
(A.4.11) Tttt
t
t
t FRSr
r
C 11*
1
1 1
1
1


 

















   
 
Total net profit (shown on the balance sheet of the CB) is the sum of net interest revenue 
(A.4.9) and realised capital gain (A.4.11).  
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The derivative of net profit with respect to   leads to: 
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 (A.4.13) indicates that the net profit growth depends heavily on the current level of the FX 
rate ( tS ). Thus, although the CB does not yield a high investment return from its foreign 
reserves, if tS  is high, then the CB’s investment will be appreciated as excellent in terms of 
local currency denominated value. Consequently, E-type CBs (considerable parts of whose 
assets are foreign ones) have an incentive to conduct an asymmetric intervention to induce the 
depreciation of local currency, all other things being equal. See Cha (2007) for more detailed 
discussion on this issue. 
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Appendix 5.1 Estimated sterilisation and offset coefficient in previous studies 
Author(s) Methodologies Country Sample period 
Estimated coefficient 
Sterilisation Offset 
Argy & Kouri 
(1974) 
Reduced: OLS:  
∆NDA=f(CA or KA, ∆Y, ∆if, seasonal dummies) 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
1963:3-1970:4(Q) 
1964:1-1970:4(Q) 
1964:1-1970:4(Q) 
-0.34(CA); -0.19(KA) 
-1.37(CA); -0.67(KA) 
-0.74(CA); -0.87(KA) 
n.a 
Kouri & Porter 
(1974) 
Reduced: OLS:  
CI =f(∆Y, ∆if, ∆NDA, CA, ∆RR, speculative 
dummies, seasonal dummy) 
Germany 
Australia 
Italy 
Netherlands 
1960:1-1970:4(Q) 
1961:3-1972:3(Q) 
1964:1-1970:4(Q) 
1960:1-1970:4(Q) 
n.a 
 
 
 
-0.74 
-0.47 
-0.43 
-0.59 
Herring & Marston 
(1977) 
Structural: OLS:  
∆M=f(∆FR, RR, ∆INF, ∆Y, seasonal dummy) 
Germany 1973:4-1975:7(M) -0.91 n.a. 
Laney (1979) Reduced;  OLS:  
∆NDA =f(lagged ∆FR) 
∆FR=f(lagged ∆NDA) 
 
Belgium 
Canada 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
1964:2-1977:6(M) 
1963:1-1977:11(M) 
1963:8-1977:9(M) 
1964:2-1977:9(M) 
1966:2-1977:10(M) 
1966:3-1977:10(M) 
1958:1-1977:11(M) 
1962:8-1977:5(M) 
1963:4-1977:6(M) 
1964:1-1977:2(M) 
-0.69 
-1.00 
-1.20 
-0.68 
-0.83 
-1.69 
-0.80 
-1.13 
-0.07 
-1.31 
-0.53 
-0.22 
-0.61 
-0.73 
-0.70 
-0.53 
-0.96 
-0.41 
-0.50 
-0.57 
Obstfeld (1982) Reduced: OLS: 
KA=f(DC, if, CA, speculative and seasonal dummies)  
Germany 1960:1-1970:4(Q) n.a. -0.93(OLS) 
-0.97(Cochrane-
Orcutt method) 
Cumby & Obstfeld 
(1983) 
Reduced and structural: 2SLS: 
M(or DA)=f(FA, RER, G, IP, RR, seasonal dummy) 
Mexico 1971:3-1979:4(Q) -1.15(2SLS) 
-1.45(2 step 2SLS) 
-0.37(2SLS) 
-0.31(2step 2SLS) 
Note: 1. M: money(M1 or M2), MB: monetary base, DC: domestic credit, FA: foreign asset, DA: domestic asset, id: domestic interest rate,  if: foreign interest rate,  
              ∆: difference operator, S: spot FX rates, S*: target FX rate or FX rate trend, RER: real exchange rates, Y: GDP, g: GDP growth, INF: inflation, CI: capital inflows  
              CA: current account, KA: capital account, G: government budget balance, RR: reserve requirement, IP: industrial production,  
              W: nominal wealth, mm: money multiplier, σ(id):volatility of id, SP: stock price, IP: industrial production 
          2. The estimated sterilisation (offset) coefficients indicate contemporaneous relationship through which the changes in NFA (NDA) affect the course of domestic credit 
 policy (capital flows) during same month or quarter. 
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(Continued) Appendix 5.1 Estimated sterilisation and offset coefficient in previous studies 
Author(s) Methodologies Country Sample period 
Estimated coefficient 
Sterilisation Offset 
Pasula 
(1994) 
Structural and reduced: OLS: 
FR (or CI) = f(M, ∆id, ∆if, GDP)  
 
Germany 
Canada 
Netherlands 
UK 
 
1957:3-1971:1(Q) 
1962:3-1970:1(Q) 
1957:3-1971:1(Q) 
1957:3-1971:2(Q) 
n.a. structural:reduced 
-0.60     ;     -1.08 
-0.72     ;     -0.95 
-0.24     ;     -0.85 
-0.30     ;     -0.93 
Kim 
(1995) 
Reduced: GLS and 2SLS: 
Offset: CI =f(∆NDA, CA, ∆(if+S), Y, W, dummies) 
Sterilisation:∆NDA=f(∆NFA,REER,IP,dummies) 
Korea 1980:1-1994:4(Q) -0.56 -0.26 
 
Moreno 
(1996) 
4 variable VAR: FA, DC, S, CPI 
Provide impulse-response analysis 
Korea 
Taiwan 
1981.1-1994.12(M)  n.a. n.a. 
Celasun et al. 
(1999) 
Reduced: IV estimation: 
∆DA =f(∆NFA, RER, y, ∆RER, ∆G, seasonal dummy) 
Turkey 1990.2-1996.6(M) -0.37 n.a. 
Emir et al. 
(2000) 
Reduced: 2SLS: 
∆NFA=f(∆NDA, lagged ∆NDA, CA, KA, ∆(if+ S)) 
∆NDA=f(∆NFA, ∆G, INF, σ(id), SP) 
Turkey 1990-93(M) 
1995-99(M) 
-0.54 
-0.88 
-0.29 
-0.78 
Siklos 
(2000a) 
Reduced: OLS and 2SLS: 
∆M2=f(∆FA, CA, g, ∆REER, S-S*, id-if, reform dummy) 
Hungary 1992:1-1997:3(M) -1.00 to -1.14 n.a. 
Bernstein 
(2000) 
 
Cointegration between NFA and NDA: 
NDA=f( NFA , id,  if , S, Y) 
6 advanced  
countries 
 
1973:1-1992:4(Q)  US:-0.95, Canada:-0.70,  
Germany:-0.41, France: 
-0.80,  UK and Japan:-1.00 
n.a. 
Takagi & Esaka 
(2001) 
Reduced: OLS and VAR:  
Real M2 =f(lagged FA. CPI, Y, id, dummies) 
5 Asian  
Emerging 
countries 
1987:1-1997:2(Q) 
 
Philippines(-0.11) 
Insignificant: Indonesia,  
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand 
n.a. 
Brissimis et al. 
(2002) 
Semi-reduced: 2SLS and 3SLS: 
Sterilisation:∆NFA=f(lagged ∆NDA,S-S*,G,CA,∆(if+ S),(S)) 
Offset: ∆NDA=f(lagged ∆NFA, S-S*, G, CA, ∆(if+ S), σ(i
d)) 
Germany 1980:2-1992:2(Q) -0.74(2SLS) 
-0.96(3SLS) 
-0.22(2SLS) 
-0.40(3SLS) 
Christensen.(2004) 4 variable VAR(1): DC, FR, id , if Czech Rep. 1993:1-1996:1(M) -0.11(one-period lagged 
 coefficient) 
-0.15 
He et al.(2005) 4 variable VAR(1): ∆NFA,  ∆NDA, ∆DC, ∆id China 1998:1-2004:12(M) -1.00(one-period lagged  
coefficient) 
n.a. 
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(Continued) Appendix 5.1 Estimated sterilisation and offset coefficient in previous studies 
Author(s) Methodologies Country Sample period 
Estimated coefficient 
Sterilisation Offset 
Ouyang & Rajan 
(2005) 
Semi-reduced: 2SLS and OLS 
∆NFA=f(∆NDA,S,∆mm,INF,∆REER,G,σ(S)) 
∆NDA=f(∆NFA,S,∆mm,INF,∆REER,G,σ(id)) 
China 1995:1-2004:4(Q) -0.73 to -0.84 -0.56 to -0.53 
 
Cavoli & Rajan 
(2006) 
Reduced: OLS 
∆DA=f(∆FA, lagged ∆FA) 
5 Asian 
 countries 
1990:01-1997:5(M) Korea(-1.11), Thailand(-0.91), 
Indonesia(-0.77), Malaysia(-
0.94), Philippines (-0.98 ) 
n.a. 
Ouyang et al. 
(2007) 
Semi-reduced: Panel with random effect 
Specification is same as Ouyang et al.(2005) 
Korea, 
Thailand, 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
Philippines  
1990:1-2005:3(Q) 
Pre-crisis:1990:1- 
 1997:1 
Post-crisis:1998:3-
 2005:3 
Pre: -1.05(perfect foresight) 
       -0.97(static expectation) 
Post: -1.27(perfect foresight) 
        -0.85(static expectation) 
Pre: -0.80(perfect foresight) 
       -0.60 (static expectation 
Post:-0.84 (perfect foresight) 
        -0.51(static expectation) 
Lavigne 
(2008) 
Sterilisation ratio = ∆NDA/ ∆NFA 35 countries 
 
Pre-crisis:1990-1996 
Post-crisis:2000-2006 
pre:-0.6(Argentina)-0.78(Russia) 
post: 0.05(Argentina)-3.20(Chile) 
n.a 
Aizenman & Glick  
(2009) 
Reduced; OLS 
DC =f( FR with lag 1, Y, g, crisis)  
8 emerging 
countries 
1985:1-2007:2(Q) 
 
China(-0.78),Korea(-0.77) 
Thailand(-0.93), Malaysia(-0.86), 
Singapore(-0.94), India 
(-0.82), Argentina(-0.99) 
Brazil(-0.86), Mexico(-0.96) 
n.a 
Wu (2009) Reduced: cointegration between ∆FA and 
∆NDA; ∆2DNA=f(∆2FA , Y) 
China 1995-2005 -0.35 n.a 
Ouyang et al. 
(2010) 
Semi reduced: 2SLS and 3SLS: 
Specification is same as Ouyang et al.(2005) 
China 2000:6– 2008:9(M) -1.02(2SLS) 
-1.23(3SLS) 
-0.52 (2SLS) 
-0.70(3SLS) 
Wang 
(2010) 
Reduced: OLS 
∆NFA=f(∆NDA, ∆if, ∆mm, INF,  ∆REER, 
sport-forward FX rate spread, ∆RR, SP, G) 
China 1999:6-2009:3(M) -0.96 -0.30 
Zhang 
(2011) 
2SLS 
∆NFA=f(lagged ∆NDA,∆mm, INF, CA, Y, 
σ(S),G, ∆(if+ S)), 
∆NDA=f(lagged ∆NFA, ∆mm, INF, CA, Y, 
σ(id), G, ∆(if+S)) 
China 1995:1-2010:2(Q) -0.79 to -0.93 -0.49 to -0.65 
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Appendix 5.2 Derivation of offset and sterilisation coefficient 
 
The loss function of the CBs is:  
(A-1) 2,
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The CBs minimises the loss function by choosing two policy instruments, i.e. money market 
operations ( tNDA ) and foreign exchange market interventions ( tNFA ), subject to above 
constraints: 
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The partial derivatives gained from the constraints are: 
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Substituting the above partial derivatives into (A-9) and (A-10) lead to: 
(A-9)' 0)1()( ,11,11  trtttct dSSYp   
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Plugging (A-2), (A-3), (A-6), (A-7) and (A-8) into (A-9)' and (A-10)', we can obtain two 
semi-reduced form equations (5.3.9) and (5.3.10). 
 
(5.3.9)
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(5.3.10)
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Appendix 5.3 Descriptive statistics of panel data 
 
(a) Main variables used in regression (1981Q1-2010Q4) 
 Country NFA/CIC ∆G/GDP ∆FR    
Australia 1.398 -0.003 0.026 0.180 0.003 0.018 
Canada 0.060 -0.005 0.024 0.153 0.003 0.008 
Norway 4.251 0.056 0.018 0.093 0.004 0.017 
New Zealand 3.938 0.013 0.032 0.187 0.004 0.016 
Sweden 1.762 -0.003 0.021 0.118 0.004 0.017 
Swiss 2.084 -0.005 0.022 0.112 0.003 0.018 
UK 0.315 -0.030 0.010 0.084 0.003 0.016 
IT-Advanced 1.972 0.003 0.022 0.132 0.003 0.016 
Indonesia 2.195 -0.014 0.024 0.104 0.013 0.022 
Korea 4.154 0.009 0.038 0.122 0.004 0.012 
Philippines 3.116 -0.017 0.025 0.280 0.009 0.012 
Thailand 3.484 -0.006 0.039 0.078 0.006 0.010 
IT-Asia 3.571 -0.006 0.031 0.166 0.008 0.014 
Czech Rep. 2.360 -0.023 0.050 0.114 0.005 0.018 
Hungary 2.098 -0.059 0.031 0.147 0.005 0.015 
Israel 7.208 -0.026 0.025 0.099 0.057 0.017 
Poland 2.107 -0.030 0.042 0.111 0.005 0.097 
South Africa 2.439 -0.008 0.033 0.309 0.004 0.023 
Turkey 0.853 -0.102 0.036 0.168 0.059 0.023 
IT-Europe 4.032 -0.040 0.035 0.179 0.024 0.033 
Brazil 2.435 -0.006 0.033 0.170 0.014(8.257) 0.042 
Chile 4.222 0.017 0.018 0.094 0.004 0.016 
Colombia 2.075 -0.037 0.015 0.117 0.006 0.011 
Mexico 2.217 -0.008 0.031 0.215 0.022 0.019 
Peru 4.076 -0.123 0.027 0.157 0.014 0.041 
IT-Latin 3.337 -0.039 0.025 0.156 0.012 0.026 
Argentina 0.606 -0.001 0.017 0.264 0.002(5138.688) 0.051 
China 1.835 0.123 0.059 0.108 0.002 0.009 
Euro 0.703 -0.021 0.003 0.052 0.001 0.016 
Hong Kong 6.957 0.014 0.027 0.050 0.003 0.002 
India 0.720 -0.053 0.031 0.155 0.012 0.010 
Japan 0.046 -0.009 0.031 0.063 0.001 0.018 
Malaysia 6.364 0.038 0.026 0.095 0.002 0.009 
Singapore 9.331 0.064 0.029 0.036 0.002 0.008 
 Non-IT 3.708 0.022 0.029 0.080 0.003 0.010 
Notes: 1.∆FR: growth of foreign reserves, ∆G: fiscal surplus : standard deviation of growth of foreign 
 reserves, : standard deviation of foreign exchange rate change, : standard deviation of 
 domestic interest rate changes  
           2. The figures of each group are simple arithmetic average of the countries included. 
           3. In calculating standard deviation of interest rate change in IT-Latin and Non-IT, we exclude the data on 
 Brazil(1989M2-1990M3) and Argentina(1989M5-1990M3) during hyperinflation period. The figures 
 in (   ) are calculated by the data from whole samples 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IMF International Financial Statistics and DataStream.  
FR dr S
FR
S dr
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(b) Balance of payment: 1980Q1 – 2010Q4 
 
   CA/GDP KA/GDP FDI/GDP PF/GDP OINT/GDP 
Australia  -0.044 0.047 0.022 0.082 0.011 
Canada  -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.007 -0.002 
Norway  0.069 -0.045 -0.046 -0.182 0.022 
New Zealand  -0.049 0.043 0.045 0.019 0.029 
Sweden  0.023 -0.015 -0.024 -0.021 0.015 
Swiss  0.110 -0.098 -0.086 -0.099 0.081 
UK  -0.014 0.013 -0.030 0.061 0.017 
IT-Advanced  0.013 -0.007 -0.017 -0.019 0.025 
Indonesia  0.007 0.003 0.015 0.024 0.062 
Korea  0.010 0.009 -0.023 0.068 0.231 
Philippines  -0.015 0.032 0.007 0.006 0.027 
Thailand  0.018 0.007 0.034 0.012 0.060 
IT-Asia  0.003 0.015 0.005 0.029 0.136 
Czech Rep.  -0.032 0.065 0.143 0.020 0.020 
Hungary  -0.060 0.085 0.061 0.027 0.061 
Israel  -0.012 0.021 0.025 -0.024 0.024 
Poland  -0.034 0.062 0.053 0.035 0.039 
South Africa  -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.001 
Turkey  -0.020 0.026 0.059 0.032 0.093 
IT-Emerging 
Europe  -0.022 0.035 0.051 0.011 0.038 
Brazil  -0.012 0.021 0.038 0.038 -0.016 
Chile  -0.003 0.014 0.062 -0.059 0.004 
Colombia  -0.021 0.028 0.038 0.001 0.010 
Mexico  -0.005 0.007 0.010 0.006 -0.001 
Peru  -0.033 0.031 0.022 0.003 0.000 
IT-Latin  -0.015 0.019 0.030 0.002 -0.002 
Argentina  0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.003 -0.006 
China  0.023 0.001 0.017 na na 
Euro  -0.002 na na 0.021 0.000 
Hong Kong  0.090 -0.045 0.001 -0.154 0.068 
India  -0.007 0.032 0.017 0.018 0.030 
Japan  0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 0.000 
Malaysia  0.133 -0.063 -0.008 -0.015 -0.119 
Singapore  0.180 -0.119 -0.340 -0.155 -0.100 
 Non-IT  0.061 -0.028 -0.059 -0.041 -0.018 
Notes: 1. CA: current account surplus KA: capital account surplus, FDI: foreign direct investment(net),  
                PF: portfolio investment(net), OINT: other investment (net) 
           2. na: data are not available 
           3. The figures of each group are simple arithmetic average of the countries included. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IMF International Financial Statistics and DataStream 
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(c) Changes in NDA and NFA over time 
group country 
NDA/GDP (%) NFA/GDP (%) 
1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 1981-2010 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 1981-2010 
IT
-A
dv
an
ce
d 
 
Australia -0.06 (2.32) 0.20 (1.58) -0.59 (4.43) -0.15 (3.01) 0.48 (2.44) 0.04 (1.76) 0.43 (3.06) 0.32 (2.47) 
Canada 0.02 (0.22) 0.04 (0.24) 0.04 (0.18) 0.04 (0.21) 0.02 (0.20) 0.00 (0.28) 0.00 (0.05) 0.00 (0.20) 
Iceland 
    
-1.49 (14.21) -1.49 (14.21) 
    
2.42 (13.98) 2.42 (13.98) 
Norway -1.11 (4.96) -0.48 (6.83) -1.05 (5.59) -0.91 (5.79) 1.34 (4.67) 0.82 (6.59) 1.13 (3.84) 1.09 (5.15) 
New Zealand -1.49 (5.10) 0.17 (2.90) -0.46 (5.46) -0.36 (4.48) 1.65 (5.21) -0.05 (2.80) 1.04 (4.90) 0.68 (4.21) 
Sweden 
    
-0.84 (9.97) -0.84 (9.97) 
    
0.78 (6.50) 0.78 (6.50) 
Switzerland -1.59 (4.80) -0.30 (5.64) -3.10 (10.44) -1.67 (7.66) 0.84 (7.09) 0.48 (6.33) 3.95 (12.13) 1.76 (8.96) 
UK 0.32 (1.85) 0.26 (1.46) 1.15 (4.84) 0.58 (3.10) -0.09 (1.74) -0.15 (0.98) 0.04 (1.88) -0.07 (1.57) 
Average -0.50 (3.44) -0.02 (3.87) -0.78 (7.89) -0.46 (5.79) 0.60 (4.11) 0.19 3.96) 1.21 (7.33) 0.72 (5.61) 
IT
-A
si
a 
 
Indonesia 
  
0.47 (4.21) 0.25 (8.75) 0.12 (7.09) 
  
1.31 (7.27) 0.95 (5.45) 1.15 (6.42) 
Korea -0.01 (3.75) -1.22 (6.70) -2.42 (8.49) -1.06 (6.72) 
  
1.61 (6.27) 2.88 (7.89) 1.59 (6.13) 
Philippines 
  
1.02 (6.84) -2.57 (5.29 -2.57 (5.29) 
  
-0.22 (6.89) 3.61 (3.95) 3.61 (3.95) 
Thailand 
    
-4.89 (5.75) -2.49 (7.00) 
    
5.47 (6.21) 3.32 (7.12) 
Average 
  
0.00 (6.07) -2.40 (7.50) -1.29 (6.78) -0.01 (3.75) 0.98 (6.80) 3.21 (6.29) 2.10 (6.30) 
IT
-L
at
in
 
Chile 
    
0.00 (4.19) 0.00 (4.19) 
    
0.92 (3.93) 0.92 (3.93) 
Colombia 
    
-0.09 (3.28) -0.09 (3.28) 
    
0.97 (1.80) 0.97 (1.80) 
Mexico 
    
-0.09 (0.58) -0.09 (0.58) 
    
0.21 (0.50) 0.21 (0.50) 
Peru 6.94 (4.31) 0.70 (3.40) -2.04 (4.95) 1.82 (5.66) 0.26 (4.77) 1.67 (3.58) 3.24 (4.92) 1.74 (4.59) 
Average 6.94 (4.31) 0.70 (3.40) -0.66 (3.98) 0.67 (4.75) 0.26 (4.77) 1.67 (3.58) 1.47 (3.46) 1.32 (3.71) 
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(Continued) Appendix 5.3(c) Changes in NDA and NFA over time 
group country 
NDA/GDP(%) NFA/GDP(%) 
1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 1981-2010 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 1981-2010 
IT
-E
m
er
gi
ng
 E
ur
op
e 
 
Czech 
    
-2.55 (6.00) -2.63 (5.94) 
    
2.55 (5.94) 2.55 (5.82) 
Hungary 
    
-1.6 (10.06) -1.88 (9.86) 
    
2.30 (9.07) 2.51 (8.92) 
Turkey     0.25 (4.23) 0.25 (4.23)     1.29 (2.92) 1.29 (2.92) 
Poland 
    
-0.88 (4.42) -0.88 (4.42) 
    
1.78 (2.85) 1.78 (2.85) 
South Africa 
    
-0.28 (0.46) -0.28 (0.46) 
    
0.41 (0.41) 0.41 (0.41) 
Israel 15.18 (22.05) 0.09 (3.97) -1.43 (4.45) 4.52 (14.90) 0.76 (7.24) 1.65 (4.32) 2.26 (4.51) 1.52 (5.45) 
Average 
    
-1.11 (5.79) 1.09 (10.79) 
    
1.77 (5.18) 1.65 (5.35) 
N
on
-I
T
 
Argentina 
  
-0.10 (0.38) 0.22 (1.68) 0.08 (1.28) 
  
0.14 (0.69) 0.31 (1.48) 0.23 (1.19) 
China 3.01 (7.36) 2.50 (7.72) -4.20 (8.47) -0.21 (8.60) 1.11 (1.62) 2.27 (2.45) 9.38 (5.61) 5.04 (5.44) 
Euro Area 
  
-1.32 (11.20) 1.37 (6.57) 0.97 (7.35) 
  
-0.26 (0.78) 0.33 (1.71) 0.25 (1.61) 
Hong Kong 
  
-3.18 (21.37) -2.65 (7.63) -2.80 (12.88) 
  
5.82 (17.88) 7.70 (14.23) 7.16 (15.21) 
India 
  
0.39 (2.00) -0.88 (4.38) -0.49 (3.85) 
  
1.15 (1.95) 3.07 (4.66) 2.48 (4.11) 
Japan 
    
-12.81 (451.62) -12.81 (451.62) 
    
13.58 (447.55) 13.58 (447.55) 
Malaysia 
    
-4.34 (10.73) -4.34 (10.73) 
    
4.76 (11.18) 4.76 (11.18) 
Singapore -6.90 (7.96) -6.64 (10.46) -7.95 (11.50) -7.16 (10.01) 8.35 (8.36) 7.36 (10.98) 8.85 (11.48 8.14 (10.26) 
Average -4.07 (8.95) -1.46 (10.34) -3.76 (150.05) -3.12 (116.18) 6.28 (7.82) 3.29 (8.57) 5.90 (148.74) 5.17 (115.01) 
Notes: 1. All figures are quarterly average changes. The average in country group is the simple arithmetic mean of all countries included.  
            2. The numbers in (  ) indicate standard deviation of quarterly average changes. 
            3. A large standard deviations of NDA/GDP and NFA/GDP in Japan is due to valuation effects of the assets in 2007, 2008 and 2009.  
 
 
369
Appendix 5.4 Time-series based ADF unit root test 
 
UK Korea Australia Peru Canada Switzerland New Zealand 
(1990-2010) (1981-2010) (1990-2010) (1990-2010) (1999-2010) (2002-2010) (2000-2010) 
Statistics P-value Statistics P-value Statistics P-value Statistics P-value Statistics P-value Statistics P-value Statistics P-value 
∆NFA -12.892 0.000 -9.369 0.000 -12.216 0.000 -6.401 0.000 -5.858 0.000 -3.971 0.002 -8.835 0.000 
∆NDA -11.297 0.000 -9.959 0.000 -8.214 0.000 -6.208 0.003 -6.589 0.000 -8.139 0.000 -9.559 0.000 
FXDIF -9.607 0.000 -6.811 0.000 -8.887 0.000 -8.222 0.000 -8.838 0.000 -8.865 0.000 -6.446 0.000 
∆p -9.734 0.000 -4.241 0.000 -3.390 0.012 -3.548 0.009 -4.003 0.002 -2.687 0.079 -3.536 0.008 
Yc -3.660 0.006 -5.156 0.000 -4.638 0.000 -3.455 0.012 -5.162 0.002 -4.395 0.007 -3.476 0.011 
∆G1 
 -1.401 
-7.989 
0.165 
0.560 
0.000 
 
-5.041 0.000 
-1.840 
-11.025 
0.217 
0.359 
0.000 
 
-11.477 0.000 
-1.738 
-2.817 
0.855*** 
0.409 
0.006 
 
-2.023 
-1.572 
0.225 
0.276 
0.493 
 
-1.508 
-2.575 
0.254 
0.523 
0.102 
 
CA -2.612 0.093 -3.568 0.008 -4.555 0.000 -2.452 0.081 -2.729 0.072 
-2.135 
-3.325 
0.145 
0.232 
0.019 
 
-2.604 
-7.352 
0.374* 
0.096 
0.000 
 
∆(rf+ES) -8.714 0.000 -8.103 0.000 -8.106 0.000 -5.512 0.000 -8.010 0.000 -8.379 0.000 -7.332 0.000 
(d1-1)σr -10.574 0.000 -7.056 0.000 -5.428 0.000 -11.200 0.000 -27.123 0.000 -10.873 0.000 -7.949 0.000 
(d2-1)σs -9.123 0.000 -7.085 0.000 -14.734 0.000 -9.781 0.000 -4.678 0.000 -3.424 0.012 -9.054 0.000 
rd -0.873 0.793 -1.541 0.509 -1.757 0.400 -2.519 0.114 -2.197 0.208 -2.734 0.007 -4.704 0.000 
∆m -11.396 0.000 -20.693 0.000 -10.447 0.000 -4.440 0.000 -4.882 0.000 -4.475 0.000 -11.141 0.000 
 -5.671 0.000 -5.869 0.000 -5.262 0.000 -5.377 0.000 -4.127 0.001 -6.158 0.004 -4.997 0.000 
∆  -6.125 0.000 -9.758 0.000 -9.245 0.001 -6.976 0.000 -5.925 0.000 -3.893 0.000 -8.848 0.000 
Notes: 1. When ADF and PP tests provide conflicting results (e.g. ∆G, CA), we additionally conduct KPSS unit root test. In the cell having three figures, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd row indicate the test 
 statistics of ADF, PP and KPSS, respectively. For example, as for the series ∆G of the UK, the null of I(1) cannot be rejected according to ADF but can be rejected according to PP. 
 KPPS test suggests that the null of I(0) cannot be rejected because test statistics (0.165) is smaller than critical value(0.347) at 10% level. Thus, ∆G is assumed stationary. 
            2. Only intercept is included in the test forms except for the series rd and rf
* which are tested with intercept and trend in test forms. 
            3. In KPSS test, ***, ** and * indicate that the null of stationarity is rejected at 1%, 5% and 10% significant level, respectively 
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(Continued) Appendix 5.4 Time-series based ADF unit root test 
 
Indonesia Thailand Japan China India Israel 
(1990-2010) (1981-2010) (1990-2010) (1990-2010) (1999-2010) (2002-2010) 
Statistics P-value Statistics P-value Statistics P-value Statistics P-value Statistics P-value Statistics P-value 
∆NFA -7.779 0.000 -6.081 0.000 -5.901 0.000 -2.628 0.091 -5.568 0.000 -10.342 0.000 
∆NDA -9.313 0.000 -5.811 0.000 -5.935 0.000 -9.221 0.000 -7.748 0.000 -6.301 0.000 
FXDIF -4.806 0.000 -3.486 0.013 -5.169 0.000 -4.926 0.000 -3.202 0.027 -6.908 0.000 
∆p -5.684 0.000 -6.017 0.000 -3.050 0.003 -3.902 0.003 -5.572 0.000 -9.036 0.000 
Yc -5.066 0.006 -3.398 0.017 -5.446 0.000 -5.634 0.000 -5.066 0.002 -5.024 0.007 
∆G1) 
-2.494 
-6.403 
0.424* 
0.125 
0.000 
 
-2.006 
-8.576 
0.500** 
0.283 
0.000 
 
-2.631 0.089 
-1.025 
-2.541 
0.630** 
0.738 
0.110 
 
-2.494 
-6.403 
0.424* 
0.125 
0.000 
 
-4.037 0.002 
CA -3.503  0.012 -4.626 0.000 -3.559 0.008 -3.056 0.033 -3.503 0.013 -2.648 0.086 
∆(rf+ES) -6.417 0.000 -3.962 0.004 -4.526 0.000 -9.546 0.000 -6.417 0.000 -6.421 0.000 
(d1-1)σr -8.776 0.000 -3.770 0.006 -6.295 0.000 -4.669 0.000 -8.776 0.000 -15.000 0.000 
(d2-1)σs -6.216 0.000 -5.350 0.000 -5.139 0.000 -4.309 0.000 -6.216 0.000 -7.152 0.000 
rd -2.605 0.100 -3.670 0.008 -1.511 0.525 -2.520 0.114 -2.605 0.100 -3.916 0.003 
∆m -11.419 0.000 -9.273 0.000 -2.775 0.073 -4.361 0.000 -11.419 0.000 -4.605 0.000 
 
-5.669 0.000 -2.713 0.080 -3.571 0.008 -6.544 0.000 -5.669 0.000 -5.466 0.004 
∆  -7.313 0.000 -4.572 0.000 -8.998 0.000 -9.758 0.000 -7.313 0.000 -12.431 0.000 
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Appendix 5.5 Sterilisation and offset coefficient: System GMM with time series 
  Australia   UK 
 
Whole 
(1981Q1-2010Q3) 
Pre-IT 
(1981Q1-1992Q4) 
Post-IT 
(1993Q1-2010Q3) 
Whole 
(1981Q1-2010Q4 
Pre-IT 
(1981Q1-1992Q2) 
Post-IT 
(1992Q3-2010Q3) 
∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA 
Intercept 
0.0102*** 
(0.0057) 
0.0012 
(0.7202) 
   0.0206*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0200*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0226** 
(0.0299) 
0.0089* 
(0.0562) 
-8.32E-05 
(0.9867) 
-0.0004 
(0.9256) 
0.0012 
(0.2706) 
0.0053*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0045 
(0.4547) 
0.0028 
(0.2453) 
∆NFA (sterilisation)  
-0.6563*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.6736*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.7739*** 
(0.0007) 
- 
-0.7412*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.8114*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.4241 
(0.1331) 
- 
∆NDA (offset) - 
-0.5061*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.8909*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.3840*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.3918*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.6543*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.2400*** 
(0.0000) 
CA 
0.1845** 
(0.0336) 
0.0011 
(0.9861) 
0.3097** 
(0.0497) 
0.3062*** 
(0.0008) 
0.5639*** 
(0.0005) 
0.1996* 
(0.0594) 
 -0.2786*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0021 
(0.9717) 
0.1187*** 
(0.0074) 
0.0939 
(0.1899) 
-0.1798 
(0.5127) 
-0.1065 
(0.2158) 
∆(rf+ES) 
0.0773*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0365 
(0.2095) 
0.0933** 
(0.0240) 
0.0292 
(0.3793) 
0.0397 
(0.6636) 
-0.1104** 
(0.0187) 
0.1609 
(0.3195) 
-0.1166 
(0.2249) 
-0.0631* 
(0.0730) 
-0.0669*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.1690 
(0.5641) 
0.1382** 
(0.0278) 
 
-0.1196*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0292 
(0.1057) 
0.0384 
(0.1633) 
0.0744*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.1218* 
(0.0713) 
-0.1126*** 
(0.0049) 
0.1096 
(0.1667) 
-0.0069 
(0.8681) 
-0.0522*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0236** 
(0.0134) 
0.1234 
(0.3543) 
-0.0345 
(0.2945) 
∆pt-1 
-0.0610 
(0.5627) 
0.1864** 
(0.0106) 
-0.3604*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.2009* 
(0.0767) 
0.3238 
(0.6709) 
0.2738 
(0.2690) 
-0.8128** 
(0.0314) 
-0.0172 
(0.9565) 
-0.1069** 
(0.0500) 
-0.2041*** 
(0.0096) 
-1.4761** 
(0.0201) 
-0.6826*** 
(0.0072) 
Yc 
0.0938 
(0.2017) 
-0.0306) 
(0.6192) 
0.2610*** 
(0.0038) 
0.2025*** 
(0.0001) 
0.6747*** 
(0.0067) 
0.0468 
(0.8199) 
-0.0301 
(0.8639) 
0.0906 
(0.3034) 
0.4514*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1838 
(0.1284) 
0.1664 
(0.2207) 
-0.1184 
(0.2524) 
Fiscal deficit 
-8.45E-05 
(0.9972) 
-0.0600** 
(0.0163) 
-0.0872*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0583*** 
(0.0004) 
0.2370* 
(0.0602) 
0.1643** 
(0.0371) 
-0.1812*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.1101 
(0.1101) 
-0.1492*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0138 
(0.5294) 
-0.1564** 
(0.0189) 
-0.1227*** 
(0.0000) 
(d1-1)σr 
-0.4997 
(0.1227) 
- 
-0.3558 
(0.1425) 
- 
-5.8433*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-3.2163*** 
(0.0017) 
- 
-0.8879*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-5.6567*** 
(0.0001) 
- 
(d2-1)σs - 
-0.4893*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.1762*** 
(0.0298) 
- 
-0.4189*** 
(0.0000 
- 
-0.6048*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.2062*** 
(0.0002) 
- 
-0.8072*** 
(0.0000) 
Observation 115 115 45 45 71 71 116 116 43 43 73 73 
J-statistics 20.263 (0.3182) 9.883 (0.3601) 11.649 (0.2339) 12.187 (0.203) 10.209 (0.3601) 9.858 (0.3621) 
Notes: 1.The numbers in parenthesis are p-values.          
            2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
            3. A constant, ∆CIC, ∆FDI, standard deviation of FX rate return and up to 2 lags of variables are used as instruments. 
            4. J-statistics is the diagnostic test for the validity of over-identifying restriction. Null is that the specification has a valid over-identifying restriction.   
            5. Newey & West (1987)’s HAC standard-errors are used.     
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(Continued) Appendix 5.5 Sterilisation and offset coefficient: System GMM with time series 
 
 
  Korea   Peru 
 
Whole 
(1981Q1-2010Q3) 
Pre-IT 
(1981Q1-1998Q4) 
Post-IT 
(1999Q1-2010Q4) 
Whole 
(1991Q3-2010Q2) 
Pre-IT 
(1991Q3-2001Q4) 
Post-IT 
(2002Q1-2010Q2) 
∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA 
Intercept 
-0.0115*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.0073 
(0.1161) 
0.0015 
(0.6083) 
  -0.0017  
(0.4552) 
   0.0186*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.0252*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.0072  
(0.1180) 
   0.0116*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0422*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.0116  
(0.3563) 
   0.0107*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.0169*** 
(0.0000) 
∆NFA(sterilisation) 
-1.0175*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
 -0.1925* 
(0.0709) 
- 
  -1.0194*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
  -1.0128*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
  -0.2282*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
  -0.9352*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
∆NDA (offset) - 
-0.7378*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
  -0.2033** 
(0.0423) 
- 
  -0.8786*** 
(0.0000 
- 
  -0.7508*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
  -0.1077  
(0.4742) 
- 
  -0.9318*** 
(0.0000) 
CA 
0.3446*** 
(0.0000) 
  0.2625*** 
(0.0001) 
   0.1921*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.0465 
(0.4539) 
   0.0942  
(0.4296) 
  -0.0989  
(0.3888) 
   0.2910* 
(0.0559) 
   0.1587 ** 
(0.0463) 
  -0.4723*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.0576  
(0.8023) 
   0.1700** 
(0.0125) 
   0.0496  
(0.5568) 
∆(rf+ES) 
0.2098* 
(0.0994) 
 -0.0726  
(0.4892) 
   0.5661*** 
(0.0004) 
  -0.5577*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.2097*** 
(0.0001) 
   0.1558  
(0.1267) 
  0.8230*** 
(0.0001) 
   0.1767  
(0.1004) 
  -0.6819*** 
(0.0000) 
  -0.1418** 
(0.0494) 
   1.1923*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.8778*** 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.0328 
(0.3520) 
 -0.1204*** 
(0.0006) 
   0.0349  
(0.2393) 
  -0.0746*** 
(0.0025) 
  0.0232 
(0.3519) 
   0.0596** 
(0.0218) 
 -0.3692* 
(0.0771) 
  -0.3427 ** 
(0.0163) 
   0.7850*** 
(0.0000) 
  -0.3347  
(0.1200) 
   0.3187*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.1725*** 
(0.0455) 
∆pt-1 
-1.3126*** 
(0.0004) 
  -1.4145*** 
(0.0003) 
  -0.2634  
(0.2852) 
   0.8733 *** 
(0.0000) 
 -1.9684*** 
(0.0000) 
  -1.9807*** 
(0.0035) 
1.0820*** 
(0.0095) 
   0.4780*** 
(0.0001) 
   0.5680*** 
(0.0002) 
   0.2831*** 
(0.0022) 
   1.2581*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.5706*** 
(0.0279) 
Yc 
-0.4410*** 
(0.0014) 
 -0.2324 
(0.1198) 
 -0.3460*** 
(0.0041) 
  0.3099** 
(0.0122) 
  -0.4115** 
(0.0179) 
  -0.1574* 
(0.0648) 
  0.5299*** 
(0.0074) 
  0.4644*** 
(0.0000) 
  -0.0947*** 
(0.0077) 
   0.5172** 
(0.0173) 
   0.9462*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.8918*** 
(0.0000) 
Fiscal deficit 
-0.0205 
(0.8089) 
  0.0062 
(0.9241) 
-0.2555*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0500 
(0.3591) 
   0.0884*** 
(0.0079) 
  -0.0211  
(0.5020) 
   0.0472  
(0.6322) 
   0.1056  
(0.2276) 
  -0.9790*** 
(0.0000) 
   0.1165  
(0.2472) 
  -0.0414  
(0.4807) 
  -0.0205  
(0.7610) 
(d1-1)σr 
-3.2106*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
 -3.4660*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
 -2.3589*** 
(0.0009) 
- 
   0.2476  
(0.1634) 
- 
  -0.5116*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
 - 0.1441* 
(0.0612) 
- 
(d2-1)σs - 
  0.5994*** 
(0.0025) 
- 
  -0.3621  
(0.0767) 
- 
  -0.2966** 
(0.0287) 
- 
   0.3495  
(0.5637) 
- 
  -0.8231  
(0.2993) 
- 
   0.3589*** 
(0.0862) 
Observation 116 116 69 69 47 47 76 76 42 42 34 34 
J-statistics 14.580 (0.1032) 14.373 (0.1097) 9.791 (0.3677) 12.302 (0.2030) 9.175 (0.2185) 8.647 (0.4704) 
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 Canada Switzerland New Zealand Israel 
 
Whole 
(1985Q4- 2010Q3) 
Post-IT 
(1991Q1- 2010Q3) 
 (2002Q1-2010Q2) (1997Q2-2010Q1) (1997Q2-2010Q1) 
∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA 
Intercept 
-0.0001 
(0.5695) 
0.0005* 
(0.0579) 
0.0002*** 
(0.2586) 
0.0006** 
(0.0127) 
0.1155*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0662*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0273*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0249*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0164*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0013 
(0.7974) 
∆NFA (sterilisation) 
-0.0621 
(0.5439) 
- 
0.1708 
(0.1515) 
- 
-0.2269*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.8625*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.2242*** 
(0.0013) 
- 
∆NDA (offset) - 
-0.2545*** 
(0.0025) 
- 
-0.2135** 
(0.0429) 
- 
-0.4602*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.8175*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.4588*** 
(0.0044) 
CA 
-0.0684 
(0.2040) 
-0.0046 
(0.9133) 
0.0067 
(0.8978) 
0.0312 
(0.5931) 
-0.9023*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3188* 
(0.0791) 
-0.2405*** 
(0.0074) 
-0.1830*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0028 
(0.9839) 
-0.0149 
(0.8764) 
∆(rf+ES) 
-0.0012 
(0.8933) 
-0.0036 
(0.7398) 
-0.0082 
(0.2156) 
0.0047 
(0.6701) 
-0.0994 
(0.3512) 
0.9803*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0678 
(0.4772) 
0.0140 
(0.8966) 
-0.1698 
(0.2532) 
0.0647 
(0.5262) 
 
0.0037 
(0.5704) 
-0.0048 
(0.4347) 
-0.0032 
(0.5323) 
0.0042 
(0.4176) 
0.0320 
(0.8341) 
0.5454*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0481** 
(0.0141) 
-0.0256 
(0.4815) 
0.0766 
(0.1137) 
0.1740*** 
(0.0014) 
∆pt-1 
0.0807* 
(0.0765) 
-0.0756* 
(0.0847) 
-0.0616 
(0.3242) 
-0.1030* 
(0.0736) 
-1.9245*** 
(0.0012) 
-4.0840*** 
(0.0001) 
2.3498** 
(0.0010) 
2.7950*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0885 
(0.6851) 
-0.0148 
(0.9590) 
Yc 
-0.0169* 
(0.0944) 
0.0144 
(0.1715) 
-0.0255** 
(0.0335) 
-0.0081 
(0.5835) 
-1.5430*** 
(0.0000) 
2.1933*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.6772*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.4887* 
(0.0542) 
0.5321*** 
(0.0007) 
0.3258* 
(0.0909) 
Fiscal deficit 
0.1039** 
(0.0364) 
-0.0496** 
(0.0137) 
0.0764* 
(0.0846) 
-0.0272* 
(0.0716) 
-3.7264*** 
(0.0000) 
-2.3017*** 
(0.0029) 
0.1401 
(0.1171) 
0.0780 
(0.3912) 
-0.5964*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.5019*** 
(0.0039) 
(d1-1)σr 
-0.4569*** 
(0.0001) 
- 
-1.0155*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.3699* 
(0.0773) 
- 
-3.1943** 
(0.0286) 
- 
-7.7020*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
(d2-1)σs - 
-0.0013 
(0.9707) 
- 
-0.0020 
(0.9659) 
- 
-1.3477*** 
(0.0001) 
- 
-0.3299 
(0.1570) 
- 
-1.1772*** 
(0.0006) 
Observation 100 100 79 79 42 42 80 80 52 52 
J-statistics 15.348 (0.0818) 13.980 (0.1230) 9.229 (0.4164) 7.656 (0.5691) 9.937 (0.3556) 
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(Continued) Appendix 5.5 Sterilisation and offset coefficient: System GMM with time series 
 
Indonesia Thailand Japan China India 
(2000Q3-2010Q3) (2000Q2-2010Q3) (2002Q3- 2010Q3) (1995Q4 2010Q3) (1997Q3 2010Q1) 
∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA ∆NDA ∆NFA 
Intercept 
-0.0034 
(0.7825) 
0.0193*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0006 
(0.9028) 
-0.0022 
(0.7638) 
0.1101* 
(0.0567) 
0.1528*** 
(0.0055) 
0.0393* 
(0.0689) 
0.0313** 
(0.0231) 
-0.0160** 
(0.0332) 
0.0328*** 
(0.0014) 
∆NFA (sterilisation) 
-1.1714*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.9884*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-1.0102*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-1.1055*** 
(0.0043) 
- 
-0.3768*** 
(0.0057) 
- 
∆NDA (offset) - 
-0.5155*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.7258*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.9898*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.1380* 
(0.0836) 
- 
0.1001 
(0.3854) 
CA 
0.0422 
(0.8192) 
-0.0032 
(0.9857) 
0.0453 
(0.7255) 
0.2366* 
(0.0689) 
-11.0921* 
(0.0549) 
-15.5806*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.8052 
(0.1628) 
-0.2555 
(0.5673) 
-0.5709** 
(0.0456) 
1.0759*** 
(0.0000) 
∆(rf+ES) 
0.0851 
(0.1841) 
0.2656*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.5592*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.3661* 
(0.0512) 
0.6558** 
(0.0136) 
0.0799 
(0.7472) 
0.3467 
(0.8745) 
-1.9199 
(0.1273) 
-0.0226 
(0.8505) 
0.0938 
(0.6861) 
 
-0.1924*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1021** 
(0.0130) 
0.1382** 
(0.0193) 
-0.0998 
(0.3018) 
-0.8122** 
(0.0230) 
-0.6972** 
(0.0481) 
-17.3943  
(0.1159) 
-0.0515 
(0.9934) 
-0.2378 
(0.1925) 
-0.8353*** 
(0.0000) 
∆pt-1 
0.2405 
(0.4626) 
-0.5484** 
(0.0170) 
0.7495*** 
(0.0038) 
0.8841*** 
(0.0000) 
11.1046*** 
(0.0012) 
5.9769 
(0.1033) 
-0.1013 
(0.9098) 
-0.2819 
(0.7355) 
0.2771 
(0.1642) 
-0.0489 
(0.8429) 
Yc 
-2.2606** 
(0.0110) 
1.2393** 
(0.0436) 
0.0917 
(0.3260) 
0.3160*** 
(0.0059) 
-1.8932*** 
(0.0005) 
-1.3965*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0591 
(0.4593) 
0.0668 
(0.1350) 
0.1484 
(0.1033) 
-0.1508 
(0.3871) 
Fiscal deficit 
-0.7289* 
(0.0920) 
-0.3745* 
(0.0706) 
-0.2607** 
(0.0178) 
-0.9241** 
(0.0218) 
-0.3164 
(0.5770) 
0.3121 
(0.6281) 
-1.5571*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3663** 
(0.0492) 
-0.2635*** 
(0.0068) 
0.2832* 
(0.0872) 
(d1-1)σr 
-6.6498*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-6.0931*** 
(0.0019) 
- 
-12.8042*** 
(0.0002) 
- 
-15.3305*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
-0.4297* 
(0.0568) 
- 
(d2-1)σs - 
-0.4249 
(0.3238) 
- 
-0.1362 
(0.3338) 
- 
2.0454** 
(0.0236) 
- 
-9.1046 
(0.6560) 
- 
-4.3367*** 
(0.0000) 
Observation 41 41 42 42 33 33 78 78 51 51 
J-statistics 15.051* (0.0895) 10.442 (0.3159) 7.237 (0.6124) 14.236 (0.1142) 11.423 (0.2478) 
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Appendix 5.6 Sterilisation effect on domestic interest rate: Single equation GMM 
Regression equation:  
 
Australia UK Canada Korea Peru 
     Whole          Pre-IT           Post-IT   Whole        Pre-IT      Post-IT Whole        Pre-IT      Post-IT Whole        Pre-IT      Post-IT Whole        Post-IT       
1981Q3 
-2010Q3 
1981Q4 
 -1992Q4 
1993Q1  
-2010Q3 
1981Q3 
-2010Q2 
1981Q3 
-1992Q3 
1992Q4 
-2010Q2 
1981Q4 
- 2010Q3 
1981Q4  
-1990Q4 
1991Q1  
-2010Q3 
1982Q1 
-2010Q3 
1982Q1 
-1996Q4 
1999Q1 
-2010Q3 
1995Q4  
-2010Q3 
2002Q1 
 -2010Q3 
Intercept 
0.0239 
(0.1576) 
0.0721*** 
 (0.0002) 
0.0546*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0325** 
(0.0399) 
0.0968*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0372*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0216*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0842*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0306*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0538 
(0.1549) 
0.0268 
(0.5179) 
0.0335*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0283* 
(0.0932) 
0.0366*** 
(0.0000) 
r*f         (+) 
0.2654** 
(0.0246) 
0.1056 
(0.4085) 
0.1179** 
(0.0114) 
0.5780*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0961 
(0.5665) 
0.2991*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6613*** 
(0.0000) 
0.4640*** 
(0.0000) 
0.4107*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9392* 
(0.0848) 
0.3837*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2857*** 
(0.0000) 
1.6736*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3265*** 
(0.0000) 
∆NDA        
-0.3502 
(0.2160) 
-0.6031* 
(0.0660) 
-0.0702 
(0.4934) 
-0.2297 
(0.5660) 
0.7060** 
(0.0371) 
-0.0153 
(0.9539) 
-1.5858 
(0.5452) 
-3.6615 
(0.1551) 
-1.9019 
(0.2302) 
-0.4279* 
(0.0973) 
0.0826 
(0.5525) 
-0.0124* 
(0.0709) 
0.1124 
(0.6475) 
-0.0140 
(0.6911) 
∆mt-1         (-) 
-0.0383 
(0.9194) 
-0.2747 
(0.7051) 
0.1463 
(0.2876) 
-0.2863** 
(0.0156) 
-0.1245 
(0.8425) 
-0.1493** 
(0.0208) 
-0.5009 
(0.7059) 
-1.7915 
(0.2829) 
-0.5688 
(0.5234) 
-0.3855 
(0.4361) 
-0.5261 
(0.1844) 
0.0634 
(0.6209) 
-0.2987 
(0.1939) 
0.1531*** 
(0.0014) 
pet+1 
5.1072*** 
(0.0001) 
3.3637*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0041 
(0.9906) 
1.0104 
(0.3132) 
2.4948** 
(0.0143) 
-0.2136 
(0.7691) 
2.0697** 
(0.0331) 
-0.4079 
(0.6091) 
0.4127 
(0.6578) 
1.6878 
(0.7653) 
5.0047*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.7696 
(0.4302) 
-0.9793  
(0.1970) 
-0.1170  
(0.6595) 
∆y        (+) 
-0.1337 
(0.8970) 
0.1180 
(0.9139) 
-0.4758 
(0.2290) 
-0.5006 
(0.8725) 
-1.8282** 
(0.0200) 
0.8377 
(0.1099) 
-1.2104*** 
(0.0067) 
-1.7506*** 
(0.0001) 
-1.0716*** 
(0.0705) 
4.3975* 
(0.0943) 
0.3520 
(0.7930) 
0.4883 
(0.2175) 
-0.2334 
(0.8003) 
-0.3505** 
(0.0366) 
Observation  
after adjustment 
116 45 71 116 45 71 116 37 79 117 62 47 60 35 
J-statistics 
7.6918 
(0.1740) 
3.2699 
(0.6584) 
3.8202 
(0.5755)  
7.6338* 
(0.0542) 
3.5686 
(0.3119) 
5.8577 
(0.1187) 
7.6476 
(0.1768) 
3.7027 
(0.5930) 
6.6877 
(0.2449) 
1.3505 
(0.7171) 
3.7507 
(0.2896) 
4.6539 
(0.1989) 
9.0329 
(0.5290) 
7.8978 
(0.6388) 
Notes: 1. The numbers in (    ) are p-values. 
            2. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
            3. The signs in (  ) indicated the priori expected signs according to model. 
            4. A constant and up to two lags of explanatory variables are used as instruments together with CIC/GDP, FDI/GDP and standard deviation of FX rate return. 
            5. Newey-West HAC standard errors & covariance is used. 
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(Continued) Appendix 5.6 Sterilisation effect on domestic interest rate: Single equation GMM 
 
Switzerland Israel New Zealand Thailand 
Indonesia China Japan India 
Pre-IT      Post-IT Whole        Pre-IT      Post-IT Post-IT Post-IT 
 
1984Q3 
-1999Q4 
2000Q1 
-2010Q3 
1983Q4 
-2010Q1 
1983Q4  
-1997Q1 
1997Q2  
-2010Q1 
1990Q1 
-2010Q3 
2000Q2 
- 2010Q3 
1998Q1 
- 2010Q3 
1990Q2 
-2010Q3 
2000Q1 
-2010Q3 
1990Q2 
-1999Q4 
2002Q4 
-2010Q3 
1997Q4 
-2010Q3 
Intercept 
0.0341*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0073** 
(0.0183) 
0.2527 
(0.3604) 
-0.7610 
(0.1166) 
0.0595*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0086*** 
(0.0271) 
0.0334** 
(0.0135) 
-0.0050 
(0.5912) 
0.0255* 
(0.0605) 
0.0227*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0262 
(0.5474) 
-0.0013 
(0.3853) 
0.0869*** 
(0.0000) 
r*f         (+) 
-0.4656** 
(0.0122) 
0.3038*** 
(0.0004) 
-6.6590 
(0.1806) 
4.7475 
(0.4418) 
0.1287 
(0.7266) 
0.0070 
(0.8482) 
0.1558 
(0.1584) 
0.1658** 
(0.0453) 
0.4819 
(0.1953) 
0.1159* 
(0.0865) 
0.7255 
(0.1679) 
0.0968*** 
(0.0043) 
0.8292*** 
 (0.0001) 
∆NDA        
0.4698** 
(0.0304) 
-0.0468  
(0.1893) 
0.3553 
(0.9148) 
-6.6167* 
(0.0726) 
0.6192** 
(0.0461) 
0.1138* 
(0.0523) 
0.0343 
(0.8347) 
0.0203 
(0.6427) 
0.3803** 
(0.0381) 
-0.1328* 
(0.0693) 
0.1682 
(0.5772) 
0.0018** 
(0.0316) 
-0.1276 
(0.4674) 
∆mt-1      (-) 
-0.3708*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0509 
(0.1473) 
0.4679 
(0.7770) 
-1.7239 
(0.5963) 
0.2694 
(0.1868) 
-0.0729 
(0.2010) 
0.4721** 
(0.0256) 
-0.0071 
(0.8341) 
0.0160 
(0.9544) 
-0.1076 
(0.1736) 
0.6861* 
(0.0773) 
0.3687 
(0.1628) 
-0.0318 
(0.8323) 
pet+1 
7.1747*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.4357 
(0.1947) 
16.6773*** 
(0.0029) 
13.7387*** 
(0.0060) 
0.1386 
(0.8568) 
1.0017** 
(0.0461) 
-1.6462** 
(0.0465) 
-0.5809 
(0.1465) 
-1.2690** 
(0.0332) 
-0.4486 
(0.1143) 
-1.3312* 
(0.0727) 
-0.7410** 
(0.0227) 
-1.0748*** 
(0.0002) 
∆y       (+) 
-2.0825* 
(0.0746) 
-0.3874 
(0.4842) 
-10.8153 
(0.1600) 
2.5884 
(0.7836) 
0.1375 
(0.8337) 
0.3204 
(0.3490) 
-0.6109 
(0.1013) 
0.9661* 
(0.0728) 
0.9339 
(0.4937) 
0.1480 
(0.5398) 
-0.4716 
(0.7098) 
0.0569 
(0.7345) 
0.4320 
(0.3916) 
Observation  
after adjustment 
62 43 106 54 52 83 40 38 82 43 39 32 51 
J-statistics 
1.5604 
(0.9060) 
4.3038 
(0.5066) 
2.0866 
(0.8370) 
1.2741 
(0.9376) 
5.7109 
(0.3354) 
14.5665 
(0.1487) 
2.4444 
(0.7848) 
8.1404 
(0.6151) 
1.4526 
(0.4836) 
2.0569 
(0.3575) 
1.2338 
(0.5396) 
5.2870 
(0.3818) 
5.5875 
(0.8485) 
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Appendix 5.7 Panel unit root test 
 IT Advanced IT Asia IT-Latin IT-Europe Non-IT 
 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 1991-2000 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 
 Statistics  P-value Statistics  P-value Statistics  P-value Statistics  P-value Statistics  P-value Statistics  P-value Statistics  P-value Statistics  P-value 
∆NFA 
79.2690  0.0000 
-6.92801  0.0000 
124.956  0.0000 
-9.71996  0.0000 
125.712  0.0000 
-9.26242  0.0000 
30.8629  0.0000 
-4.06035  0.0000 
45.1185  0.0000 
-5.12619  0.0000 
60.1000  0.0000 
-6.19032  0.0000 
47.1967  0.0000 
-4.86630  0.0000 
118.597  0.0000 
-8.51552  0.0000 
∆NDA 
74.9097  0.0000 
-6.72971  0.0000 
127.918  0.0000 
-9.81048  0.0000 
119.097  0.0000 
-8.98435  0.0000 
29.4376  0.0001 
-3.95014  0.0000 
52.8847  0.0000 
-5.90368  0.0000 
49.4330  0.0000 
-5.23945  0.0000 
62.4255  0.0000 
-6.04194  0.0000 
168.763  0.0000 
-11.0906  0.0000 
FXDIF 
87.2929  0.0000 
-7.30455  0.0000 
144.785  0.0000 
-10.2235  0.0000 
157.928  0.0000 
-10.8908  0.0000 
60.2692  0.0000 
-6.43468  0.0000 
66.2119  0.0000 
-6.91771  0.0000 
117.314  0.0000 
-9.63599  0.0000 
127.045  0.0000 
-9.86291  0.0000 
357.484  0.0000 
-17.4124  0.0000 
∆p 
70.4677  0.0000 
-6.20330  0.0000 
80.3941  0.0000 
-6.73795  0.0000 
120.801  0.0000 
-8.64380  0.0000 
31.1717  0.0001 
-3.96785  0.0000 
69.9809  0.0000 
-7.12320  0.0000 
103.512  0.0000 
-8.44621  0.0000 
78.0581  0.0000 
-6.57921  0.0000 
201.589  0.0000 
-11.5210  0.0000 
Yc 
25.2330  0.0323 
-2.30075  0.0107 
32.6821  0.0081 
-2.97025  0.0015 
60.4942  0.0000 
-5.10043  0.0000 
15.3419  0.0528 
-2.08398  0.0186 
26.7996  0.0008 
-3.56086  0.0002 
35.9246  0.0001 
-3.94305  0.0000 
31.2270  0.0018 
-3.46177  0.0003 
79.6499  0.0000 
-6.65070  0.0000 
∆G 
37.1206  0.0000 
-3.68708  0.0001 
42.8924  0.0003 
-3.45679  0.0003 
25.0589  0.0688 
-1.54549  0.0611 
26.9425  0.0001 
-3.55350  0.0002 
62.8673  0.0000 
-6.00616  0.0000 
81.6649  0.0000 
-6.84851  0.0000 
56.9176  0.0000 
-5.18193  0.0000 
220.735  0.0000 
-11.4130  0.0000 
CA 
32.9998  0.0010 
-3.39531  0.0003 
53.5596  0.0000 
-2.02238  0.0216 
47.5581  0.0001 
-3.99524  0.0000 
14.0450  0.0806 
-0.60671  0.2720 
28.5464  0.0004 
-3.72338  0.0001 
39.6110  0.0000 
-4.39341  0.0000 
34.6879  0.0005 
-3.31573  0.0005 
49.7079  0.0000 
-4.44410  0.0000 
∆(rf+ES) 
83.5697  0.0000 
-7.07828  0.0000 
111.422  0.0000 
-8.57797  0.0000 
118.728  0.0000 
-8.98923  0.0000 
29.1761  0.0003 
-3.75529  0.0001 
55.0459  0.0000 
-6.12976  0.0000 
73.7124  0.0000 
-7.17211  0.0000 
86.2570  0.0000 
-7.61957  0.0000 
242.077  0.0000 
-13.8223  0.0000 
(d1-1)σr 
55.2037  0.0000 
-5.32049  0.0000 
136.835  0.0000 
-9.88906  0.0000 
143.851  0.0000 
-9.91608  0.0000 
36.4696  0.0000 
-4.79642  0.0000 
36.7667  0.0000 
-4.38350  0.0000 
101.754  0.0000 
-8.53622  0.0000 
86.1349  0.0000 
-7.52259  0.0000 
153.378  0.0000 
-10.6121  0.0000 
(d2-1)σs 
86.3033  0.0000 
-7.63376  0.0000 
134.988  0.0000 
-9.91620  0.0000 
73.9115  0.0000 
-6.42605  0.0000 
21.0256  0.0018 
-2.98833  0.0014 
47.4948  0.0000 
-5.39288  0.0000 
67.4733  0.0000 
-6.71686  0.0000 
80.6608  0.0000 
-7.10944  0.0000 
188.279  0.0000 
-11.4966  0.0000 
rd 
21.4794  0.1608 
-1.13865  0.1274 
40.4314  0.0007 
-3.58673  0.0002 
31.8625  0.0104 
-2.72129  0.0033 
19.6075  0.0119 
-2.09002  0.0183 
21.5623  0.0058 
-1.92594  0.0271 
34.6843  0.0001 
-3.72077  0.0001 
31.2636  0.0018 
-3.32775  0.0004 
82.4429  0.0000 
-5.13042  0.0000 
∆m 
133.451  0.0000 
-10.1667  0.0000 
148.268  0.0000 
-10.7640  0.0000 
142.286  0.0000 
-10.0762  0.0000 
84.6668  0.0000 
-8.29376  0.0000 
116.473  0.0000 
-9.58966  0.0000 
73.7270  0.0000 
-6.72321  0.0000 
103.760  0.0000 
-8.28287  0.0000 
328.235  0.0000 
-15.7481  0.0000 
*
fr  
63.7845  0.0000 
-5.73265  0.0000 
76.9829  0.0000 
-6.56408  0.0000 
63.6141  0.0000 
-5.70958  0.0000 
27.1962  0.0007 
-3.56044  0.0002 
42.9187  0.0000 
-5.17290  0.0000 
56.7647  0.0000 
-5.94906  0.0000 
70.6784  0.0000 
-6.57771  0.0000 
165.372  0.0000 
-11.0082  0.0000 
∆ ty  
90.9124  0.0000 
-7.03672  0.0000 
117.545  0.0000 
-8.39179  0.0000 
129.201  0.0000 
-8.77175  0.0000 
66.7785  0.0000 
-6.42202  0.0000 
330.281  0.0000 
-14.2309  0.0000 
99.0870  0.0000 
-8.58532  0.0000 
119.854  0.0000 
-9.16624  0.0000 
200.559  0.0000 
-12.3646  0.0000 
Notes: 1. H0: All cross-sections with unit root; H1: Some cross-section without unit root. 
            2. Upper values indicate the ADF χ2 statistics (Maddala and Wu 1999) while lower ones indicate the ADF Z-statistics(Choi 2001). 
            3. P-values are the probabilities for ADF Fisher tests computed using an asymptotic Chi-square and asymptotic normal distribution, respectively.  
            4. The number of lags of each cross-section determined by SIC.      
            5. The “demean” option to xtunitroot in STATA are used 
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Appendix 5.8 GMM and diagnostic tests 
 
In this appendix, GMM estimation and relevant diagnostic tests used in Chapter 5 are 
summarized based on Baum (2006)’s Chapter 8 and Baum et al. (2003, 2007). 
 
I. GMM estimation 
 
Consider the following linear regression. 
(A.1) uXY   ,   ]|[ XuuE   with typical row iii uXY    
 
where Y is (N×1) matrix of dependent variables; X is (N×k) matrix of regressors when N(k) is 
the number of observations (coefficients); β is (k×1) vector of parameters; u is (N×1) matrix 
of error term with mean zero;  is (N×N) covariance matrix. We assume that the k1 
regressors X1 are endogenous and the (k-k1) remaining regressors X2 are exogenous: i.e., 
E(X1u)≠0 and E(X2u)=0. (N×ℓ) matrix Z indicates instrument variables which are assumed to 
satisfy orthogonality condition E(Zu)=0. Instrument Z is partitioned into [Z1 Z2] where the ℓ1 
instrument Z1 are instruments excluded from regressions, while the remaining (ℓ-ℓ1) 
instruments Z2 are included in the regression and equal to the exogenous regressors (Z2≡X2).  
GMM is based on the moment function(g) which depends on the observable random 
variable Y and X (or Z), and unknown parameters (β) and which has zero expectation in the 
population when evaluated at the true parameters. Thus, in case of a linear model, GMM is to 
choose an estimator GMM

 that solves: 
(A.2) 0)]([)](,[[  GMMiiiGMMi XYZEuZgE 

.  
where g is the moment function expressed as )()()](,[  iiiii XYZuZuZg  .In equation 
(A.2), if the model is exactly identified (ℓ=k), we can find a unique  because we solve ℓ 
moment conditions for k coefficients in . However, if the model is overidentified (ℓ>k) 
and thus we have more equations than unknown coefficients, we cannot find k-vector  
that satisfies ℓ moment condition 0)](,[[  GMMi uZgE  . Thus, the natural solution is to choose

GMM

GMM

GMM

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for )]([ GMMiii XYZE 

 to be close to zero as possible. For this, Hansen (1982) proposes 
to minimize the following quadratic form )ˆ( GMMJ  : 
(A.3)  )]
ˆ([])ˆ([min)ˆ(min GMMGMMGMM gWgJ
GMMGMM


  
where )ˆ( GMMg  = )](,[[ GMMi uZgE   = ; W is a positive definite (ℓ×ℓ) 
weighting matrix that accounts for the correlation among the when the errors are not 
i.i.d. It can be shown that this process provides a consistent estimator. Deriving and solving k 
first under order condition 0
ˆ
)ˆ(



GMM
GMMJ


, we can obtain the following GMM estimator with 
overidentifying restrictions.  
(A.4)  YZZWXXZZWXGMM 
1)(ˆ  
The above GMM estimator has several features. First, if ℓ=k (exactly identified), then ZX  is 
a square matrix, and so 1111 )()()(   ZXWXZXZZWX  . Then, GMM estimator (A.4) 
coincides with IV estimator. IVGMM YZXZ  ˆ)(ˆ
1   . Second, if all regressors are 
exogenous (i.e., Z=X), then YXXXOLSIVGMM 
1)(ˆˆˆ  . Note that the weighting matrix 
(W) does not play any role in the case of IV and OLS. Third, if ℓ>k (overidentified), there are 
as many GMM estimators as there are choices of W. Among all possible candidates for W, the 
optimal one (which provides the most efficient estimate) is the inverse of the covariance 
matrix of the moment condition g. That is, W=S-1 where S is the (ℓ×ℓ) covariance matrix of 
the moment g measured as: 
(A.5) )()( ZZEZuuZES   
Substituting (A.5) into (A.4) yields the efficient GMM estimator  
(A.6) YZZSXXZZSXEGMM 
 111 )(ˆ  
Note that there is not any assumption about the covariance matrix of error terms (Ω) to derive 
(A.6).  Because S is unknown, the efficient estimator based on the S is not feasible. Thus, we 
GMM

)]([ GMMiii XYZE 


)ˆ( GMMg 
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need to estimate S by making some assumptions about Ω. To obtain a consistent and 
asymptotically efficient GMM estimator, a two-step procedure is, in general, used. In the first 
step, the 2SLS estimator is used to obtain a preliminary estimation of parameter β (denoted 
~
) 
and residual 
~~
iii XYu  . Then, we can obtain S by the assumption about the structure of Ω 
from the residual iu
~ . In the second step, using S-1 (obtained from the first stage) as W, we re-
estimate the model to obtain a feasible efficient GMM estimator )ˆ( FEGMM . 
(A.7) YZSZXXZSZXFEGMM 
 111 ˆ)ˆ(ˆ  
 
II. Diagnostic test for GMM estimator 
 
When using IV estimations like GMM, we need to conduct tests for exogeneity and  
validity of the overidentifying  restriction. 
(1) Test for overidentifying restriction: Sargan test or  Hansen’s J-statistics 
 
The null hypothesis of the valid overidentifying restriction is tested by using 
Hansen’s (1982) J-statistics.  The statistic is the value of the GMM objective function (A.3), 
evaluated at the efficient GMM estimator EGMMˆ : 
(A.8) 2
A
1  ~)]ˆ([ˆ])ˆ([)ˆ( klGMMGMMEGMM gSgNJ     
 
If the null is rejected, the instruments do not satisfy the required orthogonality 
conditions and thus GMM specification is considered inappropriate, either because the 
instruments are correlated with the disturbances or because they are inappropriately excluded 
from the regression.  
 
(2) Instrument orthogonality test: Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton test 
 
The instrument orthogonality test or C-test is used to test whether orthogonality 
conditions are satisfied by a subset of instrument Z1 but not satisfied by the remaining 
instrument Z2: i.e., to test E(Z1u) =0 and E(Z2u)≠0. This test is used when we doubt that a 
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subset of instruments is endogenous. In this context, the C-test is different from the Hansen-
Sargan J-test, which evaluates the entire set of overidentifying restrictions.  The C-statistics 
are calculated by the difference between two J-statistics: one is computed from the regression 
using the entire set of instruments (Z) and the other is obtained from the model using a 
smaller set of instruments (Z1), in which a set of specified instruments is removed from the 
instruments. Under the null that the specified variables are proper instruments (and thus 
exogenous), the C-statistic is distributed with χ2 with degree of freedom equal to the number 
of suspected instruments. 
 
(A.9) CT=J(Z) – J(Z1) ~ χ
2 
 
If the null is rejected, the suspected instruments are not exogenous. Note that this test requests 
that the researcher believe the non-suspect instruments to be valid (Baum 2006, p 202). 
 
(3) Regressor endogeneity test: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
 
The endogenous regressors are the ones explained by the listed instrument in the model, while 
the exogenous variables are not explained by the listed instruments. If we use IV or GMM 
when endogeneity is, in fact, not a problem, the estimators will be consistent but inefficient. 
In this case, asymptotic variance of the IV estimator is larger than that of OLS. The regressor 
endogeneity test can be used when we suspect that the variables (that are specified in the 
regressor list but not included in the instrument list) are exogenous. This test basically 
compares two J-statistics:  
(A.10) HT = J(V2) – J(V1) ~ χ
2 
where J(V1) is the J-statistic obtained from the original IV estimation like GMM; J(V2) is the 
J-statistic obtained from the estimation which augments the original estimation by the 
variables which are being tested for endogeneity like OLS estimation. As a result, this test 
involves fitting the model by both OLS and GMM and comparing the resulting coefficient 
vectors. Under the null that candidate variables are exogenous and thus the OLS estimator is 
consistent and fully efficient, using IV may result in the loss of efficiency (Baum 2006, p 
211). Thus, if the null is rejected, IV or GMM estimation is appropriate. 
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(4) Weak instrument diagnostic 
 
Weak instrument problems occur when the correlations between the endogenous 
variables and the excluded instruments are non-zero but very small (Baum et al. 2007, p 23). 
The weak instruments cause a variance of the IV estimator to be higher than the OLS 
estimator and exacerbate the bias caused by invalid instruments even as the sample size goes 
to infinity. Even if the instrument is not correlated with disturbance (i.e., E(Zi ui)=0) in the 
population, IV estimation using weak instruments yields biased estimator and biased standard 
errors in a small sample. To see how highly an instrument and endogenous variable are 
correlated, we first examine the fit of the first-stage regression like R2. Note that at the first 
stage we regress the endogenous regressors X1 on the full set of instruments Z. Thus, low R
2 
indicates that the identification used may be wrong.  
When there is a single endogenous regressor, Cragg-Donald (1993) statistics are 
generally used. This statistic is simply the “first-stage F-statistic” for testing the hypothesis 
that the instruments do not enter the first stage regression of 2SLS. When there are multiple 
endogenous regressors, Stock and Yogo (2005) statistics, a variant of Cragg and Donald 
statistics, is used.  The null hypothesis of the Stock and Yogo test is that the instruments are 
weak, even though the parameters might be identified, whereas Cragg and Donald tests the 
null of under-identification. Cragg and Donald statistics are not valid if the errors are 
heteroskedastic and serially correlated. Note that there appear no established test methods for 
weak instrument in the presence of non-i.i.d error. In this case, Kleibergen-Paap (2006) Wald 
rk F statistic can be used to test weak instrument. The statistics should be compared to Stock-
Yogo (2005) weak ID test critical value for i.i.d case with caution. Alternatively, if the F-
statistics should at least 10, it is unlikely that the model does not have significant problem of 
weak identification (Baum et al 2007 p 24). 
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Appendix 6.1 Summary of previous studies on fiscal sustainability 
Authors Sample Sustainability condition Main features Sustainable? 
Hamilton & 
Flavin (1986) 
US, annual, 
1962-1984 
(Tt – GEt) ~ I(0) and Dt ~ I(0) 
 
 Nonstochastic model: constant  positive (ex post) real 
interest rate (rt+n = r > 0) 
 Real interest rate = 1 year T-bill rate - CPI rate 
 Discounted debt series should be stationary 
Yes 
Trehan & Walsh  
(1988) 
US, annual, 
1890-1986 
(rDt-1 + GEt - Tt ) ~ I(0) and Dt ~ I(1)  
 
 Constant positive real interest rate (Etrt+n= r>0) 
 Dt  is measured by par value 
 Inconsistent results between unit root and cointegration due 
to low power of unit root test and nonstationary interest rate 
Yes 
Wilcox (1989) Same as Hamilton 
& Flavin(1986) 
n Dt ~ I(0) with zero unconditional mean  N-period compound actual return on Fed debt, i.e., non-
constant ex-post real interest rates=rate of return on Fed 
debt – rate of return on gold 
 Allow non-stationary discounted debt series 
 Results are sensitive to the lag length 
 Hard to apply to the case with negative realised rate 
No 
Haug(1991) US, quarterly, 
1960-87 
(Tt – GEt) ~ I(1) and Dt ~ I(1), two series are 
CI(1.1)  
 Dt is measured by market value 
 Real interest rate =10 yrs TB – GDP deflator 
Yes 
Trehan & Walsh 
 (1991) 
US, annual, 
1962-84 
(GEt – Tt) ~ I(1) and Dt ~ I(1), two series are 
CI(1.1) (in case of Etrt+n = r) 
(rtDt-1 + GEt - Tt ) ~ I(0) (in case of Etrt+n> 0) 
 Etrt+n= r > 0 
 Applied in the sustainability of current account deficits of 
the US during 1946-87  
Yes 
Smith & Zin 
(1991) 
Canada, monthly, 
1946-84 
Same as Trehan and Walsh (1991)’s condition  Allowing negative expected real rate of return on debt  
 Dt is measured by market value 
 Focus on the interpretation of the test results 
 Fiscal regime change, omitted variable, funding source  
 other than primary surplus are crucial factors for the test 
Yes 
Hakkio & Rush 
 (1991) 
US, quarterly, 
1950-88 
(rDt-1 + GEt ) ~ I(1) and Tt ~ I(1) and two series 
are cointegrated with cointegrating vector(1,-1): 
β=1 for Tt = α + β(rDt-1 + GEt)+εt 
(same as Quintos (1995)’s strong condition) 
 All variables relative to GDP 
 Allow stochastic and stationary real interest: Etrt+n ~ I(0) 
 Consider (exogenous) breaks(1964, 1976) which signalled 
sub-periods during which the condition did not hold 
No 
Note: 1. 
ntt
n
ntnntnt
n
t DEGETRED 



    )( 11 where D=government debts; T=tax revenues; GE=government expenditures (exclusive of interest payment on debts), 
   r)1/(1 = discount factor where r is real interest rate; all fiscal variables are real or ratios to GDP growth. 
          2. CI(1,1) indicates that two series are cointegrated with cointegration vector (1,1) 
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Authors Sample Sustainability condition Main features Sustainable? 
Bohn(1991) 
 
US, annual, 
1916-1989 
If  >0 in 
ttt YVARGVARdaps   210  
(where p= primary surplus, d= debt, GVAR and 
YVA=cyclical non-debt determinants of ps), then 
the debt is sustainable.  
 
 
 Traditional stationarity-based test assume r>g, which is 
not consistent with dominant evidence of r<g. 
 Crucial point in sustainability test is not NPC but 
0)(lim ,  

ntntt
n
duE  where  ntu ,  is the marginal rate of 
substitution between t and t+n 
Yes 
Tanner &  Lieu  
(1994) 
US, quarterly, 
1950-89 
Hakkio & Rush(1991)’s condition with structural 
dummy: β=1 for Tt = α + β(rDt-1 + GEt)+γDumt 
+εt where Dum=1 (break period) and zero 
otherwise  
 Determine break date both exogenously and 
endogenously 
- dummies for a level shift at 1982Q1 and 1981Q4 
Yes 
Haug 
(1995) 
US, quarterly, 
1950-90 
Hakkio & Rush(1991)’s condition and parameter 
stability test (β=1) in cointegration 
 Impose endogenous break 
 Deficit policies in the 1980s are not significantly 
different from those during three earlier decades  
 Divergent debt-GNP ratio 
No 
Quintos 
(1995) 
US, quarterly, 
1942-1992 
(1)“Strong”: same as Hakkio and Rush(1991) 
(2) “Weak” : (ΔDt =rDt-1+GEt-Tt) ~ I(1) and 
Dt~I(2), and revenues and total spending are 
cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1,-β);  
  i.e., 0<β<1 for Tt = α + β(rDt-1 + GEt)+ εt 
 β ≤ 0 : unsustainable: 
 Newly introduce weakly sustainability 
 Endogenous break at 1975Q2 and 1980Q4 
 
Yes (weakly) 
until 1980, 
No afterward 
Ahmed & Rogers 
(1995) 
UK: 1692-1992 
US: 1792-1992 
annual 
Same as previous cointegration studies  Structural break tests 
 IBC holds despite structural breaks 
Mostly yes 
Bohn 
(1995) 
Theoretical Government has to satisfy an IBC even if the safe 
interest rate is below growth rate in stochastic 
model. 
 
 Standard tests have limits since they depend on too 
strong assumptions about future states 
 The correct discount rate in no-Ponzi condition is 
(approximately) the interest rate on income-indexed 
contingent claims, even if the debt itself is safe one 
- 
Bohn 
(1998) 
US, annual  
1916-1995 
Coefficient β>0 for the reaction function  
(tt-get)= βdt+AZt+ηt 
Where A is the vector of coefficient and Zt  is a 
vector of other variables than debts 
 Criticize standard IBC tests depending nonstochastic  
      environment (e.g. a constant real rate) 
 Focus on fiscal policy reaction function of government 
 If the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio reacts positively to  
      higher debt ratios, the policy is sustainable 
Yes 
Martin 
(2000) 
US, quarterly 
1947-92 
 Following Quintos(1995)  Investigate multiple endogenous breaks by using 
Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation 
Yes(absurdly 
weakly) 
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(Continued) Appendix 6.1 
Authors Sample Sustainability condition and method Main features Sustainable? 
Bergman 
(2001) 
Theoretical (i) strong condition: same as Quintos(1995) 
(ii) weak condition: Dt~I(m) and Dt is not 
explosive process 
 Assume that individual’s rate of time preference is 
strictly positive 
- 
Sarno 
(2001) 
Same as  
Bohn(1998) 
Standard stationary tests considering nonlinear 
mean reversion 
 
 Standard test have low power to reject a false null 
hypothesis of unit root since debt-GDP ratio has a 
property of nonlinear mean reversion 
 Smooth transition autoregressive model to investigate 
nonlinear stochastic process of debt-GDP ratio 
Yes 
Bohn 
(2004) 
USA, annual 
1792-2003 
Use both standard stationarity tests and Bohn 
test(1998) 
 Unit root test on real variables (unscaled by GDP) are 
distorted by severe heteroskedasticity 
 Bohn test for  debt-GDP ratio is  most credible  
Yes 
Davig 
(2005) 
USA, annual 
1960-1999 
Testing IBC in a Markov-switching framework  Two-regimes: periods when the PV of US debt is 
expanding vs. periods when it is collapsing 
 Expectation about future regime changes are critical 
Yes 
Benz & Fetzer 
(2005) 
Germany, annual 
2002(base year) - 2040 
Forward-looking sustainability test:  
Future budget and GDP growth should be 
projected for constructing sustainability 
indicators 
 Sustainability test should combine the General 
Accounting approach and the OECD-method. 
 Depend on arbitrary forecast methods for fiscal variable 
Yes 
Kalyoncu 
(2005) 
5 countries, quarterly,  
1970-2003 
Quintos(1995)  Sample periods differ depending individual countries 
 Weakly sustainable: Korea, Turkey 
 Unsustainable:  Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa  
Yes/No 
Wyplosz 
(2007) 
Theoretical and  
descriptive 
Basically, test for fiscal sustainability is 
impossible since it is forward-looking 
 Any practical definition of sustainability is arbitrary  
 Any sustainability indicator will be both arbitrary 
and too imprecise for policy prescription 
- 
Makin 
(2005) 
ASEAN 4, quarterly 
2003-2004 
 
Sustainable if current primary surplus is greater 
than benchmark value, 



















 
g
gr
GDP
D
GDP
GET
t 1
 
where g is a real growth rate and π is inflation 
rate 
 Benchmark value somewhat lacks of objectivity. 
 Sustainable: Malaysia and Thailand 
 Unsustainable: Philippines and Indonesia 
Yes/No 
Bajo-Rubio et al. 
 (2006) 
Spain, 
1964-2003(annual) 
1992-2004(quarter) 
If budget deficit shows a mean-reverting after a 
certain threshold reaches, the debt policy is 
sustainable 
 Consider nonlinearity in expenditures (inclusive of 
interest payment) and revenues by using threshold 
cointegration 
Yes 
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Authors Sample Sustainability condition Main features Sustainable? 
Greiner et al. 
(2007) 
1960-2003, Quarterly,  
France, Germany and  
Portugal 
Following Bohn(1998, 2007)  Two exogenous structural break 
 Estimating a semi-parametric model with time varying 
reaction coefficients 
Yes 
Haber & Neck 
(2006) 
1960-2003, annual, 
Austria 
Following Bohn(1998, 2007)  Different degree of sustainability before and after the 
structural break time 
 Public debt is affected by structural causes and a shift in 
the fiscal policy paradigm rather than political ideology 
Yes 
Luiz de Mello 
(2008) 
1995-2004, monthly, 
Brazil 
Following Bohn(1998, 2007)  Considering consolidated public sector as well as 
central and regional government, separately 
 All levels of government respond to changes in debts 
by adjusting their primary surplus targets. 
Yes 
Baharumshah & 
Lau(2007) 
1975-2003, Quarterly, 
5 Asian countries 
Exactly following Quintos(1995)  Weak sustainable: Philippines and Malaysia 
 Strong sustainable: Singapore, Thailand and Korea 
 One-way causation from spending to revenue for 
Korea, Singapore and Thailand 
Yes 
Bohn 
(2007) 
Theoretical  If Tt~ I(mT), (rDt-1 + GEt) ~ I(mTS) for any mT 
≥0, mTS≥ 0 then Dt ~ I(m) for any finite m≥0 
where mTR , mTS  and m are the order of 
integration. Once if MSBt ~I(m) and MSBt  is 
not explosive process, the current debt policy 
may be weakly sustainable 
 Stationarity test is not necessary condition for fiscal 
sustainability 
 Confirm the importance of the sustainability test based 
on fiscal policy reaction function 
 Recommend Bohn (1998) rather than stationary-based 
test 
- 
Afonso & Rault 
(2007) 
1970-2006, quarterly, 
15 EU members 
Following Quintos(1995)  Panel cointegration techniques developed by Pedroni 
(1999, 2004)  
Yes 
Correia et al. 
(2008)  
 
1852-2004, annul, 
Portugal 
Used all tests and  compare them: 
standard unit root test, cointegration test, and 
Bohn test 
 Breitung’s nonparametric tests for stationarity 
 Multiple structural breaks 
 Recursive trace test for cointegration between public 
expenditures and revenues 
Yes 
Bella (2008) 2009-2014, Dominica Calculation of the primary balance of the 
consolidated public sector to achieve the 
desired debt targets 
 Analysis under integrated accounting framework  
 Estimate country-specific debt threshold  
 Choosing an appropriate baseline scenario is crucial 
 No ad-hoc assumptions for the values of the macro 
variables during the planning horizon 
Depend on 
scenarios 
 
